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Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915–March 1916

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aliasesMcMahon–Hussein correspondence, McMahon-Hussein correspondence, Hussein–McMahon correspondence, Cmd. 5957

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Summary

The 1939 parliamentary paper (Cmd. 5957, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1939)) printing, in revised English translation, the ten letters exchanged in Arabic between Henry McMahon, His Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca from 14 July 1915 to 10 March 1916 (Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915–March 1916, PDF p.1-2). Hussein opens by asking Britain to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries within limits he specifies — north to Mersina and Adana and the 37th parallel, east to Persia and the Gulf of Basra, south to the Indian Ocean with Aden excepted, west to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean — and to approve an Arab Khalifate, in return for British economic preference and a fifteen-year mutual-assistance treaty (PDF p.3-4). McMahon first defers the limits as premature (30 August 1915, PDF p.4-5); Hussein insists the limits are his people’s minimum and not his personal demand (9 September 1915, PDF p.5-7); and on 24 October 1915 McMahon, on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, accepts the limits with one modification — the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo are excluded as not purely Arab — and, for the regions within those frontiers where Britain is free to act without detriment to France, gives five assurances, the first being that, subject to the modifications, “Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs” “to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions” within the limits Hussein demanded (PDF p.8). The remaining letters negotiate what was left open: Hussein concedes Mersina and Adana but holds Aleppo and Beirut and their coasts as purely Arab (5 November 1915, PDF p.9-11); McMahon defers Aleppo and Beirut because French interests are involved and defers Bagdad’s administration, while assuring Hussein Britain will conclude no peace that does not make Arab freedom from German and Turkish domination an essential condition, and sending £20,000 (14 December 1915, PDF p.11-12); Hussein accepts the deferral for the war’s duration but records that after the war the Arabs will ask for what they now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts (1 January 1916, PDF p.12-14); and the exchange closes with Hussein’s operational plans and supply schedule — £50,000 in gold monthly, provisions, 5,000 modern rifles and deposit at Port Sudan (18 February 1916, PDF p.15-17) — and McMahon’s approval and despatch of the requests (10 March 1916, PDF p.17-18). Palestine is nowhere named in the letters themselves; it appears in the paper only in the Contents entry for the Appendix map of pre-war Turkish administrative districts comprised in Syria and Palestine, a map not present in the file as supplied (PDF p.2; see Open questions).

What the file is

  • A scanned copy of the printed parliamentary paper: Miscellaneous No. 3 (1939), Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon … and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915—March 1916 [With a Map], presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, printed and published by His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1939, price 4d. net, Cmd. 5957 (PDF p.1). The printer’s line at PDF p.18 reads, in figures, 10263 Wt. — 6000 3/39 F.O.P. 18675 Gp. 340. Printed pagination runs p.3-18 for the letters; the title page and the Contents/Explanatory Note page are unnumbered (PDF p.1-2).
  • Structure: title page (PDF p.1); Contents listing letters No. 1-10 with their printed starting pages, and the Appendix map entry, followed by the unsigned Explanatory Note (PDF p.2); letters No. 1-10 (PDF p.3-18, printed p.3-18).
  • The unsigned Explanatory Note governs how the text is to be read: the correspondence was exchanged in Arabic; the English text is based on the original English drafts of McMahon’s letters and the contemporary English translations of Hussein’s letters; the language of some drafts and translations was modified in places where it had been criticised as not reproducing the Arabic accurately and the criticism was found justified; the printed text is the resulting revised text; footnotes, except where otherwise stated, give the text as it stood before the modifications; and His Majesty’s Government were advised by Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne, “Senior Lecturer in Arabic at the School of Oriental Studies, University of London” (PDF p.2). The footnotes (1)-(24) throughout therefore carry former readings, cross-references between letters, and, at notes (4)-(6), suggested better translations of passages of No. 3 — all recorded in the Section by section entries below.
  • Text quality: the original is a legible printed scan and was read directly. The supplied text copy is a poor optical-character-recognition rendering of that scan, garbling letterforms on every page (the title page included); quotations on this page were checked against the original, not against the text copy’s garbled readings, and the quote check’s results reflect that garbling (see the log entry). Two defects of the scan itself: the right-hand edge of printed p.17 (PDF p.17) is cropped, cutting some line-end words of No. 9’s Seventhly and Eighthly points and of No. 10’s opening (the sense is recoverable from context and is marked reading uncertain in the reading notes at those points); and the Appendix map listed in the Contents does not appear in the 18-page file (see Open questions).
  • Spellings as printed and kept on this page: Sherif (not Sharif), Khalifate and Khalifs, vilayets, Bagdad, Shauâl, Zil Hijja, Jeizan, Erzerum. Signature forms vary as printed: No. 2 and No. 10 are signed A. H. McMAHON, No. 4 A. HENRY McMAHON, No. 6 and No. 8 H. McMAHON (PDF p.5, 9, 12, 15, 18).

