Palestine Partition Commission Report

Summary

The Report of the Palestine Partition Commission (Cmd. 5854), chaired by Sir John Woodhead, appointed in March 1938 under terms of reference published in Cmd. 5634 on 4 January 1938 to take the Royal Commission’s Part III partition plan as its starting point, with full liberty to modify it, and to recommend boundaries for Arab and Jewish areas and Mandate enclaves that would afford a reasonable prospect of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States, include the fewest possible Arabs in the Jewish area and vice versa, and enable the Mandatory’s Article 28 Holy Places responsibilities, and to report on the economic and financial questions of partition. Part 1 (PDF p.1-53) gives the Preface and contents, the Chapter I synopsis of the whole report, Chapter II’s political background since July 1937, Chapter III’s general matters (boundaries, defence, population and population/land statistics), the Chapter IV boundaries and figures for the Jerusalem and Nazareth enclaves, the Chapter V boundary of Jaffa and of Jaffa–Tel Aviv, the Chapter VI Plan A boundary between the proposed Arab and Jewish States, the Chapter VII Plan A population and land figures, and the opening of Chapter VIII on exchanges and transfer of population. Part 2 (PDF p.54-97) gives the rest of Chapter VIII (the Beersheba, Jordan Valley, Beisan, Trans-Jordan, hill-country and Gaza development surveys and the chapter’s conclusions), the whole of Chapter IX rejecting the Jewish claim to part of Jerusalem, and Chapter X’s detailed examination rejecting Plan A unanimously and Plan B as no less unacceptable, its summary continuing past PDF p.97. The synopsis already records the report’s eventual shape: Plan A is examined and unanimously rejected, Plan B is held unacceptable by the majority, Plan C is the majority’s best devised scheme, Chapter XVIII concludes no boundaries can be recommended that give a reasonable prospect of a self-supporting Arab State, and Chapter XXII puts forward a modified partition called economic federalism rather than a merely negative report (Palestine Partition Commission Report, PDF p.7-13).

What the file is

The October 1938 HMSO printed report, Cmd. 5854, price 5s. 6d. net, presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty (PDF p.1). The Commission was: Chairman Sir John Woodhead, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.; members Sir Alison Russell, K.C., A. P. Waterfield, C.B., and T. Reid, C.M.G.; Secretary S. E. V. Luke (PDF p.2). The text copy is an OCR copy (ABBYY) with frequent character garbling, especially in headings, tables and fractions; garbled places in this part were read in the original, and the original’s readings are recorded in the reading notes. Printed pagination runs with PDF pagination through printed p.9 (PDF p.9); PDF p.10 is printed p.11, no printed p.10 appearing in this copy. Map 1, the Palestine Hydrographic Survey, is a full-page plate at PDF p.52, between printed p.52 and printed p.53. The report’s contents, chapters I–XXII, two notes of reservations and eleven appendices, are listed at PDF p.3-6.

Section by section

• Contents and Preface (PDF p.1-9): title, commission membership, full contents and maps list, and the Preface to Malcolm MacDonald quoting the terms of reference in full (Cmd. 5634, reproduced as Appendix 1). The Commission held no witness meetings before leaving London on 21 April 1938, arrived in Jerusalem on 27 April, toured about 5,000 kilometres (3,000 miles) in Palestine and Trans-Jordan in May and early June, spent nine days in Trans-Jordan, held fifty-five sessions in Jerusalem (two public, the rest private) and nine further private sessions in London, and records that no Arab witnesses came forward. It left Palestine on 3 August and, to avoid delay amid continuing and intensifying violence, postponed allocation of public assets, currency arrangements and preservation of civil servants’ rights to a later stage (PDF p.7-9).

• Chapter I, Introductory (PDF p.10-13 / printed p.11-14, paras. 1-19): a synopsis of the whole report by chapter. Plan A is the Royal Commission’s rough outline drawn exactly, with defence modifications agreed with the military authorities, especially to the Jerusalem Enclave, the eastern Maritime Plain and the southern Plain of Jezreel (Map 8). Plan A is unanimously rejected in Chapter X; Plan B, a variant, is held unacceptable by the majority; Plan C (Chapter XI) is the majority’s best scheme. Chapter XVIII concludes it is not possible to recommend boundaries giving a reasonable prospect of a self-supporting Arab State; Chapter XIX holds a customs union necessary; Chapter XXI holds a customs union constitutionally impossible except on conditions inconsistent with fiscal independence; Chapter XXII therefore ventures beyond a strictly negative report to propose economic federalism, withholding fiscal autonomy, if H.M. Government accepts the very considerable financial liability involved.

