Summary
Leader and secretary of Mapam (the United Workers’ Party) and president of the Israeli “peace movement”, as presented in Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, where his 7 November 1956 Knesset speech is the book’s chief exhibit of the Zionist left justifying Operation Sinai and the annexation of the Gaza Strip while condemning conquest in principle (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.257).
Details
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Yaari told the Knesset on 7/11/56 that the IDF had concluded “a dazzling military operation the likes of which will be hard to find in the entire world” and that “with the liberation of the Gaza Strip we have removed a stinging thorn from the side of the State of Israel”, adding that “the conquest of territories and areas that are not ours has no appeal to us” — the book comments that he speaks against conquest while justifying the Strip’s annexation (PDF p.257).
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He argued the annexation need not set back peace if the occupied Arabs received equal rights: “with the attachment of Gaza to the Homeland, the Arab minority in this country has grown, and it approaches half a million people”, who must be made to feel secure in their future and “human and civil sovereignty” (PDF p.258).
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He denied any collaboration with Britain and France — “To the best of my understanding, we did not make any treaty with France and Britain” — citing Eden’s own dissociation as the most authoritative testimony, a reliance the book calls “most entertaining” (PDF p.259).
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A month before the war (Al Hamishmar, 28/9/56, in debate with Yigal Allon) Yaari himself had laid down two conditions: not to find ourselves “niether de jure nor de facto” [as printed] on the front lines with imperialists, and to pursue rights in Suez, Eilat and the Jordan Canal while seeking all possibilities for peace (PDF p.259-260).
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In the withdrawal debate (6/3/57) Yaari signalled Mapam’s “serious reservations” about withdrawing before the 23/1/57 guarantees were ensured, admitted Mapam had not supported Sinai when decided but that “we were tempted by the illusion of a historical opportunity that would not return”, took full responsibility for the campaign once decided, was heckled by Toubi — “Is Gaza yours?” — and concluded Mapam would continue in the Coalition, since enemies of the working class “must not be permitted to exploit the mistake embodied in this hasty withdrawal” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.307-309).
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Chapter 7 quotes a second Yaari statement of 7/11/56 (Knesset Records, 21/207), on Mapam’s ministers having opposed the invasion proposal on 27/10/56 yet announced they would take full responsibility for it if decided: “We never renounced the opinion that we had always publicized, but when the die was cast we took full responsibility for the government’s actions and the campaign before us” — on which the book comments: “Logic and morality both demand that if the call to execute a certain action is a crime, then full responsibility for the execution of that action is a far worse crime” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.401).
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Chapter 7 also records that what kept Mapam in the government was not Yaari’s stated patriotic willingness “to be with the nation that is fighting for its life and with the defender-fighters of the Israel Defence Force” (Knesset, 7/11/56) — it was not a case of defence but of attack and invasion in collaboration with Britain and France — but the loss, had it resigned on 28 October, of “any hope of participating in any government headed by Ben-Gurion” (Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, PDF p.405).
Related pages
Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace, Operation Sinai, Maki, Shmuel Mikunis, Mapam, Yaakov Hazan