Section by section

  • Title page and Contents (PDF p.1-2): as in What the file is above. The Contents dates: No. 1, 14 July 1915; No. 2, 30 August 1915; No. 3, 9 September 1915; No. 4, 24 October 1915; No. 5, 5 November 1915; No. 6, 14 December 1915; No. 7, 1 January 1916; No. 8, 25 January 1916; No. 9, 18 February 1916; No. 10, 10 March 1916.
  • Explanatory Note (PDF p.2): as in What the file is above.
  • No. 1, Hussein to McMahon, July 14, 1915 (PDF p.3-4, printed p.3-4): headed as a translation of a letter from the Sherif of Mecca; footnote (1) states it is undated and unsigned, but was enclosed in an unsigned personal letter dated 2nd Ramadan, 1333 (14 July 1915) from the Sherif to Mr. Storrs. Preamble: the whole Arab nation without exception have decided to live, accomplish their freedom and grasp the reins of their administration in theory and practice; supporting them is in Britain’s interest and preferring British assistance is in the Arabs’; the Arab nation asks approval, through Britain’s deputy or representative, of six fundamental propositions, secondary matters left aside, until actual negotiations are possible. Firstly: England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries bounded north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn ‘Umar) and Amadia, up to the border of Persia; east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina; and England to approve the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam. Footnote (2) gives the former reading of the Jezirat/Amadia phrase, in which Amadia appears as an island (Jezireh). Secondly: the Arab Government of the Sherif to acknowledge England’s preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions are otherwise equal. Thirdly: mutual assistance, to the best ability of their military and naval forces, against any foreign Power attacking either party; peace not to be decided without both parties’ agreement. Fourthly: if one party enters an aggressive conflict the other stays neutral, and if it wishes the other to join, both meet and discuss conditions. Fifthly: England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab countries and assist the Sherif’s Government in an international convention confirming it. Sixthly: Articles 3 and 4 to remain in vigour fifteen years, renewable on one year’s notice. Close: the Arab nation, agreed and united at all costs, beg an answer, positive or negative, within thirty days — Hussein asks Britain “to answer them positively or negatively in a period of thirty days” (PDF p.4) — failing which they reserve complete freedom of action, and the Sherif’s family will consider itself free in word and deed from the bonds of its previous declaration made through Ali Effendi.
  • No. 2, McMahon to Hussein, August 30, 1915 (PDF p.4-5, printed p.4-5): thanks for the frank expression of feeling towards England; Arab interests are English interests, as printed. Confirms the terms of Lord Kitchener’s message, delivered by the hand of Ali Effendi, stating Britain’s desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants and its approval of the Arab Khalifate when proclaimed; His Majesty’s Government would welcome the resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true race. On limits and boundaries — footnote (3): the former reading added frontiers — discussion is premature in the heat of war while the Turk is in effective occupation of many portions. Surprise and regret that some Arabs in those parts are neglecting their supreme opportunity and lending their arms to the German and the Turk. Britain will send the charitable offerings of Egypt for the Holy Cities and the noble Arabs when told how and where to deliver them, and is arranging for Hussein’s messenger to be admitted and helped. Signed A. H. McMAHON.
  • No. 3, Hussein to McMahon, September 9, 1915 (PDF p.5-7, printed p.5-7): Hussein received the 30 August letter (dated by him 19th Shawal, 1333) with delight, despite the impression of ambiguity and “its tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our essential point” (PDF p.5). He states the Arabs’ sincerity towards and preference for the British Empire in all cases, which the real interests of the followers of their religion necessitate. He then presses the limits: “the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy” and be discussed with after the war, and “our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this” (PDF p.5-6); footnotes (4)-(6) print suggested better translations of three passages of this letter, including that the frontiers are as a minimum vitally necessary to the Arabs’ new life and their resolution final, that within the limits no places inhabited by a foreign race are included, and, on the Khalifate, a rendering in which the Moslems are to be comforted for its loss. The limits include only their own race and are the people’s proposals, believed necessary for economic life; Britain should not make the conduct of some Arabs promoting Turkey’s interests an excuse for coldness toward demands that are the essential essence of Arab life, material and moral; Hussein carries out Islamic Law in his country; the whole country, including those said to submit to Turco-German orders, waits on the result of these negotiations, which depend on acceptance or refusal of the limits and on safeguarding religion first and then the other rights. The letter’s second half turns to the grain for the natives, the moneys (surras) of the Wakfs’ Ministry and the pilgrim caravans: the grain is from the special Wakfs and has nothing to do with politics, and Hussein sets out a handover procedure — a special steamer to Jedda, delivery by the captain or a special Mamur, a receipt signed only by the Mamur of the grain himself, and return of the cargo if the arrangement is not followed — so that Britain’s proclamations that its antagonism is confined to the party that usurped the Khalifate’s rights can be confirmed to the Moslem world. Dated 29th Shawal, 1333; reply to be sent with the bearer.
