Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People

Summary

The Trump White House’s January 2020 Vision proposes an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement built on a “realistic Two-State solution” in which the Palestinians receive “all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel”: a demilitarized State of Palestine, its territory reasonably comparable in size to the pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza through land swaps on a Conceptual Map that incorporates the vast majority of Israeli settlements and the Jordan Valley into Israel, an undivided Jerusalem as Israel’s sovereign capital with a Palestinian capital named Al Quds in areas east and north of the existing security barrier, no right of return or absorption of any Palestinian refugee into Israel, overriding Israeli security responsibility inside the Palestinian state, and a Trump Economic Plan of more than $50 bi l l i o ninn e w in v es t m e n t o v er t e n y e a r s, co n d i t i o n e d o n P a l es t inian g o v er nan ce, e d u c a t i o nan d sec u r i t y cr i t er iaj u d g e d j o in tl y b y I sr a e l an d t h e U ni t e d S t a t es ([[w hi t e - h o u se - 2020 - p e a ce - t o - p r os p er i t y ∣ P e a ce t o P r os p er i t y : A V i s i o n t o I m p r o v e t h e L i v eso f t h e P a l es t inianan d I sr a e l i P eo pl e]], P D F p .7 - 8, 15 - 17, 21, 23 - 24, 36 - 38) . P a r t 1 co v er s t h e w h o l e p o l i t i c a l f r am e w or k (S ec t i o n s O n e t o T w e n t y - T w o), A pp e n d i x 1^{'} s C o n ce pt u a l M a p s, an d t h eo p e nin g p a g eo f A pp e n d i x 2 A . P a r t 2 co m pl e t es A pp e n d i ces 2 A - 2 C, g i v es t h e w h o l eeco n o mi c f r am e w or k (P a r tB) w i t hi t s t h r ee ini t ia t i v es an d q u an t i f i e d g o a l s, an d g i v es A pp e n d i x 3^{'} s S u mma r y O v er v i e w an d i t s f i r s tp r o j ec tt ab l es, t h r o ug h t h eD i g i t a l S er v i ces t ab l e . P a r t 3 co m pl e t es A pp e n d i x 3 : t h er e mainin g C ha pt er O n e t ab l es (T o u r i s m t h r o ug h N a t u r a l R eso u r ces), t h er e g i o na l t ab l es f or J or d an, E g y pt an d L e ban o n, a l l o f C ha pt er T w o^{'} se d u c a t i o n, w or k f or ce, h e a l t h c a r e an d q u a l i t y - o f - l i f e t ab l es, a l l o f C ha pt er T h r e e^{'} s g o v er nan ce t ab l es — w h ose t o t a l ss u m (co m p u t e d) t o t h e$ 3,330 million Governance / Reforms allocation — and the one-page Conclusion, which closes: “Their story is just being written” (PDF p.180).

What the file is

The archived White House PDF of January 2020, 181 PDF pages, about 47,701 words, letter size, produced with Acrobat Pro DC (file metadata dated January 28, 2020). The text copy supplied with it carries === PDF p.N === markers for all 181 pages and is readable in the body, with display headings spaced letter by letter, the cover emblem garbled, and graphic pages (the Part A divider at PDF p.2 and the Conceptual Maps at PDF p.45-46) absent, so those pages were read in the original. Printed page numbers run 4 behind PDF pages (the Glossary is printed p.1 at PDF p.5). The work is in three parts in this wiki: part 1, PDF p.1-48; part 2, PDF p.49-123; part 3, PDF p.124-181. In part 2 the economic framework restarts its printed pagination (its Foreword is printed p.1 at PDF p.57), and Appendix 3 (from PDF p.86) is a slide and project-table section whose graphic pages are absent or letter-spaced in the text copy, so those pages were read in the original. The same holds in part 3: the divider and goal slides at PDF p.129-130, 136-139, 143-144, 150-151, 155-156, 160-163, 168-169, 174-175 and 179 were read in the original, the Conclusion at PDF p.180 is letter-spaced in the text copy, and PDF p.181 is a blank closing page carrying only a faint emblem in the original.

Section by section

Cover, Contents and Glossary (PDF p.1-5)

Cover: “PEACE TO PROSPERITY”, dated January 2020, subtitled “A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People”; PDF p.2 is a divider for Part A, the Political Framework, in the original (PDF p.1-2). The Contents list a Glossary, twenty-two sections and Appendices 1, 2A, 2B and 2C (PDF p.3-4). The Glossary defines the “State of Palestine” as “a future state, not currently in existence that could be recognized by the United States only if the criteria described in this Vision are satisfactorily met”, and cross-refers terms including Al Quds (Section 5), Conceptual Map and International Fund (Section 4), Crossings Board (Section 8), Gaza Criteria (Section 9), Palestinian Refugee Trust (Section 16), and Prisoner & Martyr Payments (Section 23, although the Contents list no Section Twenty-Three) (PDF p.5).

Section One: Introduction (PDF p.6-8 / printed p.2-4)

Background: both peoples have suffered; no plan gives either side all it wants; this is “our view of the best, most realistic and most achievable outcome” (PDF p.6). Gaza “is under the control of Hamas, a terrorist organization, and, as a result of Hamas’ policies, is approaching a humanitarian crisis” (PDF p.6). Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and its Sinai withdrawal are presented as precedents, and the conflict’s intractability is attributed in part to “the conflation of two separate conflicts: a territorial, security and refugee dispute between Israel and the Palestinians and a religious dispute between Israel and the Muslim world regarding control over places of religious significance” (PDF p.6). Oslo: Rabin’s last Knesset speech is presented as the basis on which the Knesset approved the Oslo Accords — united Jerusalem under Israeli rule, West Bank areas with large Jewish populations and the Jordan Valley incorporated into Israel, and Palestinian civil autonomy in something “less than a state” in the remainder with Gaza — and as “not rejected by the Palestinian leadership at the time” (PDF p.7). IDF–PASF security cooperation is praised; Oslo’s unresolved issues (borders, security, refugees, Jerusalem) require a comprehensive agreement with a strong economic plan (PDF p.7). Realistic Two-State Solution: “A realistic solution would give the Palestinians all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel. This necessarily entails the limitations of certain sovereign powers in the Palestinian areas (henceforth referred to as the “Palestinian State”) such as maintenance of Israeli security responsibility and Israeli control of the airspace west of the Jordan River” (PDF p.7). The Palestinian Authority is described as “plagued by failed institutions and endemic corruption. Its laws incentivize terrorism and Palestinian Authority controlled media and schools promote a culture of incitement” (PDF p.8). US support for a Palestinian state is conditional on Palestinian leaders recognizing Israel as the Jewish state, rejecting terrorism, and satisfying the Vision’s criteria (PDF p.8). Regional cooperation is framed around shared perceptions of the threat from “Iran’s radical regime” (PDF p.8). The economic vision estimates Palestinian GDP could double in 10 years, create over 1 million new jobs, reduce unemployment below 10 percent and cut poverty by 50 percent (PDF p.8).

