Palestine: Statement of Policy (British White Paper of 1939)

Summary

The 1939 statement of policy (the British White Paper of 1939), issued after the London conferences failed to produce agreement: His Majesty’s Government declare unequivocally that Palestine is not to become a Jewish State, set as their objective an independent Palestine State within 10 years in which Arabs and Jews share government, limit Jewish immigration to some 75,000 over the next five years (10,000 a year plus 25,000 refugees) and to none thereafter unless the Arabs of Palestine acquiesce, and give the High Commissioner general powers to prohibit and regulate land transfers from Arabs to Jews (Palestine: Statement of Policy (British White Paper of 1939), lines 27, 45, 61, 97-105, 113).

What the file is

• The statement as reproduced by the Avalon Project under the heading British White Paper of 1939, downloaded from the URL above (access basis: public-domain, as supplied). The original delivered is the HTML page; the supplied text copy (about 4,701 words, 162 lines as counted in the text copy) strips the HTML but keeps its line structure, so locators are line numbers. Avalon navigation and footer matter occupy lines 1-24 and 119-161 and are not part of the statement.
• The file gives no Command Paper number, no presentation line and no day or month of issue; it dates itself only by internal references — the statement of 9 November 1938 (line 27), admissions “from the beginning of April this year” (line 97). The delivery label names MacDonald; the only MacDonald the text itself names is Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, for his February 1931 letter to Dr. Weizmann (line 91). Which MacDonald the label intends is not stated in the file (see Open questions).
• The text copy carries as-printed slips, held in the reading notes and not corrected: “intepretation” (line 51), “acheivements” (line 51), “relinquishmnet” (line 57), “absrobed” (line 91), “Permanent Mandates Commissioner” (line 91), “anddependents” (line 101), “indictaed” (line 113).

