Summary
The April 1981 communal violence between Druze Julis and majority-Christian Kufr Yasif in Galilee that is Magid Shihade’s central case study: a promotion-deciding football match on 11 April 1981, preceded by threats and fought over despite Kafr Yassif letting Julis win, left one Kafr Yassif young person killed by a grenade; an armed attack three days later killed two more residents and injured over 20, while police — warned in advance — did not intervene, blocked aid from neighbouring villages, and were absolved by a government investigation that ended in an imposed Sulha hinting at the victims’ responsibility (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.7-10 / printed p.114-117).
Details
- Preliminaries: the night before the match the Kafr Yassif team manager received a threatening call that appeared to be from someone in Julis, warning of violence if Julis did not prevail; the manager and the mayor of Kafr Yassif repeatedly asked the regional police for a preventive presence, and “Only 4 policemen were present at the Kafr Yassif football ground the following day” (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.7 / printed p.114).
- The match, 11 April 1981: Kafr Yassif scored first; at the break members of its own management asked its players to let Julis win; Julis won with two goals; Julis fans attacked Kafr Yassif fans anyway; one man from Julis was stabbed, and “a grenade killed one young person from Kafr Yassif. Several others were injured”; police present “did not interfere to prevent or stop the fighting” (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.7-8 / printed p.114-115).
- The failed Sulha: the mayor complained of the insufficient police force and was told the station head “had not expected violence”; reinforcements were sought from the regional station head and, through Israeli Communist Party members of parliament, from the Minister of Interior; a community Sulha secured a Hudna (truce), then collapsed after two days, its committee reporting that influential Druze leaders with strong connections to the Israeli establishment were advising Julis against it (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.8 / printed p.115).
- The attack, three days after the game: Julis residents attacked Christian residents of Kafr Yassif “using Israeli military arms, vehicles,” and equipment, killing two more individuals, injuring over 20, and bombing, burning and damaging scores of houses and property; more than 20 policemen present withdrew in a manner eyewitnesses perceived was coordinated with the attackers, who used military communication equipment in what eyewitnesses recognised as an organised military operation; police let the Julis entrance open while detachments at the village’s other two entrances prevented aid from neighbouring villages (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.8-9 / printed p.115-116).
- The official narrative’s contradictions, as Shihade sets them out: police who “did not expect violence to erupt” also held that “violence is part of Arab society and culture” — in which telling Druze are suddenly part of the Palestinian Arab community rather than a separate religious and ethnic group; and police unable to block the narrow Julis road blocked the two wider entrances against the hundreds coming to help (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.9 / printed p.116).
- The investigation: the government refused the local council’s demand for an independent investigation, appointed its own committee, which absolved the government and security forces, recommended only that “‘such incidents should be taken more seriously in the future by the police’”, talked only to Israeli security officials and ignored eyewitnesses, and held not one official responsible; the government then forced Kafr Yassif to accept a government-initiated Sulha, accompanied by threats of more violence, which named no one responsible and “hinted at the responsibility of Kafr Yassif and its mayor, and some unnamed ‘irresponsible individuals’” (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.9-10 / printed p.116-117).
- For many in the village the attack brought to the fore memories of 1948, the Kafr Kassim massacre of 1956, and the Land Day of 1976 (see Day of the Land) (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.9 / printed p.116).
- Shihade’s evidence basis for the case: more than three years of fieldwork (2002-2005), eyewitness interviews, archival work in the village, and Israeli official reports on the incident (Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, PDF p.2 / printed p.109). The work names none of the dead or injured; see Open questions on the source page.
Related pages
Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and its Palestinian Subjects, Kufr Yasif, Julis, Sulha, Druze, Galilee