• Chapter II, The Political Background (PDF p.14-19 / printed p.15-20, paras. 20-30): events since the Royal Commission’s Report of 7 July 1937 and the same-day Statement of Policy (Cmd. 5513); the Commons motion as amended by Winston Churchill and agreed without a division; the Permanent Mandates Commission’s Preliminary Opinion and its presentation to the League Council on 14 September 1937. The Arab reaction was immediate, unanimous and uncompromising: the Arab Higher Committee’s memorandum stated four principles (complete Arab independence, cessation of the Jewish National Home experiment, replacement of the Mandate by a treaty creating a sovereign State, immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews pending a treaty), more than a year later the Arabs remain inflexibly hostile, and the boycott of the Commission was complete. The intensified campaign of murder and intimidation culminated in the killing of Acting District Commissioner L. Y. Andrews and his escort at Nazareth on 26 September; on 1 October the Arab Higher Committee and National Committees were declared unlawful, three members and the Secretary were deported to the Seychelles, and Haj Amin al Husseini fled to the Lebanon; military courts came into being on 18 November. The Twentieth Zionist Congress (Zurich, August 1937) resolution is quoted in full: it declared the Royal Commission’s partition scheme unacceptable while empowering the Executive to negotiate to ascertain the Government’s precise terms for a Jewish State. Casualties from acts of violence in the first seven months of 1938, excluding armed Arab bands’ casualties in encounters, totalled 316 killed and 728 wounded.

• Chapter III, General Matters (PDF p.20-32 / printed p.21-32, paras. 31-54): §1 Boundaries — Plans B and C boundaries could not for secrecy be traced on the ground; a future Boundary Commission of two British officers (differences to a third) should follow the deposited signed maps with liberty for small changes; where a defensive line cuts an Arab village’s lands the boundary follows it, villagers preferring to retain a footing in the Arab State, while on an Arab State/Mandated boundary the whole village lands are generally included in the Mandated area. §2 Defence — military advice was accepted in every case; no strategic line exists west of the Jordan under modern warfare, so boundaries are judged tactically against a force armed with rifles and machine guns. §3 Population — the population has doubled since the War, from about 700,000 in 1919 to just over 1,400,000 estimated mid-1938; the Arab natural increase of about 355,000 (from about 635,000 to about 990,000) is analysed through vital statistics (1922-37 averages per thousand: Moslem birth-rate 51.15, death-rate 26.14, natural increase 25.01; Jewish 32.21, 10.78, 21.43; Christian 36.47, 15.89, 20.58); the Arab average holding is computed at 50 or 58 dunums per family against a weighted “lot viable” of about 111 dunums, and the Commission concludes that cutting off supplementary employment would be serious for Arabs, that demand for it will intensify as the rural population grows, and that, capital being in practice Jewish, the Arab future is menacing unless Jewish immigration and capital imports continue; Trans-Jordan’s population is usually estimated at about 325,000, with no vital statistics available. §4 Population and Land Statistics — village-by-village figures compiled since the Royal Commission (methods in Appendix 5), Arab population at mid-1937, Jewish at September 1936, land at 1 April 1935 except citrus (autumn 1937); Jewish-owned land was 1,238,896 dunums in April 1935, with 84,477 dunums transferred by Arabs to Jews by 31 May 1938; Beersheba sub-district is taken as 60,000, entirely Arab, over about 12,577,000 dunums, its cultivated area estimated at 1½ to 2 million dunums; the metric dunum, about a quarter of an acre, is the unit.

