Summary
The Trilateral Statement released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary on July 25, 2000, recording that President Clinton, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Chairman Yasir Arafat met at Camp David from July 11 to 24, 2000 on permanent status, “were not able to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement” in negotiations “unprecedented in both scope and detail”, and agreed five principles to guide further negotiations — ending the conflict in a just and lasting peace, concluding an agreement on all permanent status issues as soon as possible, negotiations based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the only way, avoiding unilateral actions that prejudge the outcome, and the United States remaining a vital partner (Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David (25 July 2000), lines 1-94).
What the file is
The Avalon Project reproduction of the White House release, about 420 words in the text copy, lines 1-94: the three leaders named at the head, one introductory paragraph and five numbered principles. No signatures are printed. The Avalon header and title render the summit as “at David Peace” (for Camp David), a form kept in the reading notes.
Section by section
- Head and introduction (lines 25-50). Names Clinton, Barak and Arafat; meeting July 11-24 under Clinton’s auspices; no agreement reached; progress built on.
- Principle 1 (lines 50-55). The aim of negotiations is to put an end to decades of conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace.
- Principle 2 (lines 55-60). Both sides commit to continue efforts to conclude an agreement on all permanent status issues as soon as possible.
- Principle 3 (lines 60-65). Negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only way to achieve such an agreement; an environment free from pressure, intimidation and threats of violence.
- Principle 4 (lines 65-70). Avoiding unilateral actions that prejudge the outcome; differences resolved only by good faith negotiations.
- Principle 5 (lines 70-75). The United States remains a vital partner; close consultation with President Clinton and Secretary Albright in the period ahead.
Key passages
- “While they were not able to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement, their negotiations were unprecedented in both scope and detail.” (lines 40-50)
- “to put an end to decades of conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace” (lines 50-55).
Evidence the work relies on
The Statement relies on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the stated basis of negotiations. It is a joint statement and presents no other evidence, and it does not state what the gaps at Camp David were.
Analysis
A short joint statement whose substance is procedural: it records non-agreement, characterizes the talks positively, and restates five guiding principles without any terms on territory, Jerusalem, refugees or security. Those subjects are not named in the text beyond “all permanent status issues”.
People, organizations, places and events
Camp David Summit, 2000, Bill Clinton, Ehud Barak, Yasir Arafat, Madeleine Albright, UN Security Council Resolution 242, UN Security Council Resolution 338
Concepts
How it relates to other sources
This is the primary “Trilateral statement” whose principles Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part V (1989-2000) noted at the close of the Camp David Summit. Other ingested accounts of the same summit give the substance this statement omits: Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation and The Enduring and Racist Trope of Palestinian Rejectionism record, from negotiators’ accounts, that no written offer was made, and Perceptions of Palestine records the breakdown over settlements, East Jerusalem and refugees. Five months later The Clinton Parameters (23 December 2000) supplied the terms this statement lacks.
Open questions
- The Statement does not identify the gaps that prevented agreement.
- The Avalon title’s “at David Peace” is as printed in the copy; the body correctly names Camp David.
Coverage
lines 1-94 of 94, read in full