Summary
The form deterrence takes in Israel’s thinking, in Inbar and Shamir’s account: not absolute deterrence, but cumulative deterrence, which aims to postpone each round of violence as much as possible while accepting that, as long as fundamental political realities persist, deterrence might fail at one point or another (‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict, PDF p.14).
Details
- Destruction and denial of capabilities serves to strengthen it, and using force is presented as much like fighting crime: not a sign of deterrence failure but necessary for the maintenance of a minimum level of deterrence; Colin Gray is quoted that the use of force “may not be a sign of failure; it may be a precondition for success” (PDF p.14, notes 45-47, citing Pape, Rid and Gray).
- The concept is credited in the notes to Israel Tal, National Security: The Few Against the Many (Hebrew, 1996) and Doron Almog, ‘Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism’, Parameters (Winter 2004-05) (PDF p.14, notes 43-44).
- It is the deterrence that Mowing the Grass is designed to maintain: large-scale operations are primarily designed to inflict damage on valuable assets and capabilities, with lowering the enemy’s motivation as a corollary effect (PDF p.13).
Related pages
‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict, Deterrence, Mowing the Grass