• Chapter IV, The Boundaries of the Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclaves (PDF p.33-38 / printed p.34-39, paras. 55-71): under Mandate Articles 13 and 28 and the Royal Commission’s “sacred trust of civilization” framing, the Jerusalem Enclave’s northern boundary is moved north of Ramallah for defence (the Qalandiya landing-ground, the Ramallah–Latrun road, the Beitunya high point) and for the Palestine Broadcasting Station; six co-operative-water villages including Shabtin are included; the Arab villages Salama, al Kheiriya, Saqiya, Kafr Ana and al Yahudiya and the civil airport are included and the German colony of Wilhelma’s residential area is placed in the Enclave; Sarafand cantonments and the projected Aqir RAF base are included; a wider mandated strip, not a narrow belt, gives sea access, its southern boundary the northern boundary of Rishon le Ziyon, with treaty provisions for ranges and emergency military use south to Wadi Rubin; the Jewish contention for a narrow Ramle-to-sea strip is rejected. The Enclave’s population is Arabs 211,400, Jews 80,100, total 291,500, and its land Arabs 1,485,200 dunums, Jews 78,700. The Nazareth Enclave is limited to Nazareth’s village lands, extensions to Kafr Kanna, Mount Tabor and Yafa not being supported: population Arabs 10,000, Jews 100; land Arabs 19,400 dunums, Jews 100.

• Chapter V, The Boundary of Jaffa (PDF p.39-43 / printed p.40-44, paras. 72-88): Jaffa (about 55,000 Arabs, about 16,000 Jews, essentially Arab) stays in the Arab State though separated from it by the Enclave; Tel Aviv (about 140,000, entirely Jewish) adjoins it. The Royal Commission’s narrow mandated belt between the towns is rejected; instead a boundary road, 20 metres wide (30 to 40 metres from the seashore to Hacarmel Street), with a high iron railing down its middle as the joint boundary, is recommended (Map 12), at an estimated cost of about £115,000. It transfers the Karton Quarter (about 3,200 Jews, 2,000 Arabs) and the Florentine Quarter (about 12,500 Jews) and part of Shapiro to Tel Aviv, and Neve Shalom (about 5,400, entirely Jewish) to Jaffa: in all about 15,700 Jews and 2,000 Arabs from Jaffa to Tel Aviv and about 5,400 Jews from Tel Aviv to Jaffa. Both the Jewish scheme (which would transfer almost all of al Manshiya, including the Hassan Bey Mosque, and Arab land in Saknat Abu Kabir) and the Arab scheme are rejected. The remaining Jaffa boundary follows the “Urban and Village” and town-planning boundaries (Map 4), including room for expansion.

• Chapter VI, The Boundary between the Proposed Arab and Jewish States under Plan A (PDF p.44-46 / printed p.45-47, paras. 89-97): along the eastern Maritime Plain the boundary is drawn within the Samaria foothills for defence, unavoidably including Arab foothill villages in the Jewish State; Tulkarm (nearly 6,000, entirely Arab) stays in the Arab State and the Lydda–Haifa main line is to be diverted about 10 kilometres at about £100,000. North of Tulkarm the boundary is not drawn inside the foothills, for the three reasons given; in the Plain of Jezreel it runs along the Gilboa crest, again including Arab villages; the Beisan boundary follows the Royal Commission closely; in the Jordan Valley the triangle east of Lake Tiberias, with Dagania A, Dagania B, Kfar Gun, Afiqim and Dalhamiya and over 50 per cent Jewish land, and the Palestine Electric Corporation’s Jisr al Majami land on the Trans-Jordan side, are included in the Jewish State; south of the Jerusalem Enclave the boundary interprets the Royal Commission’s outline as closely as possible.

• Chapter VII, The Figures for Population and Land under Plan A (PDF p.47-50 / printed p.48-51, paras. 98-103, part): Haifa, Tiberias, Safad and Acre are treated as part of the Jewish State, and Trans-Jordan statistics are excluded. Population: Arab State (including Beersheba) Arabs 485,200, Jews 7,200, total 492,400; Jewish State Arabs 294,700, Jews 304,900, total 599,600; Enclaves Arabs 221,400, Jews 80,200, total 301,600; all Palestine Arabs 1,001,300, Jews 392,300, total 1,393,600. In the Jewish State Arabs are 49 per cent of the population. Land: in the Arab State excluding Beersheba, Arabs hold 7,007,900 dunums and Jews 37,000, and Jewish land in Beersheba is 55,545 dunums with no Jews settled on it; in the Jewish State Arabs hold 3,854,700 dunums against Jews’ 1,140,200; in the Enclaves Arabs hold 1,504,600 against Jews’ 78,800. Of Arab citrus outside the Enclaves (105,200 dunums), only 26,600 are in the Arab State against 78,600 in the Jewish State; of Jewish citrus outside the Enclaves (about 137,200), 135,900 are in the Jewish State.