Section Two: The Approach (PDF p.9-14 / printed p.5-10)

United Nations efforts: “Since 1946, there have been close to 700 United Nations General Assembly resolutions and over 100 United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with this conflict. United Nations resolutions are sometimes inconsistent and sometimes time-bound. These resolutions have not brought about peace” (PDF p.9); the Vision “is not a recitation of General Assembly, Security Council and other international resolutions on this topic because such resolutions have not and will not resolve the conflict” (PDF p.9). Current Realities: the Vision is a holistic package of compromises; “Reciting past narratives about the conflict is unproductive”; the US role is to propose recommendations, with final details worked out directly between the parties (PDF p.10). The discussion closes at the top of PDF p.11: Arab countries “have been held hostage to this conflict” and recognize that it represents “an uncapped financial liability” to them if unresolved, and many “are ready to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and want to partner with Israel and focus on the serious issues facing the region” (PDF p.11). Legitimate Aspirations: Palestinians have “a legitimate desire to rule themselves and chart their own destiny”, addressed through designated territory, institutions, state legal status, security arrangements and a network of roads, bridges and tunnels; the Vision aims at mutual recognition of each state as the nation-state of its people “with equal civil rights for all citizens within each state” (PDF p.11). Primacy of Security: “No government should be asked to compromise the safety and security of its citizens. This is especially true for the State of Israel”; Israel “has also had the bitter experience of withdrawing from territories that were then used to launch attacks against it” and “suffers from extraordinary geographic and geostrategic challenges”, so it “has no margin for error”, and a Hamas-like regime in the West Bank “would pose an existential threat to the State of Israel”; “The United States would only ask Israel to make compromises that we believe will make the State of Israel and the people of Israel more secure in the short and long term” (PDF p.11-12). Territory, Self-Determination and Sovereignty: Israel “has already withdrawn from at least 88% of the territory it captured in 1967”, and the transfer contemplated is of land to which Israel has asserted “valid legal and historical claims” in “the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people”; “Peace should not demand the uprooting of people – Arab or Jew – from their homes”; “Sovereignty is an amorphous concept that has evolved over time” and treating it as static “has been an unnecessary stumbling block in past negotiations” (PDF p.12-13). Refugees: over 70 million refugees and displaced persons worldwide and over $8.5 billion sought by the UN in 2020 are set against the Palestinian case; “The Arab-Israeli conflict created both a Palestinian and Jewish refugee problem”, with a similar number of Jewish refugees expelled from Arab lands, whose just solution belongs in “an appropriate international mechanism separate from the Israel-Palestinian Peace Agreement” (PDF p.13). Jerusalem: “The State of Israel has been a good custodian of Jerusalem” (PDF p.13). Gaza: Israel is not expected to negotiate with a Palestinian government including Hamas or PIJ members unless it commits to nonviolence, recognizes Israel and satisfies the Gaza Criteria; Israel implements its obligations only if the Palestinian Authority or another body acceptable to Israel fully controls Gaza, terror organizations there are disarmed and Gaza is fully demilitarized (PDF p.14). International Assistance: aid dependence is to be reduced over time (PDF p.14).

Section Three: A Vision for Peace Between the State of Israel, the Palestinians and the Region (PDF p.14-15 / printed p.10-11)

The agreement is to be implemented through legally binding contracts (the “ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENT”); the appendices are integral; the Conceptual Map demonstrates “a redrawing of boundaries in the spirit of UNSCR 242” against nine listed aims, from meeting Israel’s security requirements and taking account of its “valid legal and historical claims” to significant territorial expansion and a possible expansion of Gaza for the Palestinians (PDF p.14-15).

Section Four: Borders (PDF p.15-18 / printed p.11-13)

“The State of Israel and the United States do not believe the State of Israel is legally bound to provide the Palestinians with 100 percent of pre-1967 territory (a belief that is consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242)” (PDF p.15-16). The Palestinian state encompasses territory “reasonably comparable in size to the territory of the West Bank and Gaza pre-1967”, with a high-speed West Bank–Gaza link crossing over or under Israel and special access to Haifa and Ashdod port facilities (PDF p.16). Israel “will not have to uproot any settlements, and will incorporate the vast majority of Israeli settlements into contiguous Israeli territory” (PDF p.16). “Approximately 97% of Israelis in the West Bank will be incorporated into contiguous Israeli territory, and approximately 97% of Palestinians in the West Bank will be incorporated into contiguous Palestinian territory” (PDF p.16). Palestinian and Israeli enclaves in each other’s contiguous territory keep their own citizenship and civilian administration, with access routes, and in both cases “Such enclaves and access routes will be subject to Israeli security responsibility” (PDF p.16). “The Jordan Valley, which is critical for Israel’s national security, will be under Israeli sovereignty”, with existing Palestinian agricultural enterprises continuing under Israeli licenses or leases (PDF p.17). Israeli territory close to Gaza may be allocated to the Palestinians (PDF p.17). Israel retains sovereignty over territorial waters (PDF p.17). The Triangle Communities — Kafr Qara, Ar’ara, Baha al-Gharbiyye, Umm al Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira, Kafr Bara and Jaljulia — “largely self-identify as Palestinian” and may become part of the State of Palestine if the parties agree (PDF p.17). Two Palestinian access roads cross the Jordan Valley to Jordan (PDF p.17-18); “The security barrier will be realigned to match the new borders” (PDF p.18); an International Fund pays for land-swap development, infrastructure and security measures, whose cost “is not expected to be absorbed by the State of Israel or the State of Palestine” (PDF p.18).

Section Five: Jerusalem (PDF p.18-23 / printed p.14-19)

The approach is “to keep Jerusalem united, make it accessible to all” (PDF p.19). Religious Aspects give each faith’s connection in the Vision’s own terms: for Judaism, Mount Moriah, David’s capital for “nearly 3,000 years”, the Temples destroyed in 586 B.C. and 70 A.D., “nearly 700 separate references to Jerusalem in the Hebrew Bible”; for Christianity, the life of “Jesus of Nazareth”, Constantine, 637, 1099 and 1187, the Ottoman firmans and the 1993 Vatican-Israel Fundamental Agreement; for Islam, the Koran’s night-journey verse, al-Isra’ and al-Mi’raj, the first Qiblah, the Umayyads, Saladin in 1187 and Suleiman in 1517, Jerusalem as “the third holiest site in Islam” (PDF p.19-20). Holy Sites: a long list of sites protected since 1967 is given; “the State of Israel is to be commended for safeguarding the religious sites of all and maintaining a religious status quo”; all holy sites “should be subject to the same governance regimes that exist today. In particular the status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif should continue uninterrupted”; “People of every faith should be permitted to pray on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, in a manner that is fully respectful to their religion” (PDF p.20). Political Status: division is rejected, also as inconsistent with the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995; “On December 6, 2017, on behalf of the United States of America, President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital” (PDF p.21). The existing security barrier “should remain in place and should serve as a border between the capitals of the two parties. Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel, and it should remain an undivided city. The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kafr Aqab, the eastern part of Shuafat and Abu Dis, and could be named Al Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine” (PDF p.21). Arab residents beyond the 1949 armistice lines but inside the barrier may choose Israeli citizenship, Palestinian citizenship, or retained permanent-resident status; about 6% are said to have chosen Israeli citizenship over the years (PDF p.21-22). A Palestinian special tourism zone is proposed at Atarot, with a Jerusalem-Al Quds Joint Tourism Development Authority (JTDA) and Palestinian tour-guide licenses in the Old City (PDF p.22). Both capitals should be internationally recognized, and the US embassy to the State of Palestine will be in Al Quds after signing (PDF p.23).

Section Six: The Trump Economic Plan (PDF p.23-25 / printed p.19-20)

The economic plan presented in Manama, Bahrain, in June 2019, “Peace to Prosperity: A New Vision for the Palestinian People”, has three initiatives — economy, people, government — and “the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years” (PDF p.23). Capital is placed in a new fund administered by an established multilateral development bank, with accountability, transparency, anti-corruption and conditionality safeguards; implementation is conditioned on Palestine establishing financial institutions “capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies”, proper-use governance, and a legal system protecting investments (PDF p.24-25).

