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Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon

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Summary

Sarah E. Parkinson’s Beyond the Lines is an ethnohistorical study of Palestinian militant organizations in Lebanon, arguing that their adaptation and resilience in the 1980s were driven by Backstage labor — logistic, intelligence, medical, finance and human-resources work — performed through quotidian social networks overlapping formal hierarchies, a structure Parkinson calls Social infrastructure. Adaptation is theorised as Organizational adaptation in three levels (repurposing, remapping, emergence), illustrated by the careers of Munadileh and Zahra, and grounded in a history of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the guerrilla factions in Lebanon from 1948 to 1982, a comparison of the regionalized Repertoires of violence of the 1982 Israeli invasion in South Lebanon and Beirut, the emergence of a woman-dominated clandestine intelligence, finance and supply apparatus in the occupied South, a comparison of civilian anticollaborator mobilization in Saida and Sur, the emergence of cross-factional camp defensive fronts under Ali Abu Tawq in Beirut during the War of the Camps, the contrasting emergence of personalized militias in Saida and a unified front at Rashidiyeh with neutral, supplying Burj al-Shamali in Sur, a Conclusion theorizing Holdover practices and relational plasticity, the methodological-ethical Appendix A, the archival Appendix B, the camp-population Appendix C, the Notes, the full References and the Index (Beyond the Lines — Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, PDF p.24-269).

What the file is

The Cornell University Press open-access edition, copyright © 2022 by Cornell University, first published 2022, made freely available through TOME (Toward an Open Monograph Ecosystem) with Johns Hopkins University support and licensed CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (PDF p.5). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data gives the description as Ithaca [2021], LCCN 2022010738 (print) and 2022010739 (ebook), ISBN 9781501766299 (hardcover), 9781501767142 (paperback), 9781501766305 (pdf) and 9781501766312 (epub), classification LCC DS80.55.P34 P37 2021 (PDF p.5). 269 PDF pages, about 109,745 words; printed pagination runs from roman-numeral front matter through an Introduction at printed p.1, References ending at printed p.237, and an Index at printed p.239-246 (PDF p.8, p.262-269). PDF p.261 is blank, between the References and the Index. The text copy carries === PDF p.N === markers. The four maps (PDF p.18-21) are heavily scrambled in the text copy — labels duplicated and reordered — so map detail beyond captions, place names and scales is reading-uncertain from the text copy alone. The licence URL printed on PDF p.5 is held under Open questions.

Section by section

  • Front matter (PDF p.1-23): title and copyright pages (PDF p.2, p.4-5); dedication to the author’s father and to Lee Ann Fujii (PDF p.6); Contents listing the Introduction, seven chapters, Conclusion, three appendices, Notes, References and Index with printed page numbers (PDF p.8); Acknowledgments (PDF p.10-13) recording two years of research in Lebanon, 114 in-depth interviews in the project as a whole as later specified, archival work at the American University of Beirut, the Institute for Palestine Studies, the American Friends Service Committee Archives and the Palestinian Oral History Archive, and prior publication of portions in The American Political Science Review, Perspectives on Politics and World Politics; List of Abbreviations (PDF p.14); Note on Transliteration and Translation, simplified IJMES rules with colloquial Lebanese place names — Saida, Sur and Trablous for Sidon, Tyre and Tripoli (PDF p.16); Maps 1-4: Lebanon, Beirut and Southern Suburbs, Saida, Sur (PDF p.18-21).

  • Introduction: Backstage Labor and Organizational Adaptation (PDF p.24-37 / printed p.1-14). Opens with Munadileh, a teenage nurse in Saida in June 1982 moving casualties to a hospital under IDF bombardment until the Palestinian lines collapsed and the hospital itself was hit and evacuated (PDF p.24-25). Munadileh, raised in an Arab Nationalist Movement family, had served in combat but insisted on her other roles — medic, nurse, ambulance driver, social worker, logistician — and on being called Munadileh, “a struggler”, not simply a fighter; Zahra, named for the Zaharat, Fatah’s girls’ scouting wing, survived the 1976 siege of Tel al-Za’tar and the September 1982 killings in Greater Shatila, served in social service and intelligence, smuggled under cover of teaching in a blockaded camp, was imprisoned by the Syrian mukhabarat under the Beau Rivage Hotel, and remained in Fateh social-aid and General Union of Palestinian Women work (PDF p.25-27). The Introduction defines backstage labor, states the relational claim that a militant is never only a militant, sets out repurposing, remapping and emergence, theorises violence’s material and meaning-based effects on networks, defines social infrastructure and Relational plasticity, situates the study in Beirut, Saida and Sur in 1982-1990 — IDF occupation of the South 1982-1985, Amal’s War of the Camps 1985-1988 — and gives the plan of the book, chapters 1-7 and Conclusion (PDF p.28-37).

  • Chapter 1: Memories and Mythologies of Militancy: An Ethnographic Approach to Studying Militant Organizations (PDF p.38-52 / printed p.15-29). Positions the work against organizational determinism and elite-only accounts, in relational sociology and the literature on preexisting networks, rebel governance and noncombat participation (PDF p.38-40). The methodological account gives 114 in-depth and life-history interviews with current and former militants active in Beirut and South Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, ten months of organizational ethnography with Fatah’s Women’s Office, volunteering with three camp-based educational organizations, and Palestinian texts, Arabic newspapers, PLO film footage and memoirs as sources (PDF p.41). Shadowing and slow relationship-building in 2009-2010 and on return visits revealed cross-faction everyday ties — for example Abu Houli greeting Syrian-allied rivals in the Sabra market, and Abu Hadi’s use of past organizational networks in his UNRWA work (PDF p.42-44). The Nafisa / Umm Amir interlude in Burj al-Barajneh introduces Organizational metadata: a leadership-delegated group interview in which a new officer, Umm Amir, and Rana appropriated siege and smuggling experiences they had not lived, while former underground women such as Nafisa — who had served on the defensive front and been wounded in her home — graded each claimant’s right to speak; the referral chain itself (Farouq to a commanding officer to Umm Amir) showed present, gendered party structures rather than the 1980s underground (PDF p.45-52).

