The Moratinos Report on the Israeli-Palestinian Talks at Taba (27 January 2001)

Summary

The Moratinos Report is the EU Special Representative’s non-paper of January 27, 2001, acknowledged by both parties as a relatively fair description of the Taba permanent-status talks: the sides agreed the June 4, 1967 lines are the basis for borders under Resolution 242 and accepted land swap in principle, but disputed annexation (an Israeli sketch of 6%, a Palestinian illustrative 3.1%, plus an Israeli request for a further 2% lease and to count the safe passage as swap), accepted in principle Palestinian sovereignty over Arab and Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem and Jerusalem as capital of two states, remained unresolved on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and the delineation of the Western Wall, treated Resolution 194 as the basis for refugees while disputing return, numbers (an informal Israeli 25,000 in three years within a 15-year program) and restitution (raised by the Palestinians, rejected by Israel), and split on security between a non-militarized and a limited-arms Palestine, withdrawal in 36-plus-36 months against 18-plus-10, and five Israeli emergency locations against two international ones (The Moratinos Report on the Israeli-Palestinian Talks at Taba (27 January 2001), PDF p.1-8); pages 8-10 append unattributed-by-the-report commentary signed Akiva Eldar (The Moratinos Report on the Israeli-Palestinian Talks at Taba (27 January 2001), PDF p.8-10).

What the file is

A ten-PDF-page file, about 4,390 words, headed “Peace Agreements Digital Collection”. Pages 1-8 (to §4.8) are the Moratinos non-paper: an Introduction and four numbered sections (Territory, Jerusalem, Refugees, Security), dated January 27, 2001. Pages 8-10 continue, without a break in the file, with three commentary sections — “Dispute over Ma’aleh Adumim”, “How long is the Western Wall?” and “Symbols of sovereignty” — signed “(Akiva Eldar)”, followed by a USIP Library posting note (February 13, 2008) giving UNISPal as source. The commentary is not part of the non-paper’s numbered sections and its relation to the report is not explained in the file; it is summarized separately below.

Section by section

• Introduction (PDF p.1). An EU non-paper with no official status, acknowledged by the parties as a relatively fair description of the Taba outcome; extensive work on all permanent-status issues, serious gaps remaining, solutions possible.
• 1. Territory (PDF p.1). Agreement that, in accordance with Resolution 242, the June 4, 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the state of Palestine.
• 1.1 West Bank (PDF p.1-2). First exchange of both sides’ maps; Clinton parameters a loose basis with disputed interpretation — Israel read them as providing for settlement-bloc annexation, the Palestinians did not accept blocs or their annexation and cited harm to Palestinians in annexed areas; settlement contiguity against Palestinian priority; Israeli maps including future settlement development, rejected by the Palestinians; no Israeli security need for Jordan Valley settlements; blocs incorporating approximately 80 percent of settlers; Israeli 6 percent sketch, Palestinian 3.1 percent illustrative map, land swap accepted in principle with proportionality open; Israel sought to count non-sovereign “assets” such as the safe passage in the swap and adhered to a maximum 3 percent swap; Latrun No-Man’s-Land disputed; Israeli request for an additional 2 percent lease, Palestinian response that leasing can only be discussed after statehood and transfer of sovereignty.
• 1.2 Gaza Strip (PDF p.2). No maps; implied total Palestinian sovereignty, details open; all settlements evacuated, Palestinian six-month timetable not agreed by Israel.
• 1.3 Safe passage/corridor (PDF p.3). Agreed link from Beit Hanun (north Gaza) to the Hebron district and that the West Bank and Gaza Strip must be territorially linked; governing regime and sovereignty not agreed.
• 2.1 Jerusalem sovereignty (PDF p.3). Both accepted in principle Arab neighborhoods Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods Israeli; Palestinians ready to discuss post-1967 Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem except Jebal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud, and rejected Israeli sovereignty over Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev; each side’s understanding of the other’s position on the Old City quarters recorded; Palestinian property claims in West Jerusalem accepted for discussion by Israel, in the Palestinian understanding.
• 2.2 Open City (PDF p.3). Both in favor; scope disputed — Israel proposed the Old City plus the Holy/Historical Basin, the Palestinians the full municipal borders of East and West Jerusalem; Israeli proposals for daily and municipal coordination and a “soft border regime” between Al-Quds and Yerushalaim.
• 2.3 Capital for two states (PDF p.4). Israel accepted Jerusalem as capital of the two states, Yerushalaim and Al-Quds; the Palestinian concern was that East Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine.
• 2.4 Holy/Historical Basin and Old City (PDF p.4). Coordination and special-police ideas discussed, not agreed; Israeli Holy Basin concerns (Mount of Olives Jewish Cemetery, City of David, “Kivron Valley” [as printed]) to be taken into account under Palestinian sovereignty; internationalization or joint-regime options not agreed by the Palestinians.
• 2.5 Western Wall and Wailing Wall (PDF p.4). Respective control over holy sites accepted in principle; Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall would be recognized, delineation and the link to Clinton’s sacred space disputed; the Palestinians distinguished the Wailing Wall segment, the Buraq Wall, and maintained the question unresolved.
• 2.6 Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (PDF p.4). Question not resolved; both sides close to accepting Clinton’s Palestinian-sovereignty formulation with reservations; progress on evacuations, building and public order; an informal three-year international-sovereignty suggestion (P5 plus Morocco or other Islamic presence, Palestinians as “Guardian/Custodians”) neither accepted nor rejected.
• 3. Refugees (PDF p.5-6). Non-papers exchanged; both agreed a just settlement in accordance with Resolution 242 must lead to implementation of UNGA Resolution 194. A joint narrative made much progress without agreement. Return: the Palestinian insistence on return to homes under its interpretation of 194 against the Israeli program list (return to Israel, swapped territory or Palestine; rehabilitation in host country; relocation to a third country; preference to Lebanon), subject in the Palestinian position to individual free choice. An informal Israeli three-track 15-year absorption program, not agreed — 25,000 in the first three years in a non-paper, 40,000 in five years raised verbally; no Palestinian number, and no prejudice to family reunification. Compensation: an agreed International Commission and Fund, fast-track small-sum claims, and an Israeli lump sum whose calculation basis was disputed (macro-economic survey against UNCCP and Custodian for Absentee Property records with a multiplier). UNRWA phase-out targeted at five years. Former Jewish refugees: recognition requested by Israel as not a Palestinian or bilateral responsibility, rejected as a bilateral subject by the Palestinians. Restitution raised by the Palestinians and rejected by Israel. End of claims as complete and final implementation of 194 was suggested.
• 4. Security (PDF p.7-8). Three early warning stations requested by Israel, continued operation accepted in principle by the Palestinians under conditions. Non-militarized (Israel) against a state with limited arms (Palestinians), scope open. Airspace sovereignty recognized, Israel seeking unified control under its overriding control and military access, the Palestinians refusing both. Withdrawal: 36 months plus 36 in the Jordan Valley with an international force (Israel) against 18 plus 10 under international supervision with no ongoing Israeli forces (Palestinians). Emergency locations: five Israeli (Israel) against a maximum of two, time-limited and internationally run (Palestinians), with Israeli deployment in emergencies declined. Security cooperation and fighting terror: both prepared to commit. Borders and crossings sovereignty confident in the Palestinian position, monitoring unresolved. Electromagnetic sphere sovereignty recognized by Israel with a security-control claim, full sovereign rights sought by the Palestinians with cooperative accommodation.
• Appended commentary (PDF p.8-10). “Dispute over Ma’aleh Adumim”: Israel’s recognition of the June 4, 1967 border followed Palestinian agreement in principle to discuss swaps; the 3.1% against 6%-plus-2%-lease dispute and the Latrun dispute retold; Barak instructed Gilad Sher that Shlomo Ben-Ami’s 5% bloc map had no validity; the 1:1 against Israeli 1:2 swap-ratio dispute and the rejection of counting the Halutza Dunes, the safe passage and an Ashdod Port area. “How long is the Western Wall?”: Al-Quds as capital, neighborhood division excepting Har Homa and Ras al-Amud, Muslim Quarter, “the n Quarter” [as printed, reading uncertain] and part of the Armenian Quarter to the Palestinians; the Open City boundary dispute; the Western Wall tunnels claimed as part of Haram al-Sharif. “Symbols of sovereignty”: Israeli sovereignty over the safe passage with Palestinian usage rights only; the armaments, early-warning and emergency-location concessions against harder Palestinian lines on sovereignty symbols and border posts. Signed Akiva Eldar, with a USIP Library posting note of February 13, 2008 sourcing UNISPal.