Section Seven: Security (PDF p.25-28 / printed p.21-23)

“The State of Palestine will not be burdened with such costs, because it will be shouldered by the State of Israel” (PDF p.25). “Upon signing the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, the State of Israel will maintain overriding security responsibility for the State of Palestine”, reduced as Palestine meets and maintains the Security Criteria of Appendix 2B; Palestine “shall be fully demilitarized and remain so, as outlined in Appendix 2C”, with security-force missions agreed by both states and incapable of derogating Israel’s overriding responsibility (PDF p.25-26). A pilot program in a West Bank area “designated by the State of Israel” begins once Israel determines Palestine has shown intention and sustained capacity to fight terrorism; metrics are non-binding and no less than Jordan’s or Egypt’s, whichever is stricter; failure lets Israel “reverse the process” (PDF p.26-27). A Review Committee (Israel, Palestine, United States) meets every 6 months; a regional security committee (RSC) is recommended including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; Israel maintains at least one early-warning station in Palestine run by Israeli forces; Palestinian zoning and planning adjacent to the border, including Jerusalem–Al Quds, is subject to Israel’s overriding security responsibility (PDF p.27-28).

Section Eight: Crossings (PDF p.28-29 / printed p.24)

A Crossings Board (three Israelis, three Palestinians, one US representative) meets quarterly, but its purpose “is not to interfere with the security measures at the crossings” (PDF p.28). “All persons and goods will cross the borders into the State of Palestine through regulated border crossings, which will be monitored by the State of Israel. Israeli border crossing officials, using state of the art scanning and imaging technology, shall have the right to confirm that no weapons, dual-use or other security-risk related items will be allowed to enter into the State of Palestine” (PDF p.28). Denied items are also barred from export from Israel into Palestine to avoid a competitive advantage to Israeli businesses; only security-vetted individuals and companies may handle dual-use items (PDF p.28-29).

Section Nine: Gaza Criteria (PDF p.29-30 / printed p.25-26)

Gaza’s people “have been exploited as hostages and human shields” under Hamas; “Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza nearly 15 years ago was meant to advance peace. Instead, Hamas, an internationally recognized terrorist group, gained control over the territory” (PDF p.29). Israel implements its obligations only if the Palestinian Authority or another body acceptable to Israel fully controls Gaza, Hamas, PIJ and all other militias are disarmed, and Gaza is fully demilitarized; Israeli captives and soldiers’ remains must be returned; any Hamas role in government requires adopting the Quartet principles — recognizing Israel, committing to nonviolence, accepting previous agreements, and disarming all terrorist groups (PDF p.30). Major international investment is offered as compensation for “a complete and verifiable demilitarization of Gaza”, released in tranches as milestones are achieved (PDF p.30).

Section Ten: Free Trade Zone (PDF p.30 / printed p.26)

Subject to Jordan’s agreement, a Jordan–Palestine free-trade zone is established, its goods exported through an airport in Jordan (PDF p.30).

Section Eleven: Trade Agreement with the United States (PDF p.31 / printed p.27)

The United States continues duty-free treatment for goods from areas enjoying it today and “will negotiate a free trade agreement with the State of Palestine” (PDF p.31).

Section Twelve: Port Facilities (PDF p.31-33 / printed p.27-28)

A Gaza port is “problematic for the foreseeable future”; Palestine may use and manage earmarked facilities at Haifa and Ashdod under Israel’s “undisputed sovereignty”, with Israel’s role limited to security, cargo ships only, Palestinian tax collection, Israeli law applying, shared maintenance costs and no rental fee; parallel terms at Aqaba under Jordan’s sovereignty, with Jordan entitled to an appropriate rental fee (PDF p.31-33). Five years after signing and full satisfaction of the Gaza Criteria, Palestine may create an artificial island off Gaza for a port and a small-aircraft airport, subject to Israel’s security and environmental requirements, whereupon the Haifa/Ashdod and Aqaba rights lapse unless the host agrees otherwise (PDF p.33).

Section Thirteen: Dead Sea Resort Area (PDF p.33 / printed p.29)

Israel allows a Palestinian resort area in the north of the Dead Sea “without prejudice to the State of Israel’s sovereignty at such location, including, without limitation, Israel’s sovereignty to the shoreline”, reached by a road subject to Israeli security considerations (PDF p.33).

Section Fourteen: Water and Wastewater Treatment (PDF p.33-34 / printed p.29)

“The parties recognize mutual water rights and agree to equitably share existing cross border water sources” and cooperate on desalination, wastewater treatment and reuse (PDF p.33-34).

Section Fifteen: Prisoners (PDF p.34 / printed p.30)

Release of Palestinian prisoners and administrative detainees except those convicted of murder or attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder (including by terrorism), and Israeli citizens, who “shall not be released under the terms of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement” (PDF p.34). Phase one, immediately after signing: minors, women, prisoners over 50, prisoners in ill health, and those who have served over two-thirds of their sentence; phase two: remaining eligible prisoners who have served over half; further releases only with Israeli consent (PDF p.34). Each released prisoner must sign “a pledge to promote within their community the benefits of co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians”; “Prisoners who refuse to sign this pledge will remain incarcerated” (PDF p.34). No releases occur if all Israeli captives and remains are not returned (PDF p.34).

Section Sixteen: Refugees (PDF p.35-37 / printed p.31-32)

Framing: “Nearly the same number of Jews and Arabs were displaced by the Arab/Israeli conflict. Nearly all of the Jews have since been accepted and permanently resettled in Israel or other countries around the world” while displaced Arabs were kept from citizenship in Arab countries; Kuwait’s Palestinian population is said to have dropped “from 400,000 before the invasion to about 25,000” after liberation; Lebanon is said to bar Palestinians from property and professions including law, medicine and engineering; “Their Arab brothers have the moral responsibility to integrate them into their countries as the Jews were integrated into the State of Israel” (PDF p.35). US contributions to UNRWA are given as approximately $6.15 bi l l i o n f r o m 1950 t h r o ug h 2017, an d a pp r o x ima t e l y$ 2.99 billion ($3.16 billion in 2017 terms) in the last 10 years, 28% of all contributions (PDF p.35). General Framework: “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement shall provide for a complete end and release of any and all claims relating to refugee or immigration status. There shall be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel” (PDF p.36). Eligibility is limited to persons in UNRWA Registered Refugee status as of the Vision’s release date; the UNRWA definition is used only to define claimants, and “UNRWA’s mandate, and its multi-generational definition of who constitutes a refugee, has exacerbated the refugee crisis” (PDF p.36). Three permanent-residence options: absorption into the State of Palestine (subject to limitations), local integration in host countries (with their consent), or acceptance of 5,000 refugees a year for up to ten years (50,000 total) in participating Organization of Islamic Cooperation member countries (PDF p.36). Compensation: a Palestinian Refugee Trust, administered by two trustees appointed by the State of Palestine and the United States, distributes raised funds by a methodology the trustees establish and Palestine and the United States approve; the US view is that funds have greater impact implementing the Trump Economic Plan (PDF p.36-37). Refugee immigration into Palestine is limited by agreed security arrangements, with an Israeli-Palestinian committee for entry disputes, and its rate regulated so it does not overwhelm Palestine’s infrastructure or economy or increase security risks to Israel (PDF p.37). “Upon the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, Palestinian refugee status will cease to exist, and UNWRA will be terminated and its responsibilities transitioned to the relevant governments” (“UNWRA” as printed) (PDF p.37). Refugee camps in Palestine are to be dismantled and replaced with permanent housing (PDF p.37).

