Rethinking Statehood in Palestine

Summary

An edited collection, edited by Leila Farsakh, by mostly young Palestinian scholars arguing that the Palestinian quest for a state on part of historic Palestine — the Partition paradigm embodied in the Oslo peace process — has exhausted its historical role, and that Palestinian Self-determination and decolonization must be rearticulated beyond territorial sovereignty, in ways that protect the individual and collective rights of all who live in Palestine/Israel (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.20-21). Farsakh’s Conclusion restates the shared finding: the state cannot be transcended but needs to be rethought — tamed, made accountable to citizens who are the source of sovereignty and entitled to full equality (PDF p.315).

What the file is

Rethinking Statehood in Palestine: Self-Determination and Decolonization Beyond Partition, edited by Leila H. Farsakh, University of California Press, Oakland, 2021; no. 4 in the New Directions in Palestinian Studies series. 329 PDF pages, about 149,062 words in the text copy. Published under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND license (PDF p.7); DOI https://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.113; ISBN 9780520385627 (paperback) / 9780520385634 (ebook). The text copy carries === PDF p.N === markers and is clean for prose; the maps on PDF p.16-19, p.29-30 are garbled as graphics in the text copy, and their captions and legends were recorded from the text copy. Printed page numbers run one behind PDF pages in the front matter and about nineteen behind in the main text (Introduction begins printed p.1 on PDF p.20). The book closes with Farsakh’s Conclusion (printed p.295-298), a List of Contributors (printed p.299-301), an Index whose locators are printed pages (printed p.303-308), and UC Press back matter and a back cover carrying three endorsements (PDF p.328-329).

Section by section

• Front matter and contents (PDF p.1-10): cover, Luminos open-access notice, series page, title and copyright pages, contents and list of illustrations. Eleven chapters in two parts — Part One, “Partition and the Cost of Statehood” (Hanieh, Baconi, Assali, Toukan, Munayyer), Part Two, “Decolonizing Beyond Partition” (Khoury, Farsakh, Akram, Masri, Nassar, Pappe) — plus Farsakh’s Introduction and Conclusion. Maps listed include the 1947 UN Partition Plan, July 1967, Oslo II, Gaza 2000, Camp David 2000 and the Olmert Plan 2008.

• Acknowledgments (PDF p.12-13 / printed p.ix-x): the book began as a research program on alternative models for state formation launched by the Center for Development Studies at Birzeit University in 2013 under Samia Al-Botmeh, financed by a Soros Foundation grant, which commissioned six papers and surveyed Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel on the One-state solution; findings were presented at Birzeit in 2015. Al-Botmeh, originally coeditor, and Linda Tabar could not remain in the project.

• Foreword, by Beshara Doumani (PDF p.14-15 / printed p.xi-xii): self-determination, statehood and partition shaped the modern global order after World War I, and most two-state scholarship dwells uncritically within that nationalist architecture, reproducing the climate that made Palestinian dispossession possible; the Oslo “peace process”, based on the partition logic of “land for peace”, greatly accelerated Israeli colonization. A new generation seeks exit strategies from the identity/territory/sovereignty matrix; statehood was never the sole mission of decolonization movements, and the focus has shifted from state to nation, which privileges people over territory.

• Maps 1-4 (PDF p.16-19): Palestine under the 1947 UN Partition Plan with the 1949 armistice lines; Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, July 1967, noting Beit Nuba, Emwas and Yallo as villages depopulated and razed; the West Bank under Oslo II (Areas A, B, C); the Gaza Strip in 2000, with settlements, crossings, the planned seaport and airport and the safe passage route (all PASSIA).

• Introduction: The Struggle for Self-Determination and the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, by Leila Farsakh (PDF p.20-44 / printed p.1-25): In 1971 the Palestine Liberation Organization declared a democratic state in Palestine inclusive of Christians, Jews and Muslims its goal; in 1988 its Declaration of Independence and Yasir Arafat’s recognition of Israel paved the way to Oslo and a state confined to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By 2019 Palestine was recognized by 137 states and admitted to the UN as a nonmember state, yet remains under occupation. Over 650,000 Israeli Jewish settlers in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the 708-kilometer Separation wall and over ninety-nine checkpoints have destroyed the Two-state solution; the Trump administration’s 2020 plan “put the final nail in the coffin of that solution” (PDF p.20). The book’s thesis: “the quest for a Palestinian state was not in vain, but its historical role has come to an end” (PDF p.21).

• Introduction — Self-determination and statehood (PDF p.21-24 / printed p.2-5): Palestinians expelled in 1948 sought the Right of Return enshrined in UN Resolution 194. The PLO, established by the Arab League in 1964, did not at first specify statehood; only after 1967 and the consensus on UN Security Council Resolution 242 — which mentioned Palestinians only as refugees — did an independent state become the vehicle of decolonization. Self-determination, internationalized by Lenin and Wilson and affirmed as a human right by UN Resolution 1514 (1960), was inadvertently made synonymous with territorial sovereignty, though many anticolonialists envisaged federations and confederations and warned, from Toussaint Louverture to Fanon, that independence does not guarantee liberation. Edward Said in 1978: the PLO never resolved “the question of whether it is really a national independence or a national liberation movement” (PDF p.23). The eighth Palestinian National Council (1971) resolved on a democratic Palestinian state with equal rights and duties for all who wish to live in peace in it. UNGA Resolutions 3236 and 3237 (1974) affirmed Palestinian rights and recognized the PLO as sole legitimate representative; the twelfth PNC’s Ten Points program (1974) adopted the step-by-step route, and the 1988 Declaration accepted self-determination on part of historic Palestine — a state on only 22 percent of Palestine — by negotiation rather than by defeating Israel. The state project affirmed the Palestinian “right to have rights”, quoting Arendt (PDF p.24).

• Introduction — Palestinian statehood and the Oslo peace process (PDF p.25-28 / printed p.6-9): with the Declaration of Principles (1993) and Oslo II (1995) the PLO accepted conflict resolution tied to partition and to Israel’s insistence that the conflict began in 1967, not 1948. From Arafat’s return in 1994 and his heading the Palestinian Authority (PNA) in January 1996, the narrative shifted from decolonization to State-building: performing statehood through police, ministries, anthems, ambassadors, development plans and a petition to the International Court of Justice against the barrier (2005, as printed). The Fayyad government (2007), under World Bank and International Monetary Fund sponsorship, defined its mission as “the final push to statehood” (PDF p.25) and confined self-determination to a neoliberal state defined by Washington’s good governance — law and order, fiscal transparency, a vibrant private sector — producing an increasingly authoritarian entity serving a private sector tied to the PNA and international capital, embedded in safeguarding Israeli security. The Quartet dispersed over twenty-seven billion dollars to the Palestinian territories since 1994. Juridically Oslo confined the nation to the West Bank and Gaza, compromising the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel and refugees, and the PNA and Palestinian Legislative Council de facto superseded the PLO and its National Council. West Bank and Gaza Palestinians live in a one-state condition with Israel the only sovereign, “increasingly described as apartheid” (PDF p.28).

• Introduction — Rethinking decolonization, transcending partition (PDF p.28-37 / printed p.9-18): Partition plans are intrinsic to imperial divide-and-conquer strategies and have not brought enduring peace (Dubonov and Robson). A rights-based approach gained prominence with the ICJ ruling on the wall and the rise of BDS movement, protecting return, freedom from occupation and equal citizenship, but does not by itself articulate a political alternative and risks individualizing the struggle. Two approaches to affirming nationhood are assessed. An anti-statist approach, led mainly by anthropologists and historians, treats the state as a site of inherent violence, locates sovereignty in the people, and embraces the fragmented, exilic Palestinian experience; it does not solve the position of Palestinians without legal protection in Lebanon or Syria. A One-state solution approach divides between liberal democratic defenders — Ali Abunimah: Israeli Jews have legitimate individual rights but not a collective right to self-determination; Omar Barghouti: a democratic state in all Palestine dismantles Zionism while Israelis remain equal citizens — and binationalists, who accept both peoples’ collective rights and argue they can be protected only in a civic state created by democratic constitutional self-creation, quoting Arendt on producing equality through organisation (PDF p.33). Decolonization is a process, not an event: decolonizing relationships, placing Arab-Jewish relations at its center (Bashir and Busbridge), and tackling reconciliation, trauma and transitional justice. Chapter-by-chapter summaries of all eleven chapters follow (PDF p.35-37), as recorded in the reading notes.

• Introduction — Notes and bibliography (PDF p.38-44 / printed p.19-25): notes 1-47 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. Note 47 explains that Israel offers citizenship to Jews and non-Jews but defines nationality by religious affiliation, citing Shira Robinson’s Citizen Strangers (2013).

• Part One title page (PDF p.46): “Partition and the Cost of Statehood”.

• Chapter 1: The Political Economy of State Formation in Palestine, by Adam Hanieh (PDF p.48-59 / printed p.29-40, chapter continues beyond this part): the state-formation literature since the PNA’s establishment in 1994 is criticized for Methodological nationalism — treating the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a self-contained social formation and regional relations as external — when regional tendencies are already internal to Palestinian state and class formation. The general State-building literature of the 1990s-2000s, tied to neoliberal globalization and post-conflict rebuilding, rests on the Liberal peace proposition and a neo-Weberian state defined by its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (PDF p.51), assessed by authority, capacity and legitimacy. In Palestine, the World Bank’s 1993 Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace and the EU’s 1999 Berlin Declaration tied a Palestinian state to Israel’s security; the 2007 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan committed the PNA to neoliberal fiscal reform, and its security budget — the largest portion, 257 million dollars — funded police, intelligence forces and prisons trained under Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton (2005-2010). Critiques by Mushtaq Khan and others are surveyed: donor prioritization of security for the occupying power undermines legitimacy in a vicious cycle, and the PNA “might be more accurately characterised as an extension of the Israeli security apparatus” (PDF p.54). Hanieh’s counter-conception, following Hugo Radice and Bertell Ollman: the state is not neutral or separate from society but a form of appearance of capitalist social relations, in Ollman’s phrase a set of institutional forms through which a ruling class relates to the rest of society (PDF p.55) — so the questions are authority in whose hands, capacity to do what and in whose interest, legitimacy in whose eyes. Situating Palestine regionally: hydrocarbons and petrodollars underpinned global capitalism and US hegemony; the US rolled back Arab nationalism through alliances with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel — a settler-colonial state founded on the expulsion of around three-quarters of the Palestinian population, whose military relationship a former US intelligence officer valued at “five CIAs” or 125 billion dollars (PDF p.58). From the late 1970s Arab governments adopted neoliberal structural adjustment; US policy in the 1990s-2000s pursued a “New Middle East” integrating Israel, the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan, with normalization codified by the MENA Economic Summits (1994-1998) and qualified industrial zones in Jordan and Egypt (PDF p.59, continued in part 2).

• Chapter 1 — QIZs, MEFTA and the Barcelona Process (PDF p.60-61 / printed p.41-42): the qualified industrial zones required Israeli inputs of 8 percent (Jordan) and 11.7 percent (Egypt); Jordan’s thirteen QIZs accounted for 70 percent of Jordanian exports to the US in 2007, and Egypt’s QIZ share of its US exports rose from close to one-third in 2008 to nearly 50 percent by 2013. Bush’s proposed Middle East Free Trade Area (announced mid-2003, aimed for 2013) required participating states to lift boycotts on Israel and produced US free trade agreements with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and Oman; the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process, 1995) and its association agreements likewise tied Mediterranean liberalization to normalization with Israel.

• Chapter 1 — Gulf and diaspora capital and Palestinian class formation (PDF p.61-63 / printed p.42-44): Gulf-origin FDI in 2003-2010 made up 75 percent of FDI inflows for Lebanon, 69 percent for Jordan, 61 percent for Syria, 59 percent for Egypt and 46 percent for Iraq, and more than two-thirds of FDI projects announced in PNA areas in 2003-2008 originated in the Gulf. Diaspora groups headquartered in Jordan and the Gulf — the Al Masri and Khoury family groups are the prominent examples — became integral to the post-Oslo Palestinian economy through subsidiaries and holding companies linking diaspora capital to PNA state capital and local elites. Such groups directly control fifteen of the seventeen banks operating in PNA areas, including the Bank of Palestine, Arab Bank and Cairo Amman Bank, and Paltel and Wataniya Mobile monopolize West Bank telecommunications. On Hanieh’s account the PNA’s neoliberal trajectory therefore did not merely reflect IFI policy: it constituted the PNA as a principal conduit of wealth transfer to the large internationalized conglomerates that dominate the Palestinian economy, a class whose reproduction is contingent on the PNA form of state-building and on the regional order, which clarifies the social forces underlying the PNA’s incorporation into the structures of the Israeli occupation.

• Chapter 1 — Conclusion: implications for alternative models of state formation (PDF p.63-66 / printed p.44-47): the 2011 Arab uprisings rejected neoliberal authoritarianism but established elites largely won back power, and the neoliberal model remained near-universally hegemonic — the Deauville Partnership promised up to forty billion US dollars on neoliberal premises, and World Bank and IMF engagement deepened in essential continuity. Gulf states remained regionally dominant after 2011, and Israel’s integration deepened, from the closer Israel-Saudi-UAE relationship visible from 2015 to the Abraham Accords, which the chapter dates to a signing in August 2020 (as printed). Because Palestinian class and state formation are shaped at the regional scale, state formation must not be approached abstractly as technocratic institution-building against a checklist of authority, capacity and legitimacy: the state is a social relation enabling ruling groups to maintain dominance. The internationalizing class is the PNA’s primary social base and so both a key element of the status quo’s obduracy and a fundamental obstacle to alternative paths; any just alternative — notably a One-state solution — is premised on a fundamental challenge to current Palestinian elites, is unlikely to be elite-driven, and must tackle economic inequity and the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm, in tandem with regional change.

• Chapter 1 — Notes and bibliography (PDF p.66-72 / printed p.47-53): notes 1-67 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. The bibliography gives some works at page ranges differing from the notes’ citations (Das at 27-57, Davidson at 26-46, Richmond at 1-20, Turner at 739-55), and the entry for Farsakh’s Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel ends without a closing parenthesis, as printed.

• Chapter 2: The Gaza Strip — Humanitarian Crisis and Lost Statehood, by Tareq Baconi (PDF p.73-90 / printed p.54-71): Oslo split the Palestinian movement into two projects — one committed to the PLO’s original principles of liberation, one adopting the diplomatic path to Partition — most explicitly Hamas, governing Gaza, against the PNA in Ramallah. Gaza, home to the school of thought committed to the PLO’s purist vision of armed struggle in Islamist guise, is in Baconi’s framing a microcosm of the national movement and the lynchpin of the debate over its future. Political discourse led by Israel and the US avoids a reckoning with 1948 by treating Gaza variously as a humanitarian challenge or a terroristic security threat, which has restricted dealings with the question of Palestine to the West Bank; but the fates of Hamas and Gaza are intertwined, and two million Palestinians are sealed off by blockade.

• Chapter 2 — Hamas and the Oslo process (PDF p.74-77 / printed p.55-58): Fatah’s 1967 doctrine held that regaining the homeland could happen only “except through armed violence as the sole, inevitable, unavoidable, and indispensable means in the battle of liberation” (PDF p.75). Arafat’s 1988 Algiers declaration broke with it, conceding the 78 percent of Palestine lost in 1948 for a state on the remaining 22 percent. Hamas, created in December 1987, defined the Mandate land in its charter as “an Islamic land entrusted to the Muslim generations until Judgement Day” (PDF p.75) and jihad as obligatory; 1988 thus marks the waning of the PLO’s armed-struggle resolve and the rise of Islamic nationalism to carry the mantle. Hamas opposed Oslo (1993) in a rejectionist front, acted as a spoiler, and boycotted the 1996 elections to avoid legitimating Oslo; meanwhile settlements passed 350,000 settlers, unemployment by 1996 reached 25 percent in the West Bank and 38 percent in Gaza, and Israel imposed 443 days of closure during the five negotiation years.

