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Verbatim record CR 2024/2 — Public sitting of 12 January 2024, oral argument of Israel (South Africa v. Israel)

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Summary

The verbatim record (CR 2024/2, corrected) of the public sitting of 12 January 2024 at the Peace Palace, President Donoghue presiding, at which Israel presented its single round of oral argument on South Africa’s Request for the indication of Provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel (Genocide Convention) (Verbatim record CR 2024/2 — Public sitting of 12 January 2024, oral argument of Israel (South Africa v. Israel), PDF p.1, p.12). The record covers the formal record of the bench and the parties, Co-Agent Tal Becker’s opening statement, Malcolm Shaw on prima facie jurisdiction and the preservation of the parties’ rights, Galit Raguan on the facts on the ground, Omri Sender on lack of risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency, Christopher Staker on each of the nine measures requested, and Co-Agent Gilad Noam’s closing, ending with Israel’s formal request that the Court reject the Request and remove the case from the General List (PDF p.75).

What the file is

The Court’s bilingual English/French verbatim record of the 12 January 2024 sitting, 75 PDF pages, about 29,292 words. The front matter, bench and party lists are given in English and then in French (PDF p.1-11); the speeches are in English, each carrying numbered paragraphs and numbered footnotes giving the citation, and usually the URL or Volume tab, of each source relied on. The text copy is clean and paginated with PDF page markers. Part 1 ended on PDF p.55 mid-speech in Staker’s argument on the first and second measures requested; part 2 (PDF p.56-75) gives the rest of Staker’s speech, Noam’s closing and the President’s closing, the Court rising at 1.10 p.m. (PDF p.75).