Section by section

• Introduction (line 27): the November 1938 invitation, the London conferences with Arab and Jewish delegations over several weeks, the Government proposals laid before both delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement, neither delegation able to accept, no agreement; the Government therefore adhere generally to the proposals finally submitted to and discussed with the delegations.
• The Mandate’s obligations (lines 29-37): the Mandate, confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes four main obligations from Articles 2, 6 and 13 — a national home for the Jewish people with facilitated immigration and close settlement; safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants and the rights and position of other sections; protection of and access to the Holy Places (undisputed); and development of self-governing institutions. Ambiguity in expressions such as “a national home for the Jewish people” is identified, following the Royal Commission and earlier commissions, as a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility; Partition would have given clarity but has been found impracticable, so policy is set out under The Constitution, Immigration and Land.
• Section I, not a Jewish State (lines 41-45): the Government do not contest that Zionist leaders in 1917 recognised an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the Declaration, but hold the Mandate’s framers could not have intended conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State against the Arab population’s will; the 1922 Command Paper passage is quoted against a wholly Jewish Palestine — recording that “Phrases have been used such as that `Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English.’” — and against “the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine”. The Government “now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State”, and would regard making the Arab population subjects of a Jewish State against their will as contrary to their Mandate obligations to the Arabs and to past assurances.
• Section I, the National Home as defined in 1922 (lines 47-51): the 1922 description is quoted at length — the recreated community of 80,000 with its own political organs, elected assembly and councils, school organisation, Chief Rabbinate, Hebrew vernacular and press — and adhered to as the authoritative description: further development of the existing Jewish community, not imposition of a Jewish nationality on Palestine’s inhabitants as a whole, the community present as of right and not on sufferance. Since 1922 more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated and the National Home’s population has risen to some 450,000, approaching a third of the country’s entire population; its achievements are praised.
• Section I, the McMahon contention (line 53): Arab delegations repeated that Palestine lay within the area where Sir Henry McMahon in October 1915 undertook to recognise and support Arab independence; British and Arab representatives investigated the claim during the conferences and their published report records no agreement on interpretation. The Government adhere to the view that “the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon’s pledge” and cannot agree the correspondence justifies converting Palestine into an Arab State.
• Section I, objective and transition (lines 55-83): the objective is self-government and ultimately an independent Palestine State where Arabs and Jews share authority safeguarding each community’s essential interests, reached through a transitional period under continued Mandatory responsibility. Numbered intentions in substance: establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State in treaty relations with the United Kingdom, with consultation of the League Council on terminating the Mandate (line 61); shared government (line 63); an increasing Palestinian part in government during transition, carried on whether or not both sections take it up (line 65); Palestinians placed in charge of all Departments, with British advisers under the High Commissioner, Arab and Jewish heads approximately in proportion to population, until all heads are Palestinians, then consideration of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers (line 67); no proposals yet on an elective legislature, regarded as an appropriate development if public opinion favours it (line 69); at five years from restoration of peace and order, a representative body to review the transitional arrangements and recommend on the independent State’s constitution (line 71); treaty safeguards required for the Holy Places, the different communities and the special position of the Jewish National Home, strategic requirements, and certain foreign countries’ interests (lines 73-79); postponement after 10 years only after consultation with Palestine’s representatives, the League Council and the neighbouring Arab States (line 81); increased powers for municipal corporations and local councils during transition (line 83).
• Section II, Immigration (lines 87-109): Article 6 requires facilitation “while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced”, and the Mandate nowhere defines the permitted extent. The 1922 criterion of Economic capacity is quoted, and its treatment in practice as the sole limiting factor — laid down as policy in Ramsay MacDonald’s February 1931 letter to Dr. Weizmann, an interpretation the statement notes “has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commissioner” (“Commissioner” as printed, line 91) — is expressly not read as binding for all time: political as well as economic adverse effects count. The disturbances that fear of indefinite immigration made possible are said to have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations “which is deplorable between citizens of the same country”; if immigration continues up to economic absorptive capacity regardless of all other considerations, “a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated” and Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East, and the Government cannot take the view that their Mandate obligations, or considerations of common sense and justice, require them to ignore these circumstances (line 91). Indefinite immigration against the Arab population’s strongly expressed will would mean rule by force, contrary to the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant. The Government adopt the alternative of further expansion only with Arab acquiescence, while rejecting an immediate stop as damaging, unjust to the National Home and disregardful of Jewish refugees from certain European countries. The scheme: five years of immigration bringing the Jewish population to approximately one-third of the total, allowing “some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years” from the beginning of April this year (line 97) — a quota of 10,000 a year, shortfalls addable within the period if capacity permits (line 99), plus 25,000 refugees once the High Commissioner is satisfied their maintenance is ensured, with special consideration for refugee children and dependents (line 101); the absorptive-capacity machinery and the High Commissioner’s ultimate decision retained, with Jewish and Arab representatives consulted (line 103); “After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it” (line 105); illegal immigration to be checked, and illegal immigrants who cannot be deported deducted from yearly quotas (line 107); after the five years the Government hold themselves neither justified nor obliged to facilitate the National Home’s further development by immigration regardless of Arab wishes (line 109).
• Section III, Land (lines 111-115): expert commissions’ reports indicate that in certain areas there is now no room for further transfers of Arab land, and in others transfers must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created; the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land from the statement’s publication, retained throughout the transitional period, with Government policy directed to land development and improved cultivation, and the High Commissioner able to review and modify orders where the Arab population’s rights and position are preserved.
• Conclusion (line 117): the Government have endeavoured to act strictly according to their obligations to both Arabs and Jews; the Mandate’s vagueness made the task difficult; they cannot hope to satisfy partisans of either party; the two peoples must practise mutual tolerance, goodwill and cooperation in a country revered by Moslems, Jews and Christians worldwide.