• Chapter 2 — Al-Aqsa Intifada, the War on Terror and disengagement (PDF p.77-79 / printed p.58-60): the Second Intifada (September 2000) rapidly militarized. Hamas’s al-Rantissi stated its aim as complete withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem “without giving up on 80 percent of Palestine” (PDF p.77) — an implicit recognition of the 1967 lines — and the Al-Qassam Brigades adopted a “Balance of Terror” approach. Sharon, elected February 6, 2001, sought pacification without collective political rights; after September 11 the Intifada was presented as Israel’s War on Terror, and Israel’s targeted assassinations removed all of Hamas’s senior leadership. Sharon’s unilateral Gaza disengagement withdrew nine thousand settlers who controlled up to 30 percent of the Strip, in order to remove Gaza’s 1.8 million Palestinians from Israel’s direct jurisdiction while consolidating its grip on the West Bank and East Jerusalem; his aide Dov Weisglass told Haaretz that “The disengagement is actually formaldehyde” (PDF p.79). The failure of Hamas’s military strategy, and the US-pushed 2006 elections, opened its turn to politics, on fixed principles: refusal to concede historic Palestine, the Right of Return, and the right to resist.

• Chapter 2 — Marrying resistance with politics, and the blocking of Hamas’s government (PDF p.79-83 / printed p.60-64): Hamas ran on “Change and Reform” and won 76 of the 132 legislative council seats against Fatah’s 43. The Bush administration decided to isolate Hamas and reassert Fatah’s dominance militarily, financially and diplomatically; the Quartet made future assistance conditional on nonviolence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements — the prerequisites the PLO had met almost two decades earlier. Hamas’s offered program nonetheless called for “the formation of an independent and fully sovereign Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital” on the 1967 borders (PDF p.81), and Khaled Meshal held that “The problem has always been with Israel” (PDF p.81). The outgoing legislature expanded President Abbas’s powers over security and the judiciary at the incoming cabinet’s expense; Fatah insisted Hamas first transition from liberation through armed struggle to state-building towards independence, while Hamas insisted the PLO be reformed before past agreements could be upheld. Map 7 (PDF p.83) shows Gaza in 2014: crossings closed since 2007-2010, the destroyed airport, and IDF-enforced fishing limits of 3 nautical miles (January 2009-November 2012) and then 6 nautical miles.

• Chapter 2 — The fig leaf: Gaza as terrorist haven (PDF p.84-87 / printed p.65-68): during the 2006-2007 window more than six hundred Palestinians were killed and the brief democratic episode ended in fratricide and Hamas’s violent capture of Gaza in June 2007. All five crossings from Israel and Rafah were shut; Israel halved fuel shipments and reduced imports to survival minima, producing electricity cuts of up to sixteen hours a day, unemployment over 50 percent, only 23 of more than 3,900 industrial operations functioning, and 70 percent of Gaza’s agricultural land unirrigated — effects compounded by decades of De-development. Rather than collapsing Hamas, the blockade let it consolidate; Israel’s security establishment adopted intermittent force to undercut the resistance factions — the doctrine named elsewhere “mowing the lawn” — producing an equilibrium of belligerence in which, in a security-establishment formulation, “Israel needs Hamas to be weak enough not to attack, but stable enough to deal with the radical terrorist groups in Gaza” (PDF p.85). Israel thus exercises effective control over the whole Occupied Palestinian Territories without responsibility as an occupying force: in the West Bank the occupation is outsourced to a compliant PA, and in Gaza Hamas’s containment supplies a fig leaf for separation policies that predate Hamas — Gaza was designated a “fedayeen’s nest” in the 1950s and became a “hostile entity” and “enclave of terrorism” — while Israel acts as an “effective and disengaged occupier” (PDF p.86). Reducing both strands of the national movement from liberation to governance and stabilization lets Israel avoid the political drivers — self-determination, the refugee injustice of 1948, and the right to resist — and amounts to a “politicide” of Palestinian nationalism (PDF p.87).

• Chapter 2 — Gaza as humanitarianism and the Great March of Return (PDF p.87-90 / printed p.68-71): under Trump the US recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, severely defunded UNRWA, recognized the Golan annexation and legitimized the settlement enterprise, and promoted Gaza investment projects (power, sewage, desalination) under a humanitarian framing that blamed Hamas exclusively. Humanitarian treatment of Gaza serves the occupation twice: it makes the blockade sustainable without a catastrophic crisis, and it formalizes Gaza’s separation from the rest of the territories while West Bank annexation proceeds. The resulting “state minus” discourse culminated in the Trump plan (January 2020), redefining statehood as self-governance within around 168 urban silos lacking sovereignty — a fraction of the 22 percent accepted in 1988. Against this, grassroots mobilization outside the political establishment — the 2017 Jerusalem “prayer intifada” and above all the Great March of Return, launched by Gaza civil society under the single banner of return — broke from Oslo’s tenets and re-anchored nationalism in al-Nakba; although challenged by Israel’s lethal force and by Hamas’s cooptation, Baconi concludes that rethinking statehood must heed grassroots demands rooted in rights, above all return, which Israel marginalizes in order to manage rather than resolve the question of Palestine.

• Chapter 2 — Notes and bibliography (PDF p.90-98 / printed p.71-79): notes 1-87 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. The chapter’s evidence rests heavily on Hamas’s own publications in Filastin al-Muslima and on Palestinian documents collected in al-Watha’iq al-Filastiniyyah, on author interviews with Hamas leaders and with Israeli security analysts (2015), and on the secondary literature (Sayigh, Roy, Zoughbie, Kimmerling, Filiu).

• Chapter 3: The Forgotten Palestinians — East Jerusalem and the Oslo Peace Process, by Hania Assali (PDF p.99-120 / printed p.80-101): the PLO’s 1988 Declaration of Independence made East Jerusalem the capital of the envisioned Palestinian state, but Oslo defined Jerusalem as one of seven “permanent status” issues for future negotiation; the Camp David Summit (2000) and Taba Talks (2001) ended in failure, and despite recognition by 138 countries and UN nonmember-state admission in 2012 the Palestinian state, let alone its capital, has failed to materialize. Twenty-eight years after Oslo the process is declared dead, at a particularly high toll on East Jerusalem and its approximately 330,000 Palestinian residents.

• Chapter 3 — East Jerusalem since 1967 (PDF p.100-105 / printed p.81-86): Israel occupied and illegally annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, expanding it to 108 square kilometers (38 West, 6 Jordanian East, 64 from twenty-eight Palestinian villages) at a ratio of 74.2 percent Jewish to 25.8 percent Palestinian Arab, applying Israeli law de facto without declaring annexation; the 1980 capital law was declared null and void by UN Security Council Resolution 478, and only the Trump administration broke the international non-recognition consensus in December 2017. Palestinians present at the June 1967 census received revocable “permanent resident” status rather than citizenship — a means, with the 1973 Gafni Committee ratio of 73.5 percent Jews to 25.5 percent Palestinians (as printed), of controlling Palestinian growth. Oslo I deferred Jerusalem, Oslo II excluded it from Palestinian Authority jurisdiction, and East Jerusalemites received only participation in Legislative Council elections — a superfluous right to representation where the PNA has no jurisdiction.

• Chapter 3 — Consolidation of territorial control (PDF p.105-110 / printed p.86-91): from 1968 Israel built settlements to create facts on the ground — 33,300 settlers in eight East Jerusalem settlements in 1968-1977 against 4,300 in the rest of the West Bank; 137,400 around Jerusalem by 1993; by 2018 fifteen settlements with 213,000 settlers in an estimated sixty thousand housing units, plus about 3,000 in the “visual basin of the Old City”. The Greater Jerusalem Master Plan (1995, area extended by the Metropolitan Plan to 950 square kilometers) aimed to secure domination of the central West Bank and prevent a viable Palestinian state. Closure from January 1991 and March 1993, the closure of the Orient House in 2001, and the Separation wall from 2002 — 712 kilometers in total, only 15 percent on the Green Line; about 140 kilometers in Jerusalem, only four on the Green Line — left 140,000 East Jerusalemites beyond the wall receiving services from neither municipality nor PNA. Basic Law amendments and the 2014 Referendum Law entrenched barriers to any transfer of Jerusalem authority, culminating (2018) in a requirement of 80 of 120 Knesset members.

• Chapter 3 — Demographic engineering and the center of life (PDF p.110-114 / printed p.91-95): two principles since 1967: hinder Arab population growth and force residents elsewhere, and rapidly increase the Jewish population. The “Center of life” principle, formulated by Justice Barak in the 1988 Mubarak Awad case beyond the 1974 regulations, was applied aggressively only after Oslo, with “outside Israel” expanded in 1995 to include the West Bank and Gaza Strip, unpublicized and retroactively: 11,555 revocations in 1995-2017 against 3,078 in 1967-1994 — the “silent transfer”. The 2000 Sharansky Declaration reinstated only a few hundred; the 2017 Al-Haq ruling recognized East Jerusalemites as “native-born residents” without ending revocation. Mixed families face the graduated family-unification procedure and the 2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law barring unification for West Bank and Gaza spouses. Residents live in political and legal limbo — Jordanian travel documents without citizenship, Israeli identity cards without citizenship, a Legislative Council vote for a body barred from acting in East Jerusalem — effectively stateless, and, in Assali’s contention, abandoned by a PNA and PLO that failed to sustain their presence.

• Chapter 3 — What lies ahead (PDF p.115-120 / printed p.96-101): resilience and self-preservation until the balance of power shifts. Participation in the 2018 municipal elections drew under 1 percent of eligible East Jerusalemite voters (Ramadan Dabash received 3,001 votes), and citizenship applications in 2014-September 2016 were approved for only 84 of 4,152 applicants — both routes are judged futile or merely individual. Resistance before Oslo ran through the Orient House under Faisal Husseini; since 2000 residents rely on NGOs, and the uncoordinated knife attacks of 2016-2017 show an atomization of resistance. Assali calls for proactive, funded protection of Arab land and property (a task force against dispossession through the Absentees’ Property Law and settler organizations such as Ateret Cohanim) and of residents’ status, and concludes that East Jerusalemites, tested at Al-Aqsa in 2017 and in April 2021, are morabitoun (here to stay).

• Chapter 3 — Notes and bibliography (PDF p.120-125 / printed p.101-106): notes 1-81 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. The chapter’s evidence rests on PASSIA, Ir Amim, HaMoked and B’Tselem reporting, Halper and Dumper, Farsakh’s Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel for settlement figures, and the Oslo texts and ICJ advisory opinion of July 9, 2004.

• Chapter 4: The State, the Land, and the Hill Museum, by Hanan Toukan (PDF p.126-140 / printed p.107-121; notes begin PDF p.140 and continue beyond this part): reprinted from Radical Philosophy (December 2018). How is a museum to represent a transterritorial people resisting obliteration, in a “postcolonial colony” where the PNA, as middleman of the occupation, conducts cultural diplomacy rebranding Palestinians as nonviolent, modern citizens within the 1967 borders? The Palestinian Museum in Birzeit, opened in 2016 by Taawon, interrogates the European museum’s nation-state mission through its mission of “a museum without borders” and a building embedded in the terraced landscape, proposing the postcolonial museum as an unstable, dynamic memory-making institution.

• Chapter 4 — An empty museum and the political economy of museums (PDF p.130-134 / printed p.111-115): the museum opened on May 18, 2016 with no art objects on display, after the dismissal of director and chief curator Jack Persekian, whose “Never Part” project had envisioned an empty museum with artist interventions; Taawon’s task force had disliked the concept, yet the dismissal produced the empty opening anyway, opened by Mahmoud Abbas and mocked in Western media headlines that ignored dispossession and the seizure of Palestinian material culture and archives. Khaled Hourani’s “Picasso in Palestine” (2009) had shown the near-impossibility of bringing artworks through Oslo protocols and Israeli control of checkpoints and airports. Toukan situates the twenty-four million dollar building — its Gulf-made investors, alleged in-kind returns to board members’ firms, and construction materials left on display at the opening — within Hanieh’s account of the internationalization of Gulf capital and Palestinian class formation, and asks whether its function as resistant praxis can be separated from its provenance.

• Chapter 4 — Landscape, the state and other museums (PDF p.134-140 / printed p.115-121): the building occupies 3,000 of its 40,000 square meters; the terraced garden and floor-to-ceiling view toward a Mediterranean Palestinians are barred from reaching reclaim a landscape that settlements, surveillance and the wall sever. The PNA complained the museum appropriated the state’s cultural patronage; Beshara Doumani’s 2010 proposal, still the blueprint, envisioned a “postterritorial” museum stitching together a fragmented body politic — Gazans under siege, walled-off Jerusalemites, West Bank Palestinians, citizens of Israel, refugees and exiles — through online technology, virtual and satellite museums. Against the PNA’s Darwish and Arafat museums (state power, a “dictatorship of nostalgia”) and the Gulf museum boom (which Mignolo reads as de-westernization, a claim Toukan finds unexamined against geopolitics, military alliances and corporate power), Toukan concludes that decolonization in curation means forestalling amnesia and narrative erasure, and that the museum’s wresting back of narrative and material culture is an emancipatory moment in epistemic decolonization.

• Chapter 4 — Notes and bibliography, completed (PDF p.140-145 / printed p.121-126): notes 1-47 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. Note 43 records the Persekian/Khalidi/Yazan Khalil roundtable: Persekian’s point that the museum is a civil society project that does not intend to represent the state but works in parallel to it. The bibliography gives Hourani’s chapter at pages 297-303 against 297-306 in note 20.

• Chapter 5: Defending Palestinian Rights in the Trump Era and Beyond, by Yousef Munayyer (PDF p.146-168 / printed p.127-149): Trump’s election paradoxically enhanced momentum for US support for Palestinian rights and for BDS movement; support remains a function of US-Israel special relations and of exposing intersections between the Palestinian struggle and the struggle against racism in the United States, and it requires reframing the struggle from a defunct Two-state solution to affirming rights irrespective of the solution proposed.

• Chapter 5 — Activism since 2001 and the BDS call (PDF p.146-149 / printed p.127-130): pre-1967 organisations represented the cause as part of the Arab struggle for independence; post-1967 organisations explained the Palestinian plight against a “terrorist” stereotype but hit a “special glass ceiling” of pro-Israel influence on policy. The US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR), founded 2001 as a coalition of over three hundred groups, first targeted US military aid through Washington, then, after the 2005 BDS call adopted by over 170 West Bank and Gaza organisations, turned to grassroots campaigns against complicity below the level of government — new targets, winnable campaigns, and a reframing from a nationalist contest to the average American’s own complicity. A rights-based approach proved more productive than the pre-2000 state-focused efforts and exposes ethnic nationalism, specifically Zionism, amid a global divide between ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism.

• Chapter 5 — From Balfour to Trump (PDF p.149-151 / printed p.130-132): Arthur Balfour, prime minister 1902-1905, was a white supremacist who in 1906 defended disenfranchising Black South Africans — “Men are not born equal, the white and black races are not born with equal capacities” (PDF p.149) — and as prime minister presided over the 1905 Aliens Act aimed at Jewish immigration. His Zionism came from the same source: separation instead of equal incorporation, so that Zionism would “mitigate the age-long miseries created for Western civilization by the presence in its midst of a Body which it too long regarded as alien and even hostile, but which it was equally unable to expel or to absorb” (PDF p.150). Balfour wrote in 1919 that in Palestine Britain “deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination” (PDF p.151) and would not consult the 700,000 Arabs, about 90 percent of the population. Israel now views Palestinians as a “demographic threat” in the same terms; Trump’s “herrenvolk nationalism” aligns globally with Zionism while Israel sells itself in the West as a liberal democracy.

• Chapter 5 — Obama, the partisan shift and the Iran deal (PDF p.151-155 / printed p.132-136): despite Obama securing Israel “the largest military financing agreement in history”, an unprecedented partisan shift in US opinion broke the bipartisan consensus. Three factors: Obama the person, viewed with suspicion in Israel’s government — Michael Oren wrote that “From the moment he entered office, Mr. Obama promoted an agenda of championing the Palestinian cause” (PDF p.152); Netanyahu’s overlapping right-wing premierships, which changed the subject from settlements to Iran; and the JCPOA fight, in which treason allegations against Obama were often racially coded. Right-wing pundits cast Obama as a traitor to the orthodox “Judeo-Christian” position on Israel — Krauthammer’s “It’s Obama vs. Israel”, Kristol’s Emergency Committee for Israel, Jennifer Rubin’s “most anti-Israel in history” amplified by Breitbart — and the white supremacist base saw no contradiction with that analysis. Netanyahu’s speaker-invited address to Congress against the president’s agenda drew a boycott by sixty members of Congress, many of the Congressional Black Caucus. Obama represented a majority-minority America whose ethos of civic belonging — democracy over identity — clashes with Israel’s ethos prioritising identity over democracy.

