Summary
A Palestinian refugee camp near Sur where, in contrast to Ain al-Hilweh, the IDF maintained an in-camp base and a more personalistic, known-collaborator structure, so anticollaborator responses took more nuanced forms — isolation, intimidation and targeted grenade attacks — rather than a mass unmasking network (Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, PDF p.133-135).
Details
- The primary IDF contact, Abu [Jaradh], was described as poorly disciplined and notorious for attacking UNRWA officials and extorting residents; two hand grenades were thrown in his direction, one injuring his wife and one debilitating a fellow collaborator (Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, PDF p.134-135).
- Amal’s six-month complete blockade that began in early September 1986 started at Rashidiyeh before extending to Burj al-Barajneh and Shatila (Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, PDF p.145).
- Amal laid siege to Rashidiyeh, a camp of approximately 15,000 people, in the fall of 1986; a shared defensive front repulsed Amal’s attempts to overrun it, with 590 people injured and approximately 200 houses destroyed (Nofal 2006, 44, as cited, Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, PDF p.169-170).
- Besieged Rashidiyeh was supplied by a cross-regional clandestine apparatus: Burj al-Shamali residents collected food and cash and ran secret nautical routes, al-Buss staffed a strategic communication centre directing smuggling, and couriers such as Nadia smuggled cash from Saida and Beirut (Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, PDF p.161, p.171).
Related pages
Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, War of the Camps