Section Seventeen: Foundations of a Palestinian State (PDF p.37-39 / printed p.33-34)

Statehood criteria “must be determined to have occurred by the State of Israel and the United States, jointly, acting in good faith, after consultation with the Palestinian Authority” (PDF p.38): a rule-of-law governing system with freedom of press, free and fair elections, human rights, religious freedom, due process and an independent judiciary; transparent, independent, credit-worthy financial institutions like those of western democracies, meeting the objective criteria to join the International Monetary Fund; ending all programs, curricula and textbooks that incite or compensate or incentivize criminal or violent activity; civilian and law-enforcement control of all territory and a demilitarized population; and compliance with all other Vision terms (PDF p.38). Jordan is assigned a distinctive assistance role (PDF p.38). The international community “will provide technical assistance across the spectrum of services that the Palestinian government will need to provide, including security”, with donors emphasizing “upgrading infrastructure, equipment, and mobility and communication capacity to ensure the Palestinian government can professionally police a future State of Palestine”; “Once these measures are completed the United States will encourage other countries to welcome the State of Palestine as a full member in international organizations. However, the State of Palestine may not join any international organization if such membership would contradict commitments of the State of Palestine to demilitarization and cessation of political and judicial warfare against the State of Israel” (PDF p.39).

Section Eighteen: Education and Culture of Peace (PDF p.39 / printed p.35)

President Trump is quoted: “Peace can never take root in an environment where violence is tolerated, funded and even rewarded” (PDF p.39). A culture of peace requires ending incitement and “the glorification of violence, terrorism and martyrdom”, prohibiting hostile propaganda and “textbooks, curriculum and related materials contrary to the goal of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, including the denial of one another’s right to exist”; a joint Commission on Acceptance and Tolerance is created “to focus on steps that can be taken help the people from both countries heal the wounds that have been created by this conflict and bring the people closer together through dialogue” (“can be taken help” as printed) (PDF p.39).

Section Nineteen: Israeli-Arab Relationships; Regional Economic Partnerships (PDF p.40-41 / printed p.36-37)

Egypt’s and Jordan’s treaties are “major historic breakthroughs”; Saudi Arabia’s Arab Peace Initiative role “inspired some of the ideas contemplated by this Vision” (PDF p.40). Arab states and Palestine “should cease to support anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and in other multilateral bodies”; “These countries are expected to end any boycott of the State of Israel and oppose the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (commonly referred to as BDS) movement”; “The United States views the BDS movement as destructive towards peace” (PDF p.40). “Revisionist initiatives that question the Jewish people’s authentic roots in the State of Israel should also cease” (PDF p.40). New Opportunities for Regional Security Initiatives: Israel, Palestine and the Arab countries will counter Hezbollah, ISIS, Hamas (unless it reorients under the Gaza Criteria) and other terrorist and extremist groups; “The State of Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever. Economic conditions and Iran’s malign activities, however, pose an existential threat to many of the region’s states”; the 2019 Iranian attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia is cited; an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (OSCME), modelled on the OSCE, should be formed by Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and Israel and others who wish to join (PDF p.41).

Section Twenty: Mutual Recognition Between Nation States (PDF p.41 / printed p.37)

The agreement provides that the parties recognize Palestine as the nation state of the Palestinian people and Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people (PDF p.41).

Section Twenty-One: End of Claims / End of Conflict (PDF p.42 / printed p.38)

The agreement ends the conflict and all claims between the parties, to be proposed in new UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions (PDF p.42).

Section Twenty-Two: Conduct During Negotiations (PDF p.42-43 / printed p.38-39)

Israel: in West Bank areas not contemplated as part of Israel, no new settlement towns, settlement expansion or building plans; no expansion of the Section 4 Israeli enclaves beyond their current footprint; no demolition of structures existing at the Vision’s date, except illegal construction initiated after its release, structures posing a safety risk “as determined by the State of Israel, or punitive demolitions following acts of terrorism” (PDF p.42). Palestinians: the PLO and Palestinian Authority shall refrain from joining any international organization without Israel’s consent; dismiss all pending actions against Israel, the United States and their citizens before the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and all other tribunals; take no action before Interpol or other foreign legal systems; immediately terminate the “PRISONER & MARTYR PAYMENTS” and cease them completely by signing; and develop self-governance institutions (PDF p.43). United States: allow the PLO General Delegation office to reopen, open a liaison mission to the Palestinian Authority (printed “liasion”), take steps to resume assistance to the West Bank and Gaza in consultation with Congress, and work on electricity, water, movement and jobs initiatives (PDF p.43).

Appendix 1: Conceptual Maps (PDF p.44-46)

A divider (PDF p.44) and two graphic maps, read in the original: the Vision for Peace Conceptual Map of the State of Israel (PDF p.45), showing the Palestinian areas, swap areas, Israeli enclave communities, port access at Haifa and Ashdod, the West Bank–Gaza Tunnel and bridges to Jordan, with notes that the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif is preserved and that there will be no evacuation of any community, Israeli or Palestinian; and the Conceptual Map of a future State of Palestine (PDF p.46), showing the Palestinian state with enclave communities, access roads, the tunnel, and swap areas for a high-tech manufacturing industrial zone and for residential and agricultural use, with a note welcoming all Muslims who come in peace to visit and pray at the al-Aqsa Mosque. Both maps state that implementation is subject to the Vision’s terms and conditions (PDF p.45-46).

Appendix 2A: Security Considerations (PDF p.47-48, opening only)

Divider (PDF p.47), then “The State of Israel’s Security Needs”: Israel “has not known a single day of peace with all of its neighbors. It has fought numerous defensive wars, some existential in nature”, remains in a state of war with Lebanon and Syria, and faces northern rocket and missile arsenals, Gaza rocket fire, and Iranian ballistic missiles “including missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads” (PDF p.48). The coastal plain holds 70% of Israel’s population and roughly 80% of its industrial capacity; before 1967 it was “only 9 miles wide at its narrowest point”; the West Bank ridge dominates Ben Gurion Airport and north–south roads (PDF p.48). The security portion was developed from Israel’s security requirements “as presented by successive Israeli governments to the United States” (PDF p.48). The Jordan Valley: the Jordan River lies about 1,300 feet below sea level beside a ridge reaching about 3,318 feet, “a steep, approximately 4,600 foot physical barrier against an external attack from the east”, held until reserve mobilization, “which could take 48 hours”; Gaza after withdrawal “became a safe haven, not only for Hamas, but also for international Jihadi groups like the PIJ that undermined the security of Egypt in the Sinai” (PDF p.48). Appendix 2A continues in part 2.

Appendix 2A: Security Considerations, continued (PDF p.49)

Secure supply lines to the Jordan Valley; the Ben Gurion Airport perimeter (the airport is 5.9 miles from the pre-1967 line; MANPADS are cited); Israeli control of the airspace west of the Jordan River (approximately 40 miles from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, coverable by a modern combat aircraft in under three minutes, the same time scrambling fighters takes); the failure of international troops in Sinai (before 1967), Lebanon, Gaza and the Golan, and Israel’s doctrine “that it must be able to defend itself by itself”; and Iran’s strategy of encirclement and a “land bridge” from the Iran-Iraq border to the Mediterranean (PDF p.49).