• Chapter 5 — Trump, Netanyahu and the antidemocracy policy (PDF p.155-159 / printed p.136-140): neither Clinton (committed against BDS, responding to donor Haim Saban) nor Trump offered Palestine advocates anything; Trump rode “a wave of nativist, xenophobic white nationalism”, promised to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and took David Friedman and Jason Greenblatt as advisers. As president-elect he intervened in the December 2016 UN settlement vote via Egypt’s Sisi. The Trump/Netanyahu embrace shocked liberal American Jews and let activists brand Israel as a Trump ally. Netanyahu gave cover to Poland’s Holocaust law, Lithuania’s honouring of Nazi collaborators, Duterte and Bolsonaro. Trump’s Middle East policy was an “antidemocracy policy”: normalising Israeli Apartheid by having unelected Gulf leaders recognise Israel against Arab publics’ opposition, breaking the Arab Peace Initiative sequence; the January 2020 Trump plan favoured Israeli annexation of 30 percent of the West Bank while calling a nonsovereign, disconnected archipelago a Palestinian state, launched at the June 2019 Manama conference with no Palestinians officially involved; the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain, announced in August 2020, made the normalisation official.

• Chapter 5 — Building toward the “S” in BDS (PDF p.159-165 / printed p.140-146): intersectional organising — the summer 2014 Gaza war (fifty-five days, well over two thousand Palestinians killed, most civilians) coincided with the police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson on August 9, 2014; Palestinian tear-gas advice, identical Pennsylvania-made canisters and keffiyahs in Ferguson made the connections striking; the wall-builder for Israel’s Separation wall was frontrunner for Trump’s border wall, G4S links BDS to the US prison-industrial complex, and ADL-facilitated police exchanges take US officers to Israel. Michelle Alexander’s 2019 New York Times column is quoted: King’s teachings “require us to speak out passionately against the human rights crisis in Israel-Palestine, despite the risks and despite the complexity of the issues” (PDF p.160). Challenges: reform the anti-lobbying culture BDS success created, because “there is no way to sanctions without going through Congress” (PDF p.161) — a 2017 poll found 56 percent of Democrats and 41 percent of Americans overall would support sanctions over settlement expansion; and Lawfare — twenty-seven states had enacted anti-BDS legislation since 2014, the federal Israel Anti-Boycott Act (up to a one million dollar fine and twenty-year jail sentence) expired with the 115th Congress after ACLU-led opposition, the 2020 Democratic platform committed to First Amendment freedoms around boycotts, and anti-BDS laws were successfully challenged in Kansas and Arizona. Congressional support is building: Betty McCollum’s 2016 letter on Palestinian children (nineteen members, invoking the Leahy Law) and her 2017 HR 4391 (some thirty-one cosponsors), against a decade earlier when five signatures for UNRWA aid were hard to get; the first South Africa sanctions bill (1972) took fourteen years to pass. The rights-based approach, not nationalist advocacy for Partition or statehood, is “the shortest path” because it permits coalitions in a changing America.

• Chapter 5 — Notes and bibliography (PDF p.165-168 / printed p.146-149): notes 1-45 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. The bibliography lists “Louis, Willian Roger” (as printed) and cites Bernard Porter’s Critics of Empire, which the notes do not cite.

• Part Two title page (PDF p.170): “Decolonizing beyond Partition”. PDF p.169 and p.171 are blank in the text copy.

• Chapter 6: Transitional Justice in Palestine/Israel — Whose Justice? Which Transition?, by Nadim Khoury (PDF p.172-184 / printed p.153-165; notes begin PDF p.185 and continue beyond this part): Transitional justice has gained appeal in the Palestinian camp as a way to devise alternatives to Oslo — countering Palestinian fragmentation, reckoning with past wrongs, providing venues for reconciliation with Israeli Jews — but it is a deeply contested concept that can also justify Oslo-line measures or negate Palestinian demands for justice; its potential depends on incorporation into a larger political project seeking equality and justice for all Palestinians.

• Chapter 6 — What is transitional justice? (PDF p.173-175 / printed p.154-156): the UN defines it as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (PDF p.173). Retributive justice (Nuremberg) punishes perpetrators; restorative justice (South Africa) privileged the Truth and Reconciliation Commission — 21,000 victims’ testimonies, 7,112 amnesty applications, 849 granted and 5,392 denied — over trials, Thabo Mbeki explaining that the ANC could not “simultaneously prepare for a peaceful transition while saying we want to catch and hang people” (PDF p.173). Nadim Rouhana’s distinctions: conflict settlement (a victor’s negative peace), conflict resolution (principled, reciprocal) and reconciliation, “a process that brings about a genuine end to the existential conflict between the parties and transforms the nature of the relationship between the societies” (PDF p.174), centred on victims and on dealing with historical injustices.

• Chapter 6 — Transitional justice and Oslo (PDF p.175-177 / printed p.156-158): Oslo was closer to conflict settlement than reconciliation and deliberately avoided the past — Rabin to the Knesset, April 18, 1994: “We decided not to deal with past accounts” (PDF p.175); Uri Savir: “never again would we argue about the past” (PDF p.175). At Taba (2001) a consensus around monetary compensation delinked compensation from return — UNGA Resolution 194 (December 1948) had offered compensation only to refugees who chose not to return — and the option vanished with the process’s collapse. The process was designed not to solve but to dissolve the refugee problem: framing it as humanitarian (the 1991 Madrid Refugee Working Group’s databases, family reunification, public health and job creation) and imposing a temporality in which only post-1967 land and history were negotiable and 1948 was “off-memory”. Danny Rubinstein: “you don’t have to remember. You have to forget” (PDF p.176). Partition displaced responsibility onto a future Palestinian state — Tzipi Livni: “your state will be the answer to all Palestinians including refugees” (PDF p.176-177) — and Israel rejected legal, historical and moral responsibility even at Taba, insisting compensation be paid indirectly so as not to imply responsibility.

• Chapter 6 — The promise: reparations, integrative solutions, decolonization (PDF p.177-180 / printed p.158-161): Nur Masalha: “As long as historical truth is denied or excluded, there can be no peace, no reconciliation in the Middle East” (PDF p.177). Reparations are wider than compensation — restitution, return, ending ongoing violations, accountability, commemoration, acknowledgment, apology and prevention (UN) — and Israel and its allies rejected them; Condoleezza Rice called reparations “backward-looking” (PDF p.178). George Bisharat: an Israeli apology “would be a milestone toward reconciliation that no Palestinian could ignore” (PDF p.178). Zochrot has run its own truth commissions on the Negev 1948-1960, against official “Nakba laws”. Proponents privilege restorative over retributive mechanisms because of power — trials of Israeli perpetrators will likely never happen — seeking relative, not absolute, justice: Edward Said: “No one gets absolute justice, but there are steps that must be taken, like the ones taken at the end of apartheid” (PDF p.179). Returning to the Nakba reframes historic Palestine as one political unit and Palestinians as one people against Oslo’s fragmentation, supports integrative (one-state) solutions without prescribing an arrangement — restitution pushes against two states, apology and compensation could serve either — and links reconciliation to Decolonisation when it overturns the coloniser/colonised asymmetry. Ali Abunimah: “The ideological collapse of the two-state solution leaves no alternative but to shift our discourse and practice toward democratic and decolonizing alternatives [such as] South Africa” (PDF p.180).

• Chapter 6 — The limits (PDF p.180-184 / printed p.161-165): transitional justice leaves open what counts as a historical injustice — Ron Dudai argues it must also cover Palestinian violence against Israeli citizens, intra-Palestinian violence and PA violations — and it can be weaponised: Israel’s “Jewish Nakba” public diplomacy equates Arab Jewish exile with Palestinian refugees as a population exchange, demanding Arab responsibility, apologies and reparations, “weaponizing the language of transitional justice against Palestinians” (PDF p.182). Temporal scope is contested, as in Canada’s residential-schools process (more than 150,000 children): the government used the mechanisms as a wall closing accountability, indigenous peoples as a bridge linking past and present settler-colonialism. Israel could delimit the Nakba to 1948-1949 against the Palestinian view of an ongoing Nakba — “the Nakba is a structure, not a single event” (PDF p.183, paraphrasing Patrick Wolfe) — and a limited acknowledgment could act “as a no-further-claims clause, vaccinating Israel against further Palestinian demands, foremost among them the right of return” (PDF p.183). Nor does it prescribe the destination or the pace: Dudai’s three-strand, incremental version would work through “an incremental process of narrow mechanisms and small steps through a long process of transition” (PDF p.183-184) — a corrective to Oslo, not an alternative. Conclusion: transitional justice is “an essentially contested concept”; harnessing its promise and guaranteeing “equality from the river to the sea” depends on a larger political project — “If we do not do it, someone else is bound to do it for us” (PDF p.184).

• Chapter 6 — Notes opening (PDF p.185-186 / printed p.166-167): notes 1-37 begun, recorded item by item in the reading notes; the remaining notes and bibliography continue in part 5.

• Chapter 6 — Notes and bibliography, completed (PDF p.187-191 / printed p.168-172): notes 37 (concluded)-63 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. Note 49 carries Khoury’s gloss that Dudai’s wider definition of historical injustice risks conflating colonizer and colonized violence and reproducing the peace process’s false symmetry. The bibliography differs from the notes on several entries as printed: Al-Hardan at volume 3 against 35 in n.40, Barghouti at volume 2 against 4 in n.47, Bashir and Busbridge at 2018 against 2019 in n.47, and Kaufman and Bisharat at Journal of Human Rights 1, no.2 against no.1 in n.63.

• Chapter 7: Alternatives to Partition in Palestine — Rearticulating the State-Nation Nexus, by Leila Farsakh (PDF p.192-206 / printed p.173-187): a Palestinian state recognized by over 138 countries and admitted as a UN nonmember state in 2012 cannot materialize on the ground — over ninety-nine checkpoints, the 708-kilometer Separation wall, a settler population that doubled to over 643,000 in 2018 and the siege on Gaza make a contiguous state impossible — so the chapter explores the questions any rejection of Partition must answer, through two historical one-state documents: Ihud’s Palestine: A Bi-National State (1946) and the PLO’s “Towards a Democratic State in Palestine for Muslims, Christians and Jews” (1970), the basis of the Palestinian National Council’s 1971 call.

• Chapter 7 — Historical origins and the Zionist binational rationale (PDF p.193-196 / printed p.174-177): the one-state idea’s genesis lies in the Mandate period 1922-1928, when Britain treated Palestine as a single political and administrative unit — a single Palestinian nationality, three official languages and a proposed legislative council of twenty-three (twelve elected: eight Muslims, two Christians, two Jews; eleven appointed) — abandoned after the 1929 Western Wall riots, with the Peel Commission (1937) and Resolution 181 (1947) enshrining partition instead. Brit Shalom (1925) and Ihud (1942) — Martin Buber, Judah Magnus and Moses Smilansky among them — viewed Zionism as spiritual and cultural redemption requiring a Jewish nation but not necessarily a separate Jewish state; Magnus argued the Jewish people do not “need a Jewish state to maintain its very existence” (PDF p.194). The 1946 Ihud document called for “the union of Jews and Arabs in a bi-national Palestine based on parity of the two peoples” (PDF p.195), resting on three notions: equality (the “natural rights of the Arabs” through labor and presence held of equal validity with the “historical rights of Jews”); self-determination detached from territorial sovereignty, national rights being fulfillable in various political configurations; and prevention of domination — immigration until demographic parity, then a joint board on entry, on the Swiss federal model of “separate nationalities yet a single citizenship” (PDF p.196). Sovereignty is tied to the people, not the land, and the document laid the foundation for Azmi Bishara’s 1990s calls for a state of its citizens.

• Chapter 7 — The Palestinian vision of a one-state solution (PDF p.196-198 / printed p.177-179): the PLO pamphlet of 1970, written by a Fatah member under a pseudonym (Mohammad Rasheed, per the notes) and building on the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Nayef Hawatmeh, was adopted by the eighth PNC in 1971: a democratic, nonsectarian state inclusive of Muslims, Christians and Jews — “the armed struggle of the Palestinian people is not a racial or religious struggle directed against the Jews” (PDF p.197). It was the first official Palestinian attempt to accept Jewish presence, acknowledging individual if not national rights, and remained the official PLO plan until 1988. Its revolutionary element is acceptance of Jews living in or coming to the state, seeking to repair 1948’s injustice and eliminate Zionist domination; but the state proposed is neither binational nor clearly secular, its constitutional shape undiscussed. The text explicitly rejects Binationalism — “religious and ethnic lines clearly cross in Palestine so as to make the term bi-national and the Arab-Jewish dichotomy meaningless or at best quite dubious” (PDF p.197) — does not consider Jews a nation, highlights the Arab Jew (absent from the Zionist document; Ellah Shohat shows Zionism’s Orientalist homogenization of oriental Jews into an Ashkenazi-defined identity), and separates Jews from Zionists: Jews, even Israelis born after 1948, are included if they reject Zionism — “all Jewish Palestinians—at the present Israelis—have the same right provided of course they reject Zionist racist chauvinism and fully accept to live as Palestinian in the New Palestine” (PDF p.198). The state’s nationality is Arab Palestinian, part of “the Arab Homeland”; collective rights are not explained — self-determination is recognized for Arabs only, and the document refuses to separate the nation from the state.

• Chapter 7 — What went wrong, and the political framework (PDF p.198-204 / printed p.179-185): the 1971 project was shelved for the two-state solution; the 1988 Declaration acknowledged Israel and accepted Resolution 242, and Oslo (1993, 1995) never promised statehood outright though the Quartet Road Map (2003) acknowledged it as the aim. Three reasons explain the one-state revival since 2000: Zionism proved determined to destroy rather than respect Palestinian self-determination, instituting a de facto Apartheid structure confirmed by the Trump administration’s 2020 stance; the Oslo quest compromised collective and individual rights — sovereignty, East Jerusalem, the Right of Return — and fragmented the body politic by prioritizing the PNA over the PLO, while the PNA bought legitimacy with unsustainable economic opportunities and Hamas’s Gaza government sought it through resistance rather than citizens’ rights; and demography — in 2020, 6.87 million Jews against 5.03 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza plus 1.96 million inside Israel, with Palestinians projected a majority by 2025 (growth 2.7 percent against 1.8 percent). The framework section decouples state from nation: the Weberian state (a “human organization that has the legitimate monopoly over the use of force in a specific territory”, PDF p.201) is never neutral, and the nation as “imagined community” transcends territorial frontiers; following Arendt, the nation-state both affirms the right to have rights and excludes non-members, so scholars propose a civic state above the nation — a juridical executor of citizens’ will that decouples nation from state and alone gives space to determine how a state can be decolonized. Against reified sovereignty: Netanyahu’s claim that the Jewish state alone protects Jews worldwide, proven exclusionary by the 2018 Nation-State Law; the Birzeit Center for Development Studies 2015 survey (1,060 respondents) found over 80 percent of West Bank/Gaza respondents supporting a Palestinian state there (47 percent for security, 22 percent for rights protection) yet over 66 percent rejecting a single democratic state with equal rights, against over 80 percent acceptance among Palestinian citizens of Israel; and the parallel-states proposal, a reformulation of the binational ideal, which without dismantling Israel’s colonial foundation “will simply perpetuate Israel’s colonial power and Palestinian dispossession” (PDF p.203).

• Chapter 7 — Domination versus equality, recognition, and conclusion (PDF p.204-206 / printed p.185-187): dismantling colonialism requires rebalancing power — Israel’s economy is over 20 times the Palestinian economy’s size (n.43: GDP in 2019 of 394 billion dollars against 16 billion), so Israeli capital would dominate and Palestinian workers remain cheap labor absent constitutional equality, dismantling of Jewish privileges, compensation mechanisms and institutional supports such as affirmative action (the UNSCOP minority report’s 1947 economic union is a model). Reconciliation requires each side to recognize the “other”: Palestinians must address the “Jewish question” — Jewish attachment and a claim to a home — explaining how to decolonize Israel without negating seventy years of Jewish Israeli culture, Hebrew and political autonomy, and reworking the PLO’s 1971 appeal so the Jewish Israeli is neither a rehabilitated Arab citizen nor a resident without full citizenship; Israelis must address Buber’s “Arab Question”, give up privileges, and confront living in an Arab world — over 50 percent of Israel’s Jewish population is of Arab descent — and the Arab dimension of Jewishness, the negation of the Arab Jew being central to Zionism as a Western civilizing enterprise. Conclusion: “Partition as a solution to Palestine has failed, but the one-state solution as a clear and acceptable political project is still not born” (PDF p.206); Palestinian citizens of Israel are best placed to lead the movement and must be reincorporated into a redefined, reinvigorated PLO, and international pressure on Israel will be key.