  • No. 4, McMahon to Hussein, October 24, 1915 (PDF p.7-9, printed p.7-9): McMahon regrets the impression of coldness in No. 2 — footnote (7) identifies the letter meant — and says the time had not yet come when the limits question could be discussed conclusively; footnote (8) gives the former reading, in which the moment had not arrived for the most profitable discussion. Having realised Hussein regards the question as vital and urgent, he informed the Government of Great Britain and now communicates its statement. The modification: the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab and should be excluded from the limits demanded; with that modification, and without prejudice to existing treaties with Arab chiefs, Britain accepts those limits. Footnote (9) prints the former reading of the whole passage, which differs in wording throughout, including its form of assurance (1). For regions within those frontiers where Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, McMahon is empowered to give five assurances: (1) subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared “to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions” within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca; (2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression “and will recognise their inviolability” (PDF p.8); (3) when the situation admits, Great Britain will give the Arabs her advice and assist them to establish the most suitable forms of government in those territories; (4) it is understood the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and such European advisers and officials as are required for a sound administration will be British; (5) for the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that Britain’s established position and interests necessitate special administrative arrangements — footnote (10): the former reading used the stronger term of administrative control — to secure those territories from foreign aggression, promote the welfare of the local populations and safeguard mutual economic interests. Close: the declaration should assure Hussein of Britain’s sympathy with the aspirations of her friends the Arabs — footnote (11): the former reading was “her traditional friends” — and result in a firm and lasting alliance whose immediate results will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke; other matters in Hussein’s letters can be discussed later; relief at “the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings” (PDF p.9); the letter is sent by the hand of Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, who will speak to the lesser matters. Signed A. HENRY McMAHON.
  • No. 5, Hussein to McMahon, November 5, 1915 (PDF p.9-11, printed p.9-11): replying to No. 4 (dated by him 15th Zil Hijja; footnote (12)). Point 1: to facilitate agreement, serve Islam and avoid hardship, Hussein renounces insistence on including the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom; but the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, with no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab, both descendants of one forefather; Moslems will follow Omar ibn Khattab and the succeeding Khalifs, who ordained that Christians be treated as Moslems treat themselves — Omar’s ruling as Hussein quotes it gives Christians the same privileges and the same duties as Moslems themselves — so Christians will enjoy civic rights as far as accords with the general interests of the whole nation. Point 2: the Iraqi vilayets are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom, seat of its government under Ali ibn Abu Talib and the Khalifs after him, where Arab civilisation began and the first towns built in Islam stood; the Arabs cannot be made to give Britain a title over them; but, to ease accord and on the strength of assurance (5), Hussein might agree to leave the districts now occupied by British troops under British administration for a short time, without prejudice to either party’s rights (especially the Arab nation’s, whose interests there are economic and vital), against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation, respecting Britain’s agreements with the Sheikhs of those districts. Point 3: two grounds of apprehension at Britain’s haste — blame from Moslems of the opposite party, who would say the Arabs revolted against Islam; and the risk that a weakened Entente Power makes peace and the Arab nation is left alone before Turkey and her allies, its fate decided without its claims having been made good. Point 4: belief that after the war the Turks under German influence will provoke the Arabs, violate their rights material and moral, and seek to reduce them to utter submission. Point 5 (PDF p.11): when the Arabs know Britain is their ally, will not abandon them at the peace and will effectively defend them, entering the war at once will accord with their general interest. Point 6: No. 3 (footnote (13)) already states his opinions on assurances (3) and (4), especially as Britain has declared it will not interfere with internal affairs. Point 7: a clear and definite answer is expected as soon as possible; the Arabs have made their utmost concessions; “We know that our lot in this war will be either a success” guaranteeing a life becoming their past history, or destruction in the attempt (PDF p.11); but for Arab determination Hussein would have secluded himself on a mountain, but the Arabs insisted he guide the movement. Dated 27th Zil Hijja, 1333.
