Oil-for-Food Programme

Summary

The UN mechanism, agreed in May 1996, that allowed Iraq to purchase food using oil revenues without lifting the sanctions regime; in Chapter 6 of Debunking the Genocide Allegations it is presented as riddled with corruption at the UN’s highest levels and acting as a mechanism for aid diversion (Debunking the Genocide Allegations: A Reexamination of the Israel-Hamas War from October 7, 2023 to June 1, 2025, PDF p.151-153).

The UN spent over five years negotiating the mechanism, designed to prevent Iraq from accessing foreign currency that could be diverted for military purposes or to sustain its authoritarian rule; Saddam Hussein’s regime refused any mechanism preventing use of oil revenues for its own purposes (PDF p.152).
Mounting controversy over the falsified infant-mortality survey led to agreement on terms acceptable to the Iraqi government: the final Memorandum of Understanding, signed in May 1996, allowed Iraq to keep one-third of its oil export revenues instead of dedicating it for humanitarian needs, and proved vulnerable to exploitation and corruption by Iraqi actors and UN officials, including the son of then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (PDF p.153).
The regime gained over $11 bi l l i o nb ey o n d t h eo f f i c ia l l y a l l oc a t e d am o u n tt h r o ug hi l l e g a l o i l s m ug g l in g t ha tl e v er a g e d t h e p r o g r am, an d a f u r t h er$ 1.7 billion through secret commissions and bribes paid by more than half the participating companies (PDF p.153).
Despite the increasing flow of food, consumer goods and infrastructure projects (per capita GDP recovering from $241 in 1995 t o$ 1,006 in 2000, near pre-war $1,371), the Iraqi Ministry of Health continued to report rising infant mortality; the World Food Programme determined the aid delivered under the program was insufficient to meet the population’s needs as early as 2002 (PDF p.153).

tags
aliases	Oil-for-Food, Oil for Food Program