Key passages

• “it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations” (PDF p.1).
• “the June 4 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the state of Palestine” (PDF p.1).

Evidence the work relies on

The non-paper relies on Moratinos’s and his team’s consultations with the two sides at Taba, on the non-papers the sides exchanged on refugees, on the maps both sides presented at Taba, and on the Clinton parameters as the talks’ loose basis, together with Resolutions 242 and 194. The appended commentary relies on “the document” it describes and gives no further sourcing in the file.

Analysis

A mediator’s stocktaking, not a negotiated text: its value is in recording, issue by issue, which principles were accepted in principle (1967-lines basis, land swap, neighborhood sovereignty in Jerusalem, two capitals, Resolution 194 as the refugee basis, compensation machinery) and exactly where each remained open (percentages and ratios, bloc annexation, Haram sovereignty, return numbers, restitution, withdrawal and emergency arrangements). Its limits are stated in its Introduction — no official status — and compounded in this file by the appended Eldar commentary, which adds claims (the Ben-Ami map instruction, the 1:2 ratio, the quarter-by-quarter Old City account) that the non-paper itself does not make; the two are kept separate above and in the reading notes.

People, organizations, places and events

Taba negotiations, Clinton parameters, Ehud Barak, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Maale Adumim, Jordan Valley, Hebron, UNRWA, UN General Assembly Resolution 194, UN Security Council Resolution 242, Western Wall, Temple Mount

Concepts

Right of Return, Safe passage, Corpus separatum

How it relates to other sources

This is the primary Moratinos account that Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part V (1989-2000) drew on for the Taba negotiations (land swap in principle, neighborhood sovereignty, the 15-year absorption program). It works directly from The Clinton Parameters (23 December 2000) and shows the parameters’ ranges hardening into opposed figures (6% against 3.1%, 3% swap ceiling) and their formulations (Haram sovereignty, return alternatives) remaining unresolved at Taba.

Open questions

• The file does not explain who appended the Akiva Eldar commentary (PDF p.8-10), when, or whether it formed part of the document as circulated in 2001; its UNISPal/USIP posting note is dated 2008.
• “American Quarter” in §2.1, “Kivron Valley” in §2.4 and “the n Quarter” in the commentary are as printed; the last reading is uncertain.
• The report records understandings each side held of the other’s position on Jerusalem (§2.1) without stating that the other side confirmed them.

Coverage

PDF p.1-10 of 10, read in full