• Chapter 7 — Notes and bibliography (PDF p.206-210 / printed p.187-191): notes 1-46 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes; parts of the chapter are drawn from Farsakh, “Common State in Israel-Palestine”, Ethnopolitics 15, no.4 (2016): 380-92. The notes give the Ihud document’s text and the Rasheed pamphlet’s passages (at pages 38, 29, 16, 35, 34 and 12-13), the CDS survey’s tables, and in n.43 the GDP figures. The bibliography lists Farsakh’s own four works under dash continuations following the Faris (ed.) entry, with no “Farsakh, Leila” heading, as printed in the original.

• Chapter 8: Palestinian Nationality and “Jewish” Nationality — From the Lausanne Treaty to Today, by Susan M. Akram (PDF p.211-228 / printed p.192-209; chapter continues beyond this part): the chapter assesses the legal foundations of Zionist and Palestinian national claims since the Mandate. Its central premise: Palestinians possess a defined nationality that remains valid and legally cognizable today, not negated by the claim of a Jewish state or by an extraterritorial claim to Israel by Jews elsewhere — under international nationality law the territorial and direct “bloodline” connection, not a religious connection, determines national rights, and “getting the law right” paves the way for a more equitable shared future.

• Chapter 8 — Definitions of nationals and citizens (PDF p.212-214 / printed p.193-195): nationality in its legal sense (against the sociological, ethnonational sense) is a legal relationship between an individual and a state or territory — “the link between [international] law and the individual” (PDF p.212) — defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice (1939) as “the bond … between the State and the individual” and by the ICJ as the “genuine link”. The genuine links are birth on the soil (jus soli), birth to a parent holding the nationality (jus sanguinis) and, less certainly, long-term residence (jus domicilii); by the early 1900s the norms excluded race, religion, language or ethnic origin alone. Citizenship is domestic, but a state cannot define citizens arbitrarily or discriminatorily; inhabitants of a territory undergoing a change of sovereignty automatically acquire the new state’s nationality, and arbitrary denationalization is prohibited. On statelessness (1954 and 1961 conventions), the chapter’s premise is that Palestinians remain nationals of Palestine but are effectively stateless, wrongfully deprived of their nationality — approximately twelve million stateless nationals of Palestine worldwide today, all entitled to return and obtain Palestine nationality or the successor state’s, regardless of race, religion or ethnic origin.

• Chapter 8 — Palestinian nationality before 1948 (PDF p.214-216 / printed p.195-197): under the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 (jus sanguinis and jus soli, not religious or ethnic criteria) Palestinians held Ottoman citizenship; the Treaty of Lausanne (signed July 24, 1923), Article 30, made Turkish subjects habitually resident in detached territory “ipso facto” nationals of the successor state — Palestinian nationality was formed on August 6, 1924, on the treaty’s ratification. The Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925 codified citizenship (over seventy thousand Palestinian passports issued) but narrowed Palestinians abroad’s retention and return claims while naturalization provisions and the September 1922 proclamation granted citizenship to approximately thirty-eight thousand people, mostly Jewish immigrants; the population meeting the Order’s criteria numbered 847,000. The Mandate’s Article 7 obliged a nationality law facilitating acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews taking up permanent residence. The Balfour Declaration, incorporated into the Mandate (whose Article 2 speaks of “the establishment of the Jewish national home” while “safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion”), set the stage for a two-tiered rights system but mentioned no Jewish state; read consistently with international law it proposes a “home”, not a homeland or state — and neither it nor the Mandate disturbed Palestinian nationality under Lausanne or established a cognizable Jewish nationality.

• Chapter 8 — The UN and Palestinian nationality (PDF p.217-219 / printed p.198-200): Resolution 181 (1947) was a General Assembly recommendation with, in the UN Secretariat’s interpretation, “no obligatory character whatsoever” (PDF p.217); its plan made residents citizens of the state in which they resided — “Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine … as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine … shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights” (PDF p.217) — and required constitutions guaranteeing equal rights after a one-year UN supervision period; it authorized no superior rights for any religious or racial group. Resolution 194 (December 11, 1948) framed refugee rights through national claims, established the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Palestine Conciliation Commission), and in paragraph 11 set the formula for resolving the refugee problem; the UNCCP’s analysis holds “the term ‘refugees’ applies to all persons, Arabs, Jews and others who have been displaced from their homes in Palestine” (PDF p.218), and the UN legal advisor’s note of April 9, 1951 defined the covered categories by Palestinian citizenship under the 1924 law — correcting the 1925 Order’s exclusions and covering all persons eligible for Palestinian nationality under Lausanne, and their descendants.

• Chapter 8 — Israel’s redefinition of nationality, 1948-1952 (PDF p.219-221 / printed p.200-202): against the Declaration of Independence’s promise of equal rights, the Law of Return (July 5, 1950) provides “every Jew has the right to come to this country [i.e., Israel] as an oleh” (PDF p.219) — no territorial connection required, only being Jewish — and the “Nationality Law” of 1952 (July 14, 1952; in reality a citizenship law, its English name an erroneous translation) offered acquisition by return (Jews only), residence, birth or naturalization; residence required registration by March 1, 1952 and continuous inhabitancy, which none of the 750,000 refugees outside the country could meet, and its “Loss of Nationality” provision retroactively repealed Palestinian citizenship granted from 1925 to May 14, 1948 — “Any reference in any provision of law to Palestinian citizenship or Palestinian citizens shall henceforth be read as a reference to Israel nationality or Israel nationals” (PDF p.220). As international law the repeal was illegal, violating the successor-state citizenship principle and the prohibition on arbitrary denationalization on protected grounds.

• Chapter 8 — “Israel” nationality, Jewish nationality and the 2018 law (PDF p.220-223 / printed p.201-204): there is no “Israel nationality”, as the Israeli High Court itself confirmed — the Population Registry lists over one hundred nationalities, and the only nationality carrying the state’s rights is “Jewish nationality”, restricted to Law of Return qualifiers; the two laws set up a two-tiered citizenship whose superior Jewish-national rights include exclusive use of approximately 95 percent of the lands expropriated from Palestinians, codified in the Absentee Property Law and held as a land bank by the Jewish National Fund and affiliates as “Israel Lands”. The ICJ’s Nottebohm decision (1955) restated that nationality requires a close connection and is not solely a domestic matter; the extraterritorial grant is a continuing breach requiring amendment, return and restoration of nationality. The UN, its treaty bodies and the ICJ have consistently called preferences for Jews violations of the UN Charter and human-rights treaties, and there is no international recognition of the “Jewish people” as a nationality granting self-determination rights to Jews outside Israel. The 2018 Nation-State Law — a basic law — states “the State of Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people” (PDF p.222): it reserves self-determination to Jews (Palestinians being 20 percent of the population within Israel), establishes Hebrew as official with promotion of Jewish symbols and culture (reversing Arabic’s official status), and promotes Jewish settlement as a “national value” — its extension to the Occupied Territories formally entrenches an Apartheid system.

• Chapter 8 — The right of return (PDF p.223-225 / printed p.204-206): the 1952 law’s passage does not abrogate Resolution 194 or the customary norms beneath it. The right of return rests most relevantly on the individual’s right to return to his place of origin or nationality: ICCPR Article 12(4) — “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country” (PDF p.224) — whose drafting history shows “his own country” was kept deliberately wider than “the country of which one is a national”, and “arbitrarily” covers denationalization that violates international law even if domestically legal: “For international law purposes, states do not enjoy the freedom to denationalize their nationals in order to expel them as ‘non-citizens.’” (PDF p.224). CERD Article 5(d)(ii), the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1963 Draft Principles on the Right to Leave and Return ground the same right; the only serious attack on the right of return as principle or practice is its application to Palestinian refugees, and the right now forms a customary norm.

• Chapter 8 — Oslo and Palestinian nationality; nationality today (PDF p.225-228 / printed p.206-209; chapter continues beyond this part): after 1967 Israel ruled the Occupied Territories by military orders without citizenship rights for residents while extending its domestic law to settlers; the September 1967 census counted 954,898 Palestinians present, excluding at least 270,000 absent, whose return Israel refused to recognize; unregistered Palestinians could gain residency only through family reunification, and about one hundred thousand Palestinians have lost Jerusalem residency under the “Center of life” requirement, which does not apply to Jews (figure as printed). Oslo gave the PA authority to issue identity cards, passports and permanent residence only with Israel’s permission; the Palestinian Basic Law (passed 1997, ratified 2002) addresses nationality only in Articles 1, 4 and 7 — Article 7: “Palestinian citizenship shall be regulated by law” (PDF p.226) — leaving it unclear whether “the Palestinian people” covers only the 1967 territories or the global population, the PA governing only approximately 30 percent of Palestinians. Two draft citizenship laws failed: the Interior Ministry’s 1995 draft (based on the 1925 Order and the 1954 Jordanian law, twenty-five articles), never disseminated or deliberated, and the PLO’s 2012 draft, whose basic rule grounds Palestinian citizenship in entitlement as of August 6, 1924 under Lausanne, covering West Bank and Gaza inhabitants, Mandate Palestine refugees and Israeli inhabitants — never tabled. The closing section opened here argues Palestinians retain an unbroken nationality — Israel is party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the ICCPR and “ICERD” (as printed), its denationalization was illegal when it occurred and remains remediable by return — and that framing Palestinians as only refugees or stateless persons is the weaker argument: they are stateless nationals, their return resting on their rights as nationals of Palestine, with no parallel legal authority for a Jewish nationality claim, religion and ancient “historic” claims not being “genuine links” [continues in part 6].

• Chapter 8 — Conclusion, completed (PDF p.229-230 / printed p.210-211): dual nationality is no barrier to return, as most Jews in Israel hold a second citizenship. “The strongest claim for right of return is based on Palestinians as nationals, not as stateless persons and not just as refugees” (PDF p.229), framed around Lausanne; Palestinian nationality is not undermined by Resolution 181, Resolution 194 or Israel’s Nationality Law. Fashioning a nationality law is complicated in a two-state scenario — the categories within a West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem state alone, quoted from Mutaz M. Qafisheh, are East Jerusalem inhabitants, refugees expelled from Israel since 1948 settled in the West Bank or Gaza, West Bankers or Gazans who lost residence since 1925 and were prevented from returning by Britain (1917-1948) or Israel (since 1967), and Jewish-Palestinian natives of the West Bank or Gaza who lost residence since 1948 — plus diaspora categories including dual nationals in Jordan and refugees in the Arab world who are Palestinian stateless nationals. There is no serious prospect of implementing such a law for Palestinians outside Israel, and the PLO/PA drafts recognised it remains aspirational without independence; Israel’s Nation-State Law and its declared intent to fully annex the West Bank show it intends to allow no semblance of a Palestinian state, and return to original homes is not acknowledged in political discourse. In a future single state with equal citizenship, the “nationality” distinctions, “the denationalization provision of the 1950 Nationality Law” (as printed) and the Nation-State Law in its entirety would need repeal, and Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and the diaspora could be included through Lausanne: all those who can claim nationality by jus sanguinis and/or jus soli as fixed on August 6, 1924, and all their descendants, are nationals of Palestine with rights to return, restitution and compensation.

• Chapter 8 — Notes and bibliography, completed (PDF p.230-243 / printed p.211-224): notes 1-118 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes. The notes supply the chapter’s legal apparatus in full: Oppenheim and the Harvard Research nationality study (seventeen jus sanguinis, twenty-five primarily jus sanguinis and twenty-six primarily jus soli laws in 1929), Qafisheh’s works on Palestinian nationality and on the unpublished 1995 and January 2012 draft citizenship laws (the 2012 draft drafted by Qafisheh for the PLO Negotiation Affairs Department), the Lausanne, Mandate, statelessness, CERD, ICCPR and VCLT instruments, the Nottebohm, Tamarin (1970) and Ornan (2013) cases, and the UN treaty bodies’ findings on Israel. Note 102’s source title gives 140,000 Palestinians stripped of residency rights, against the main text’s about one hundred thousand for Jerusalem.

• Chapter 9: Constitutional Frameworks for a One-State Option in Palestine — An Assessment, by Mazen Masri (PDF p.244-265 / printed p.225-246; chapter continues beyond this part): statehood is inherently intertwined with law, and constitutional design — membership, belonging and rights — is especially significant for a single democratic state in historic Palestine. The conflict, rooted in the late nineteenth century between two national movements, is in Masri’s framing a settler-colonial one: Zionism shares settler-colonial movements’ ideologies, narratives and strategies, and current reality reflects severe inequality between settler and native populations built into the political system, economy and law, with the Nakba embodying decades of historical injustice. A single state built on equality and democracy must address that inequality, tackle past injustices, and foster security and partnership.

• Chapter 9 — Guiding principles (PDF p.245-252 / printed p.226-233): constitutional design is not a blank-slate exercise; its principles must address current injustice, problems the two-state solution is unlikely to solve, and problems likely in a one-state arrangement. Equal citizenship: Masri classifies inhabitants between the Mediterranean and the Jordan into six hierarchical legal categories — Jewish citizens of Israel (full rights, trumping all below); Palestinian citizens of Israel (formal civil rights without full equality or membership in the self-determining “nation”); East Jerusalem Palestinians (revocable residency, not citizenship); West Bank Palestinians (under occupation, Israel in ultimate control, the PA as local agent); Gazans (legally still under occupation, under siege and periodic violence, the most severe conditions short of exile); and Palestinian refugees (most disenfranchised, a sizable number stateless). The hierarchy is created and maintained by law, entrenched further by the 2018 Nation-State Law; equal citizenship requires legal and political equality as of right, cultural, linguistic and religious rights, and social equality through resource allocation, affirmative action and transitional-justice reparations including restitution. Immigration, residency and citizenship: the 1948 Nakba entailed mass displacement, while a Jewish state relied on Jewish immigration to build a majority; the Law of Return is a fundamental, value-laden distinction — Barak: aliya is “a social, value-laden, and national term” (PDF p.248) and the law is “the constitutional cornerstone of the character of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people” (PDF p.248) — and Jewish “return” must not be confused with Palestinian refugees’ right of return, a well-established international-law human right. Group rights: Jewish Israelis and Palestinians are the two main groups, with distinctive language, culture, heritage and religion, living separately but not as equals; group identities should be accommodated without dominance or privileges, and without group belonging replacing citizenship as the main source of rights. Historical redress and Transformative constitutionalism: a constitution should anchor transitional justice (truth-telling, reparation, prosecution) and transform the present into an equal reality — Klare’s transformative constitutionalism as “a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement” toward egalitarian transformation, exemplified by the South African Constitutional Court’s holding that the interim constitution “represents a radical and decisive break from that part of the past which is unacceptable” (PDF p.250). Decolonization: settler-colonialism’s essential feature is Wolfe’s “logic of elimination, a sustained institutional tendency to supplant the indigenous population” (PDF p.251); decolonization here does not mean settlers’ departure but a process addressing colonial structures and transforming relations onto equality, settlers abandoning privileges and recognising past injustices, the indigenous society accepting the settler society, privileges abandoned, as an equal partner.

• Chapter 9 — Unitary models: the liberal state and binationalism (PDF p.252-258 / printed p.233-239): a liberal, difference-blind state does not exist in reality; states promote Taylor’s “politics of universalism”, which is “a particularism masquerading as the universal” (PDF p.252), France being the archetype. For Palestine/Israel its narrow equality-as-uniformity cannot account for group diversity, group rights, transitional justice or decolonization, and one culture would eventually become hegemonic. Binationalism is assessed in four levels — declarative recognition; cultural autonomy and joint symbols; immigration (preserving a Law of Return logic and Brit Shalom/Ihud’s parity through unlimited Jewish immigration until parity); and governance as Consociationalism (“Conscociationalism”, as printed, attributed to “Arendt Lijphart”, as printed), with executive power-sharing, proportional group representation, mutual veto and segmental autonomy, as in Ihud’s 1946 parity legislature and executive. Its pitfalls: defining the two nations (Jewish or Israeli — there is legally no Israeli nation, Tamarin dated 1972 in this chapter), legally defining who belongs to each group, compelled association and exclusion of those in neither group (Bosnia’s Sejdić and Finci case, 2009), entrenching division over a common citizenship, strengthening group elites, weakening opposition and distributive politics, and violating equal citizenship if a parity legislature outlasts parity; some consociational ideas (parliamentarism, proportional representation of parties, language rights, cultural autonomy) could be used without the ethnic dimension.

