Summary
The July 2006 war between Israel and Hizbollah in Lebanon, in light of which Siboni’s October 2008 article is written: more than two years after it, Siboni argues, Israel’s immediate response after the July 2006 kidnapping attack significantly boosted its ability to deter Hizbollah and Syria from operating against Israel (Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, line 336).
Details
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The article names the war’s trigger only as the July 2006 kidnapping attack and gives no account of the war’s course, casualties or damage (line 336).
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The war is the article’s evidence and its occasion: the updated Israeli security concept for responding to rocket and missile threats from Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip is presented as gradually evolving in its light (line 336).
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The doctrine Siboni prescribes from it — a disproportionate strike as the primary war effort — is applied in the article both to a future large-scale conflict and to isolated border incidents, expressly to prevent a war of attrition (lines 338-344).
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Inbar and Shamir give a full case-study account: the war of 12 July-14 August 2006 was a reaction to a rocket barrage used as a diversion for the abduction of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of three others; Israel’s enunciated goals included driving Hizballah out of southern Lebanon, deploying the Lebanese army there, restoring deterrence and returning the kidnapped soldiers, but Israel limited its attacks to Hizballah targets, and the authors state its strategy was neither attempting to target civilian infrastructure nor planning to pressure the population to rise against Hizballah (‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict, PDF p.17-19).
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Their figures: a UN report’s 1,191 Lebanese civilians killed and 4,405 wounded, about 900,000 fled and nearly 30,000 residential units destroyed or extensively damaged; Israel’s evaluation of 700 Hizballah fighters killed and over 1,000 wounded; Israel’s own 144 killed (121 soldiers) and about 2,000 wounded; and the assessment that the 2006 response appears to have strengthened Israeli deterrence against Hizballah (PDF p.19-20).
Related pages
Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, Hizballah, Lebanon, Dahiyeh Doctrine, Lebanon invasion 1982