  • Chapter 2: Building a Social Infrastructure: The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Guerrilla Factions in Lebanon (PDF p.53-63 / printed p.30-40, chapter continues beyond PDF p.63). Opens in contemporary Ain al-Hilweh — factional turf, a dozen-plus party-linked mosques, checkpoints, a Security Committee, staged strongman performances for journalists — against everyday camp life, an estimated unemployment rate as high as 80 percent, and a Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine representative’s description of today’s factions as mainly advocacy (PDF p.53-55). The history is divided into 1948-1969, 1969 to early 1975, and early 1975 to August 1982 (PDF p.56-57). The first period: 100,000-130,000 refugees entering Lebanon at the Nakba; camps under the Deuxième Bureau; UNRWA active from spring 1950 for 726,000 registered refugees across its fields as cited; bans on permanent housing, over seventy professions and political parties, justified against tawtin; the ANM’s founding (dated 1952 at PDF p.56 and 1951 at PDF p.59, held under Open questions), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1967, Fatah’s founding in the late 1950s by Yasir Arafat, Salah Khalaf and Khalil al-Wazir, and the Arab League’s creation of the PLO in 1964 under Ahmad al-Shuqayri (PDF p.57-60). Karameh in March 1968, the April 1969 Bint Jbeil episode and protests, and the November 1969 Cairo Agreement transferring camp governance to the PLO (PDF p.60-61). The second period opens: Popular Committees, incursions and Israeli reprisals displacing tens of thousands of Lebanese, Black September in Jordan in 1970 and the PLO’s relocation to Lebanon in summer 1971, the PLO as Lebanon’s largest employer (about 65 percent of Palestinians in Lebanon employed by its apparatus, as cited from Suleiman 1997), “Fatahland” and the “Fakhani Republic”, Samed, the PRCS and a GUPW membership of 21,000 as cited, Yunis’s account of GUPS cultural work in Tel al-Za’tar and East Beirut in 1970-1971, entanglement with the Lebanese National Movement, Fatah’s training of Amal, the May 1973 attacks on Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh and the Melkart Protocol of May 17, 1973, and the 1974 Rejectionist Front formed after the 10 Point Program (PDF p.61-63).

  • Chapter 2 continued (PDF p.64-74 / printed p.41-51, chapter ends PDF p.74): the Ma’alot (DFLP, May 1974) and Kiryat Shmona (PFLP-GC, April 1974) attacks and more than 30,000 Israeli violations of Lebanese territory June 1968-June 1974 as counted by the Lebanese army and quoted from Picard; the outbreak of the Civil War — the Saida fishermen/Proteine dispute and Maarouf Saad’s fatal wounding as interlocutors’ starting point, the April 13, 1975 Ain al-Rummaneh bus attack killing twenty-six ALF members, and the January 1976 attacks on Tel al-Za’tar, Jisr al-Basha, Dbayeh and Maslakh-Karantina and the Damour killings of January 20, 1976; Tel al-Za’tar as a historical touchstone (cordon January 1976, fall August 12, 1976, approximately 4,000 dead over the siege, the community bulldozed, and survivors’ siege identity overriding factional affiliation); Dalal al-Mughrabi’s March 1978 hijacking (37 killed) and Operation Litani (25,000 IDF troops, approximately 285,000 fled, some 2,000 died, UNIFIL under Resolutions 425 and 426); the PLO’s declining Lebanese support by 1982 (Khalidi’s “flopping helplessly on dry land”); and the social infrastructure of a state in waiting — the three-level military apparatus (Palestine Liberation Army brigades, 6,000-10,000 PLA soldiers in Lebanon in June 1982; Fatah approximately 14,000 guerrillas in five brigades and 26 battalions; DFLP and PFLP approximately 6,000 each; al-Sa’iqa 3,000; PFLP-GC 500), Palestinian Red Crescent Society healthcare (nine hospitals, twelve clinics, 425,682 patients in 1980; approximately US5/US$60 patient charges) and scouting and sports, with the TIEMC 1981 self-reported-data caveat (PDF p.64-74).

  • Chapter 3: Social Networks and Wartime Violence: Comparing Repertoires during the 1982 Israeli Invasion (PDF p.75-93 / printed p.52-70). The June 6, 1982 invasion (attacks from June 4; prompted in the text by the Fatah-Revolutionary Council’s June 3 attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the UK). The chapter problematizes the indiscriminate/selective and direct/indirect dichotomies on three grounds and argues that organizational networks and social infrastructures mediate violence’s material and meaning-making effects. In the South: aerial bombardment and camp destruction (AFSC estimate approximately 200,000 Palestinians homeless; the June 23, 1982 UNRWA housing-damage estimate; the June 7, 1982 Nadi al-Houli bombing killing ninety-four civilians); camp-level militias outlasting the PLA and guerrillas, with Ain al-Hilweh holding out over a week; and gendered mass incarceration (9,064 prisoners announced November 1982, about two thirds Palestinian; Ansar prison camp estimated at 12,000-15,000 inmates June 1982-May 1985 by Khalili as cited) effected through hooded collaborators on the beaches of Saida and Sur and perceived as arbitrary collective punishment. In Beirut: the Siege (June 26-August 12), the PLO evacuation (14,398 personnel and soldiers) and headquarters’ relocation to Tunis, the LAF/Kata’ib mopping-up, and the Sabra and Shatila massacre of September 16-18 in the Shatila district (between 2,000 and 3,500 killed or disappeared in this chapter’s account), whose shared vulnerability seeded later camp defensive fronts. Toll for June 4-August 31, 1982: approximately 19,085 killed and 30,302 wounded (Rubenberg 1986, 281, as cited) (PDF p.75-93).

