Summary
In Siboni’s 2008 article, the purpose that the prescribed disproportionate strike serves: a response that creates a lasting memory among Syrian and Lebanese decision makers increases Israeli deterrence, reduces the likelihood of hostilities for an extended period, and prevents a long war of attrition (Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, lines 340-348).
Details
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Siboni’s premise is that deterrence has already been won once: Israel’s immediate response after the July 2006 kidnapping attack significantly boosted its ability to deter Hizbollah and Syria from operating against Israel, and Hassan Nasrallah’s quoted remark is read as Nasrallah internalizing that change (lines 334-336).
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The mechanism is memory and cost: damage and punishment demanding long and expensive reconstruction create a lasting memory among decision makers and force Syria, Hizbollah and Lebanon into lengthy, resource-intensive reconstruction programs (line 340).
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Deterrence is also the stated condition of the ceasefire that is the IDF’s primary goal: a ceasefire attained under conditions that will increase Israel’s long term deterrence (line 348).
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The home front’s endurance is part of the mechanism: Israelis must be prepared to be fired upon, possibly with heavy fire for an extended period, on the understanding that the IDF is working to create an effective balance of deterrence (line 344).
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Inbar and Shamir’s 2014 account makes deterrence cumulative rather than absolute: Cumulative Deterrence aims to postpone each round as much as possible, destruction and denial of capabilities strengthens it, and only temporary deterrence can be achieved against radical non-state actors, whose motivation force cannot change in the short run (‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict, PDF p.6, p.13-14).
Related pages
Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, Disproportionate Force, Dahiyeh Doctrine, Hassan Nasrallah