Summary
The principle Siboni prescribes in October 2008 as the core of Israel’s evolving concept of response: on an outbreak of hostilities the IDF is to act immediately and decisively with force disproportionate to the enemy’s actions and the threat it poses, making the disproportionate strike against the enemy’s weak points the primary war effort and operations against missile launchers the secondary effort, so as to inflict punishment demanding long and expensive reconstruction and thereby create deterrence (Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, lines 338-340).
Details
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Targets, as Siboni prescribes them: punishment aimed at decision makers and the power elite; in Syria, the Syrian military, the regime and the state structure; in Lebanon, Hizbollah’s military capabilities together with the economic interests and centers of civilian power that support it, and Lebanese state infrastructure in proportion to Hizbollah’s closeness to the Lebanese government (line 340).
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The same response is prescribed for isolated incidents, not only for large-scale conflict: Israel cannot limit its response to actions whose severity is seemingly proportionate to an isolated incident (line 344).
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Applied to the Gaza Strip, the principle means striking hard at Hamas, not chasing Qassam rocket launchers, and imposing a ceasefire on the enemy (line 346).
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Success is not to be measured by the level of high trajectory fire against Israel at the end of the confrontation, but by shortening the fighting and striking a serious blow at the enemy’s assets (line 342).
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Inbar and Shamir, writing in 2014, present Israel as having refrained from the disproportionate-force doctrine in its ‘Dahya concept’ form, while noting that some Israeli strategists suggested stronger retaliatory measures and that the validity of deterrence changes once non-state actors act as de facto governments (‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict, PDF p.14).
Where sources disagree
- Siboni states the principle as prescription and as a deterrent success: the 2006 response already boosted deterrence, on his reading of Nasrallah’s remark (lines 334-336). Makdisi describes the same strategy as proclaimed and authorized practice, the Dahiyeh Doctrine, and presents it as a sweeping and indiscriminate use of massive firepower against villages and civilian areas (Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, PDF p.373-374).
- Falk names the treatment of civilian infrastructure as permissible military targets State Terrorism and reads the 2008-2009 Gaza attacks as an extension of the Dahiya doctrine (Palestine: The Legitimacy of Hope, PDF p.141-142).
Related pages
Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, Dahiyeh Doctrine, Deterrence, State Terrorism, Israel Defense Forces