Appendix 2B: Security Criteria (PDF p.50-51)

A divider (PDF p.50) and the specific criteria (PDF p.51): a counterterrorism system encompassing detection to longtime incarceration, with stand-alone detention facilities and vetted personnel; a legal system banning all terror activity, organizations, incitement and financing, prosecuting and sentencing those involved directly or indirectly, and ending all payments rewarding terrorism to those involved or their families; breadth and depth measured by arrests, investigations, indictments, punishments, weapons interdiction and prevention of infiltration into Palestine’s security forces; and initial non-binding metrics, acceptable to Israel and no less stringent than Jordan’s or Egypt’s, whichever is stricter (PDF p.51).

Appendix 2C: Demilitarization Criteria and Other Security Arrangements (PDF p.52-53)

A divider (PDF p.52), then (PDF p.53): Israel is responsible for security at all international crossings into Palestine, with Rafah arrangements agreed between Egypt and Israel; Israel maintains control over the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum west of the Jordan River; the Israeli Navy may block prohibited weapons and weapon-making materials, including into Gaza; Palestine may not forge military, intelligence or security agreements that adversely affect Israel’s security, as determined by Israel, and may not develop military or paramilitary capabilities; the prohibited-capabilities list runs from combat aircraft, heavy armored vehicles, mines, missiles and rockets to offensive cyber capabilities, production facilities and any weapons of mass destruction; any expansion of Palestinian security capabilities beyond those existing on the Vision’s release date is subject to agreement with Israel; and Israel may dismantle and destroy any facility used for production of prohibited weapons or other hostile purposes and take necessary security measures to keep Palestine demilitarized (PDF p.53).

Part B divider and the economic plan’s Contents (PDF p.54-56)

PDF p.54, read in the original, is the divider for Part B, the Economic Framework. The Contents (PDF p.55-56) list the Foreword, Overall Vision Goals, the three initiatives — Unleashing Economic Potential, Empowering the Palestinian People, Enhancing Palestinian Governance — the Afterword, and Appendix 3, Economic Incentive / Economic Package.

Economic plan: Foreword (PDF p.57-58 / printed p.1-2)

The three initiatives, the fund administered by an established multilateral development bank, distribution by grants, concessional loans and other support to projects meeting defined criteria, and annual investment guidelines, development goals and governance reforms agreed with beneficiary countries (PDF p.57-58). “Only through peace can the Palestinians achieve prosperity” (PDF p.58).

Economic plan: Overall Vision Goals and Chapter One, Unleashing Economic Potential (PDF p.59-68 / printed p.3-12)

Goals within 10 years: more than double GDP, unemployment to nearly single digits, over one million jobs, poverty rate reduced by 50 percent (PDF p.59). The initiative’s four programs (PDF p.60) and its goals list: exports from 17 to 40 as a percentage of GDP, continual affordable electricity, doubled potable water per capita, high-speed data services, and FDI from 1.4 percent to 8 percent of GDP (PDF p.61). The foundation sections cite South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan, and Germany and Sweden, as models (PDF p.62). Breakout Ventures in this range: Startup Equity-Matching and Lending Facilities ( $100 mi l l i o n g r an t e q u i t y,$ 300 million concessional financing, PDF p.62); “Breaking Down Barriers” border-crossing upgrades (up to $900 mi l l i o nin g r an t s, P D F p .64); " P o w er G a z a " (u pt o$ 590 million; Stage One $90 mi l l i o n t oco n v er tt h e G a z a P o w er P l an tt o na t u r a l g a s, a dd in g a pp r o x ima t e l y 70 M W, S t a g e T w o$ 500 million for an additional 400 MW, PDF p.65); and the Tourism Lending Facility and Site Rehabilitation (up to $750 mi l l i o n co n cess i o na l f inan c in g an d$ 200 million grants, with up to $375 million of loan capacity over the facility’s five-year life, PDF p.66). Sector sections cover roads and a West Bank–Gaza corridor with a possible rail line, border crossings, power (at least 16 hours of electricity per day in Gaza within a year, continuous access within five years, PDF p.64), water (potential to double potable water per capita within five years, PDF p.65), digital services (4G LTE and 5G, PDF p.65), tourism (over forty kilometers of Gaza coastline, PDF p.66), agriculture (approximately eight percent of Palestinian employment, PDF p.66), housing, manufacturing and natural resources (the Gaza Marine natural gas field, oil fields and West Bank quarrying, PDF p.67), and regional stabilization, trade, investment (enterprise funds on the Poland, Egypt and Tunisia examples) and cross-border services (PDF p.68).

Economic plan: Chapter Two, Empowering the Palestinian People (PDF p.69-77 / printed p.13-21)

Regional Tourism and its Breakout Venture (up to $1.5 bi l l i o n co n cess i o na l f inan c in g an d$ 500 million grants across the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, PDF p.69) close Chapter One. Chapter Two’s four programs (PDF p.70) and goals: a 0.70 World Bank Human Capital Index score, at least one Palestinian university in the global top 150, female labor force participation from 20 to 35 percent, infant mortality from 18 to 9 per 1,000 births, life expectancy from 74 to 80 years (PDF p.71). Breakout Ventures: a New Palestinian University (up to $500 mi l l i o nin g r an t s, m o d e l e d ina ccess t er m so n U A E an d Q a t a r ini t ia t i v es, P D F p .72); C a r eer C o u n se l in g an dJ o b P l a ce m e n t (u pt o$ 30 million, PDF p.73); Strengthening Palestinian Hospitals and Clinics (up to $300 mi l l i o n g r an t s an d$ 600 million concessional financing, PDF p.75); and Urban Renewal (up to $200 million, PDF p.76). Education sections cover quality benchmarks, access, scholarships with students expected to return home, youth and women, STEM, technical and vocational education on German and Swedish models, internships, apprenticeships and workforce training (PDF p.72-74); healthcare sections cover access, quality and preventive care (PDF p.75-76); quality-of-life sections cover arts and culture, sports and municipal services (PDF p.76-77).

Economic plan: Chapter Three, Enhancing Palestinian Governance, and Afterword (PDF p.78-85 / printed p.22-29)

The initiative’s three programs (PDF p.78) and goals: a Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index score of 60 or better, a UN E-Government Development Index score greater than 0.75, a sustainable public-sector budget, and a World Bank Doing Business ranking of 75 or better (PDF p.79). Sections cover property rights and land registration in a national database, the legal and tax framework and a one-stop-shop for business registration, capital markets and monetary policy, international trade and FDI, judicial independence, accountability, transparency and civil society, fiscal sustainability (ending reliance on donor aid, short-term support to pay off arrears), civil service and service delivery including privatization where the private sector has a stronger proven record (PDF p.80-84). Breakout Ventures: Land Registration (up to $30 mi l l i o n, P D F p .80), P a l es t inian E - G o v er nan ce (u pt o$ 300 million, modeled on Estonia, PDF p.82) and Attracting Global Expertise (up to $100 million, drawing on the Palestinian diaspora, PDF p.83). The Afterword (PDF p.85) restates the plan as realistic and achievable with international support.