• Chapter VIII, The Possibility of Exchanges and Transfer of Population (PDF p.51-53 / printed p.52-53, paras. 104-108, opening only): H.M. Government have not accepted the Royal Commission’s compulsory-transfer-in-the-last-resort proposal, and Jewish opinion was stated to oppose any compulsion. Under Plan A the Jews in the Arab State number 7,200 with 37,000 dunums, while the Arabs in the Jewish State number 294,700 with 3,854,700 dunums; there is little scope for voluntary exchange of land, and little possibility of voluntary exchange of rural population, between the two states, and the Jerusalem Enclave’s rural Jews and Jewish land are too small to appreciably affect the Jewish State’s minority problem. The Royal Commission’s recommended survey of irrigation, water storage and development possibilities in Beersheba, the Jordan Valley and Trans-Jordan began early in 1938 at an estimated £90,000; its results to the end of July 1938 follow in the paragraphs after PDF p.53.

• Chapter VIII, The Possibility of Exchanges and Transfer of Population (continued) (PDF p.54-72 / printed p.54-72, paras. 109-152): Beersheba — of 16 wells sunk only one near Gaza succeeded, twelve of fourteen interior wells were complete failures and 75 per cent of selected sites failed, flood-weir experiments could not enable extensive settlement, and dry-farming prospects are speculative pending an experimental station funded in August but blocked by insecurity. Jordan Valley south of the Sea of Galilee — wells are unhopeful on the west bank (estimated eastern-bank well area 10,000 dunums; perennial streams possibly +20,000 dunums annually); large irrigation requires the Sea of Galilee, Jordan and Yarmuk and faces the Palestine Electric Corporation’s Jisr al Majami concession (capital about £1,000,000), the lack of a Syria agreement on the Yarmuk, the Palestine Potash Company’s Dead Sea level interest, and the Place of Baptism; high-level canals might irrigate an additional approximately 350,000 dunums, providing after Plan A and existing-population deductions for about 49,000 additional agricultural persons at 30 dunums per holding, while pumping would provide for 18,000-19,000; markets are essential to such schemes. Southern Beisan Plain — additional population not likely to exceed about 4,000. Trans-Jordan — cultivated zone about 7,700,000 dunums against 82,300,000 uncultivated, fiscal-survey classes totalling 10,000,000 dunums, northern holdings indicating land-hunger (about 800 Irbid families applied for eastern-desert State Domain land in winter 1937-38), and nine plateau wells uniformly disappointing: small scope for intensive settlement. Hill country — already congested: the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries’ Hebron investigation gives the northern portion a congestion-free capacity of about 16,500 persons against about 38,000 actually supported by agriculture, and the southern portion 18,235 theoretical against 17,500-20,000 actual, on the Director’s lot viable table (10 dunums citrus/bananas to 400 dunums lowest grades) which the Commission adopts over the Jewish authorities’ 40-dunum Galilee fruit claim. Gaza sub-district — theoretical capacity 45,865 persons against an agricultural population of 67,200-72,000, intensive cultivation possible over a considerable area only with underground water of the right quality and by a slow change. The chapter’s conclusions (para. 152) hold there is practically no scope for exchange, and limited, conditional scope in each development area.

• Chapter IX, The Jewish Claim in regard to Jerusalem (PDF p.73-80 / printed p.73-80, paras. 153-174): the claim, quoted from a Jewish memorandum, is that only the Old City’s Holy Places need Mandatory trusteeship and that new Jewish Jerusalem (about 72,000 people, 69,000 Jews, with the Jewish Agency, Hebrew University and other institutions) should be in the Jewish State, with a corridor to the Maritime Plain; the proposed area would hold about 74,500 people, 71,000 Jews, and includes main roads, Christian institutions and the Mamilla cemetery on higher ground beside the Old City. Administrative difficulties (policing, movement control, customs, the single water and drainage systems centred on Ras-el-Ain and Romema) are formidable but, given goodwill, not insuperable; the political and religious objections are held fatal — the Haram-esh-Sherif with the Dome of the Rock and the Mosque of Aqsa is among the Moslem world’s most treasured possessions, Moslems would regard a neighbouring Jewish State as a spearhead against the Old City (the Shaw Commission’s Ch. IV comment is quoted at length), Christian opinion would be deeply grieved, and inclusion of the main approach roads would handicap free and safe access. The entire city is recommended to remain in the Jerusalem and Bethlehem Enclave, and the proposed Jewish Corridor falls with the claim.

