Summary
In Chapter 9 of Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, one of the two broad constitutional designs Mazen Masri assesses for a one-state option: on William Riker’s definition, a constitution in which two levels of government rule the same land and people, each autonomous in at least one area with a guarantee of that autonomy (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.260-264).
Details
- Masri distinguishes purely territorial federalism — here, units following the 1967 line or a larger number of smaller units, with regional control mainly over language, religious services, education and culture — from a model combining territorialism with Consociationalism on national or linguistic lines, exemplified by Belgium and Bosnia and Herzegovina and resembling Ihud’s 1940s parity proposal (PDF p.261-263).
- Supporters’ case as presented: federalism bolsters democracy and participation, makes government more responsive through proximity, limits state power by dividing it, and lets people move to like-minded communities (PDF p.261).
- Critics’ case as presented: postconflict federalism is unstable, reinforces intergroup conflict, rests on unstable borders drawn for homogeneity, and tends to preserve economic inequality and the status quo — casting doubt on its capacity to deliver redistribution, Transitional justice or Decolonisation (PDF p.263-264).
Related pages
Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, Mazen Masri, One-state solution, Binationalism, Consociationalism, Multiculturalism