Appendix 3: Economic Incentive / Economic Package — Summary Overview (PDF p.86-98)

Dividers and vision slides (PDF p.86-95, read in the original where the text copy is absent or letter-spaced): the projects are drawn from private sector proposals, government planning documents, independent analysis and previous studies by organizations such as the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund and the Office of the Quartet (PDF p.91); the Peace to Prosperity Master Fund will act as a conduit for capital, sign off on disbursement by tranche linked to developmental milestones agreed as conditions precedent, and be responsible for transparency and accountability, on an implementation mechanism analogous to the Marshall Plan, with independent businesses predominately implementing (PDF p.92-93). The West Bank / Gaza Program Totals pie chart (PDF p.96) allocates, in US $mi l l i o n s : T r an s p or t a t i o nan d M o bi l i t y$ 6,562 (24%), Governance / Reforms $3, 330 (12$ 2,625 (10%), Power $2, 539 (9$ 2,322 (8%), Education $1, 895 (7$ 1,450 (5%), Natural Resources $1, 450 (5$ 1,320 (5%), Home Ownership $1, 000 (4$ 910 (3%), Manufacturing $875 (3$ 630 (2%), Business Development $560 (2$ 345 (1%). The Regional Program Totals (PDF p.97) give Gaza and West Bank $27, 813, E g y pt$ 9,167, Jordan $7, 365 an d L e ban o n$ 6,325. The Regional Program Summary (PDF p.98) gives Total Sources of $50, 670 mi l l i o n — G r an t s$ 13,380, Subsidized Loans $25, 689 an d P r i v a t e C a p i t a l$ 11,600 — phased over Years 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 and 9-10.

Appendix 3: Macroeconomic Impact and Chapter One project tables (PDF p.99-123)

The Macroeconomic Impact table (PDF p.99) projects GDP from $14.6 bi l l i o nin t h e B a se Y e a r t o$ 33.1 billion in Year 10 (total increase 126.7%, compound annual growth 8.5%), GDP per capita from $2, 952 t o$ 4,743 (increase 60.7%), total jobs from 1,050,756 to 2,376,868, and unemployment from 30.9% to 12.4%, with the rate rising in Years 2, 4, 6 and 8 as printed. Dividers and goal slides for Chapter One follow (PDF p.100-103, read in the original). The project tables then give, for each project, its description, phase, estimated cost and financing split (grants, concessional loans, private) and implementation timeline: Strategy for Reform, 14 projects, total $475 mi l l i o n, a l l g r an t s (P D F p .104 - 105); H u man C a p i t a l, 17 p r o j ec t s, t o t a l$ 1,500 million (PDF p.106-107); Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 3 projects, total $410 mi l l i o n (P D F p .108); S ma l l an d M e d i u m B u s in esses, 5 p r o j ec t s, t o t a l$ 650 million (PDF p.109); Roads and Rail, 6 projects, total $5, 652 mi l l i o n, d o mina t e d b y t h e P ha se 3 W es tB ank - G a z a T r an s p or t a t i o n N e tw or k a t$ 5,000 million (PDF p.112); Border Crossings, 4 projects, total $910 mi l l i o n, a l l g r an t s, in c l u d in g t h e A l l e nb y cr oss in g (P D F p .113); P o w er, 21 p r o j ec t s, t o t a l p r in t e d$ 2,581 million, including the Gaza Power Plant conversions, Egypt-Gaza and Israel-Gaza (161 Kv, as printed) lines, solar stages of 100 MW each for Gaza and the West Bank, and Jenin and Hebron power plants at $600 mi l l i o n e a c hin P ha se 3 (P D F p .116 - 118); W a t er an d W a s t e w a t er, 15 p r o j ec t s, t o t a l$ 2,322 million, including 10 short-term low-volume desalination plants in Gaza, the Gaza Central Desalination Plant and rainwater capture rising from 6 to 25 million cubic meters per year (PDF p.119-120); and Digital Services, 6 projects, total $2, 625 mi l l i o n, d o mina t e d b y t h e P ha se 3 in t er n e t in f r a s t r u c t u r es t a g e a t$ 2,000 million (PDF p.121). Goal and program divider slides for Promoting Private-Sector Growth close the range (PDF p.122-123, read in the original). Appendix 3 continues in part 3.

Appendix 3: Chapter One project tables, continued (PDF p.124-128)

Tourism, 6 projects, total $1, 450 mi l l i o n ($ 300 million grants, $865 mi l l i o n l o an s,$ 285 million private), including restoration of historical and religious sites and beachfront areas in two stages and two stages of hotel and resort construction (PDF p.124). Agriculture, 6 projects, total printed $910 mi l l i o n, in c l u d in g a F in T ec han d l o w - cos tl o an s f a c i l i t y f or f a r m er s a t$ 400 million and a West Bank Irrigation Initiative at $200 mi l l i o n (P D F p .125) . H o u s in g, 2 p r o j ec t s, t o t a l$ 1,000 million, a mortgage facility and home ownership subsidies in two stages (PDF p.126). Manufacturing, 10 projects, total $875 mi l l i o n, in c l u d in g t h r ee b o n d e d w a r e h o u ses, t h r ee in d u s t r ia l p a r k s an d aW es tB ank ce m e n t f a c t or y a t$ 300 million (PDF p.127). Natural Resources, 4 projects, total $1, 450 mi l l i o n, d o mina t e d b y t h e G a z a M a r in e g a s f i e l d a t$ 1,000 million in Phase 2 — “Estimated to hold 1.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas” — with oil and gas exploration and production at $390 million in Phase 3, “to the extent agreed by the parties on resource rights” (PDF p.128). Goal and divider slides for Strengthening Regional Development and Integration close the West Bank and Gaza tables: Palestinian exports are to rise “as a percentage of GDP from 17 to 40” (PDF p.129-130).

Appendix 3: Regional project tables — Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon (PDF p.131-135)

Jordan, 15 projects, total $7, 365 mi l l i o n : P ha se 1 in c l u d es t h e A l l e nb y, A mman, Z a r q a B u s R a p i d T r an s i t ($ 150 million), Stage 1 of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance ( $145 mi l l i o n) an d a J or d an S M E F u n d e x p an d in g t h ee x i s t in g O P I C p r o g r am ($ 125 million); Phase 3 is dominated by the Jordan+Regional Rail Network ( $1, 825 mi l l i o n), J or d an T r an s p or tC or r i d or s ($ 1,500 million) and Aqaba’s Corniche District / High Lakes Resort ( $1, 400 mi l l i o n) (P D F p .131 - 132) . E g y pt, 12 p r o j ec t s, t o t a l$ 9,167 million: Phase 1 includes repair and two upgrade stages of the Egypt-Gaza transmission lines ( $42 mi l l i o nina l l) an d Q u a l i f y in g I n d u s t r ia l Z o n esr e v i e w in g t h e 35 p er ce n t co n t e n t r e q u i r e m e n t; P ha se 2 g i v es t h e E a s t er n M e d i t er r an e an E n er g y H u b ($ 1,500 million) and three Sinai development projects at $500 mi l l i o n e a c h; P ha se 3 g i v es a T r an s p or t an d L o g i s t i cs M o d er ni z a t i o n P r o g r ama t$ 5,000 million (PDF p.133-134). Lebanon, 5 projects, total $6, 325 mi l l i o n, a l m os t a l l in P ha se 3 : t h e L e ban o n E co n o mi c C or r i d or r o a d s ($ 3,000 million), rail ( $2, 000 mi l l i o n) an d ai r / se a ($ 1,000 million) programs (PDF p.135). Each country’s total matches its figure in the Regional Program Totals at PDF p.97.

