Summary
Carter’s secretary of state, who in Perceptions of Palestine’s account (see also part 2, lines 1702-1722) took the position that the Palestinian problem was the essence of the conflict, carried on the indirect 1977 negotiation with the PLO through Arab leaders, proposed the trusteeship formula later incorporated into Camp David, interpreted the Sinai II pledge so strictly he would not permit any direct U.S. contacts with the PLO at all, recognized Begin’s home-rule plan as a tactic to avoid withdrawal — and in March 1980 was forced to retract a U.S. Security Council vote he had approved, an incident White House aides blamed for Carter’s New York primary loss, after which he resigned (Perceptions of Palestine, lines 1724-1731, 1802-1819, 1856-1861, 1940-1947).
Details
- Vance’s memoirs, as quoted: in the early days the administration put the burden for stalling the peace process on Israel, and “The hope for a just and durable peace” rested on Israeli leadership’s capacity to resolve its “atavistic fears and mistrust of the Arabs” (Perceptions of Palestine, lines 1736-1741).
- Vance regarded settlement construction as a kind of “creeping annexation” in his words, and the United States publicly termed the settlements illegal throughout Carter’s administration (Perceptions of Palestine, lines 1742-1743).
Related pages
Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Harold H. Saunders, Menachem Begin, Camp David Accords