Summary
Israel’s eight-day operation in Gaza, 14-21 November 2012, treated by Inbar and Shamir as the fourth of their Mowing the Grass case studies: a minimalist, air-only operation, opened by the elimination of Hamas military commander Ahmed al-Jabari, aimed at strengthening deterrence and crippling Hamas’s rocket capabilities, and ended by an Egyptian-negotiated truce in which Hamas committed to maintain and enforce the ceasefire (‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict, PDF p.22-24).
Details
- Trigger and scale as the article gives them: rocket and mortar incidents from Gaza numbered 365 in 2010, 680 in 2011 and 800 in 2012; the operation was an immediate response to over 100 rockets fired within 24 hours, an attack on an Israeli patrol and an IED explosion on the Israeli side of the border, and, unlike previous incidents, Hamas also fired rockets (PDF p.22).
- Objectives, as presented by Defense Minister Ehud Barak: strengthen Israel’s deterrence, severely impair Hamas and other terror organisations, specifically crippling its rocket capabilities, and minimizing attacks on Israel’s home front; no statements about toppling Hamas or attaining decisive victory were issued (PDF p.22-23).
- Course: surprise airstrikes eliminated Ahmed al-Jabari and many junior Hamas terrorists and struck underground launchers and warehouses of Iranian-made Fajr-5 missiles; Iron Dome intercepted 422 rockets fired into urban areas, an 88 per cent success rate; 60,000-70,000 reservists were mobilised for a ground invasion that did not materialise; total Palestinian fatalities are given as 200, of whom civilian casualties were less than a third (PDF p.23).
- The article’s two problems with the absence of a ground operation: Hamas’s claim of victory, by insisting Israel was deterred from a ground offensive, encourages further provocation, and parts of the terrorist infrastructure remained intact (PDF p.24).
- Falk treats the same November 2012 attack very differently: al-Jabari’s assassination as a planned provocation breaking an informal truce he had agreed to, and at least 160 Gazans killed in an attack officials described as a rehearsal for Iran (Palestine: The Legitimacy of Hope, PDF p.79, p.88-89).
Where sources disagree
- Inbar and Shamir present the operation as a response to rocket escalation in which Hamas itself fired, and its achievement as Hamas’s commitment to enforce the ceasefire (PDF p.22-24). Falk presents its opening assassination as a provocation planned well in advance that shattered an informal truce (PDF p.79).
Related pages
‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict, Palestine: The Legitimacy of Hope, Mowing the Grass, Ahmed al-Jabari, Hamas, Gaza