Summary
His Majesty’s Government’s November 1938 statement (Cmd. 5893), issued after receipt of the Palestine Partition Commission report: the Government accept that the political, administrative and financial difficulties of creating independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that partition is impracticable, will continue their responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine, and will first invite Palestinian Arab, neighbouring-State and Jewish Agency representatives to confer in London on future policy, including immigration, reserving the right to refuse Arab leaders they regard as responsible for assassination and violence, and to decide themselves if the talks produce no agreement in reasonable time (Palestine: Statement by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom (1938), PDF p.1-2).
What the file is
- The statement as reproduced in the UNISPAL PDF downloaded from the URL above (access basis: public-domain, as supplied). The original is the PDF (2 pages); the supplied text copy (about 1,143 words) carries PDF p.1 and p.2 markers, so locators are PDF pages throughout. Title page: presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, November 1938, London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, price 1d. net, Cmd. 5893 (PDF p.1). The text copy’s headnote gives the source as United Kingdom and the date as 11 November 1938 (PDF p.1).
- The body is seven numbered paragraphs; there are no annexes. One footnote on PDF p.1 gives Cmd. 5634 for the 23 December 1937 despatch.
Section by section
- Para. 1, the Peel proposal recalled (PDF p.1): the Royal Commission under the late Earl Peel reported in July 1937, proposing independent Arab and Jewish States with other areas retained under mandatory administration; the Government then announced general agreement with its arguments and conclusions and held partition on those general lines to be the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.
- Para. 2, the further examination authorised (PDF p.1): the proposal needed detailed examination; it was discussed in Parliament and before the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations, which gave authority to explore partition’s practical application; the despatch of 23 December 1937 (Cmd. 5634) to the High Commissioner announced the further investigations, defined the technical Commission’s functions and terms of reference, and stated the final decision required the material a detailed scheme would provide.
- Para. 3, the Partition Commission’s report (PDF p.1-2): the four members advise unanimously against the Royal Commission’s scheme. One member prefers Plan B; two, including the Chairman, hold Plan C the best scheme devisable under the terms of reference; the fourth agrees Plan C is the best devisable but regards both plans as impracticable. Under either plan the Jewish State’s budget would likely show a substantial surplus and the budgets of the Arab State (including Trans-Jordan) and of the Mandated Territories substantial deficits; the Commission reject a direct subvention from the Jewish State to the Arab State as impracticable, think a customs union essential on economic grounds, and consider such a union inconsistent with fiscal independence for the two States; on a strict interpretation of their terms of reference they could recommend no boundaries affording a reasonable prospect of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States.
- Para. 4, partition rejected (PDF p.2): after careful study the Government conclude the difficulties are so great that this solution is impracticable.
- Para. 5, continued responsibility and the London invitation (PDF p.2): the Government will continue responsibility for the whole of Palestine and seek alternative means consistent with their obligations to Arabs and Jews; the surest foundation for peace and progress would be an Arab-Jewish understanding, so representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of neighbouring States, and of the Jewish Agency, are to be invited to confer in London as soon as possible on future policy including immigration; for Palestinian Arab representation the Government reserve the right to refuse leaders they regard as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence.
- Para. 6, decision if talks fail (PDF p.2): an early decision matters; if the London discussions produce no agreement within a reasonable period, the Government will take their own decision and announce the policy they propose to pursue.
- Para. 7, the Mandate (PDF p.2): in settling policy the Government will keep in mind the international character of the Mandate and their obligations in that respect.
Key passages
- “unable to recommend boundaries for the proposed areas which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States” (PDF p.1-2)
- “this solution of the problem is impracticable” (PDF p.2)
- “His Majesty’s Government will therefore continue their responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine” (PDF p.2)
Evidence the work relies on
- The file is the Government’s own statement. It relies on, without reproducing, the Peel Commission report of July 1937, the despatch of 23 December 1937 (Cmd. 5634), the discussions in Parliament and before the League of Nations bodies it names, and the Palestine Partition Commission report whose conclusions para. 3 summarises (PDF p.1-2).
Analysis
- Form: a two-page Command Paper of seven paragraphs that reverses the Government’s announced position of the previous year. Its reasoning is carried entirely by the Partition Commission’s summarised conclusions — the budget contrast, the rejected subvention and the customs-union/fiscal-independence contradiction — none of whose underlying figures are given in this file.
- The statement decides only the negative (partition will not proceed) and the procedure (London conferences, then a Government decision if needed); it states no alternative policy on immigration, land or constitution, expressly leaving those to the conferences it convenes. Its one substantive condition on those conferences is the reserved right to exclude Palestinian Arab leaders held responsible for violence, stated without naming any leader.
People, organizations, places and events
Peel Commission, Palestine Partition Commission, Jewish Agency, League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, 1939 London Round Table Conference
Concepts
Partition, Mandate for Palestine, Jewish National Home
How it relates to other sources
- It is the Government’s response to the Palestine Partition Commission report ingested as Palestine Partition Commission Report; para. 3’s summary of Plans B and C, the budget findings and the customs-union point should be read against that report’s own text.
- The London conferences it convenes are the conferences whose failure the 1939 statement of policy records at its opening, referring there to the statement on Palestine issued on 9 November 1938 and to its announced invitation to representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighboring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer in London regarding future policy (Palestine: Statement of Policy (British White Paper of 1939), line 27). The 1939 statement then carries out this statement’s para. 6: a Government decision announced after no agreement was reached.
- Where the Peel Commission report proposed partition and the Government’s 1937 statement of policy agreed in general, this statement records the abandonment of that scheme, while keeping the Mandate itself and the Government’s obligations to both peoples as the stated frame.
Open questions
- Date as given in the file against date as given in the 1939 statement: this file’s headnote dates it 11 November 1938 and its title page only November 1938 (PDF p.1); the 1939 statement refers to it as the statement on Palestine issued on 9 November, 1938 (Palestine: Statement of Policy (British White Paper of 1939), line 27). Both dates are held as printed in their respective files; neither file explains the difference.
- The statement does not name which neighbouring States were to be invited, which Palestinian Arab leaders might be refused, or what “a reasonable period of time” for the London discussions meant.
- “So Chichester Street, Belfast” in the Stationery Office address list (PDF p.1) is held as printed.
Coverage
PDF p.1-2 of 2, read in full