  • Chapter 4: Beyond the Lines: Gendered Mobilization and Organizational Resilience in Militant Groups (PDF p.94-108 / printed p.71-85, chapter continues beyond PDF p.108): opens with Intisar and Sawsan’s account of women keeping Fatah alive in 1990s Beirut through the al-Quds publication and money-smuggling apparatus (salons, medical workers, cooks and tailors as distribution hubs; female officers holding family lists and strapping salary cash to their bodies). It traces the post-1982 emergence in South Lebanon of a clandestine information, intelligence, finance and supply apparatus: first movers were women with preexisting organizational ties, often new heads of household, whose trips to the Bekaa and Trablous carried news, cash and then military intelligence and liaison; cadres remapped communications into tight cells (a leader running at most three groups of three to five persons who knew only their leader) communicating through female couriers, sustained by PSP, LCP, Amal, PNO and Jama’a Islamiyya ties. Mass imprisonment’s organizational consequences are told through Abu Riyad of al-Buss: capture, two years in Ansar prison camp (fifteen mu’askarat of 250-300 prisoners; protest, the “Eid Uprising” in which guards fatally shot seven prisoners, the tunnel escape of seventy-three and transfer of some 2,000 to Wadi Jahannam), and the finding that Ansar’s mixing, surveillance and informants sent released prisoners back to their old factions rather than seeding new networks, while smaller-facility interrogation stories, Rahaf’s among them, circulated through Sawt al-Mukhayyam and word of mouth as a collective narrative of Israeli brutality. From 1983 elites adopted the grassroots network as the official salary conduit, routed from Tunis through the Arab Bank in Saida in Yusif’s “anqud” (bunch of grapes) structure with women as the linking branches, and the apparatus diversified into document forgery, into which Dalal was recruited by her professor (PDF p.94-108).

  • Chapter 4 continued and ended (PDF p.109-114 / printed p.86-91): routinized safe-house chains in Saida (Kamal’s Gulf-to-South return); suspicion and rumour between factions; socialization and indoctrination as organizational maintenance, centred on Sawt al-Mukhayyam, the bimonthly clandestine Saida newspaper whose August 1984 issue attacked elite corruption (a diverted $30 million check; a 100,000 JD Amman villa) and celebrated Vietnamese women’s revolutionary roles, and whose salary-plus-literature exchanges made affiliation an iterated, life-risking political statement (Giannou, as quoted); the chapter closes arguing the backstage roles women assumed were integral and collectively valued, not low-status support (PDF p.109-114).

  • Chapter 5: Crossing Collaborators: Emotion, Informing, and Civilian Mobilization in Occupied South Lebanon (PDF p.115-136 / printed p.92-113). Gendered sweeps emptied the camps of men and boys (Dalal, Fatimah, Umm Karim, Tala, Halimah), while Kata’ib/Lebanese Forces killings, evictions and threats around Ain al-Hilweh — including the April 1983 Associated Press reports and the killing and torture-marked return of Muhammad Mabruka’s body — were read as occupation-facilitated terror. Women built narrative networks around violated homes, staged daily protests, confronted the Kata’ib office in Saida, internationalized advocacy to human rights organizations, Arab governments and the UN, and mounted the September 17, 1984 march of more than ten thousand for the Sabra and Shatila massacre anniversary. Collaboration is then compared regionally: in Ain al-Hilweh the IDF institutionalized anonymous collaborators as the Palestinian National Guard, spurring a cross-generational anticollaborator network — teachers socializing children through storytelling, youth identifying targets, women blocking doors, militants assassinating — while in Sur’s camps (Rashidiyeh, Burj al-Shamali, al-Buss) collaborators were known strongmen such as Abu [Jaradh], and responses ran to isolation, intimidation and targeted attacks that could leave known informants alive and relations steadier (PDF p.115-136).

  • Chapter 6: The Face of the Camps: Leadership and Loyalty in Combat Units (PDF p.137-154 / printed p.114-131, chapter continues beyond PDF p.154): Ali Abu Tawq — Fatah officer, supply-network figure, commander of Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh defences in the War of the Camps until his 1987 assassination — as the paradox of a disciplined militant revered for saying “no” to Arafat. Post-massacre Beirut adaptation is traced through Nader’s small secret groups, women couriers linking neighbourhood cells, the PLO’s Cyprus “bridge” (US$50,000 a launch, Picard 2002, 133, as cited) and “ghost cadres” corruption, to the War of the Camps sieges (blockade sequence 1985-1986; residents eating mules, grass, rats, dogs and cats), in which PLO and Palestinian National Salvation Front members formed joint committees, built underground cities, ran the cross-factional “mihwar” defence, shared all supplies regardless of affiliation, and disobeyed Tunis and Damascus — Syria punishing the PNSF and George Habash fleeing Syria in May 1985 — with mixed-descent and marriage ties giving smugglers such as Aisha and Ibtisam passage through Amal checkpoints on the “Corridors of Death” (PDF p.137-154).

  • Chapter 6 continued and ended (PDF p.155-157 / printed p.132-134): Abu Tawq’s assassination in Shatila on January 27, 1987 — on Fatah al-Intifada’s military commander’s orders, four dissidents detonated a buried 82mm shell in the shared defensive earthworks, killing him and his deputy (Giannou 1990, 136-39) — and the chapter’s conclusion: siege reinforced camp identification and disobedience, united fronts emerged in Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh, by the war’s end the DFLP and PCP had resumed dialogue with Fatah and Birri could no longer distinguish the PNSF from Fatah (Y. Sayigh 1997, 595), surviving Fatah officers were expelled from Beirut, and the factions’ nominal “survival” must be problematized given changes to their structures, motivations, goals and practices (PDF p.155-157).

  • Chapter 7: ‘Every Faction for Itself’: Personalized Militias and Fragmented Battle Lines (PDF p.158-177 / printed p.135-154). Opens with Abu Hadi, a former PLO fighter turned UNRWA administrator in South Lebanon, defusing a father’s gun threat at a school by indirectly activating his wartime friend Issam rather than the formal bureaucracy he distrusted. In Saida: after the IDF’s February 16, 1985 withdrawal (160 guerrilla attacks in February and 200 in March and sixty alleged collaborators murdered, Y. Sayigh 1997, 581), returning PLO officers — resented as “the foreigners” by fighters who had survived the occupation and Ansar — were assassinated by the meso-level officers meant to transfer them, seeding smaller, insular Fatah cliques operating like private militias; affiliation became protection (“everyone was in an organization to protect himself,” Yusif), local leaders became brokers with independent funding, and the Magdousheh front against Amal (opened to lift the Beirut and Rashidiyeh sieges) was fought autonomously sector by sector — “every party for itself” (Munadileh) — with Arafat’s direct voice-and-fax micromanagement encouraging rivalry (Y. Sayigh 1997, 604), though Syrian-allied factions disobeyed Damascus to defend Ain al-Hilweh as “sons of the camp first” (Yusif). In Sur: Burj al-Shamali declared neutrality (agreement with its Shi’i neighbours and modest military capacities, Abdullah 2008, 56), formed the Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Prisoners and ran sea-borne supply into besieged Rashidiyeh (approximately 15,000 people; 590 injured, approximately 200 houses destroyed, Nofal 2006, 44), while al-Buss staffed a communication centre directing the smuggling. The General Union of Palestinian Women professionalized and coordinated the clandestine apparatus — by 1987 graduating first-aid classes — Syrian forces explicitly targeted women couriers (Mamdouh Nofal 2006, 365), marriage brokerage carried Nawal into elite Fatah/GUPW and combat roles at Magdousheh, women reported harassment up the chain of command (the nurse/Abu Fahad case, Nofal 2006, 296), and a 1991 Ain al-Hilweh study found 58.9 percent of residents reporting no allegiance to any group (Khashan 1992, 15) (PDF p.158-177).