• Chapter X, A Detailed Examination of Plans A and B (PDF p.81-97 / printed p.81-97, paras. 175-207, part): Plan A repeats the Ch. VII figures — Arabs are 49 per cent of the Jewish State and own over 75 per cent of its land — and the Royal Commission’s transfer assumption is tested and rejected: exchange is impossible on 7,200 Jews and 37,000 dunums in the Arab State, and voluntary transfer fails because resettlement land exists for at most a fraction, because Arabs will not leave fertile ancestral lands for arid Beersheba or the oppressive Jordan Valley, and because they will not migrate to make room for the Jews (Jewish National Fund leases bar Arab labour). The predominantly Arab southern section south of the Enclave (Arabs 18,100 of 19,700, containing the Nabi Rubin shrine) should be excluded. Galilee (Arabs 88,200, Jews 2,900; Arab land 1,321,100 dunums against Jewish 35,900) should not be included, for its almost wholly Arab population and ownership, its certain forcible resistance and the lack of justification for compulsion, and the temporary nature of any pacification; its Appendix 7 additional agricultural capacity is put at say 15,000 persons, absorbable by natural increase in about ten years. Plan A is therefore not recommended. Plan B (Plan A minus Galilee and the southern section) fails on Galilee’s disposition: Arab control would leave the Jewish State’s narrow strips (about 15 kilometres and 7-8 kilometres at their narrowest) tactically dominated and Haifa untenable if Acre were hostile, while permanent Mandatory control would deny Galilee’s Arabs the independence granted to the plains’ Jews, the utmost concedable independence area being less than one-third of Galilee; the Galilee problems are in themselves fatal to Plan B. Haifa under Plan B is a mixed town (about 50,000 Arabs would come under Jewish rule; 1938-39 urban property tax Arabs about 30 per cent, Jews about 55 per cent) and Palestine’s only deep water port, with a planned £5,000,000 refinery for not less than 2,000,000 tons of crude oil yearly; it could go to neither state without serious detriment to the other, and Mandatory control is suggested. Even under Plan B the Jewish State would hold 188,400 Arabs (38 per cent) and 2,260,500 dunums of Arab land against 1,077,500 Jewish, with its third portion (Haifa to Beisan and north) 83,000 Arabs against 26,000 Jews. Plan B is found no less unacceptable than Plan A; the chapter’s summary (para. 207) continues past PDF p.97.

Key passages

• “there is no evidence that the population increased or diminished during the last two centuries” (Palestine Partition Commission Report, PDF p.22 / printed p.23, quoting Carr-Saunders, World Population)
• “Family limitation is the only way of escape” (Palestine Partition Commission Report, PDF p.29 / printed p.30, quoting Carr-Saunders on India)
• “it is thus clear that nearly a quarter of the agriculturists would be unable to maintain their present standard of life if they were unable to find a secondary means of subsistence” (Palestine Partition Commission Report, PDF p.27 / printed p.28, quoting the 1931 Census Report, para. 259)

Evidence the work relies on

To be completed in the final part. In this part the report relies on: the Royal Commission’s Report (Part III, Ch. XXII and p.375, p.381, p.385 as cited); Cmd. 5513 and Cmd. 5634; the Permanent Mandates Commission’s Preliminary Opinion; the Arab Higher Committee’s memorandum to the Permanent Mandates Commission; the Twentieth Zionist Congress resolution; Carr-Saunders, World Population (1936); the Government’s Annual Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan for 1937 (Colonial No. 146) and the Report by H.M. Government on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1937, p.221; the Census of Palestine 1931, para. 259; Horowitz, Economic Survey of Palestine (Tel Aviv, 1938); the village-by-village population and land figures described at para. 51 and Appendix 5; Sir George Adam Smith, The Historical Geography of the Holy Land, Chs. XX and XXII; the Shaw Commission Report (Cmd. 3530), Chs. III-IV; the Fiscal Survey Records for Trans-Jordan and the eastern Jordan Valley streams; the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries’ Hebron sub-district and lot viable investigations and the Appendix 7 Galilee absorptive-capacity enquiry; and the advice of the military authorities, the RAF authorities and Palestine Administration and Government officers as recorded in the text.

Analysis

To be completed in the final part.