• Chapter 9 — Unitary models: the multicultural state (PDF p.257-261 / printed p.238-242): a multicultural state could combine binationalism’s benefits without its risks. On Kymlicka’s definition, multiculturalism is “the view that states should not only uphold the familiar set of common civil, political, and social rights of citizenship” but also adopt group-specific rights accommodating ethnocultural groups (PDF p.258); its three principles are that the state belongs to all citizens equally, that it recognises non-dominant groups’ history, language and culture, and that it acknowledges historic injustice and offers remedy. Masri’s version: Arabic and Hebrew as equal official languages, bilingual services, parliament and courts, both languages taught in all schools, and cultural autonomy organised by language rather than religious criteria, so membership is by self-identification, with accountability to the public as a whole — equality informed by decolonization, removing settler privileges rather than renaming them, and supporting transitional justice. Governance would entrench those principles (South Africa’s amendable only with 75 percent of Parliament and six of nine provinces), prefer a parliamentary system and a mixed proportional electoral system, and would likely produce cabinets representing both groups without quotas. Masri judges it the model most compatible with the guiding principles, while noting two critiques: diversion from social/economic justice and class solidarity, and harm to internal minorities (women, sexual minorities, religious dissidents).

• Chapter 9 — Federal models and human rights, opening (PDF p.260-265 / printed p.241-246; chapter continues beyond this part): federalism, on Riker’s definition, is a constitution where “two levels of government rule the same land and people”, each autonomous in at least one area with a guarantee of that autonomy (PDF p.260). Territorial federalism here could follow the 1967 line (two majority units) or many smaller units, with regional control mainly over language, religion, education and culture; a combined territorial-consociational model is exemplified by Bosnia and Herzegovina (two entities, “Republika Sparska” as printed) and Belgium (three regions, three communities, linguistic parity in the Council of Ministers, change requiring two-thirds plus a majority of each linguistic group), resembling Ihud’s 1940s federal parity proposal. Critics argue postconflict federalism is unstable, reinforces intergroup conflict, creates unstable homogenous borders, and preserves economic inequality and the status quo, casting doubt on its capacity for redistribution, transitional justice and decolonization. On human rights, an enforceable bill of rights has been central to settlements since the 1990s (South Africa, Bosnia, Northern Ireland); Waldron’s democratic objection to judicial review rests on four assumptions — well-ordered democratic and judicial institutions, societal commitment to individual and minority rights, and good-faith disagreement about rights — which may not hold in transition, so even on his argument a bill of rights would be necessary here; Ginsburg’s political-insurance theory could make judicial review attractive to both groups. Equality should have prominent, entrenched status (South Africa’s section 1, amendable only by three-quarters of Parliament), understood through decolonization to permit affirmative action, land restitution and reparations, and protection should extend to social and economic rights.

• Chapter 9 — Epilogue, notes and bibliography, completed (PDF p.266-271 / printed p.247-252): the Epilogue concludes that the one-state solution is not one concrete idea; democratic models exist with differing promises and risks, and the hard task is choosing among them, starting from a clear understanding of the challenges and a clear vision of objectives, with the constitution as a means to decolonization, equality and/or justice rather than an end. Clauses on democracy, dignity, diversity and human rights must become “the local currency of the population” (PDF p.266). Notes 1-46 and the bibliography are recorded item by item in the reading notes; the cases cited are Tamarin (1972), Ornan (2013) and Toshbeim (2005) in Israel, Shabalala (1995) in South Africa, and Sejdić and Finci (2009) in the European Court of Human Rights. Chapter 9 ends PDF p.271.

• Chapter 10: Between Two States and One — Palestinian Citizens of Israel, by Maha Nassar (PDF p.272-294 / printed p.253-275): Oslo — and before it the 1988 declaration of statehood — excluded Palestinian citizens of Israel (‘48 Palestinians) from the national agenda; Nassar traces their political debates since 1948 between a communist camp (the ICP/Maki, then Rakah) that recognised Israel, focused after 1967 on the “‘67 issues” and championed two states, and a nationalist camp (the Ard movement, then Abna’ al-Balad) that questioned Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state and advocated for a single democratic state in all of historic Palestine. The PLO’s 1988 Declaration and the 1993 Oslo Accords solidified a two-state consensus that severed ‘48 Palestinians from the national project and encouraged integration into Israel, even as the Zionist left increasingly emphasised Israel’s Jewish character; the National Democratic Assembly (Balad, founded 1995) answered with “a state of all its citizens” and Azmi Bishara’s early binational proposals. The Second Intifada, the October 2000 killings of thirteen unarmed Palestinians, the Orr Commission report (2003) and increasingly discriminatory laws returned decolonizing — specifically settler-colonial — discourses to the centre, in the 2006-2007 Vision Documents among them; since then one-state initiatives (Abna’ al-Balad’s revised 2008 platform, the Popular Movement for One Democratic State on Historic Palestine of 2013, the One Democratic State Campaign from 2018) have gained ground alongside persistent two-state advocacy (Ayman Odeh), without a leadership consensus or a national programme incorporating the ‘48 lands. The 2018 Nation-State Law, the INSS framework (a Palestinian “state” in 65 percent of the West Bank) and the Trump administration’s January 2020 proposal (including transfer of the triangle communities, potentially stripping some 250,000 Palestinians of Israeli citizenship) close the chapter’s account.

• Chapter 10 — Politics until 1967 and the two-state debate, 1967-1987 (PDF p.272-279 / printed p.253-260): the ICP was for decades the only legal, non-Zionist party with Arabs and Jews as equals, holding one to three Knesset seats (MKs Emile Habibi and Tawfiq Tubi); the nationalists’ Ard papers (Oct. 1959-Jan. 1960) were wildly popular, but Ard’s 1964 application for recognition — its articles echoing Articles 3 and 4 of the PLO Charter, signalling “that there were Palestinians in Israel who were not reconciled to their perpetual minoritization within the Jewish state” (PDF p.274) — was denied and the denial upheld. After 1967 Rakah invoked UN Security Council Resolution 242 and denounced the occupation while refusing to unequivocally call for return; its leaders faced house arrest and curfews. Abna’ al-Balad, founded in Um al-Fahm in 1972, held that “the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people” (PDF p.277) as a single entity and strove for one Palestinian state on all the land. Rakah and Abna’ al-Balad joined for Land Day in March 1976, after which six unarmed protesters were killed by police. In fall 1976 Fouzi El-Asmar recorded both positions — Rakah’s pragmatic acceptance that ‘48 Palestinians would “remain an Arab minority in Israel” (PDF p.277) and a student journalist’s counter that a West Bank/Gaza state would leave them “a persecuted minority” (PDF p.278). The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) won 50 percent of the Palestinian vote in 1977; in 1984 the DFPE took 33 percent and the Progressive List for Peace 18 percent, both on near-identical two-state platforms. A December 1987 poll found only 28 percent preferring a state alongside Israel, 33 percent a binational state and 10 percent a Palestinian state in all of historic Palestine, while 78 percent ranked a state in the Occupied Territories with no modifications to the 1967 borders as their realistic expectation.

• Chapter 10 — The two-state consensus, 1988-2000 (PDF p.279-283 / printed p.260-264): the First Intifada’s urgency, coupled with the PLO’s desire to stay relevant in a rapidly changing international environment, led it to formalize what had been its de facto stance for several years (PDF p.279); the November 1988 PNC Declaration and communiqué demanded withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 and removal of settlements, with no mention of Palestinians inside the Green Line; the resolutions “resurrected the Green Line in the consciousness of both Palestinian communities” (PDF p.280). In 1992, 53 percent of Palestinian voters voted for Zionist parties. Rabin in October 1995 promised the Palestinian entity would be “an entity which is less than a state” (PDF p.281) with united Jerusalem including Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev as Israel’s capital. In the 1996 elections the NDA (printed “NDP” in two places, as printed) with Hadash gained three seats and the United Arab List with the Arab Democratic Party four. Bishara in 1997 predicted a binational turn once a sovereign state on every inch of the West Bank and Gaza proved unrealizable, sketching a Jewish-Arab polity with two legislative chambers and a common parliament; his 1999 prime-ministerial nomination, withdrawn before the election, publicised the demand. Barak, elected with 95 percent of the Palestinian vote, refused to take citizens’ demands seriously.

• Chapter 10 — The Second Intifada, decolonizing discourses and the present debate (PDF p.283-290 / printed p.264-271): the March 2000 Qa’dan ruling was denounced on the right as “a black day for the Jewish people” (PDF p.283); Sharon’s September 28 walk onto al-Haram al-Sharif triggered the Second Intifada, in which twelve-year-old Muhammad al-Durrah was among those killed in the first days. The Vision Documents of 2006-2007 — the Haifa Declaration calling Zionism a “settler-colonial project in Palestine” and the Future Vision describing “internal colonial policies” (PDF p.285) — stressed that “Israel should be a democratic binational state that guarantees full equality between Arabs and Jews within the Green Line” (PDF p.285); the 2011 Nakba Law answered them. A 2015 poll found 56 percent of ‘48 Palestinians and 55 percent of ‘67 Palestinians wanting a greater ‘48 role in the national movement, but only 41 percent of ‘48 Palestinians (against 73 percent of ‘67 Palestinians) saw a need for ‘48 representation in national institutions. NDA Secretary General Mtanes Shehadeh in 2017 questioned whether a Zionist left that is part of a colonial project can offer a solution according with Palestinian natural rights. A December 2017 survey found support at 83 percent for two states, 59 percent for one state and 70 percent for confederation. The Joint List, formed in 2015, has not produced a clear political vision, and younger activists question directing energy toward Knesset inclusion at all. Notes 1-69 and the bibliography are recorded item by item in the reading notes. Chapter 10 ends PDF p.294.

• Chapter 11: Indigeneity as Resistance, by Ilan Pappe (PDF p.295-306 / printed p.276-287; chapter continues beyond this part): Pappe opens with Arafat’s “We are not red Indians” (PDF p.295) and argues that Palestinians within Israel articulate, by their actions, aspirations and visions, their own version of a national indigenous struggle for liberation — decolonizing historic Palestine as a whole, incrementally and from below — and that Indigeneity has become a signifier of cultural and political struggle there, treated not as a fixed identity but as a dynamic one activists grow into. The indigeneity debate in Palestinian studies was prompted by study of the Naqab Bedouins and fears of “divisive classification” (PDF p.296) and of the limits of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which does not clearly endorse independent statehood; Nadim Rouhana’s counter prefers “homeland nationalism” on the ground that Zionism, unlike North America and Australia, has not yet “triumphed”. Against that, Pappe, following Said’s expanded definition of culture, Barakat and Mamdani (citizenship and land as the shared struggle; the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act and Israel’s 1952 Nationality Law alike “declaring” natives citizens akin to naturalization), contends cultural indigenous resistance is not an alternative to the national struggle but its optimal available form.

• Chapter 11 — Indigeneity as a political strategy (PDF p.298-301 / printed p.279-282): since Camp David’s collapse in 2000 and the July 2018 Nation-State Law, Israeli expansion has in Pappe’s account dealt the two-state solution a final deathblow, yet Palestinian leadership on both sides of the Green Line still treats the statehood struggle and the civic struggle inside Israel as distinct; Bishara is quoted that the strategy in Israel was never about destroying the Jewish state from within or gaining sovereignty. Native is defined as a neutral, static term of location and attachment, indigenous as an evolving position of empowerment and resilience; the indigenous claim goes beyond a state over 22 percent of the homeland to the homeland in totality, land and wealth redistribution, and dismantling settler-colonial institutions. Despair at any viable state and determination to work locally have eased the tension between national and indigenous self-definition; framing the minority as indigenous also internationalizes a cause the peace process treated as a domestic Israeli issue, as in Salaita’s work and the Fall 2013 joint Palestine Youth Movement of San Diego and Collectivo Zapatista run along the US-Mexico border. Against the liberal Zionist position granting cultural autonomy, the struggle centres on land: “the land speaks Arabic in the Jewish state” (PDF p.301).

• Chapter 11 — Culture as political resistance: de-Judaizing, graffiti, the home, education (PDF p.301-306 / printed p.282-287; chapter continues beyond this part): cultural resistance, in Bleiker’s phrase “located in countless non-heroic practices that make up the realm of the everyday” (PDF p.301), fights Gramsci’s “wars of position” rather than “wars of maneuver” (PDF p.301-302); indigenous cultural projects have been more systemically targeted since 2016 as a threat to national security. In the Galilee, the “Judaization of the Galilee” project indigenizes Jewish society while de-indigenizing Palestinians, yet resistance venues paradoxically sit inside Israeli tourist sites — at Safuriyya and Bir’im, second-generation internal refugees declare return. Galilee murals redraw pre-1948 village scenery as a virtual reruralization; the Hadara project (2017, the NGO al-Manar with the firm al-Arkan) reconstructs archetypal pre-1948 villages from destroyed villages’ own materials, its models supplied to more than one hundred Palestinian schools; in Haifa, organizations resist demolition of houses such as Emil Touma’s and seek UNESCO heritage recognition. In education, the four Vision Papers of 2006-2007 demand recognition as “a native national group” (PDF p.305) and “cultural educational autonomy” on the ground that “the Arab Palestinians in Israel — as natives — have the right to run their own educational system” (PDF p.305), including a “territorial cultural statutory autonomy” and a separate Arab educational authority; the Follow-Up Committee expanded Ibn Khaldun’s shadowing of Ministry textbooks — against “One Hundred Basic Notions about Zionism,” “One Hundred Basic Notions about Palestine” (PDF p.306). Pappe contrasts the indigenous cultural project from below with the liberal Zionist project, which “tries hypocritically to universalize” both the Jewish and Arab narratives (PDF p.306). The chapter continues into “Indigenizing Segregated Spaces,” on land ownership and mixed towns [continues in part 8].

• Chapter 11 — Indigenizing segregated spaces, completed (PDF p.307 / printed p.288): in originally mixed towns the struggle is regaining space for expansion, demolishing segregation walls, safeguarding Arabic street and neighborhood names and improving infrastructure; in Acre and Jaffa it runs against silent de-Arabization and transfer of Arab neighborhoods to Jewish ownership, and in Ramleh residents resist a municipality that deems them aliens and mitrad (“nuisance”), with the NGO al-Bayt winning UNESCO heritage recognition for some Palestinian buildings while Palestinian neighborhoods stay outside the city’s municipal strategic planning. The second challenge is movement the other way: approximately seventy thousand Palestinians are estimated to live in officially Jewish spaces or traditionally Jewish neighborhoods in mixed towns, higher earners paying double or triple the rent demanded of Jewish renters, partly to remain inside the pre-1967 borders if a two-state solution were implemented; the Acceptance to Communities Law of 2011, formalizing admission committees for communities of up to four hundred family units in the Naqab and Galilee, is in the chapter’s account intended to prevent Palestinians settling in Jewish communities.

• Chapter 11 — Commemoration as cultural resistance (PDF p.307-308 / printed p.288-289): ADRID, the principal body representing the internal refugees in Israel (more than a quarter of a million people), founded after the 1991 Madrid Conference failed to broach refugees, has since 1998 organized an annual March of Return on Israel’s Independence Day to a different 1948-destroyed village each year; Nakba Day commemorations on May 15, begun in the early 1990s, prioritize the internal refugees’ return before the general right of return, double as solidarity with Gaza by video call, and are a focus of struggle against the 2011 Nakba law barring public funding to anyone commemorating 1948 as the Nakba — liberal Zionist Shlomo Avineri criticized the commemoration as delegitimizing the state. ADRID’s strategies, including making Nakba collective memory part of the identity and ethos of any future political entity, are in the chapter’s account similar to those used in other indigenous struggles, and the term internal refugees itself emphasizes indigeneity against efforts to denationalize the Palestinian struggle.