  • Conclusion: Echoes of Organizations (PDF p.178-191 / printed p.155-168). Opens with the November 12, 2015 ISIS bombing adjacent to Burj al-Barajneh and the blood-donation mobilization, introducing Holdover practices — siege-era knowledge such as teaching children their blood type, worked into everyday life. The book’s argument is restated and its implications drawn: emergent organizations as a category beyond “survival”/“death”; Relational plasticity and social infrastructure, with comparative cases (the Huk, the EPLF, Hezb-i-Islami, foreign fighters); the insider-outsider cleavage between ground cadres and exiled leaderships and its consequences for ceasefires and peacebuilding; the failure of ethnic/sectarian group-level analysis, with Mazur 2019 on clans, families and towns in Syria; gender — backstage labour as high-risk, structurally positioned work, not naturally women’s or low-status; and violence beyond the headlines — incarceration, collaboration, starvation and siege as constitutive, with Syria and Yemen casualty and disappearance figures (PDF p.178-191).

  • Appendix A: Methodological Approach and Ethical Considerations (PDF p.192-202 / printed p.169-179, appendix continues beyond PDF p.202): the fieldwork chronology (summers 2007-2008; October 2009-2010; return visits to 2018; eight of twelve UNRWA camps visited; residence in West Beirut — Raouche, Caracas and Sanayeh — in 2009-2010, with Palestinian friends in Tariq al-Jdideh in 2011-2012, and with an interlocutor’s family in Burj al-Barajneh camp part time from 2012, full time in 2014 and again in 2018, PDF p.192), volunteering with three civil society organizations, the FTO constraint limiting volunteering to secular-nationalist and leftist-linked organizations, consent and funding disclosure (NSF and SSRC distinguished from DoD/Education fellowships such as Fulbright), IRB protocols H10075 and H07177 (Chicago) and 1312S46161 (Minnesota), pseudonyms and confidentiality, ten months of organizational ethnography with Fatah’s Women’s Office, close relationships with seven Fatah-linked families, participant-driven ethnohistory (the Nakba Day poster, the Mavi Marmara demonstration, the early-1980s media binder), interview and life-history method (twenty-four extended life histories; interviews of at least an hour, many up to twelve hours; no formal interviews with long-term current Fatah al-Intifada or al-Sa’iqa members), the three challenges of historical interviewing (Wood 2003, 33), and the post-2011 decision to stop seeking new War of the Camps interviews as Syrian intelligence presence grew (PDF p.192-202).

  • Appendix A continued and ended (PDF p.203-210 / printed p.180-187): neutrality is not a legible position in the camps — affiliations were assigned by kinship, work, parents or children, and only one UNRWA worker met had none assigned; visit frequency measured and signalled closeness (the Sabah / Muna / Abu Ghassan sequence, in which gossip first shielded the author, then the disclosure that Abu Ghassan had tortured and killed Fatah members made continued social visits unacceptable, and a subtle threat ended them, with later visits to Muna confined to the family’s public sandwich shop, copying senior Fatah officers’ daughters); the Women’s Office “Sister” title as discursive claiming and the pressure to move teaching under Fatah control as network closure (Malejacq and Mukhopadhyay 2016, as cited); “unavoidable partiality” reframed as method — chosen proximity as essential to seeing cliques, boundaries, rivalries and memory politics — and classification of the author by biographical role (mid-to-late twenties, woman, unmarried, politically active) rather than biography; affiliation as family protection — physical, psychological, economic, social, emotional, reputational — seeping into balcony, living room and kitchen; the two Palestinian research assistants (different politics and cities, AUB graduate rate, no participant observation or interviews), the refusal of interpreters/fixers after 2007-2008 on performance, bought-access and security grounds; and the seven confidentiality/security precautions (no recording, verbal consent, coded bilingual notes destroyed after encrypted transcription, encrypted vault and backups, no smartphone in 2009-2011, in-person scheduling and varied routes, pseudonyms with detail substitution preserving a story’s core) (PDF p.203-210).

  • Appendix B: Archival Materials and Methods (PDF p.210-215 / printed p.187-192). Five publicly accessible archives — AUB Jafet Library, the Institute for Palestine Studies, the al-Safir archives and the IFPO in Beirut, and the AFSC archives in Philadelphia — with the newspaper base built from AUB’s digitized al-Safir (left-leaning, “pro-Syrian” in the text’s framing; al-Nahar consulted on microfiche but reported to have lacked consistent camp coverage in the 1980s), organized by year and camp, RA-annotated and triangulated, with the censorship limit stated (a former journalist’s box of censored, never-published War of the Camps photographs, one of many such boxes, 2014); AUB’s Political Poster Archive, four pre-public POHA Ein al-Hilweh interviews quoted with permission, IPS’s PLO camp studies, consultant reports and nine copies of Sawt al-Mukhayyam; and the AFSC humanitarian files (photographed in Philadelphia, hundreds of pages) giving a uniquely comparative Saida/Sur view. Private archives in Mar Elias, Shatila, Burj al-Barajneh, Burj al-Shamali and al-Buss, the joint PLO-LNM media archive originally housed in Rashidiyeh, and PLO internal film of Tel al-Za’tar, Sabra and Shatila and the War of the Camps. “An Archival Archipelago”: much of the PLO and faction archive destroyed or lost — no time to microfiche before the 1982 departure (Khalidi 1985, as cited), Fakhani raids and the IDF’s destruction of the IPS and private collections (Said 1983, as cited), documentation taken to Israel and largely inaccessible, the Chairman’s Archive taken Tunis-Gaza-Jericho and reported destroyed by Hamas in Gaza in 2006, Syrian-allied factions’ archives around Damascus inaccessible — so extant material is both window and preservation product. Research assistants’ contributions are named: Salah Hamzeh and Rima in Lebanon, Thomas Vargas (AFSC), Sean Williams, Eslam Bedawy and Kelsey Fogt at Minnesota, Sofia J. Smith and Raied Haj Yahya at Johns Hopkins (PDF p.210-215).

