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Bandung Conference

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aliasesAsian-African Conference

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Summary

The April 1955 conference of 29 Asian and African states at which Asians and Africans appeared as a mighty force on the political stage for the first time in modern times, Israel was not invited, and a resolution on Palestine drafted by Gamal Abd al-Nasser was passed; in Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace it is the mirror of Israel’s isolation and of its Foreign Ministry’s victorious Western school (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.165-167).

Details

  • Most newspapers in Israel tried to play down the conference’s importance and attacked it harshly for not inviting Israel and for the Palestine resolution (which, the book notes, was drafted by Nasser and will be discussed in another chapter) (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.165).

  • The Progressive Party’s Zmanim editorial (21/4/55), quoted at length: the Foreign Ministry’s Western school prevailed over the Eastern, forming the outlook that Israel could be “bad Middle Easterners” so long as it was no less “Western” than the West itself, its advantages destining it to be the vanguard of Western influence in the region — the authors interject: rearguard (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.166).

  • The editorial draws three lessons: new political and psychological tracks of orientation towards the peoples of Asia; fostering ties with the Near and Far East; and an honest desire to contribute to solving the Arab refugee problem, “one of the main factors affecting our relations with the states of Asia” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.167).

  • Its verdict: “The first days of the Bandung Conference served as a grim illustration of the extent of our political and spiritual isolation in the world” and “Breaching the walls of isolation that have been erected around us is an imperative condition for the perpetuation of our existence in this region” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.167).

  • The spectacle was repeated, more strongly, at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo, the Addis Ababa conference (June 1960) and the Casablanca Conference (January 1961), but the stewards of Israeli policy did not learn the “grim lesson” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.167).

  • At Bandung, the book notes, “the peoples of the continents that were emancipating themselves appeared for the first time as a great force on the international stage” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.367).

  • Chapter 7 quotes the Palestine resolution’s text: “In view of the ongoing tension in the Middle East, which stems from the Palestinian problem, in view of the fact that this situation endangers the peace of the world, the Conference of the States of Asia and Africa expresses its full support for the rights of the Arabs of Palestine and calls for the implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine, which call for a peaceful solution to the problem” — drafted by Nasser and voted for by all 29 participating states, including the Arab delegations (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.367-368).

  • Ben-Gurion answered it in his seventh Independence Day speech as a “sanctimonious accusation”: the Asian and African nations had been “deceived this time in Bandung by the tyrants of the Arab nations and their oppressors”, and the UN resolutions “no longer exist, and will not return to life” (Davar, 28/4/55) — a premise the book calls the basic premise of Israeli policy from 1949 to the day of writing, and turns back on its author: the one who nullified the Partition Plan in his secret talks with Abdullah “has no “moral or judicial right” to accuse others of doing the same” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.368-369).

  • The book’s verdict is that the resolution “constitutes great progress in relation to the previous Arab position”: Nasser declared in a CBS television interview in January 1956, “I announced at the Bandung Conference, and the Arab states agreed with this for the first time, that we want to implement the UN resolutions of 1947 and 1948, the Partition Plan”. The authors comment, after Nasser’s quotation ends: “This was the first time that the Arab states recognized and accepted the Partition Plan, and thus they effectively recognized the right of self-determination for the Jews of Palestine, that is, their right to establish an independent state” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.369-370).

  • Nasser held the line after Bandung: to Newsweek (22 May 1955) an improvement in Israeli-Arab relations was possible if Israel proved its good will “by ratifying the UN resolutions that it has rejected up to now”, a just peace requiring acceptance of the resolutions “regarding the refugees, their right to compensation and on the internationalization of Jerusalem”; “We certainly have no aggressive intentions towards Israel, or any other state… There is no place for war in our constructive plans” — published the next day (23/5/55) in the semi-official Al-Jumhuriya (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.370-371). The Brioni statement of Nehru, Tito and Nasser (21/7/56) reaffirmed “their agreement with the resolutions of the Bandung Conference” on Palestine (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.390).

Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Algeria, Non-alignment, Self-determination

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