  • No. 6, McMahon to Hussein, December 14, 1915 (PDF p.11-12, printed p.11-12): gratification that Hussein agrees to the exclusion of the districts — footnote (14): the former reading said vilayets — of Mersina and Adana. Pleasure at the assurances on the precepts of Omar Ibn Khattab and the early Khalifs, “which secure the rights and privileges of all religions alike” (PDF p.11). Arab recognition of British treaties with Arab chiefs is understood to apply to all territories in the Arab Kingdom, since Britain cannot repudiate existing engagements. On the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, Britain has fully understood and taken careful note — footnote (15): the former reading omitted the words of full understanding — of Hussein’s observations, but, French interests being involved in them both — footnote (16): the former reading omitted those words too — the question requires careful consideration and a further communication will follow in due course. On Bagdad: Britain is ready to give all guarantees of assistance and support within its power to the Arab Kingdom, but its interests demand a friendly and stable administration in the vilayet of Bagdad, whose safeguarding needs fuller and more detailed consideration than the present urgency permits. Britain appreciates Hussein’s caution and does not urge hasty action, but meanwhile Hussein should attach all the Arab peoples to the united cause and urge them to give the enemies no assistance; on such efforts and on the Arabs’ later active measures the permanence and strength of the agreement must depend. McMahon is directed to assure Hussein that “you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace” on terms in which Arab freedom from German and Turkish domination is not an essential condition (PDF p.12). As earnest, £20,000 — “a sum of twenty thousand pounds” (PDF p.12) — is sent by the trustworthy messenger. Signed H. McMAHON.
  • No. 7, Hussein to McMahon, January 1, 1916 (PDF p.12-14, printed p.12-14): Hussein received No. 6 (dated by him 9th Safar) with pleasure; it removed his unease. After Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif’s arrival and interview with McMahon, McMahon will have realised Hussein’s procedure was not personal inclination but the decisions and desires of their peoples, whom Hussein and his family merely transmit and execute. On El Iraq: compensation for the occupation period is left to Britain’s wisdom and justice, as evidence of trust. On the northern parts and coasts: the previous letter stated the utmost possible modifications, made to avoid injuring the Anglo-French alliance and their agreement in the present wars; but McMahon should be sure that at the first opportunity after the war the Arabs will ask Britain for what they now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts (the passage as Hussein phrases it averts their eyes from it today). Their plan better secures Britain’s interests and protection of its rights — footnote (17): the former reading was presumption — so that Britain may see her friends — footnote (18): the former reading had Britain seeing all her own peoples — in contentment, while allied neighbours will be a germ of difficulties with no peaceful conditions — footnote (19): the former reading was a phrase of peace of mind. The citizens — footnote (20): the former reading was people — of Beirut will never accept such dismemberment — footnote (21): the former reading was isolations — and may oblige the Arabs to measures troubling Britain, given the Arabs’ certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of their interests — footnote (22): the former reading stopped at reciprocity — which is why they never negotiated with any other Power. It is impossible to allow any derogation giving France or any other Power a span of land in those regions. Close (PDF p.14): the living will inherit this belief from the dead, in the declarations McMahon gave; the Arabs remain firm to the resolution Storrs learnt from them two years ago, the time for action now near; McMahon’s expression about not pushing them to hasty action needs no explanation beyond what they may ask for when necessary, such as arms and ammunition. Dated 25th Safar, 1334.
  • No. 8, McMahon to Hussein, January 25, 1916 (PDF p.14-15, printed p.14-15): McMahon received No. 7 (footnote (23)) by Hussein’s trusty messenger, with verbal messages; Britain fully realises Hussein’s motives and that he acts entirely in the Arab peoples’ interests. The Bagdad vilayet remarks are noted and will be carefully considered when the enemy is defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives. On the northern parts, Britain notes with satisfaction the desire to avoid anything that “might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France” (PDF p.14); “nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war” to a victorious conclusion (PDF p.14); after victory the Anglo-French friendship will be firmer, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen; Arabia is now associated in the great cause. Britain is pleased at Hussein’s action to win all the Arabs to the joint cause and leaves it to his discretion to seize the most favourable moment for more decided measures; requests will receive immediate consideration. El Sayed Ahmed el Sherif el Senussi has been beguiled into hostile action against the Arabs’ interests; misfortune has overtaken him and may lead him to peace. The letter goes by Hussein’s good messenger. Signed H. McMAHON.