  • Appendix C: Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon (PDF p.216 / printed p.193). Table C.1 gives each UNRWA-administered camp’s 1979-1980 population (PLO demographic study / UNRWA registered) and 2011 registered population — Ain al-Hilweh 20,021/24,340 and 50,309 largest, Nahr al-Bared 11,455/15,205 and 36,338, Rashidiyeh 29,363 in 2011, Shatila 8,278/5,435 and 9,154, Mar Elias 466/472 and 627 smallest extant — with Dikwaneh (Tel al-Za’tar) and Jisr al-Basha destroyed 1976, Gourand closed 1963 and Nabatiyeh N/A for 2011; the notes give the July 1981 PLO Central Bureau of Statistics report and Sa’id Ibrahim (1983, 19) as sources, the non-re-registration of Jordan movers, approximately 50 percent of refugees living outside camps, a 1980 total registered population of 226,554, UNRWA’s non-removal of emigrants, and Tel al-Za’tar’s 1976 population at approximately 30,000 (Berggren et al. 1996) against 11,415 for 1972 (Faris 2007, 23) (PDF p.216). PDF p.217 is blank.

  • Notes (PDF p.218-238 / printed p.195-215, notes end at PDF p.238). Endnotes to the Introduction and chapters 1-7, the Conclusion and Appendices A-B, giving interview attributions with place and season, the field-note record, archival citations in full (notably the AFSC Friesen notes of September 23, 1983, the Siblin and Rashidiyeh reports in Folder 11551, and the 1987 Borj el-Barajneh health-workers’ declaration and telex in Folder 55487), and substantive asides the chapters do not carry: the ANM founding dated to 1951 by both Y. Sayigh (1997, 31) and PASSIA against the 1952 survey date held under Open questions; Tel al-Za’tar siege deaths in sum 4,280 with 450 militant-organization members and 750 armed volunteers and some 3,000 civilians and 400 fighters fled August 9-10 (Sayigh, as cited, PDF p.223); the disputed Coastal Road bus account (Cobban’s single bus and thirty-seven dead including six commandos against Macleod 2008’s two buses and disputed explosion cause); Rougier’s (2007) Islamist-networks account of Ain al-Hilweh’s 1982 defence disputed by Khalili (2007b) and by the author’s interviews; white phosphorous and Protocol III (Israel not bound, Convention in force December 1983); the Kahan Commission documents on Israeli leaders’ awareness; Arafat’s moral-hazard role in the Tel al-Za’tar siege diplomacy as a bone of contention into the War of the Camps; al-Muragha’s mutiny justification (Abu Musa and Abu Salih 1983, 180); Abu Tawq picture displays only in offices of leaders present in 1980s Beirut; the PNSF’s membership list; Yarmouk’s pre-war 110,000, siege reduction to approximately 18,000 and 2015 ISIS entry; and fixer pay of US$150-400 a day against a camp family’s typical monthly income (PDF p.218-238). PDF p.239 is blank.

  • References (PDF p.240-246 / printed p.217-223, list continues beyond PDF p.246): the front lists — Arabic-language newspapers (al-Nahar, al-Safir, Sawt al-Mukhayyam), the five archives, documentaries and film footage, and English-language media reports and interviews (Abouzeid 2013 through Wright 1983) — then Memoirs (Abu Iyad and Rouleau 1981; Ang 1989; Cutting 1989; Giannou 1990; Khaled 1973; Mamdouh Nofal 2006; Yermiya 1984; Zeidan 2017), Reports and Theses (the Advisory Committee 1983; the PLO Central Bureau of Statistics 1981; the Kahan Commission 1983; Sa’id Ibrahim 1983; TIEMC 1981), and Secondary Sources alphabetically from Abdullah 2008 through Denkner 1983 in this range (PDF p.240-246).

  • References continued and ended (PDF p.247-260 / printed p.224-237): Secondary Sources from DiMaggio and Powell 1983 through Zerubavel 1996, in alphabetical order with the single exception of the Pader 2006 entry, which follows Pachucki and Breiger 2010 as printed. The range carries the works the chapters cite most heavily in their final form — Y. Sayigh 1997 and R. Sayigh 1979, Khalidi 1985, Picard 2002, Rougier 2007, Rubenberg 1983a/1983b/1986, Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, Khalili 2005/2007a/2007b/2008, Khashan 1992, Suleiman 1997/1999, Mazur 2019/2020/2021, Malejacq and Mukhopadhyay 2016 (spelled “Malejacq, Romain” here), the author’s own articles 2013-2022, and the UNHCR, UNRWA, World Bank, WHO, Electronic Disease Early Warning System and Syrian Network for Human Rights items cited for contemporary figures — together with the relational-sociology and civil-war literatures (Emirbayer, Granovetter, Padgett, Kalyvas, Wood, Staniland, Weinstein) on which the book’s framework rests (PDF p.247-260). PDF p.261 is blank.

  • Index (PDF p.262-269 / printed p.239-246): a single alphabetical index, Abu Mujahid through youth, whose entries map the book’s argument in its own terms — affiliations, brokerage roles, collaboration/collaborators, counterinsurgency and counterintelligence networks, defense (camp and community-based), emergence, factions/factionalism, imprisonment/incarceration (mass), insider-outsider dynamics, leaders/leadership (exiled), logistics apparatuses, militias (personalized), networks, obedience/disobedience, operations (clandestine), plasticity (relational), remapping, repurposing, research methodology, resilience (organizational), violence (repertoires of) — with camp, city and organization entries for Ain al-Hilweh, Beirut, Burj al-Barajneh, Burj al-Shamali, al-Buss, Rashidiyeh, Saida, Shatila, Sur and Tel al-Za’tar, the PLO and its bodies, and the War of the Camps (PDF p.262-269).

Key passages

Evidence the work relies on

  • In the range read: in-depth and life-history interviews with 114 current and former militants active in Beirut and South Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, plus NGO, community-organization and United Nations employees; ten months of organizational ethnography with Fatah’s Women’s Office; volunteering with three camp-based educational Palestinian civil society organizations (PDF p.41).