• Chapter 11 — Conclusions (PDF p.308-310 / printed p.289-291): the minority’s political elite still operates with reference to the two-state solution, but its death and the formation of a de facto single state, a variation on the South African Apartheid model, have changed the civil and cultural struggle inside Israel, with effects also for Jerusalem and Area C; while the national political limbo persists, activists stress indigeneity as an alternative language to the banned demand for national Palestinian rights, and space, place and counter-settlements are the means of the modern-day struggle. The outlawed Islamic movement’s turn to claiming religious spaces as “traditional” and “Islamic cultural” centers is read as a strategy of survival against settler-colonial erasure, not submission to it; such cultural resistance is daily and everywhere — community centers, youth and football clubs, informal education, plays and films. Demanding normality may seem modest, but it is existential: the daily cultural struggles center on equality now, in the name of civic and indigenous rights, a call for humanizing the Palestinians in Israel.

• Chapter 11 — Notes and bibliography, completed (PDF p.310-313 / printed p.291-294): notes 1-35 and a full bibliography, recorded item by item in the reading notes; parts of the chapter are drawn from Pappe, “Indigeneity as Resistance”, South Atlantic Quarterly 117, no.1 (2018): 157-78. The bibliography lists Amal Jamal’s Arab Minority in Israel: The Politics of Indigeneity (2011) and two works by Lorenzo Veracini, which the notes as read do not cite.

• Conclusion, by Leila Farsakh (PDF p.314-317 / printed p.295-298): “The Palestinian quest for an independent state has been unsuccessful but it was not in vain” (PDF p.314) — it affirmed Palestinians’ right to self-determination and their political presence, which UN Resolution 242 denied, but it could not bring liberation, let alone justice, confined within an international consensus based on territorial Partition that does not question the settler-colonial structure of Zionism nor address the injustices inflicted since 1948, and deepened that colonialism, as manifested by the 2018 nationality law. Self-determination cannot be protected within a strict territorial understanding of sovereignty or an ethno-nation-state; whether the state can be transcended in exercising it is the central question going forward. Following Hanieh, the state is a social relation within a dynamic global capitalist reality — Covid-19’s impact, capital flows and class formation are critical — and Palestine must be de-exceptionalized in its regional context, its history of displacement no longer distinctive beside Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese refugees; the demand for self-determination and equality is shared by Arab citizens across the region, as the 2011 Arab uprising demonstrated. The volume’s conclusion is that the state cannot be transcended but needs to be rethought: its power tamed, a constitutive political community accountable to and representative of its citizens, the source of sovereignty, entitled to full equality — though how to hold it accountable in an increasingly integrated and deeply unequal regional and international context warrants further research. The Abraham Accords, signed at the White House on September 14, 2020 (date as printed), formalized long-standing informal economic and security relations, signaled the official end of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative — which had conditioned normalization on ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its “capitol” (as printed) — and, with the Trump Administration’s 2020 peace plan, entrench an authoritarian understanding of statehood and mark the end of an era in which resolving the conflict was considered central to regional peace. Against readings of demise, the 2011 uprisings’ aftermath shows the symbiotic relationship between Palestine and the Arab region, and the “Ferguson to Palestine” rallies, the “Black Life Matters” demonstrations (as printed) and the international outcry against Israel’s 2021 war show the cause’s worldwide resonance and the intersectionality of struggle; race, class and decolonization are redefining political liberation and citizenship in the twenty-first century. Following “Masen Masri” (as printed), statehood is intertwined with law, produced by and for the people as the only sovereign; the law continues to affirm the individual right of return, the collective right to fight colonialism and the legal validity of Palestinian nationality (Akram), but how to translate those legal tools into a political program of decolonization needs further study, since, as Noura Erakat has shown, law can be a weapon of oppression as much as an instrument for liberation. Liberation cannot be achieved by accepting Israel’s colonial structure in the hope of containing it, and decolonization’s meaning differs by constituency — return for the diaspora, independent statehood for the West Bank and Gaza, transforming Israel into a state ensuring equality for all its citizens for Palestinian citizens of Israel — with no institutional platforms to harmonize these visions into a single political project; which constituency can best articulate liberation’s political shape, and whether Palestinian citizens of Israel should or would become the center of gravity of Palestinian nationalism, as refugees did in the 1970s and 1980s and West Bank and Gaza Palestinians over the past three decades, remains an open question. Settler-colonialism is an ongoing process whose dismantlement entails decolonizing Israeli-Palestinian relations above all: Israelis giving up colonial privileges and addressing historical injustices and reconciliation, Palestinians in turn addressing Israelis’ collective and individual rights once those privileges are revoked — among the thorniest issues for Palestinian activists and researchers; the success of any constitutional design for a democratic decolonized polity, binational, federal or confederal, will hinge on the willingness of those involved to work and live together as equals, and, following Khoury, decolonization entails reconciliation, including within Israeli and Palestinian societies and across an Arab world scarred by ten years of war. The closing dilemma is how to move beyond the grand narrative of national liberation without falling into the neoliberal discourse of rights: Pappe’s indigeneity is offered as a more productive approach, its effectiveness still to be seen, and grassroots resistance — the yearly Nakba commemoration inside the Green Line, the 2017-18 Great March of Return and the Spring 2021 uprising — expresses new ways of unifying the Palestinian body politic without ossifying it in rigid institutions, against calls to revive the PLO. At the heart of the question of Palestine is the desire for freedom and justice, shared with Arab citizens against oppressive regimes, indigenous peoples in the Americas and Australia, people of color in the United States, refugees at the doors of Europe and Iranians waging the Green Revolution; further research can illuminate what political and legal actions are needed to create a decolonized polity ensuring liberation and equality for all. The Conclusion has no notes or bibliography.

• List of Contributors (PDF p.318-320 / printed p.299-301): biographies of the eleven contributors, recorded in full in the reading notes — Akram at Boston University’s International Human Rights Clinic, Assali a Jerusalem-born lawyer working as a freelancer consultant and researcher, Baconi the Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Israel/Palestine, Farsakh at the University of Massachusetts Boston, Hanieh at the University of Exeter, Khoury at Lillehammer University College, Masri at City University of London, Munayyer a nonresident senior fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC, Nassar at the University of Arizona, Pappe at the University of Exeter, and Toukan at Bard College Berlin.

• Index (PDF p.322-327 / printed p.303-308): a full index whose locators are printed pages, recorded entry by entry in the reading notes; PDF p.321 is blank in the text copy.

• Back matter and back cover (PDF p.328-329): a University of California Press and UC Press Foundation page, and the back cover — Luminos free-ebook notice, cover illustration credited to Franz Josef Ulm, Ghanamaat, the series line New Directions in Palestinian Studies, 4, a blurb presenting the book as giving prominence to “a young set of diverse Palestinian scholars” and setting “the terms of debate for the future of Palestine beyond partition”, and endorsements by Rashid Khalidi, Penny Johnson and Alain Gresh, with a short author note for Farsakh.

Key passages

• “the quest for a Palestinian state was not in vain, but its historical role has come to an end” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.21)

• “all people have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.22) — UN Resolution 1514 as quoted in the Introduction.

• “the armed struggle of the Palestinian people is not a racial or religious struggle directed against the Jews” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.23) — eighth Palestinian National Council resolution, 1971, as quoted in the Introduction.

• “we are not born equal; we become equal members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutual equal rights” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.33) — Hannah Arendt as quoted in the Introduction.

• “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.51) — the neo-Weberian definition of the state as presented in Chapter 1.

• “The disengagement is actually formaldehyde” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.79) — Dov Weisglass, Sharon’s top aide, to Haaretz, as quoted in Chapter 2.

• “Israel needs Hamas to be weak enough not to attack, but stable enough to deal with the radical terrorist groups in Gaza” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.85) — a key member of Israel’s security establishment, as quoted in Chapter 2.

• “an Islamic land entrusted to the Muslim generations until Judgement Day” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.75) — Hamas’s charter on the land of historic Palestine, as quoted in Chapter 2.

• “a permit for permanent residency, when granted, is based on a reality of permanent residency. Once this reality no longer exists, the permit expires of itself” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.110) — Justice Aharon Barak in the Awad case, as quoted in Chapter 3.

• “I don’t want to legitimize the Israeli occupation, and I am afraid of the Palestinian Authority. Our situation is terrible, but voting wouldn’t make it any better. We Jerusalemite Palestinians are no one and we are nowhere” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.116) — an East Jerusalemite woman on the 2018 municipal elections, as quoted in Chapter 3.

• “a mobilizing and interactive cultural project that can stitch together the fragmented Palestinian body politic by presenting a wide variety of narratives about the relationships of Palestinians to the land, to each other and to the wider world” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.136) — Beshara Doumani’s conception of the Palestinian Museum, as quoted in Chapter 4.

• “What is happening is not merely an imitation of westernization, but an enactment of de-westernization in that western cultural standards are being appropriated and adapted to local or regional sensibilities, needs and visions” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.139) — Walter Mignolo on the Qatari Museum of Islamic Art, as quoted in Chapter 4, whose decolonial claim Toukan questions.

• “Men are not born equal, the white and black races are not born with equal capacities” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.149) — Arthur Balfour in the 1906 Commons debate, as quoted in Chapter 5.

• “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.173) — the UN definition of transitional justice, as quoted in Chapter 6.

• “We decided not to deal with past accounts” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.175) — Yitzhak Rabin to the Knesset, April 18, 1994, as quoted in Chapter 6.

• “would be a milestone toward reconciliation that no Palestinian could ignore” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.178) — George Bisharat on a sincere Israeli apology, as quoted in Chapter 6.

• “the union of Jews and Arabs in a bi-national Palestine based on parity of the two peoples” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.195) — Ihud’s Palestine: A Bi-National State (1946), as quoted in Chapter 7.

• “We regard the historical rights of the Jews and the natural rights of the Arabs as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.195) — Ihud’s 1946 document, as quoted in Chapter 7.

• “all Jewish Palestinians—at the present Israelis—have the same right provided of course they reject Zionist racist chauvinism and fully accept to live as Palestinian in the New Palestine” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.198) — the PLO’s 1970 pamphlet, as quoted in Chapter 7.

• “Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine … shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.217) — Resolution 181’s Partition Plan, as quoted in Chapter 8; the ellipsis marks the plan’s reference to Arabs and Jews not holding Palestinian citizenship, as given in the reading notes.

• “every Jew has the right to come to this country [i.e., Israel] as an oleh” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.219) — Israel’s Law of Return (1950), as quoted in Chapter 8.

• “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.224) — ICCPR Article 12(4), as quoted in Chapter 8.

• “The strongest claim for right of return is based on Palestinians as nationals, not as stateless persons and not just as refugees” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.229) — Chapter 8’s conclusion.

• “a particularism masquerading as the universal” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.252) — Charles Taylor on universal equality, as quoted in Chapter 9.

• “the view that states should not only uphold the familiar set of common civil, political, and social rights of citizenship that are protected in all constitutional liberal democracies, but also adopt various group-specific rights or policies that are intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and aspirations of ethnocultural groups” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.258) — Will Kymlicka’s definition of multiculturalism, as quoted in Chapter 9.

• “the local currency of the population” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.266) — Chapter 9’s Epilogue on what constitutional values must become.

• “We are not red Indians” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.295) — Yasser Arafat on Palestinians as an indigenous people, as quoted in Chapter 11.

• “the land speaks Arabic in the Jewish state” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.301) — Palestinians in the north of Israel, as quoted in Chapter 11.

• “The Palestinian quest for an independent state has been unsuccessful but it was not in vain” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.314) — the Conclusion’s opening.

• “the state cannot be transcended but needs to be rethought” (Rethinking Statehood in Palestine, PDF p.315) — the Conclusion, drawing the volume’s chapters together.

Evidence the work relies on

• For the Introduction: Said, The Question of Palestine (1979); Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire (2019) and Wilder, Freedom Time (2015) on self-determination; UN Resolutions 1514, 181, 194, 242, 3236 and 3237 and the PNC programs of 1971 and 1974 (the latter quoted in Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within, 1988); Khalidi, The Iron Cage (2007); Farsakh’s own articles on aid and the one-state solution (2011, 2016, 2017); Stamatopoulou-Robbins (2018) and Rabie on state-building’s material projects; Quartet aid figures from Farsakh (2016); Central Bureau of Statistics employment figures (the PNA employing 31-48 percent of the employed labor force in Gaza and over 15 percent in the West Bank since 2000, Introduction n.23).

• For Chapter 1 (to PDF p.59): the state-building and liberal-peace literature, including Fukuyama and USAID definitions; the World Bank’s Developing the Occupied Territories (1993) and the State and Peace Building Fund rationale; the EU Berlin Declaration (1999); the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010 (security allocation 257 million dollars); critiques by Mushtaq Khan, the International Crisis Group (2002) and Mandy Turner on Hamas’s 2006 victory; Radice and Ollman on state theory; a former US intelligence officer’s valuation of the US-Israel military relationship (Chapter 1 n.44).

• For Chapter 1 (PDF p.60-72): QIZ trade figures from Kotschwar and Schott (2010), the US Trade Representative (2007) and a 2014 US State Department speech; Gulf FDI shares from the World Bank’s Over the Horizon: A New Levant (2014) and ANIMA (2009); Palestinian banking control from the author’s analysis of stock-exchange data and Palestine Monetary Authority bank lists (Chapter 1 n.62); Hanieh’s own Capital and Class article (2011) on Gulf capital and Palestinian class formation; the Deauville Partnership pledge as reported in the Wall Street Journal (May 28, 2011).

• For Chapter 3 (PDF p.99-125): PASSIA, Jerusalem and Its Changing Boundaries (2018) and Maps 8-9; Ir Amim, Permanent Residency (2012); HaMoked’s timeline, regulations excerpt and freedom-of-information revocation figures; B’Tselem, Divide and Rule (1998) and, with HaMoked, The Quiet Deportation Continues (1998); Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound (2014); Halper, “The Three Jerusalems” (2002); Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel (2005), for settlement figures; Jefferis on the center-of-life policy (2012); the Declaration of Principles and Interim Agreement texts; the ICJ advisory opinion of July 9, 2004; settler figures in Figure 1 from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and B’Tselem.

• For Chapter 4 (PDF p.126-141): Massad on the “post-colonial” colony (2000); the author’s interviews and field conversations, including Zina Jardaneh (December 17, 2017) and Nasser Soumi; Doumani’s 2010 museum proposal; Salti and Khouri, Past Disquiet, on the 1978 International Art Exhibition for Palestine; Hanieh on Gulf capital and Seikaly on Palestinian capitalist entrepreneurs; Mignolo on the Museum of Islamic Art, Doha.

• For Chapter 2 (PDF p.73-98): Hamas’s charter and its publications in Filastin al-Muslima (including al-Rantissi, Abu Marzouq and Meshal statements), Palestinian documents in al-Watha’iq al-Filastiniyyah (Hamas’s 2006 political program, interviews and letters), Fatah’s 1967 statement as quoted in Sayigh’s Armed Struggle and the Search for State (1997); the Quartet statement of January 26, 2006; Weisglass’s Haaretz interview (October 6, 2004); blockade impact figures from OCHA’s December 15, 2008 humanitarian situation report; polling figures for 1993 and 1998-99 from Milton-Edwards and Bloom (Chapter 2 n.15); the author’s interviews with Hamas leaders and with Israeli security analysts (June-August 2015); Map 7, Gaza Strip 2014 (PASSIA, adapted from OCHA, January 2013).

• For Chapter 5 (PDF p.146-168): Bawardi, The Making of Arab Americans (2014) and Pennock, The Rise of the Arab American Left (2017) on early activism; the USCPR’s own “BDS Wins” list; Balfour’s 1906 Commons speech and his 1919 statements via Cohen, Britain’s Moment in Palestine (2014), Krämer and Walid Khalidi; Oren’s Wall Street Journal and Foreign Policy pieces (2015); the right-wing punditry quoted (Krauthammer, Kristol, Stephens, Rubin, Huckabee, Gingrich); the UN Human Rights Council’s 2014 Gaza inquiry report; Telhami and Rouse’s 2017 University of Maryland poll on sanctions; Palestine Legal’s count of anti-boycott legislation; Michelle Alexander’s New York Times column (January 19, 2019).