  • No. 9, Hussein to McMahon, February 18, 1916 (PDF p.15-17, printed p.15-17): Hussein received McMahon’s letter dated 25th Rabi El Awal with pleasure at the attainment of the required understanding and the desired intimacy. Firstly: a son sent to Syria to command the necessary operations reports that the Government’s tyrannies there have left almost no dependable persons, of any rank, save a few of secondary importance; he awaits forces announced from the country and the surrounding Arab regions such as Aleppo and the south of Mosul, estimated at not less than 100,000 in total, and intends, if the majority are Arab, “to begin the movement by them” (PDF p.15); if they are Turks or others, he will observe their advance to the Canal and move against them differently than they expect when fighting begins. Secondly: the eldest son is to be sent to Medina with sufficient forces to strengthen his brother in Syria and possibly occupy the railway line; the levies so far are Hejaz guards to keep the interior quiet, raised from the people of Hejaz only, for reasons of secrecy, speed of supply and reinforcement. The statement is to stand as foundation and standard for Arab actions through all changes. Needs, Firstly: £50,000 in gold for the monthly pay of the troops levied and other necessities, to be sent with all possible haste. Secondly: 20,000 sacks of rice, 15,000 sacks of flour, 3,000 sacks of barley, 150 sacks of coffee, 150 sacks of sugar, “5,000 rifles of the modern pattern and the necessary ammunition” (PDF p.16), 100 boxes of the two sample cartridges enclosed and of Martini-Henry cartridges and the cartridges Hussein names Aza, those of the St. Etienne factory rifles in France, for the tribes’ two kinds of rifles, with 500 boxes of both kinds not amiss. Thirdly: deposit of all of it at Port Sudan. Fourthly: the stores to remain there until the movement begins, of which Britain will be officially informed, when the Governor will be told the destination and the intermediaries. Fifthly: “the money required should be sent at once to the Governor of Port Sudan” (PDF p.16), a confidential agent to receive it in one sum or two instalments, recognised by a secret sign printed as a section-like glyph (reading uncertain; see Open questions). Sixthly: the money envoy will reach Port Sudan in three weeks, on 5th Jamad Awal (9th March), carrying a letter to Al Khawaga Elias Effendi about rent of Hussein’s properties, but instructed to ask for the Governor; the money is to be given him with no discussion of any question concerning Hussein, the affair kept secret. Seventhly and Eighthly (PDF p.17, right edge cropped in the scan, reading uncertain at line ends): the change of bearer is not from lack of confidence — the bearer is appointed elsewhere and is not to be sent by steamer; the present bearer is definitely instructed, his mission finished since the position is known in general and in detail, and the next representative, arriving in three weeks, may carry McMahon’s instructions back; and the British Government is asked to treat the expenditure against the books that will be kept on it, explaining how the money was spent. Dated 14 Rabi al Akhar, 1334.
  • No. 10, McMahon to Hussein, March 10, 1916 (PDF p.17-18, printed p.17-18): McMahon received No. 9 (footnote (24)) by the trusted messenger. Britain is grateful for the active measures proposed, considers them the most suitable in the circumstances, and His Majesty’s Government have approved meeting Hussein’s requests; what was asked to be sent with all haste is being despatched with the messenger; the remainder will be collected and deposited at Port Sudan until Britain hears officially of the movement’s beginning, its destinations and the intermediaries; instructions as in Hussein’s letter have gone to the Governor at Port Sudan. Hussein’s representative was facilitated on his journey to Jeizan and, on completion, will be brought to Port Sudan and proceed by the safest means to join Hussein “and report the results of his work” (PDF p.18). Then, to forestall misunderstanding: Turkish posts and small garrisons along the coasts of Arabia are hostile and said to be planning injury to British naval interests in the Red Sea; Britain may have to take hostile measures against them, but “there are various Turkish posts and small garrisons along the coasts of Arabia who are hostile to us” (PDF p.18) and strict instructions require British ships to differentiate those garrisons from the innocent Arab inhabitants; notice is given in case distorted reports reach Hussein. Rumours that the common enemies are building boats “for the purpose of laying mines in the Red Sea, and of otherwise injuring our interests there” (PDF p.18) — Hussein is asked for early information on any confirmation. Ibn Rashid’s camel sales: “We have heard that Ibn Rashid has been selling large quantities of camels to the Turks, which are being sent up to Damascus” (PDF p.18); Hussein is asked to use his influence to stop the practice and, failing that, to arrange for the Arabs between Ibn Rashid and Syria to seize the camels, “a procedure which will be to our mutual advantage” (PDF p.18). The Arabs under Sayed Ahmed el Senussi are beginning to see the error of their ways and coming in asking forgiveness; the forces collected against Britain have been severely defeated, and “the eyes of the Arabs are now becoming open to the deceit which has been practised upon them” (PDF p.18). The capture of Erzerum and Turkish defeats in the Caucasus help the common cause. Close: “We ask God to prosper your endeavours. and to further the work which you have taken in hand” (PDF p.18); “we beg you to accept our warmest salutations and expressions of friendship” (PDF p.18). Signed A. H. McMAHON, dated also 6 Jamad Awwal, 1334.
  • Appendix (Contents entry, PDF p.2): a map of pre-war Turkish administrative districts comprised in Syria and Palestine. No map page appears in the file as supplied (see Open questions).