  • Primary-source Palestinian texts, mainstream and clandestine Arabic-language newspapers of the periods studied, original PLO documentary film footage, and Palestinian, Lebanese and limited Israeli memoirs (PDF p.41); video interviews from the Palestinian Oral History Archive, American Friends Service Committee archival materials, and translated portions of Mahmoud Zeidan’s memoir published by the Institute for Palestine Studies, excerpted with permission (PDF p.12).

  • Secondary scholarship cited in the narrative in this range, each credited in the reading notes: notably Y. Sayigh 1997 and R. Sayigh 1979 on refugees, the Deuxième Bureau period and the fida’iyyin; Suleiman 1997 for PLO employment; Rubenberg 1983b for GUPW membership; Traboulsi 2007 for “Fatahland” and Lebanese support; Khalidi 1985 and Picard 2002 on 1973; Cobban 1985 on the Rejectionist Front; E. J. Wood 2009 for repertoires of violence; Fujii 2010 for metadata; UNHCR 2020 and the Syrian Network for Human Rights reporting as cited for contemporary conflict figures (PDF p.28-29, p.48, p.57-63).

  • In the range read in part 2: TIEMC 1981 and Rubenberg 1983a for the PLO’s military, medical and scouting capacities, with the text’s own caveat that the TIEMC data are primarily self-reported and cover only social-wing projects (PDF p.69); AFSC/Advisory Committee on Human Rights in Lebanon 1983 reporting for camp destruction, prisoner numbers and Ansar release requests (PDF p.79, p.83, p.103, p.106); Y. Sayigh 1997, Khalidi 1985, Picard 2002, Cobban 1985, Schiff and Ya’ari 1984 and Fisk 2002 for the 1975-1982 history and the 1982 invasion; Zeidan 2017 and Giannou in Cobban 1982 for the beach denunciation process; Abourahme 2010 for Khadija’s courier account; and interlocutor testimony throughout, including Abu Wissam, Kamal, Abu Riyad, Yahya and Khalid, Hala, Amjad, Khadija, Dalal, Yusif and Rahaf (PDF p.64-108).

  • In the range read in part 3: Sawt al-Mukhayyam itself as a primary source read closely (August 1984 corruption and Vietnamese-women articles, raid and Mabruka reports, September 1984 march coverage); Associated Press wires of April 1983 and November 1984 and Faramarzi 1983; AFSC/Advisory Committee documents including ICRC delegate Thomas Ruegg’s February 1983 assessment, the Siblin and Village League notes and Sur/Abu [Jaradh] internal correspondence; Zeidan 2017 memoir for children’s experience of fear, collaborators and anticollaborator socialization; Giannou 1990 and Cutting 1989 firsthand siege accounts; Y. Sayigh 1997 for reinfiltration, Syrian punishment of the PNSF and Arafat’s payroll cut against Abu Tawq; Picard 2002 for the Cyprus bridge; Aruri 1985 for the camps battles; and interlocutor testimony including Kamal, Bassam, Dalal, Fatimah, Halimah, Zahrah, Hala, Umm Karim, Yusif, Abu Houli, Nader, Abu Tariq, Abu Hassan, Abu Adnan, Sami, Aisha, Ibtisam, Zahra, Murid and Abu Husayn (PDF p.109-154).

  • In the range read in part 5: the Notes’ full archival trail for the chapters — AFSC Friesen notes (September 23, 1983, Folder 10153), the Siblin Principal and Rashidiyeh reports (March-April 1983, Folder 11551), the Borj el-Barajneh health-workers’ declaration and telex (January-February 1987, Folder 55487) and Barbara Pizacani’s May 12, 1987 letters (Folder 10067); the POHA video interviews by Bushra al-Mughrabi (2009) with ark identifiers and timestamps; al-Safir issue dates throughout 1982-1987; and Appendix C’s camp populations from the PLO Central Bureau of Statistics July 1981 report, Sa’id Ibrahim (1983, 19) and the UNRWA Public Information Office (2011) (PDF p.216, p.218-238).

  • In the range read in part 6: the completed References (Secondary Sources DiMaggio and Powell 1983 through Zerubavel 1996, PDF p.247-260) and the Index (PDF p.262-269), which together confirm the citation base and the book’s own locator map for every chapter, appendix and note; no new evidence is introduced in this range.

  • In the range read in part 4: Mamdouh Nofal’s 2006 memoir as a central cited source (Amal torture, the Damascus Agreement and Magdousheh coordination, the Tunisia communications system, Syrian targeting of women, the nurse/Abu Fahad complaint); Y. Sayigh 1997 for the 1985 withdrawal attacks, the war’s-end realignment and Arafat’s micromanagement; Sawt al-Mukhayyam’s January 1985 final accessible issue; Abdullah 2008 for Burj al-Shamali’s neutrality; Khashan 1992 for the 1991 Ain al-Hilweh allegiance survey; AFSC liaison Barbara’s Saida reporting; Dupuy et al. 2017, the Syrian Network for Human Rights, WHO and Electronic Disease Early Warning System figures in the Conclusion’s violence discussion; and interlocutor testimony including Abu Hadi, Issam, Abu Houli, Nader, Yusif, George, Abu Ali, Munadileh, Tala, Nadia, Abu Zaki, Nawal, Hisham and Abu Taha (PDF p.155-202).

Analysis

The method in the range read is ethnohistorical and explicitly relational: networks are treated not as independent variables but as dynamic systems of social relations that shape and are shaped by violence, and formal hierarchies are read against the quotidian ties that overlap them (PDF p.38-39). Its strength in this range is the reflexive treatment of its own evidence — the Nafisa / Umm Amir episode shows interviews being checked against referral chains, silences, inventions and later corrections rather than taken at face value, and turns that checking into the concept of organizational metadata (PDF p.45-52). Its limits in this range are those the text itself marks: historical processes could not be witnessed firsthand and are reconstructed from contemporary observation and recollection (PDF p.44); many interlocutors are anonymous at their request (PDF p.10); and the historical chapter is expressly a synthesis drawing on existing scholarship rather than new archival findings (PDF p.56). Figures are given with their cited sources and are held, where the text gives two forms, under Open questions rather than resolved. Chapter 3 extends the method into an explicit critique of counterinsurgency categories, arguing from the regional comparison that the same tactic carries different network effects by place and by perceived targeting, and Chapter 4 supplies the causal sequence — gendered targeting, brokerage, remapping, elite institutionalization — in interview-level detail, while marking its negative case: Ansar produced no new cross-faction networks, on the prisoners’ own accounts, because of the camp’s informant structure (PDF p.76-77, p.104-107).