• For Chapter 6 (PDF p.172-186, notes continuing): the UN Guidance Note on Transitional Justice (2010) and UNGA Resolution 60/147 on reparations; Rouhana (2004) on reconciliation; Dudai (2007) on dealing with the past and on transitional justice’s open ends; the Rabin, Savir, Qurei and Livni statements as quoted from published sources and the Palestine Papers; Masalha on Nakba memory and the politics of denial; Zochrot’s and BADIL’s transitional-justice work as presented; Jung on Canada’s residential-schools process; Perugini and Gordon, The Human Right to Dominate, on inverted human-rights discourse.

• For Chapter 7 (PDF p.192-210): the Ihud document Palestine: A Bi-National State (1946) and Buber’s and Magnus’s essays in Towards a Union in Palestine (1947); Rasheed, Towards a Democratic State in Palestine for Moslems, Christians and Jews (PLO Research Center, 1970), as quoted in Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within (1988); Shohat on Sephardim and the Arab Jew; Anderson’s Imagined Communities and Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism on nation and state; the Birzeit CDS 2015 survey as reported in Farsakh’s 2016 policy paper “The Legal and Political Limitation of the Oslo Agreements” (1,060 respondents, tables 1-2); LeVine and Mossberg, One Land, Two States (2014), for the parallel-states proposal; B’Tselem checkpoint and settlement statistics (2019); World Bank GDP and GDP-per-capita data in n.43; Israeli CBS and PCBS population figures (2020) in n.32.

• For Chapter 8 (PDF p.211-228, notes continuing): the Treaty of Lausanne, Article 30; the Palestine Mandate (Articles 2 and 7) and the Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925 with the September 1922 proclamation; UN Resolutions 181 and 194 with the UN Secretariat’s interpretation of 181, the UNCCP’s analysis of paragraph 11 and the UN legal advisor’s note of April 9, 1951; Israel’s Law of Return (1950), “Nationality Law” (1952) and Jewish Nation-State Basic Law (2018); the ICJ’s Nottebohm decision (1955); the ICCPR, CERD, the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions and the 1963 Draft Principles on the Right to Leave and Return; the September 1967 census and population registry; the Palestinian Basic Law (Articles 1, 4, 7) and the unpublished 1995 and 2012 draft citizenship laws as described in the chapter.

• For Chapter 8 (PDF p.229-243): Qafisheh, “Who Has the Right to Become a Palestinian Citizen?” (2017), for the categories a Palestinian nationality law must cover and for the 1995 and 2012 drafts (the latter drafted by Qafisheh); Qafisheh’s International Law Foundations of Palestinian Nationality (2008), Palestine Membership in the United Nations (2013) and “Genesis of Citizenship” (2010) throughout the notes; Oppenheim (1905) and the 1929 Harvard Research nationality study; Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest (2009) and “The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians” (2005); Tekiner (1991) on the citizenship/nationality translation; the Tamarin (1970), Ornan (2013) and Nottebohm (1955) decisions; UN treaty-body concluding observations on Israel (CERD 2018, CESCR 1998/2012, Human Rights Committee 2014) and the Falk-Tilley ESCWA report (2017).

• For Chapter 9 (PDF p.244-265, notes continuing): the 2018 Nation-State Law and the Law of Return as interpreted by Aharon Barak; Klare on transformative constitutionalism and the South African Constitutional Court in Shabalala (1995); Wolfe on settler-colonialism’s logic of elimination; Taylor on the politics of universalism; Lijphart’s consociational model and its critics, with Bosnia’s Sejdić and Finci judgment (2009) and the Belgian and Bosnian federal arrangements; Kymlicka on multiculturalism and its three principles; Riker’s definition of federalism; Waldron’s case against judicial review and Ginsburg’s political-insurance theory; the South African constitution’s equality provisions.

• For Chapter 9 (PDF p.266-271): Resolution 194 (III) on return; the comparative constitutional literature in notes 1-46 (Klare and Davis on transformative constitutionalism, Lijphart, Kymlicka, Riker, Waldron, Ginsburg) and the cases cited (Tamarin, Ornan, Toshbeim, Shabalala, Sejdić and Finci).

• For Chapter 10 (PDF p.272-294): Nassar’s Brothers Apart (2017) throughout; Robinson, Citizen Strangers (2013); El-Asmar, “Israel Revisited, 1976” (1977), for the 1976 debate; Jiryis (1979); the December 1987 poll in Zureik and Haider (1991); the PNC Communiqué, Algiers, November 15, 1988; Rabin’s “Ratification of Interim Agreement” (October 5, 1995); Bishara’s 1997 Journal of Palestine Studies interview; the 2006-2007 Vision Documents (Haifa Declaration; Future Vision); the Orr Commission report as cited in Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker (2005); Shehadeh and Sa’abnah (2016) and the PCPSR Palestinian-Israeli Pulse joint poll (December 2017) for the 2015 and 2017 figures; the Nation-State Basic Law text (Adalah translation, July 25, 2018); the INSS framework (October 8, 2018); the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” (January 28, 2020).

• For Chapter 11 (PDF p.295-306, part): the settler-colonial and indigenous-studies literature (Wolfe, Salamanca et al., Nasasra on the Naqab); Rouhana’s “homeland nationalism” counter; Said on culture; Barakat and Mamdani on shared indigenous fate and on citizenship and land; the 2006-2007 Vision Papers for educational autonomy; the Hadara reconstruction project and Galilee murals as presented in the chapter.

• For Chapter 11 (PDF p.307-313, completion): Falah, Hoy and Sarker on mixed cities (2000) for the segregated-spaces account (n.31); Yediot Achronot, April 27, 2013, for Palestinians and Jews living in each other’s spaces (n.32); Avineri’s Haaretz piece of October 6, 2012 for the liberal Zionist objection to Nakba commemoration (n.33); Rouhana’s “Homeland Nationalism” (n.34); and the chapter’s own earlier version in South Atlantic Quarterly 117, no.1 (2018): 157-78.

• For the Conclusion (PDF p.314-317): no notes or bibliography; it draws on the volume’s own chapters (Hanieh on the state as a social relation, Akram on Palestinian nationality, Masri — printed “Masen Masri” — on law, Khoury on reconciliation, Pappe on indigeneity) and on Noura Erakat’s showing, as the Conclusion presents it, that law can be a weapon of oppression as much as an instrument for liberation.

Analysis

In the parts read so far, the book’s method is framing and synthesis: Farsakh’s Introduction sets the shared terms — partition, self-determination detached from territorial sovereignty, settler-colonialism as the analytical paradigm, rights as the uniting frame — and Hanieh’s chapter supplies the political-economy grounding, replacing the neo-Weberian, technocratic account of state-building with a class-relational one and placing Palestinian class formation inside the regional order of oil, US hegemony and normalization. The Introduction’s historical claims rest largely on the cited secondary literature rather than on documents reproduced in the text; its strongest documentary moments are the quoted PNC resolutions of 1971 and 1974 and the UN resolutions it paraphrases. Hanieh’s completed chapter grounds the framing in trade, FDI and ownership figures, though several central figures rest on his own earlier work and on his analysis of banking data (Chapter 1 n.62-63). Baconi’s chapter works as a political history of Hamas and Gaza drawn substantially from Hamas’s own publications and documents, which gives its account of Hamas’s stated positions unusual documentary depth while leaving Israeli policy to be characterized mainly through secondary literature, leaked reports and the author’s interviews with security analysts. Assali’s chapter is a legal-administrative history: its force is the accumulation of statutes, regulations, court rulings and revocation figures from rights organizations (Ir Amim, HaMoked, B’Tselem, PASSIA), showing Oslo’s deferral of Jerusalem operating as a free hand for consolidation; its prescriptive close (task forces, funded proactive protection) is asserted rather than evidenced. Toukan’s chapter is an ethnographic and critical essay, reprinted from a journal, whose evidence is field conversation and the museum’s own history; its political-economy critique applies Hanieh’s Chapter 1 frame to cultural production, making the collection’s argument cumulative across chapters. Munayyer’s Chapter 5 closes Part One as a movement history written from inside the USCPR: its evidence is the campaign’s own record, the punditry it quotes at length, and one opinion poll, and its central claim — that the Trump/Netanyahu alignment paradoxically opened space for rights-based advocacy — is argued from the partisan-shift narrative rather than from polling series of its own. Khoury’s Chapter 6 opens Part Two as the collection’s most self-limiting chapter: a conceptual analysis that presents transitional justice’s appeal to the Palestinian camp and then shows, through the Dudai proposals and the Canadian and “Jewish Nakba” cases, that the same mechanisms can serve partition, incrementalism or the negation of Palestinian claims — so the chapter’s force is its insistence that mechanisms do not choose their politics. Farsakh’s Chapter 7 is a documentary comparison: it reads the Ihud and PLO one-state texts against each other to show that both turn on the state-nation relation — Ihud detaching sovereignty from statehood to protect two nations’ collective rights, the PLO refusing that detachment and recognizing Jewish rights only individually — and then tests the revived one-state idea against survey evidence (the CDS 2015 results cut against its advocates in the West Bank and Gaza) and against the economic asymmetry any single polity would inherit. Akram’s Chapter 8 is a legal-doctrinal argument built from the instruments themselves — Lausanne, the Mandate, the 1925 Order, Resolutions 181 and 194, the 1950-1952 Israeli laws and the human-rights treaties — whose force is its chain: if Palestinian nationality was formed in 1924 and Israel’s denationalization was illegal, return follows as a national’s right rather than a refugee’s plea; its limits, in the part read so far, are that the counter-arguments (statelessness, sovereign discretion over entry) are stated mainly to be answered, and several figures (the twelve million stateless nationals, the one hundred thousand Jerusalem residency revocations) are asserted in the text with their support in the notes still to come in part 6. With the notes now read, that support proves to be largely secondary and institutional — Qafisheh’s monographs for the nationality chain, Shiblak for the statelessness counter-argument, and a Guardian report of an Israeli document for residency revocations, whose 140,000 headline figure covers a wider population than the main text’s Jerusalem figure. Masri’s Chapter 9 is a constitutional-design assessment rather than a documentary argument: it first derives guiding principles from the existing legal hierarchy (its six-category classification of rights between the river and the sea is the chapter’s most concrete descriptive work) and then measures each model — liberal, binational, multicultural, federal — against those principles, drawing its comparative material (France, South Africa, Belgium, Bosnia) from the constitutional-theory literature it cites. Its preference for the multicultural model follows from its own principles by construction, and its treatment is even-handed in cataloguing each model’s pitfalls, including its preferred model’s; what it does not yet do is address transition — how any of these frameworks could be reached from the hierarchy it describes; its Epilogue, read in this part, answers only that the choice among democratic models must start from clarity about the political project — decolonization, equality and/or justice — not from constitutional technique. Nassar’s Chapter 10 is a political history built largely on her own Brothers Apart and on the parties’ own record: its strength is showing the present one-state revival as the return of the nationalist camp’s older position rather than a new invention, with poll evidence (1987, 2015, 2017) that complicates any simple story of consensus at each stage; its limit is that the communist camp’s positions are presented mainly through their critics and through Nassar’s own earlier work. Pappe’s Chapter 11, in the part read so far, is a programmatic essay: it answers Rouhana’s objection by redefining the contest as cultural and incremental, and supports the turn with cases (Galilee murals, Hadara, textbook shadowing) that are described rather than documented, so the claim that indigeneity is now the community’s operative frame rests on the examples’ representativeness, which the chapter asserts more than it tests. Its completed sections widen the evidence — the ADRID marches, the mixed-town movements in both directions and the Islamic movement’s reframing of religious space as indigenous cultural space — but on the same descriptive terms, and its conclusion’s central demand, equality now and humanization, is a normative restatement of the frame rather than a test of it. Farsakh’s Conclusion is a synthesis, not a new argument: its work is to hold the collection’s constituencies — diaspora, West Bank and Gaza, citizens of Israel — in one frame, to name the questions the chapters leave open (which constituency leads, how legal tools become a political program, how the state is held accountable, what Israeli rights mean after privilege is revoked) as the research agenda, and to close on the volume’s one constructive formula, that the state cannot be transcended but needs to be rethought. It cites no apparatus of its own, so its factual claims (the Abraham Accords, the 2021 war and uprising) stand as the editor’s framing rather than as documented findings.

People, organizations, places and events

Leila Farsakh, Beshara Doumani, Samia Al-Botmeh, Linda Tabar, Adam Hanieh, Tareq Baconi, Hania Assali, Hanan Toukan, Yousef Munayyer, Nadim Khoury, Nadim Rouhana, Michael Oren, US Campaign for Palestinian Rights, BADIL, Zochrot, East Jerusalem, Orient House, Faisal Husseini, Mubarak Awad, Palestinian Museum, Taawon, Yasir Arafat, Edward Said, Ali Abunimah, Omar Barghouti, Keith Dayton, Mushtaq Khan, Arik Sharon, Mahmoud Abbas, Michelle Alexander, Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, Great March of Return, Abraham Accords, Balfour Declaration, Gaza, Gaza Siege, Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestinian Authority, Center for Development Studies, Birzeit University, Oslo Accords, Hamas, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Court of Justice, UNRWA, Susan M. Akram, Martin Buber, Judah Magnus, Moses Smilansky, Ihud, Brit Shalom, Azmi Bishara, Ellah Shohat, Treaty of Lausanne, Law of Return, Citizenship Law (1952), Nation-State Law, Jewish National Fund, Palestine Conciliation Commission, UN General Assembly Resolution 181, UN General Assembly Resolution 194, Mazen Masri, Mutaz M. Qafisheh, Maha Nassar, Ilan Pappe, Ayman Odeh, Abna’ al-Balad, National Democratic Assembly, Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, Progressive List for Peace, United Arab List, Joint List, Orr Commission, Land Day, Vision Documents, Haifa Declaration, Popular Movement for One Democratic State on Historic Palestine, One Democratic State Campaign, Hadara, Rakah, ADRID, Acceptance to Communities Law, Noura Erakat, Rashid Khalidi

Concepts

Partition, Self-determination, Two-state solution, One-state solution, Binationalism, State-building, Liberal peace, Methodological nationalism, Settler Colonialism, Decolonisation, Right of Return, BDS movement, Apartheid, Normalization, De-development, Mowing the Grass, Judaization, Center of life, Separation wall, Transitional justice, Lawfare, Intersectionality, Palestinian nationality, Secular Democratic State, Arab Question, Multiculturalism, Transformative constitutionalism, Federalism, Indigeneity, Consociationalism

How it relates to other sources

• With The Political Economy of Israeli Occupation: What is Colonial about It?: Farsakh’s 2008 article already argued Oslo redefined rather than ended a colonial political economy and foreclosed a viable two-state solution; the 2021 Introduction generalizes that conclusion into the claim that the state project’s historical role has ended, and Hanieh’s chapter extends the political-economy critique from the occupation’s structure to the regional class formation sustaining the PNA.
• With The Question of Palestine and Zionist Colonialism in Palestine: both are cited as foundations (Introduction n.1, n.7); the Introduction takes Said’s unresolved independence-versus-liberation question as the ambiguity at the heart of the state project, and Sayegh’s settler-colonial framing as the paradigm the new discourse revives.
• With From the River to the Sea: Essays for a Free Palestine: Adam Hanieh argues there, as here, that Oslo deepened control while cultivating a Palestinian social base invested in the status quo; here the argument is developed as a critique of state-formation theory itself and of methodological nationalism.
• With From the River to the Sea: Essays for a Free Palestine on Gaza: Baconi’s chapter there reads the 7 October 2023 attack against the post-2007 “violent equilibrium” of Hamas’s containment; the chapter here supplies that equilibrium’s prehistory — the blocking of Hamas’s 2006 government, the 2007 takeover and blockade, and the “mowing the lawn” doctrine — and ends with the Great March of Return as the grassroots alternative to both factions’ failed strategies.

Open questions

• The Introduction dates UN Resolution 194 to “December 4, 1948” (PDF p.21), as printed; the work gives no other date.

• The Introduction dates the ICJ ruling against Israel’s wall to 2005 (PDF p.31), and the Introduction itself dates the PNA’s petition to the ICJ to 2005 (PDF p.25). Both dates stand as printed in their places.

• Spelling variants as printed: “Richeter-Devroe” for Richter-Devroe in the Introduction text (PDF p.28) and n.34, against “Richter-Devroe” elsewhere; “Munayyar” for Munayyer in the chapter summary (PDF p.36); “Abumineh” for Abunimah in n.38 (PDF p.40); “George Mitchel” for Mitchell in n.26; “Sayigh, Fayez” in n.7 against the wiki’s “Sayegh”.

