Summary
A local Palestinian method of conflict management, used — in Magid Shihade’s account — by communities that cannot rely on the Israeli security structure for safety or on its judicial system for justice; its first step is a Hudna (truce), its committee is normally composed of community leaders including heads of large families, experts in the method, politicians and even poets, and its proper procedure requires naming those responsible for the violence and their formal apology (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.8, 10 / printed p.115, 117).
Details
- Definition and citation: Sulha is “a local method of conflict management used in communities that cannot rely on the Israeli security structure for safety, or on its judicial system for justice” (note 14, to Elias Jabbour, Sulha: A Palestinian Traditional Peacekeeping Process (House of Hope Publications, 1996)) (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.8, 16 / printed p.115, 123).
- At Kufr Yasif in April 1981, leaders contacted the larger Palestinian community to initiate a Sulha while also pressing the police for reinforcements; the initiative “was making progress in securing a Hudna (truce), which is the first step towards conflict resolution”, then failed after two days when Julis’s leadership, advised by influential Druze leaders connected to the Israeli establishment, withdrew from the truce (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.8 / printed p.115). See Kafr Yassif attack, 1981.
- The imposed Sulha: after its own investigation absolved it, the Israeli government “forced the leaders in Kafr Yassif to accept a Sulha framework different from the one initiated earlier by the community itself”, accompanied by threats of more violence; “[w]hile normally Sulha procedures require the naming of those who are responsible for the violence, they need to formally apologise, the Sulha imposed on Kafr Yassif ended without naming those who were responsible” and instead hinted at the responsibility of Kafr Yassif, its mayor and unnamed ‘irresponsible individuals’ (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.10 / printed p.117).
- At Al-Maghar in 2005, Christians who had fled the Druze-Christian fighting returned only when “a Sulha secured their return” (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.11 / printed p.118).
- In Shihade’s conclusion, “local conflict management methods are also used to manage tensions” alongside continued calls on the state to maintain internal peace and order, and party and organisational work on education and mobilisation for unity (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.14 / printed p.121).
Related pages
Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, Kafr Yassif attack, 1981, Kufr Yasif, Al-Maghar