Key passages

  • Hussein on why the limits cannot wait: “the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy” and be settled with after the war; “our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this” (Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915–March 1916, PDF p.5-6).
  • Hussein on McMahon’s first reply: it gave “its tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our essential point” (PDF p.5).
  • McMahon’s central assurance, No. 4, point (1): subject to the modifications, “Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs”, “to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions” within the limits Hussein demanded (PDF p.8).
  • McMahon, No. 4, point (2): Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression “and will recognise their inviolability” (PDF p.8).
  • McMahon in No. 6, on the Omar precepts Hussein cited: they are precepts “which secure the rights and privileges of all religions alike” (PDF p.11).
  • McMahon in No. 6, the no-separate-peace assurance: “you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace” in terms of which Arab freedom from German and Turkish domination is not an essential condition; the same letter sends “a sum of twenty thousand pounds” (PDF p.12).
  • Hussein in No. 5, on entering the war: “We know that our lot in this war will be either a success” that guarantees the Arabs a life becoming their past history, or destruction in the attempt to attain their objects (PDF p.11).
  • McMahon in No. 8, on France: Britain’s determination is that “nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war” to a victorious conclusion, and Hussein is praised for avoiding anything that “might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France” (PDF p.14).
  • Hussein in No. 9, the supply schedule’s arms item: “5,000 rifles of the modern pattern and the necessary ammunition”, and “the money required should be sent at once to the Governor of Port Sudan” (PDF p.16).
  • Hussein closing No. 9: “my best and numberless salutations beyond increase” (PDF p.17).
  • McMahon closing the correspondence, No. 10: “We ask God to prosper your endeavours. and to further the work which you have taken in hand” (PDF p.18).