Appendix 3: Chapter Two project tables (PDF p.136-159)

Chapter Two, Empowering the Palestinian People, opens with divider and goal slides: a 0.70 World Bank Human Capital Index score, at least one Palestinian university in the global top 150, and female labor force participation rising from 20 to 35 percent (PDF p.136-143). Education tables: Educational Quality, 7 projects, $645 mi l l i o n, a l l g r an t s; E d u c a t i o na l A ccess, 4 p r o j ec t s,$ 850 million, including the New Palestinian University at $500 mi l l i o n; E d u c a t i o na l A f f or d abi l i t y, 2 p r o j ec t s,$ 400 million, all grants, in international and teacher scholarships whose students are expected to return home — together $1, 895 mi l l i o n, ma t c hin g E d u c a t i o nin t h e p i ec ha r t a tP D F p .96 (P D F p .140 - 142) . W or k f or ce t ab l es : Y o u t han d W o m e n$ 20 million; STEM $100 mi l l i o n; T ec hni c a l an d V oc a t i o na l E d u c a t i o n$ 75 million; Internships and Apprenticeships $100 mi l l i o n; W or k f or ce T r ainin g$ 50 million — together $345 mi l l i o n, ma t c hin g W or k f or ceD e v e l o p m e n t in t h e p i ec ha r t (P D F p .144 - 149) . H e a l t h c a r e t ab l es, u n d er g o a l so f r e d u c in g in f an t m or t a l i t y f r o m 18 t o 9 p er 1, 000 bi r t h s an d r ai s in g l i f ee x p ec t an cy f r o m 74 t o 80 y e a r s : H e a l t h c a r e A ccess$ 1,000 million, including upgrading facilities and equipment at $900 mi l l i o nin P ha se 3; H e a l t h c a r e Q u a l i t y$ 120 million; Preventive Healthcare $200 mi l l i o n — t o g e t h er$ 1,320 million, matching Healthcare in the pie chart (PDF p.150-154). Quality-of-life tables: Arts and Culture $230 mi l l i o n, in c l u d in g a P a l es t inian M u se u man d C u l t u r a l C e n t er a t$ 150 million; Sports and Athletics $100 mi l l i o n, in c l u d in g a P a l es t inian A t h l e t i cD e v e l o p m e n tC e n t er a t$ 75 million; Municipal Services $300 mi l l i o n — t o g e t h er$ 630 million, matching Quality of Life in the pie chart (PDF p.155-159).

Appendix 3: Chapter Three project tables and Conclusion (PDF p.160-181)

Chapter Three, Enhancing Palestinian Governance, opens with divider and goal slides: a World Bank Doing Business ranking of 75 or better, a comprehensive database of land ownership, a Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index score of 60 or better and a UN E-Government Development Index score greater than 0.75 (PDF p.160-163). Creating a Better Business Environment: Property Rights $140 mi l l i o n (in c l u d in g t h e L an d R e g i s t r a t i o n D a t aba se,$ 30 million), Legal and Tax Framework $50 mi l l i o n, C a p i t a l M a r k e t s an d M o n e t a r y P o l i cy$ 25 million, and International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment $75 mi l l i o n (P D F p .164 - 167) . I n s t i t u t i o n B u i l d in g : J u d i c ia l I n d e p e n d e n ce$ 175 million, Accountability $75 mi l l i o n, T r an s p a r e n cy$ 50 million and Civil Society $180 mi l l i o n (P D F p .168 - 173) . I m p r o v in g G o v er nm e n tO p er a t i o n s : F i sc a l S u s t ainabi l i t y$ 1,825 million, dominated by Arrears Payments / Operations & Maintenance Contingency Reserve at $1, 750 mi l l i o n; C i v i l S er v i ce$ 400 million, including Streamlining Civil Service at $250 mi l l i o n; an d S er v i ceD e l i v er y$ 335 million, including Palestinian E-Governance at $300 mi l l i o nin P ha se 2 (P D F p .174 - 178) . T h e C ha pt er T h r ee t ab l es t o g e t h er t o t a l$ 3,330 million (computed), matching Governance / Reforms in the pie chart at PDF p.96. A Conclusion divider (PDF p.179) and the closing page (PDF p.180): “While the vision is ambitious, it is achievable. The future of the Palestinians is one of huge promise and potential. The Palestinian story does not end here. Their story is just being written.” PDF p.181 is a blank closing page with only a faint emblem.

Key passages

“A realistic solution would give the Palestinians all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel.” (PDF p.7)
“Sovereignty is an amorphous concept that has evolved over time.” (PDF p.13)
“Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel, and it should remain an undivided city. The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kafr Aqab, the eastern part of Shuafat and Abu Dis, and could be named Al Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine.” (PDF p.21)
“There shall be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel.” (PDF p.36)
“The State of Palestine shall be fully demilitarized and remain so, as outlined in Appendix 2C.” (PDF p.26)
“Their story is just being written.” (PDF p.180; letter-spaced in the text copy)

Evidence the work relies on

The work is a policy proposal, not a research report: it cites no bibliography and gives its figures without sources, including the count of close to 700 General Assembly and over 100 Security Council resolutions since 1946 (PDF p.9), the estimate that Israel has withdrawn from at least 88% of the territory captured in 1967 (PDF p.12), approximately 97% incorporation figures for West Bank Israelis and Palestinians (PDF p.16), approximately 6% of Arab residents of the Jerusalem areas inside the barrier having chosen Israeli citizenship (PDF p.21), the economic estimates of doubled GDP, over 1 million jobs, unemployment below 10 percent and poverty reduced by 50 percent (PDF p.8), more than $50 bi l l i o ninin v es t m e n t o v er t e n y e a r s (P D F p .23), o v er 70 mi l l i o n r e f ug ees an dd i s pl a ce d p er so n s an d o v er$ 8.5 billion in UN funding sought for 2020 (PDF p.13, 35), Kuwait’s Palestinian population falling from 400,000 to about 25,000 (PDF p.35), US contributions to UNRWA of approximately $6.15 bi l l i o n (1950 - 2017) an d$ 2.99 billion in the last ten years (PDF p.35), and the Jordan Valley and coastal-plain figures of Appendix 2A (PDF p.48). Part 2 adds Appendix 2A’s Ben Gurion and airspace figures (5.9 miles, approximately 40 miles, under three minutes, PDF p.49), the economic plan’s stated sources for its projects — private sector proposals, government planning documents, independent analysis and previous studies by the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, the Office of the Quartet and others (PDF p.91) — and Appendix 3’s quantified projections and allocations: the sector and regional totals summing to $50,670 million (PDF p.96-98) and the Macroeconomic Impact table’s GDP, jobs and unemployment series (PDF p.99), followed by project-by-project cost and financing tables (PDF p.104-123). Part 3 completes those tables for the remaining sectors and for Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon (PDF p.124-178), adds the Gaza Marine estimate of 1.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (PDF p.128), and gives no further sources; the regional tables’ country totals each match the Regional Program Totals at PDF p.97, and the Chapter Two and Chapter Three table groups each sum (computed) to their pie-chart allocations at PDF p.96. Documents and instruments it invokes include the Oslo Accords and Rabin’s last Knesset speech (PDF p.7), UN Security Council Resolution 242 (PDF p.9, 15-16), the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (PDF p.20), the 1993 Vatican-Israel Fundamental Agreement (PDF p.19), the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994 (PDF p.5), the Quartet principles (PDF p.30), and the Arab Peace Initiative (PDF p.40).