Chapters 5 and 6 extend the argument in two directions the text marks explicitly: fear is treated not as a depressant of action but as a force that reshaped how civilians negotiated risk, organized and acquired skills, with the Saida/Sur comparison isolating collaborator anonymity and institutionalization as the mechanism that produced a mass unmasking network in one city and steadier, personalized responses in the other (PDF p.116, p.125, p.136); and siege disobedience is explained not by weak socialization but by its content — civic engagement, nationalism and community defence — interacting with deployment among besieged civilians, producing role strain and collective insubordination that reinforced hybrid cross-factional forms (PDF p.140, p.151-154).

Chapter 7 and the Conclusion generalize the comparison: the same war produced cross-factional unity under siege in Beirut and Rashidiyeh, declared neutrality plus clandestine supply in Burj al-Shamali, and personalized militia fragmentation in Saida, where the front-based Magdousheh fighting and Arafat’s centralized micromanagement reinforced factional chains rather than community loyalties — a divergence the Conclusion turns into a methodological claim against group-level ethnic/sectarian analysis and event-based casualty models (PDF p.160-161, p.176, p.180, p.184-186, p.188-191). The completed References and Index close the work’s apparatus without adding new claims: the bibliography confirms that the narrative’s load-bearing citations (Sayigh, Khalidi, Picard, Rubenberg, Schiff and Ya’ari, Khalili, Nofal, Giannou, the AFSC and Advisory Committee files and Sawt al-Mukhayyam) sit inside a wider comparative and relational literature the Conclusion draws on, and the Index’s cross-referenced headwords reproduce the book’s conceptual structure — adaptation, emergence, remapping, repurposing, relational plasticity, backstage roles and repertoires of violence — rather than a purely nominal index. Appendix A strengthens the method’s reflexive strand from Chapter 1: access asymmetries are named as limits (FTO-constrained volunteering; no formal interviews with current Fatah al-Intifada or al-Sa’iqa members; interviews stopped after 2012 for safety), and romanticized memory is treated both as an evidentiary problem to be structured around and as contemporary organizational data in its own right (PDF p.193-194, p.199-201).

People, organizations, places and events

Concepts

How it relates to other sources

Parkinson’s account of the PLO’s social and economic apparatus in Lebanon — largest employer, Samed industry, PRCS medicine, the general unions — extends the institutional picture in The Question of Palestine, where the PLO’s schooling, health and supply networks and its place made for any Palestinian are central to its legitimacy, and gives that apparatus a camp-level, network mechanism Said does not trace. Her Deuxième Bureau period and camp history run parallel to the Lebanon refugee history presupposed in Palestinian Chicago — Identity in Exile’s account of the secular-nationalist generations formed by the PLO era, though her subject is wartime adaptation inside Lebanon rather than diaspora identity. Her treatment of Sabra and Shatila massacre in Zahra’s story — militiamen of the Kata’ib, the SLA and other predominantly Christian militias killing between two and three thousand predominantly Palestinian civilians (PDF p.26) — is held alongside, not merged with, the figures and the IDF-observation account on that page from Israel: The Hijack State — America’s Watchdog in the Middle East; see Open questions. Agreements and disagreements with other sources on shared figures are recorded on the entity pages and under Open questions, not resolved here.