Evidence the work relies on

  • The work is itself the evidence: ten letters, printed as translations, with the Explanatory Note (PDF p.2) stating their provenance — McMahon’s letters from their original English drafts, Hussein’s from contemporary English translations of his Arabic letters — and the 1939 revision of that English where criticism of its fidelity to the Arabic was found justified, with the former readings preserved in footnotes (1)-(24).
  • Documents the letters themselves invoke: Lord Kitchener’s earlier message to Hussein, delivered through Ali Effendi, confirming British desire for Arabia’s independence and approval of an Arab Khalifate (No. 2, PDF p.4); the Sherif’s family’s previous declaration made through Ali Effendi (No. 1, PDF p.4); the resolution Storrs learnt from the Arabs two years before January 1916 (No. 7, PDF p.14); Britain’s existing treaties with Arab chiefs, which the assurances are without prejudice to (No. 4, PDF p.8) and which Britain says it cannot repudiate (No. 6, PDF p.11); Britain’s agreements with the Sheikhs of the Iraqi districts, to be respected under the temporary-administration proposal (No. 5, PDF p.10); and the Anglo-French alliance and the agreement between Britain and France in the present wars, which Hussein says impelled the Arabs’ concessions on the northern coasts (No. 7, PDF p.13).
  • Figures the letters state: the 37th parallel as the northern limit (No. 1, PDF p.3); a thirty-day deadline for Britain’s answer (No. 1, PDF p.4); a fifteen-year term for Articles 3 and 4 (No. 1, PDF p.4); £20,000 sent with No. 6 (PDF p.12); an estimated force of not less than 100,000 awaiting the son in Syria (No. 9, PDF p.15, the estimate attributed to that son’s report); £50,000 in gold monthly, and the provision and rifle schedule, including 20,000 sacks of rice and 5,000 modern rifles (No. 9, PDF p.16).
  • Persons the letters name as carriers and intermediaries, presented as the correspondence’s working channel: Ali Effendi, Mr. Storrs, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif, Al Khawaga Elias Effendi, and the unnamed Governors of Jedda and of Port Sudan (PDF p.3-18 passim).

Analysis

  • Form and status: a wartime negotiation printed twenty-three years later by one of the two parties, the British Government, as a parliamentary paper. What is printed is not the Arabic correspondence but a revised English text: McMahon’s side from its own English drafts, Hussein’s side from contemporary translations, with 1939 modifications where the English had been criticised against the Arabic, and the superseded readings kept in footnotes. Every quotation from the paper is therefore a quotation from that revised official English text, and the footnotes are part of the record: on the single most consequential passage, No. 4’s exclusion and assurances, footnote (9) prints a materially different former wording of both the exclusion and assurance (1), and footnotes (15)-(16) record words on Aleppo, Beirut and French interests that the former reading of No. 6 omitted entirely.
  • The negotiation’s shape, as the letters present it: Hussein fixes his people’s minimum limits first and refuses to defer them; Britain first defers, then accepts the limits with the Mersina–Alexandretta–western-Syria exclusion and gives the five assurances expressly only for regions where it is free to act without detriment to France; Hussein concedes the two northern vilayets he is asked for, refuses to concede Aleppo and Beirut, and converts Bagdad and Basra into a temporary, compensated administration without prejudice; Britain defers both open questions — Aleppo and Beirut for French interests, Bagdad for fuller consideration — and substitutes assurances of support, a no-separate-peace pledge and £20,000; Hussein accepts the wartime deferral while putting on record that the Beirut claim will be revived at the first opportunity after the war. The correspondence therefore closes with the two territorial questions that mattered most to its Palestine-adjacent geography — the Syrian coast and Iraq — expressly unresolved, a fact the letters state themselves and no later reading needs to supply.
  • Palestine’s place in the text: Palestine is not named in any of the ten letters. It enters the paper only in the Contents description of the Appendix map, as one of the two lands whose pre-war Turkish administrative districts the map was to show (PDF p.2). Whether the districts west-of-Damascus exclusion in No. 4 was intended to cover any part of Palestine is a question the paper does not answer in words; the map that might have borne on it is absent from the file as supplied (see Open questions).
  • Limits of the paper as evidence: it prints no Arabic text, no covering correspondence with London or Paris, and nothing after 10 March 1916; dates are given in both Gregorian and Hijri forms inconsistently (some letters carry only a Hijri date, supplied with a Gregorian equivalent in the Contents or in the receiving letter); and the scan’s cropped right edge at printed p.17 leaves a small number of line-end words in No. 9 and No. 10 reading uncertain.