Analysis

The work is a government policy proposal in two unlike halves. Part A is a political framework written as conditions and determinations: its central moves are definitional (a Palestinian state whose sovereignty is limited by overriding Israeli security responsibility, demilitarization, and statehood criteria judged jointly by Israel and the United States) and cartographic (the Conceptual Map and the land-swap and enclave arrangements of Section Four). Part B and Appendix 3 are a costed development program: quantified ten-year goals, sector narratives with named Breakout Ventures, and project tables giving every project a phase, an estimated cost, a grants / concessional loans / private capital split and an implementation timeline, all channelled through a Master Fund disbursing by tranche against agreed milestones. The work cites no bibliography and gives almost none of its political or historical figures a source; its economic tables are its most checkable element, and they are largely internally consistent — the regional country totals match the Regional Program Totals, and the Chapter Two and Chapter Three table groups sum to their pie-chart allocations — but not perfectly: the $1 mi l l i o n - l e v e l d i scr e p an c i es an d t h e P o w er t ab l e^{'} s$ 42 million gap against the pie chart are recorded under Open questions, not reconciled. Its perspective is stated, not argued against alternatives: past UN resolutions are dismissed as unproductive, Palestinian institutions are described as corrupt and inciting, and Israeli security requirements, as presented by successive Israeli governments, supply the framework for Appendix 2A. Claims that depend on acceptance by the other party — land swaps, a Palestinian capital in Al Quds, refugee absorption by third countries, Gaza demilitarization — are presented as the Vision’s terms, with implementation repeatedly conditioned on criteria and consents the text itself specifies.

People, organizations, places and events

Peace to Prosperity, Donald Trump, Yitzhak Rabin, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Authority, Palestine Liberation Organization, UNRWA, Quartet, Arab Peace Initiative, City of Jerusalem, East Jerusalem, Al Quds, Temple Mount, Jordan Valley, The Triangle, Gaza, Hezbollah, Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, Palestinian Refugee Trust, Peace to Prosperity Master Fund, Oslo Accords

Concepts

Two-state solution, Right of Return, Self-determination, Normalization, BDS movement, Economic peace, Status Quo (Holy Places)

How it relates to other sources

This is the primary text of the plan that Invited to Witness — Solidarity Tourism across Occupied Palestine reads in its Conclusion through its tourism provisions and that Thirty Years On: The Ruse of the Middle East Peace Process records as the 2020 initiative that ultimately secured Israel’s interests through a series of normalization agreements with several Arab states (Peace to Prosperity).
Its refugee framework directly opposes the position set out in The Right of Return of the Palestinian People: where that work affirms a right of return, this Vision provides “There shall be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel” (PDF p.36) and ends refugee status and UNRWA on signing (PDF p.37).
Its borders chapter restates, against the Quartet Roadmap and the Geneva Accord model in The Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement (Draft Permanent Status Agreement, 1 December 2003), a reading of Resolution 242 under which Israel is not bound to provide 100 percent of pre-1967 territory (PDF p.15-16).

Open questions

The Glossary refers “Prisoner & Martyr Payments” to a Section 23, but the Contents list only Sections One to Twenty-Two; the payments are defined in Section Twenty-Two (PDF p.43). Recorded as printed; not resolved.
The Vision prints “UNWRA” once, at PDF p.37, for UNRWA (spelled correctly elsewhere, e.g. PDF p.35). Recorded as printed.
The text copy prints “liasion mission” at PDF p.43 and “the the donor community” at PDF p.29; both readings are confirmed in the original.
Whether the “approximately 6%” Jerusalem citizenship figure, the “at least 88%” withdrawal figure and the resolution counts are computed or sourced is not stated in the work.
The Regional Program Summary at PDF p.98 is off by $1 mi l l i o nin tw or o w s u m s (co m p u t e d) : i t s G r an t sy e a r f i g u r ess u m t o$ 13,381 against the printed $13, 380 t o t a l, an d i t s G r an t s an d L o an sy e a r f i g u r ess u m t o$ 39,069 against the printed $39,070 total; the text copy also prints its last year column as “9-14”, where the original reads 9-10. Recorded as printed; not resolved.
The Macroeconomic Impact Key Statistics at PDF p.99 give Total New Jobs Created as 1,326,111, against the table’s cumulative Year 10 figure of 1,326,112, which the annual figures also sum to (computed). Recorded as printed.
The Power project table’s total at PDF p.118 is $2, 581 mi l l i o n, a g ain s t$ 2,539 million for Power in the program totals pie chart at PDF p.96; within the Power table, project 13’s financing columns ( $8 mi l l i o n l o an s an d$ 3 million private) sum to $11 mi l l i o na g ain s t i t s$ 10 million cost, the Phase 1 financing subtotals are $1 mi l l i o nb e l o w t h e p r o j ec t r o w s inb o t h l o an s an d p r i v a t ec a p i t a l (co m p u t e d), an d t h e P ha se 2 l o an ss u b t o t a l i s$ 1 million below its rows (computed). The Water table’s Phase 2 loans subtotal is likewise $1 mi l l i o nab o v e i t sr o w s (co m p u t e d), an d i t s p r o j ec t 8 f inan c in g s u m s t o$ 66 million against a $67 million cost (computed). Recorded as printed.
The economic plan’s Contents (PDF p.56) list the Afterword at printed p.38; the Afterword appears at printed p.29 (PDF p.85). Recorded as printed in both places.
The original prints “offcials” and “afordability” (PDF p.75), “contestedland” (PDF p.80) and “ofers” and “eforts” (PDF p.83), each confirmed in the original; the dropped letters are the “ff” ligature in each case. Recorded as printed.
The Tourism table prints “Accomodations” in projects 1 and 4 (PDF p.124), confirmed in the original. Recorded as printed.
The Agriculture table’s Phase 3 financing columns sum to $176 mi l l i o na g ain s t i t s$ 175 million subtotal, and its printed financing totals ( $115 mi l l i o n g r an t s,$ 708 million loans, $88 mi l l i o n p r i v a t e) s u m t o$ 911 million against its printed $910 mi l l i o n t o t a l (co m p u t e d, P D F p .125) . T h e M an u f a c t u r in g t ab l e^{'} s p ha se f inan c in g s u b t o t a l ss u m t o$ 601 million in loans and $151 mi l l i o nin p r i v a t ec a p i t a l a g ain s t i t s p r in t e d t o t a l so f$ 600 million and $150 mi l l i o n (co m p u t e d, P D F p .127) . T h e N a t u r a l R eso u r ces t ab l e^{'} s P ha se 2 f inan c in g co l u mn ss u m t o$ 1,061 million against its $1, 060 mi l l i o n s u b t o t a l, an d i t s p ha ses u b t o t a l ss u m t o$ 1,081 million in loans and $361 mi l l i o nin p r i v a t ec a p i t a l a g ain s tp r in t e d t o t a l so f$ 1,080 million and $360 mi l l i o n (co m p u t e d, P D F p .128) . T h e J or d an t ab l e^{'} s P ha se 3 l o an sr o w ss u m t o$ 2,376 million against its printed $2, 375 mi l l i o n s u b t o t a l (co m p u t e d, P D F p .132) . I n e a c h o f t h ese t ab l es t h e d i scr e p an cy s i t s inin d i v i d u a l p r o j ec t r o w s w h ose f inan c in g co l u mn ss u m t o$ 1 million more than the project’s cost: Agriculture project 6 (PDF p.125), Manufacturing projects 6 and 9 (PDF p.127), Natural Resources projects 2 and 4 (PDF p.128), and Jordan projects 12 and 14 (PDF p.132) (computed). Recorded as printed; not resolved.

Coverage

PDF p.1-181 of 181, read in full (parts 1-3 of 3). Sections One to Twenty-Two, Appendix 1, Appendices 2A, 2B and 2C, the economic framework (Part B) and Appendix 3 in full — all project tables, the regional tables for Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon, and the Conclusion — are complete. The work ends at PDF p.180; PDF p.181 is a blank closing page.

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