Key passages

• “now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State” (line 45)
• “The objective of His Majesty’s Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future” (line 61)
• “some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years” (line 97)
• “After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it” (line 105)
• “the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon’s pledge” (line 53)

Evidence the work relies on

• The file is the Government’s own statement. It quotes the Mandate for Palestine (Articles 2, 6 and 13), the Balfour Declaration, the 1922 Command Paper (British White Paper of June 1922) at length, and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; it relies on the Royal Commission’s and Partition Commission’s findings on ambiguity and partition’s impracticability, on the published British-Arab report on the McMahon–Hussein correspondence from the London conferences, on Ramsay MacDonald’s February 1931 letter, and on unnamed expert commissions’ reports for the land findings (lines 29-113).

Analysis

• Form: a policy statement in three sections that redefines each Mandate obligation by interpretation rather than amendment — the National Home capped at the 1922 description, immigration made subject to a political as well as an economic test and then to Arab acquiescence, and land transfers made regulable — while promising a single independent State, shared between the two peoples, as the constitutional end.
• The statement’s own limits: the 75,000 figure is expressly computed from expected natural increase and illegal immigrants already present, neither of which it numbers separately; the one-third proportion is approximate; the 10-year objective is subject to a postponement procedure the statement itself builds in; and the land powers are announced without the areas, categories or orders that would give them content, which are left to the High Commissioner.

People, organizations, places and events

British White Paper of 1939, Jewish Agency, League of Nations, Peel Commission, Palestine Partition Commission, 1939 London Round Table Conference, Ramsay MacDonald, Henry McMahon, McMahon–Hussein correspondence, Balfour Declaration, Mandate for Palestine, British White Paper of June 1922

Concepts

Jewish National Home, Economic capacity, Partition

How it relates to other sources

• It executes the procedure the November 1938 statement announced: conferences first, then a Government decision when no agreement came (Palestine: Statement by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom (1938), PDF p.2).
• Against the Palestine: Statement of Policy by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom: both statements rest on the 1922 interpretation and on land and immigration restriction, but the 1930 statement’s restrictions were framed through development and total unemployment and, on ingested accounts, were then retracted in effect by the February 1931 letter; the 1939 statement expressly refuses to read that 1931 letter as fixing economic absorptive capacity as the sole criterion for all time (line 91).
• Against the British Policy in Palestine — British White Paper of June 1922: the 1939 statement quotes its two central passages (no wholly Jewish Palestine; the National Home as the existing community’s further development) and adheres to them, while adding what 1922 did not contain — a dated independence objective, a numbered immigration ceiling and land-transfer powers.
• Ingested later accounts summarise its terms in the same figures: Lockman records the same terms in summary — an independent Palestinian state within ten years, land-purchase restrictions, a 75,000 five-year immigration ceiling (Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948, lines 3060-3074), and Banko records it as describing limits to Jewish immigration and land purchases, greater Arab involvement and independence within ten years, rejected by both the Arab leadership and the Zionist Organisation (The Invention of Palestinian Citizenship, 1918–1947, PDF p.207-216). The statement itself records neither delegation’s response to this final form of the proposals beyond the introduction’s statement that neither felt able to accept the proposals laid before them (line 27).
• The The Alexandria Protocol (7 October 1944) treats the pledges embodied in this policy — cessation of Jewish immigration, preservation of Arab lands and independence for Palestine — as “permanent Arab rights” whose prompt implementation is demanded (The Alexandria Protocol (7 October 1944), line 135).

Open questions

• The delivery label names MacDonald, but the file names no author or presenter; the only MacDonald in the text is Ramsay MacDonald in connection with the February 1931 letter (line 91). Who presented this statement, and its Command Paper number and exact date of issue, are not stated in the file.
• The statement refers to its own immigration admissions “as from the beginning of April this year” (line 97) without giving the year in that sentence; the year 1939 is carried by the Avalon heading and the file’s delivery, not by a date line in the statement itself.
• The declaration of intentions refers to “the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (6)” (line 73), but the intentions are not numbered as sub-paragraphs in the Avalon text; which numbered item is meant cannot be fixed from this reproduction.
• The statement gives the National Home’s population as some 450,000 approaching a third of the total (line 51) and computes the 75,000 from expected natural increase and present illegal immigrants (line 97) without giving the total population or either component figure.

Coverage

lines 1-162 of 162, read in full