People, organizations, places and events

Palestine Partition Commission, John Woodhead, Peel Commission, Arab Higher Committee, Palestine Electric Corporation, Amir Abdullah, Winston Churchill, Jerusalem Enclave, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Nazareth, Permanent Mandates Commission, World Zionist Organization, Jordan Valley, Haifa, Galilee, Beersheba, Transjordan, Hebron, Gaza, Palestine Potash Company, Temple Mount, Shaw Commission, Jewish National Fund

Concepts

Partition, Transfer, Lot viable, Holy Places, Jewish National Home

How it relates to other sources

To be completed in the final part. This part takes the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission as its direct predecessor text, quoting its Part III plan, its Ch. XXII boundary outline and its conclusions, and uses the population and land-statistics framework that the Shaw Commission (Cmd. 5530, cited at PDF p.29) had treated.

Open questions

• No printed p.10 appears in this copy between printed p.9 (PDF p.9, end of the Preface) and printed p.11 (PDF p.10, Chapter I); whether printed p.10 is a blank leaf in the printed report or a leaf omitted from this copy is not established in this part.

• Para. 58 (PDF p.33) states the Jerusalem Enclave boundary is shown on Map No. 10, while Ch. I para. 2 (PDF p.10) states the resulting Plan A is shown in Map 8 and the contents list Map 10 as the “C” Plan map; both statements stand as printed.

• The combined Enclaves population at para. 100 splits urban/rural as Arabs 91,000/130,400 and Jews 76,000/4,200; the totals agree with the separate Ch. IV figures (Jerusalem total Arabs 211,400, Jews 80,100, plus Nazareth Arabs 10,000, Jews 100, giving Arabs 221,400, Jews 80,200), but the urban/rural split cannot be checked against Ch. IV because para. 71 gives no urban/rural split for Nazareth (paras. 70, 71 and 100).

• Para. 107 (PDF p.53) gives the Jerusalem Enclave’s rural Jews as 4,000 and its total Jewish-held land as 78,800 dunums; para. 70 (PDF p.37) gives rural Jews 4,100 and Jewish total land 78,700 dunums for the Jerusalem Enclave alone, 78,800 being the combined Enclaves Jewish total land at para. 102. Both statements stand as printed.

• Para. 105’s land groupings regroup the Ch. VII tables (uncultivable including built-on area), as recorded in the reading notes; the totals agree.

• The 1938 row of the para. 38 table places 989,500, footnoted as including Christian Arabs, in the Moslems column, with Christians shown as a dash and Others as 24,600 including non-Arab Christians; the table stands as printed in the original (PDF p.22).

• Para. 171 (PDF p.78) dates the outbreak in Jerusalem narrated in Ch. III of the Shaw Commission Report (Cmd. 3530) to 23 August 1928, as printed and verified in the original; the date stands as printed.

• Para. 152 (iii) (PDF p.72) puts the Jordan Valley additional agricultural population, on the most optimistic view, at not exceeding about 50,000 persons, while para. 128 (PDF p.62) computes 49,000 after the Plan A and existing-population deductions and para. 178 (b) (PDF p.83) repeats about 49,000; all statements stand as printed.

• Para. 207 (i) (PDF p.96) states the Arabs hold four-fifths of the land in Plan A’s proposed Jewish State, giving the figures as 3,855,000 dunums out of 4,995,000 (77 per cent, computed), while para. 175 (PDF p.81) states over 75 per cent on the same figures; both statements stand as printed.

• Para. 204 (PDF p.95) cross-refers the predominantly Arab southern area to paragraph 184, but its population and land figures are given at para. 183 and para. 184 begins the Galilee discussion; both paragraph numbers stand as printed.

• The Ch. IX Jerusalem figures are approximations that do not sum exactly: new Jewish Jerusalem about 72,000 of whom 69,000 Jews (para. 156) plus about 3,000 Jews in the outside suburbs (para. 158) against a proposed included area of approximately 74,500 of whom 71,000 Jews (para. 159); all figures stand as printed.

• The report gives the Shaw Commission Report’s command number in two forms: Cmd. 5530 at para. 48 (PDF p.29 / printed p.30, verified in the original) and Cmd. 3530 at para. 171 (PDF p.78); both stand as printed.

Coverage

PDF p.1-97 of 322, read in full in parts 1-2 of 7. Remaining: part 3, PDF p.98-140; part 4, PDF p.141-189; part 5, PDF p.190-233; part 6, PDF p.234-275; part 7, PDF p.276-322.