• Bibliographic conflict: Farsakh, “The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, is given as Middle East Journal 65, no. 1 (2011): 55-71 in n.38 (PDF p.41) and as Middle East Journal 64, no.1 (2011): 20-45 in the bibliography (PDF p.42). Both stand as printed.

• The Introduction bibliography lists Tilley, “After Oslo, a Paradigm Shift”, at pages “4252-53” (PDF p.44, as printed) and Wilder’s Freedom Time with the subtitle “the Future of the Work” (as printed).

• Chapter 1 dates “the split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2006” (PDF p.52), while the Introduction dates the Fatah-Hamas debacle to June 2007 (PDF p.25). Both stand as printed.

• Map 6’s land-exchange figures are printed in two methodologies whose percentages do not pair symmetrically (6.8% / 93.2% and 8.8% / 91.2% Israeli methodology; 5.5% / 5.4% Palestinian methodology, PDF p.30); recorded as printed from the map legend.

• Chapter 2’s note 33 dates the ICJ advisory opinion on the wall to “July 20, 2004” in its text and cites the opinion as “July 9, 2004” in the same note (PDF p.92); the Introduction dates the ICJ ruling to 2005 (PDF p.31). All dates stand as printed in their places.

• Chapter 2’s note 19 cites Andoni’s article to the Journal of Palestinian Studies 25, no. 3 (1994), as printed, while the chapter bibliography lists the same volume and issue under the Journal of Palestine Studies as (1996) (PDF p.91, p.95).

• Chapter 1’s notes and bibliography differ on page ranges for several works: Das, “State Theories”, cited at p.43 in n.34 against 27-57 in the bibliography; Davidson at 24-46 in n.33 against 26-46; Richmond at p.7 in n.24 against 1-20; Chapter 2 likewise gives Baumgarten at 24-48 in n.8 against 25-48 in its bibliography, and Filiu’s “The Twelve Wars on Gaza” at p.53 in n.81 against 52-60. All stand as printed.

• Chapter 2 n.40 cites a Filastin al-Muslima item dated February 26, 2014 amid the 2004-2006 documents supporting Hamas’s fixed principles (PDF p.93); recorded as printed.

• Chapter 2 uses the abbreviation “GRM” for the Great March of Return (PDF p.89, as printed) and the phrase “central tenants” for tenets (PDF p.89, as printed).

• Chapter 3 gives the Gafni Committee ratio as 73.5 percent Jews and 25.5 percent Palestinians (PDF p.104), which sums to 99 percent; both figures stand as printed.

• Chapter 3 gives the 1986 East Jerusalem settler total as “103,9000 settlers” (PDF p.105), as printed.

• Chapter 3 gives the Separation Wall’s total length as 712 kilometers (PDF p.108), while Chapter 2’s note 33 describes it as a 703 kilometer-long structure (PDF p.92). Both stand as printed.

• Chapter 3’s main text says the Sharon government ordered the Orient House closed in March 2001 (PDF p.108), while its note 32 records the temporary closure order as August 9, 2001 (PDF p.121). Both stand as printed.

• Chapter 3’s note 13 attributes the right to participate in “the PNC election process” (PDF p.121), as printed, where the main text concerns elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PDF p.104).

• Chapter 3’s note 50 cites Jefferis’s center-of-life article at page 1 (PDF p.122), as printed, against pages 94-103 in the bibliography (PDF p.124).

• Chapter 4’s main text records the firing/dismissal of Jack Persekian (PDF p.130-131), while its note 8 cites the Artforum item titled “Jack Persekian, Director of Palestinian Museum, Resigns” (PDF p.141). Both stand as printed.

• Chapter 4 gives the museum architect’s and author’s names in variant forms — “Al-Qattan” and “Al Qattan” (PDF p.128, p.135) — and Assali spells the Orient House founder both “Hussayni” and “Husseini” (PDF p.108, p.116). All stand as printed in their places.

• Chapter 4’s bibliography gives Hourani’s chapter at pages 297-303 (PDF p.144) against 297-306 in its note 20 (PDF p.142). Both stand as printed.

• Chapter 5 gives the span of Evangelical political mobilisation as “the two Bush administrations between 1988 and 2008” (PDF p.153), as printed, and spells Robert Spencer as “Robert Spence” in the main text (PDF p.154) against “Robert Spencer” in its note 20 (PDF p.166). Both stand as printed.

• Chapter 5’s bibliography lists “Louis, Willian Roger” (PDF p.168), as printed, and includes Porter’s Critics of Empire, which no note in the chapter cites.

• Chapter 6 gives the South African TRC figures as 7,112 amnesty applications received, 849 granted and 5,392 denied (PDF p.174); granted and denied sum to 6,241, not 7,112. All figures stand as printed.

• Chapter 6’s note 49 passage, as quoted in the main text (PDF p.181), opens a quotation for Dudai’s “intra-Israeli violence” definition without a closing attribution in the sentence as printed; recorded as printed.

• Chapter 6’s bibliography differs from its notes as printed: Al-Hardan’s article at volume 3 (PDF p.188) against volume 35 in n.40; Barghouti’s article at volume 2 (PDF p.188) against volume 4 in n.47; Bashir and Busbridge at 2018 (PDF p.188) against 2019 in n.47; Kaufman and Bisharat at Journal of Human Rights 1, no.2 (PDF p.189) against no.1 in n.63 (PDF p.188). The bibliography spells Ghanim “Huneida” (PDF p.189) against “Hunaida” in n.47, Nusseibeh against “Nuseibah” in n.29, and Rouhana “Nadeem” (PDF p.190) against “Nadim” elsewhere; Perugini and Gordon’s The Human Right to Dominate is dated 2005 in both n.53 and the bibliography, as printed. All stand as printed.

• Chapter 7 spells Magnus “Judah” in the main text (PDF p.194) and “Judas” in the document’s title credits (PDF p.192, p.194), throughout its notes and bibliography, and “Magnes” once in the main text (PDF p.197). It also gives Farsakh’s Ethnopolitics article in the notes headnote as “15:, no. 4” (PDF p.206), as printed, and dates Israel’s per-capita income comparison to 2013 in n.43 against 2019 GDP figures in the same note, with the West Bank and Gaza figure printed “$3,562-” (PDF p.208). Chapter 7’s bibliography dates the Israeli CBS Statistical Abstract to 2019 (PDF p.209) against 2020 in n.32, lists Azoulay and Ophir’s The One-State Condition, which no note in the chapter cites, and prints Farsakh’s four works (the CDS policy paper, the Middle East Journal article at 64, no.1: 20-45, Palestinian Labor Flows to Israel — title as printed — and the 2008 EJMES article) as dash continuations of the Faris (ed.) entry with no “Farsakh, Leila” heading, confirmed in the original.

• Chapter 7 and Chapter 6’s bibliography both cite Farsakh’s “The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” at Middle East Journal 64, no.1 (2011): 20-45 (PDF p.208, p.209), matching the Introduction bibliography’s version and standing against the Introduction n.38 version recorded above.

• Chapter 8’s Resolution 194 categories give category 1’s departure date as “after 19 November 1947” (PDF p.218) against November 29, 1947 in categories 2-4, as printed. Chapter 8 also says Israel “enacted its citizenship law of 1950” to grant “nationality” to Jews only (PDF p.222), as printed, where its own account dates the Law of Return to 1950 and the “Nationality Law” to 1952; names the ICJ’s Nottebohm parties as Guatemala and “Lichtenstein” (PDF p.221), as printed; gives the 1967-census aftermath figure as about one hundred thousand Palestinians who have lost Jerusalem residency under the center-of-life requirement (PDF p.226), as printed; and names the racial-discrimination convention “ICERD” (PDF p.228), as printed, against “CERD” in the same chapter (PDF p.224). All stand as printed.

• Chapter 8 gives the population meeting the 1925 Citizenship Order’s criteria as 847,000 (PDF p.216) and the September 1967 census count as 954,898 with at least 270,000 absent (PDF p.225); both stand as printed.

• Chapter 8’s conclusion calls for repeal of “the denationalization provision of the 1950 Nationality Law” (PDF p.229), as printed, checked against the original, where the chapter elsewhere dates the Nationality Law to 1952 and the Law of Return to 1950. Its notes print the Nottebohm respondent as “Liech” (n.3, n.46, n.68) against “Lichtenstein” in the main text (PDF p.221), and n.2 prints “edited by edited by” for the Butenschøn, Davis and Hassassian volume, confirmed in the original. All stand as printed.

• Chapter 8’s bibliography differs from its notes as printed: Eide’s chapter at pages 88-122 (PDF p.241) against 91-92 in n.2, with the editors ordered Butenschøn, Hassassian and Davis against Butenschøn, Davis and Hassassian in n.2; BADIL’s Closing Protection Gaps at pages 14-15 (PDF p.241) against 11, 14-15 in n.117; Rosand’s article at 1,094-138 (PDF p.243) against 1,094-1,138 in n.97; Akram’s 2013 chapter lists its editors as “Rochelle Davis and & Mimi Kirk” (PDF p.241), confirmed in the original; Dajani’s title is printed “Ruling Palestine, A History…” with a comma after Palestine (PDF p.241). Note 85 also leaves a parenthesis unclosed in its GA Resolution 2535 citation, as printed. All stand as printed.

• Chapter 8’s note 102 cites Sherwood’s Guardian report titled “Israel Stripped 140,000 Palestinians of Residency Rights” (PDF p.239), a West Bank and Gaza figure, while the main text supported by it gives about one hundred thousand Palestinians losing Jerusalem residency under the center-of-life requirement (PDF p.226). Both stand as printed in their places.

• Chapter 9 prints the consociationalism heading as “Conscociationalism” and attributes the model to “Arendt Lijphart” (PDF p.254), both confirmed in the original, against Arend Lijphart elsewhere in the wiki; it first prints Kymlicka as “Will Kymilcka” (PDF p.257), confirmed in the original, before spelling Kymlicka correctly; it prints Bosnia’s entity as “Republika Sparska” (PDF p.262), confirmed in the original, and “Bosnia Herzegovina” without “and” in several places. It dates Tamarin v. The State of Israel to 1972 (PDF p.256) against 1970 in Chapter 8 n.59 (PDF p.235), and spells the Law of Return’s immigration term shvout (PDF p.247), as printed. All stand as printed.

• Chapter 9’s notes differ from its bibliography as printed: n.27 gives Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” at pages 509-36 (PDF p.268) against 29-50 in the bibliography (PDF p.269), the latter confirmed in the original; n.42 gives Beramendi at pages 783-820 (PDF p.268) against 165-93 in the bibliography (PDF p.269); n.26 gives Choudhry, “Group Rights,” at 1,099-123 (PDF p.268) against 1,099-1,123 in the bibliography (PDF p.269), the latter confirmed in the original. Its notes also print “Yakoboson” (n.13, PDF p.267) against Yakobson in the bibliography, “Yuvl-Davis” (n.14) against Yuval-Davis, “Smilanksy” (n.21) against Smilansky, and “Arendt Lijphart” (n.24, PDF p.267) as in the chapter’s main text; the bibliography prints Abdo’s co-author as “Yuval-Davi” (PDF p.269). All stand as printed.

• Chapter 10 prints the National Democratic Assembly as “the NDP” and “the NDP-Hadash” list (PDF p.282), confirmed in the original, against “NDA” throughout the rest of the chapter. It prints the One Democratic State Campaign as both “ODSC” and “OSDC” on the same page (PDF p.288), confirmed in the original. Its notes and bibliography differ as printed: Shehadeh and Sa’abnah’s article is dated Winter 2016 at pages 56-60 in n.1 (PDF p.290) against Winter 2015 at 53-60 in the bibliography (PDF p.294); n.61 cites the article at page 55 (PDF p.293), outside the 56-60 range given in n.1 but inside the bibliography’s 53-60; n.52 names “Meza Qato” against “Mezna Qato” in the bibliography (PDF p.294); the bibliography prints Jabareen’s Journal of Palestine Studies issue as “mo. 1” (PDF p.293); n.28 cites Haidar, “The Nationalist Progressive Movement,” at page 109 (PDF p.291), outside that chapter’s bibliography range of 161-74. All stand as printed.

• Chapter 10’s attribution of “Twenty Years of Oslo: The Green Line’s Challenge to the Statehood Project” (Journal of Palestine Studies 43, no.1, 2013) conflicts as printed: n.38 credits it to Hassan Jabareen (PDF p.291), but the chapter bibliography prints it as a dash continuation under “Jabareen, Yousef”, after Yousef Jabareen’s 2010 “Critical Reflection” chapter (PDF p.293). Nn.49 and 54 cite it only as Jabareen, Twenty Years of Oslo (PDF p.292). The passages those notes support — “the Oslo political climate” quotation (PDF p.281, n.38), the Citizenship Law amendments (PDF p.284, n.49) and the Vision Documents’ “democratic binational state” line (PDF p.285, n.54) — are attributed to Hassan Jabareen per n.38 or neutrally in this wiki, never to Yousef Jabareen alone.

• Chapter 11 locates the NGO al-Manar in “Majdal Krum” (PDF p.304), confirmed in the original. It dates the Vision Papers as four documents of 2006-2007 published by Musawa, the Follow-Up Committee, Mada al-Karmil and Adalah (PDF p.305), while Chapter 10 describes three documents issued by Palestinian NGOs in Israel in 2006 and 2007 (PDF p.285). Both stand as printed in their places.

• Chapter 11 prints the Conclusions’ settler-colonial reality as the “ongoing setter-colonial reality” (PDF p.310), as printed. Its notes and bibliography differ as printed: n.5 names “Mansour Nasara” against “Nasasra” in the bibliography (PDF p.310, p.313); n.12 and the bibliography print Cheyfitz’s subject as “Steven Saliata” against Salaita (PDF p.310, p.312); n.17 prints “Land Reforms ad Food Sovereignty” and n.16 ends without a period (PDF p.311); n.28 dates Between Vision and Reality to “1006-2007”, confirmed in the original, against “2006-2007” for the Vision Papers in the main text, and n.28 prints editor “Ozacky-Lazar” against “Oszacky-Lazar” in the bibliography (PDF p.311, p.312); the bibliography prints Falah as “Gahzi” (PDF p.312), gives Mamdani’s Critical Inquiry article at volume 4 in both notes and bibliography (PDF p.310, p.312), lists Veracini’s article in “Palestine Studies” 42, no.2 (PDF p.313), and lists works by Jamal and Veracini that the notes as read do not cite. All stand as printed.

• The Conclusion dates the signing of the Abraham Accords to September 14, 2020 (PDF p.315), confirmed in the original, where Chapter 5 dates the accords’ announcement to August 2020 (PDF p.159); it prints “Masen Masri” for Mazen Masri, East Jerusalem as the Arab Peace Initiative’s Palestinian “capitol”, and the “Black Life Matters” demonstrations (PDF p.315-316), all confirmed in the original at PDF p.315 and standing as printed; and on PDF p.317 the scars of war “would need to healed” and “the yearly commemoration the Nakba”, both as printed.

• The Index dates United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 to “(1988)” in its heading and in the Six Days War cross-reference (PDF p.326), against 1967 in the work itself; it gives “democracy” a locator of 315 (PDF p.323), beyond the book’s printed text pages; it gives citizenship under Israeli law at “228-93” (PDF p.323), Resolution 181 a locator of “xiiimap” (PDF p.326), and prints “consociationism” (PDF p.323), “Fasal” Husseini and “Water” Mignolo (PDF p.324), the “United States Campaign for Palestinians Rights” and “Palestine Museum” for the Palestinian Museum (PDF p.326), and a doubled “See also See also” under Hadash (PDF p.324). All stand as printed.

• The back cover gives Farsakh’s book as Palestinian Labor Migration to Israel (PDF p.329) against Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel in the List of Contributors (PDF p.318-319), and the co-edited volume’s subtitle as “Geographies of Engagement in Palestine and Beyond” (PDF p.329) against “Geographies of Engagements” in the Contributors list (PDF p.319). Both stand as printed in their places. The Contributors list likewise prints Pappe’s On Palestine with an unclosed parenthesis (PDF p.319) and Toukan’s journal as the Journal for Palestine Studies (PDF p.320), both as printed.

Coverage

PDF p.1-329 of 329, read in full (parts 1-8 of 8).