People, organizations, places and events

Henry McMahon, Sherif Hussein of Mecca, Lord Kitchener, Britain, France, Syria, Mecca, Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, McMahon–Hussein correspondence

Concepts

Arab Khalifate, Holy Places

How it relates to other sources

  • The correspondence is the earliest primary document in the wiki for the wartime diplomacy the later sources argue about: it predates the Sykes–Picot agreement as A Brief Genealogy of Jewish Republicanism: Parting Ways with Judith Butler and Orientalism (1978) describe that pact, and the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 as dated by Zionist Colonialism in Palestine and The Question of Palestine. Those sources discuss the promises made to the Zionist movement; this paper prints, in its own revised official English, the contemporaneous assurances made to the Sherif of Mecca — acceptance of Arab independence within Hussein’s limits as modified, expressly limited to regions where Britain was free to act without detriment to France — with Palestine unnamed in the letters and present only in the Appendix map’s Contents description. The two sets of pages are complementary records, and no letter in this paper mentions Zionism, a Jewish national home, or Palestine.
  • Where Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace argues, for 1948, that Arab governments could make no important decision without the British Foreign Office, this paper shows the wartime relationship in the parties’ own words a generation earlier: Hussein presenting his demands as his people’s and himself as their transmitter (No. 7, PDF p.13), and McMahon writing throughout as the empowered channel of the Government of Great Britain rather than in his own name (No. 4 and No. 6, PDF p.8, 12).
  • The paper’s own account of Muslim–Christian equality inside the proposed Arab Kingdom (No. 5, PDF p.9-10, on the Omar precepts) is the earliest statement in the wiki, from the Arab side of a negotiation, of the civic-equality claim later sources treat in other settings; McMahon’s reply takes it as securing the rights and privileges of all religions alike (No. 6, PDF p.11).

Open questions

  • The Appendix map of pre-war Turkish administrative districts comprised in Syria and Palestine, listed in the Contents (PDF p.2), does not appear in the 18-page PDF as supplied, which ends with No. 10 and the printer’s line (PDF p.18). Whether the map was a fold-out plate omitted from this scan cannot be determined from the file.
  • Whether the portions of Syria west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, excluded in No. 4 (PDF p.8), were intended to include any part of Palestine: the paper does not say, Palestine is not named in the letters, and the missing map is the only place the paper joins Syria and Palestine. Held as a question, not resolved from outside sources.
  • The former reading of No. 4 in footnote (9) (PDF p.8) differs from the revised text in the wording of both the exclusion and assurance (1) — including, in the former reading, a different preposition for the excluded portions and a form of assurance (1) tied to the territories included in the limits proposed — and footnotes (15)-(16) record that the former reading of No. 6 omitted both the words of full understanding on Aleppo and Beirut and the words placing French interests in them both (PDF p.11-12). The paper does not say which Arabic wording each English form translates at those points, beyond the Explanatory Note’s general account of the revisions.
  • The secret sign in No. 9, Fifthly (PDF p.16), is printed as a glyph resembling a section mark; the text copy renders it as a numeral in parentheses. The exact printed character is reading uncertain.
  • The punctuation mark after “endeavours” in No. 10’s close (PDF p.18) is not legible in the scan of the original: no comma or full stop can be read in the gap before “and”, although the full stops after “working” and “hand” on the same page are clear. The text copy gives a full stop (“endeavours. and”), and the quotations of that close on this page follow the text copy on this point — reading uncertain.
  • The right-hand edge of printed p.17 (PDF p.17) is cropped in the scan, cutting line-end words in No. 9’s Seventhly and Eighthly points and No. 10’s opening lines; the wording at those line ends is reading uncertain, and the paraphrases in the Section by section entries follow the recoverable sense only.
  • No. 2 as printed (PDF p.4) has Arab interests as English interests and English Arab, a sentence whose second half is incomplete as printed; no footnote corrects it. Held as printed.
  • No. 3’s grain passage (PDF p.7) prints a parenthetical query in the Mamur receipt condition — he would, as printed with a question mark, not accept any receipt but the Mamur’s own — leaving the negation itself queried in the printed text. Held as printed.
  • Dates: several letters carry only Hijri dates in their text (No. 3 closes 29th Shawal, 1333, PDF p.7; No. 5 closes 27th Zil Hijja, 1333, PDF p.11; No. 7 closes 25th Safar, 1334, PDF p.14; No. 9 closes 14 Rabi al Akhar, 1334, PDF p.17; No. 10 is also dated 6 Jamad Awwal, 1334, PDF p.18), with the Gregorian dates supplied by the Contents (PDF p.2) and by cross-references in the answering letters; the paper gives no Hijri date for No. 1 beyond footnote (1)‘s 2nd Ramadan, 1333.

Coverage

PDF p.1-18 of 18, read in full.

Graph View

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