Open questions

  • The ANM founding is dated two ways inside this range: the period survey gives “the founding of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) in 1952 in Beirut” (PDF p.56), while the narrative gives Habash, Haddad and al-Hindi founding the ANM in 1951 (PDF p.59). Both are held, not reconciled.
  • The copyright page names the licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 but prints the URL as https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/legalcode, without the nc element (PDF p.5). Held as printed.
  • The Acknowledgments print the Yale scholar’s name as “Stathis Kalyvis” (PDF p.11), while the Introduction cites “Kalyvas and Balcells 2010” (PDF p.29). Both spellings held as printed in the text copy, byte-checked.
  • Chapter 1 prints the mnemonic-socialization sociologist as “Eviatar Zarubavel (1996, 286)” at first mention and “Zerubavel 1996” shortly after (PDF p.50-51). Both forms held as printed, byte-checked.
  • Chapter 2 prints the Jordanian-war passage with “its leftist elements such as the PLFP” (PDF p.61), a transposition of PFLP as printed, byte-checked; and dates the 1974 dissent to “the 12th session of the Palestinian National Congress” (PDF p.63), while the PLO’s legislature is elsewhere in the same chapter the Palestinian National Council (PDF p.60). Held as printed.
  • Casualty framing for September 1982 in Greater Shatila differs by source and is not reconciled: Parkinson, in Zahra’s story, gives militiamen “disappearing and killing between two and three thousand predominantly Palestinian civilians” (PDF p.26), while the figures recorded on Sabra and Shatila massacre from other sources are 700-800 (Israeli army) and 762 recovered with 1,200 more buried privately (Lebanese government). The events’ naming and scope also differ — Greater Shatila district here, Sabra and Shatila camps there.
  • The maps (PDF p.18-21) cannot be fully read from the text copy, whose labels are duplicated and scrambled; camp and place detail from the maps is therefore not entered on pages from this range.
  • The Burj al-Shamali destruction is given two ways in Chapter 3: the AFSC report’s June 23, 1982 UNRWA estimate gives “Bourj el Shemali 35% destroyed” for camp housing (PDF p.79-80), while Abdullah 2008, 53, drawing on UNRWA figures, is cited for 70 percent of homes in Burj al-Shamali destroyed (PDF p.80). Both are held, not reconciled.
  • The September 1982 toll is given two ways inside this work: the Introduction gives militiamen “disappearing and killing between two and three thousand predominantly Palestinian civilians” in Greater Shatila (PDF p.26), while Chapter 3 gives Lebanese militiamen killing or disappearing “between 2,000 and 3,500 predominantly Palestinian civilians” in the Shatila district (PDF p.91). Both are held, not reconciled; the district scope also differs (Greater Shatila against the named Shatila district neighbourhoods).
  • Printed forms held as printed in this range, each byte-checked in the text copy: “Menachim Begin” for the prime minister (PDF p.75); “even the miniscule ALF” inside the Sayigh 1997, 451 paraphrase/quotation (PDF p.71); the Ansar camp placed outside “Nabitiyeh” (PDF p.83); and “agressive [sic]” inside the Khalidi 1985, 49 quotation, the [sic] being the book’s own (PDF p.88).
  • Printed forms held as printed in this range, each byte-checked in the text copy: “the IDP minimally regulated” for the IDF in Sur (PDF p.134); “extorsionists [sic]” and “dissention” inside the AFSC internal correspondence quotation (PDF p.134); “subvert [sic]” inside the AFSC report quotation (PDF p.133); “he will executed, too” inside the Associated Press 1984 statement quotation, the missing “be” as printed (PDF p.132); Giannou quotations spelling the commander “Ali Abu Toq” (PDF p.147, p.153) against the text’s own “Ali Abu Tawq”; and “Belonging to a [sic] organization” inside the Giannou memoir quotation (PDF p.113).
  • The Sawt al-Mukhayyam Vietnamese-women article, as quoted, gives “In Bayan city alone, there were 1 million women participating in civil tasks” (PDF p.112); the figure and place name are held as quoted, not reconciled.
  • Printed forms held as printed in this range, each byte-checked in the text copy (soft hyphens removed for the check): Sawt al-Mukhayyam’s “[DFLP leader Nayef] Hawatmeh has committed many subversive crimes against that masses and against the revolution” (PDF p.162); “the practical assessment that that the camp could not sustain a siege” with doubled “that” (PDF p.175); “the interactions that collectively bring about organizational as well as and social change” with doubled “as” (PDF p.179); and “clandestine operations in, for example, Irish, Algerian, and Eritrean civil wars well as serving as ground troops” with a missing “as” (PDF p.187). The Sayigh 1997, 604 quotation spells the Magdousheh offensive “Maghdusha” (PDF p.168), against Magdousheh in the text’s own usage throughout this range.
  • Appendix A’s participant-driven ethnohistory says the Nakba Day poster discussions facilitated introductions to women who had worked in “the clandestine support network described in chapter 6” (PDF p.196); the network accounts in the chapters read span chapters 4, 6 and 7. Held as printed.
  • Printed forms held as printed in this range, each byte-checked in the text copy (soft hyphens removed for the check): Bedawy ‘helped to located and translate’ (PDF p.214-215); the POHA ‘Ein al-Hilwet’ collection for Ein al-Hilweh (PDF p.212); ‘the PLFP’ for the PFLP in Chapter 2 note 19 (PDF p.222) and Chapter 4 note 2 (PDF p.227); ‘interlocuters’ (PDF p.227); ‘These particular experience jibes’ (PDF p.228); Lebanon ‘did not consent by be bound by Protocol II’ (PDF p.225); Umm Nader’s ‘their greatest fear during was being separated’ with a missing word after ‘during’ (PDF p.232); Appendix A note 17’s thanks to Fujii with no full stop before note 18 (PDF p.237); ‘Fleifel, Mahdi, dir..’ with a doubled full stop (PDF p.240); the Central Bureau of Statistics title’s ‘Libanon’s Camps’ and the TIEMC title’s PLO’s with a straight double quotation mark in place of an apostrophe (PDF p.242); and Beddawi’s 1979-1980 figure printed ‘5,791/8194’ without a comma in the second figure, checked against the original (PDF p.216).
  • The interpreter scholar is spelled “Roman Malajacq” in the Appendix A main text (section Research Assistance and Interpreters) at PDF p.207 (printed p.184) and in Appendix A note 25 (PDF p.237), against “Malejacq” for Romain Malejacq in the Appendix A text (PDF p.204). Both forms held as printed, byte-checked.
  • The ANM dating held above (1952 at PDF p.56 against 1951 at PDF p.59) is joined in the Notes by a third statement: Y. Sayigh (1997, 31) and a PASSIA guide both date the founding to 1951 (PDF p.221). All three are held, not reconciled.
  • Tel al-Za’tar’s toll is given in Chapter 2 note 38, as cited from Sayigh, as in sum 4,280 people died during the siege, 450 of them members of militant organizations and 750 armed volunteers, with around 3,000 civilians and 400 fighters fled on August 9 and 10 (PDF p.223), held alongside the chapter text’s approximately 4,000 dead over the siege (PDF p.66-67), not reconciled.
  • Printed forms held as printed in the final range, each byte-checked in the text copy and, where marked, checked against the original: McAdam 1986’s page range printed “64–90” (PDF p.252, checked against the original); the Syrian Network for Human Rights 2021 title’s “Health Care Personal” for Personnel (PDF p.258, checked against the original); the World Bank n.d.c entry’s access date printed “July 21, 2021c” (PDF p.260, checked against the original); Mao’s On Guerilla Warfare with “Guerilla” as printed (PDF p.259); the Pader 2006 entry filed after Pachucki and Breiger 2010, out of alphabetical order (PDF p.253); and the DOIs of Shesterinina 2018, Stewart 2020 and Weinstein 2005 printed without a closing full stop (PDF p.257, p.258, p.259).
  • Index forms held as printed, each byte-checked: “Jisr al-Pasha camp” (PDF p.265) against Jisr al-Basha in the text; the headword “PDFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine)” (PDF p.267) against the DFLP headword and usage elsewhere; and “white phosphorous” (PDF p.269), the spelling the main text also uses, against “White Phosphorus” in the Federation of American Scientists fact-sheet title in the References (PDF p.247).
  • The References give “Malejacq, Romain” (PDF p.252) for the co-author of Malejacq and Mukhopadhyay 2016, joining the Appendix A forms held above — “Malejacq” in the Appendix A text (PDF p.204) and “Roman Malajacq” in the Appendix A text and note 25 (PDF p.207, p.237) — all held, not reconciled. The References likewise give “Zerubavel, Eviatar” (PDF p.260), joining the Chapter 1 forms “Eviatar Zarubavel (1996, 286)” and “Zerubavel 1996” (PDF p.50-51) held above.

Coverage

Read in full, PDF p.1-269 of 269 (parts 1-6 of 6).

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