Section by section

  • Cover, bench and parties (PDF p.1-11). Public sitting held on Friday 12 January 2024, at 10 a.m., President Donoghue presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel). Present: President Donoghue, Vice-President Gevorgian, Judges Tomka, Abraham, Bennouna, Yusuf, Xue, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth, Brant, Judges ad hoc Barak and Moseneke, Registrar Gautier (PDF p.2). South Africa’s Agent is Vusimuzi Madonsela, Co-Agent Cornelius Scholtz, with counsel and advocates John Dugard, Vaughan Lowe, Max du Plessis, Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, Adila Hassim and Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh (PDF p.4-6). Israel’s Co-Agents are Gilad Noam, Tal Becker and Tamar Kaplan Tourgeman, with counsel and advocates Malcolm Shaw, Christopher Staker, Omri Sender and Galit Raguan, and counsel including Eyal Benvenisti (PDF p.8-10).
  • The President’s opening (PDF p.12). The Court meets to hear Israel present its single round of oral argument on the Request submitted by South Africa on 29 December 2023. She gives the floor to Israel’s Co-Agent, Mr Tal Becker.
  • Tal Becker, Co-Agent’s Opening Statement (PDF p.12-22). Israel is singularly aware of why the Genocide Convention was adopted: “Seared in our collective memory is the systematic murder of six million Jews as part of a pre-meditated and heinous programme for their total annihilation”; Israel was among the first States to ratify the Convention without reservation, and Raphael Lemkin coined “genocide” (PDF p.12). South Africa invokes the term in a war Israel “did not start and did not want”, against Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other terrorist organizations; civilian suffering is tragic, but the Convention was not designed to address the brutal impact of intensive hostilities, even where force raises “very serious issues of international law”, and South Africa’s picture is “a deliberately curated, decontextualized and manipulative description” that erases Jewish history and Palestinian agency and weaponizes the term (PDF p.12-13). Becker then gives Israel’s account of 7 October 2023: over 20 communities, bases and a music festival invaded, some 1,200 people killed, more than 5,500 maimed, some 240 hostages abducted, with named examples from Kibbutz Nir Oz, the Nova festival and Mefalsim, and screen clips (PDF p.14-15). Three aspects follow: if there have been genocidal acts they have been perpetrated against Israel, citing the Hamas charter and Ghazi Hamad’s 24 October 2023 interview; Israel has an inherent right to defend its citizens and secure the hostages’ release, and a suspension measure would leave over 110,000 internally displaced Israelis unable to return safely; and any measures should be directed to South Africa, which he says enjoys close relations with Hamas, to end its support and use its influence for the hostages’ release (PDF p.15-18). Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007, its diversion of aid and its embedding in civilian infrastructure — tunnels several hundred miles in length, hubs in homes, mosques, UN facilities, schools and hospitals — are presented as the cause of civilian suffering; South Africa’s telling omits booby-trapped and military-use buildings, over 2,000 misfired rockets landing in Gaza, that the “over 23,000 casualties” are unverified statistics provided by Hamas, and Israel’s mitigation and humanitarian efforts (PDF p.18-20). The key component of genocide, intent to destroy a people, is “totally lacking”; Israel’s aims, as Netanyahu reiterated this week, are that “Israel is fighting Hamas terrorists, not the civilian population”, that it seeks neither to permanently occupy Gaza nor to displace its civilian population, and that Palestinians have all the power to govern themselves but not the capacity to threaten Israel (PDF p.20-22). The Application should be dismissed as “a libel”, lest the Convention become “an aggressor’s charter”, and to free the 136 hostages Hamas still holds (PDF p.21-22).
  • Malcolm Shaw, Prima Facie Jurisdiction and the Preservation of the Rights of the Parties (PDF p.22-40). Context: South Africa’s “75-year-long apartheid” context is rejected — “why stop at 75 years?” — and the immediate context is 7 October, an armed conflict regulated by international humanitarian law, which Israel says it fully respects; “Not every conflict is genocidal”, and genocide is the “crime of crimes” (PDF p.22-24). No dispute: Article IX jurisdiction requires a dispute at the filing date, objectively determined, in which the claim of one party is “positively opposed” by the other, with exchange and a reasonable opportunity to react; South Africa cites only general public statements not addressed to it (PDF p.24-26). The Notes Verbales story: Israel responded to the 21 December Note the same day, its MFA Director General proposed a meeting on 26 December, and its Embassy emailed a Note Verbale on 27 December suggesting a Directors General meeting, with hand delivery advised for 2 January, before South Africa filed on 29 December and stated no reply had been received; the January 2024 exchange is then traced to South Africa’s 10 January Note saying there was no point in a meeting (PDF p.26-28). Prima facie consideration must be cautious, since measures sought assume genocide before conclusive proof: “Provisional measures are intended to constitute a shield and not a sword” (PDF p.28-29). Intent: acts can only be capable of falling within the Convention if intent is present — to consider acts alone is “Hamlet without the Prince” — and Israel’s targeting restrictions, forewarning by telephone calls and leafletting, and facilitation of aid demonstrate the opposite of genocidal intent (PDF p.29-31). Government intent is to be read from the Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs and the War Cabinet, not random quotes: the Minister of Heritage is outside war decision-making and was immediately repudiated, while tab 1A cabinet excerpts of 29 October direct preventing “a humanitarian disaster”, increasing aid trucks and promoting field hospitals in southern Gaza (PDF p.31-32). The IDF’s daily operational directive in tab 1B directs attacks solely towards military targets under distinction, proportionality and precautions; Netanyahu’s 10 January statement — “Israel has no intention of permanently occupying Gaza or displacing its civilian population” — and his Amalek statement of 28 October 2023, quoted more fully, are presented as showing objectives limited to destroying Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities and returning the hostages (PDF p.33-35). Rights: plausibility requires more than assertion and extends to whether a breach plausibly happened; the Court must preserve the respective rights of both parties under Statute Article 41, chief among Israel’s being inherent self-defence, acknowledged by a wide range of States, against Hamas, which is not before the Court; States that supported or glorified 7 October are said to stand guilty of complicity under Article III(e) (PDF p.35-39). Conclusion: no intent, no dispute at filing, and the Respondent’s rights must be weighed (PDF p.39-40). Coffee break, 11.30 a.m. to 11.45 a.m. (PDF p.40).
  • Galit Raguan, Facts on the Ground (PDF p.40-49). South Africa’s partial and deeply flawed picture prevents proper assessment of plausibility. Hamas’ strategy is founded on embedding assets and operatives in and amongst civilians; civilian casualties may be the unintended but lawful result of attacks on lawful military objectives, and many are directly caused by Hamas — booby-trapped homes, mines, and over 2,000 misfired rockets, with the 17 October Al Ahli Hospital blast presented as a failed rocket launch from within Gaza, confirmed by United States and other intelligence (PDF p.41-42). Hospitals: Hamas’ military use is described hospital by hospital — Rantissi, Quds, Shifa, Adwan (more than 80 militants surrendered) and the Indonesian hospital in Jabalya — with tunnels, weapons including a weapon in incubators, and hostages brought into Shifa’s lobby; “In every single hospital that the IDF has searched in Gaza, it has found evidence of Hamas military use”, hospitals have not been bombed, and the Shifa tunnel was exploded without damaging the building above (PDF p.43-44). Mitigation: evacuation is an IHL measure to protect civilians, carried out by a Civilian Harm Mitigation Unit using a detailed area map, localized pauses, and — against South Africa’s 24 hours — over three weeks urging evacuation south before the ground operation; millions of leaflets, countless messages and over 70,000 individual phone calls give advance warning (PDF p.44-46). Humanitarian co-ordination: COGAT mans the crossings, including Erez, through which almost 20,000 Gazans passed daily for work before 7 October and which Hamas attacked that day, murdering and kidnapping COGAT staff; COGAT co-ordinates needs with the UN and States, facilitates aid with “no limit on the amount of food, water, shelter or medical supplies”, re-opened Kerem Shalom as acknowledged in Security Council resolution 2720, and facilitated four field hospitals, two floating hospitals, new ambulances and Jordanian airdrops; Hamas commandeering and stealing aid, and hoarding fuel, are significant challenges, while security checks are required and fuel is enabled for essential infrastructure (PDF p.46-48). A series of rhetorical questions closes the speech: Israel’s efforts are “the very opposite of intent to destroy them”, and genocidal intent is “not even a plausible inference” (PDF p.48-49).
  • Omri Sender, Lack of Risk of Irreparable Prejudice and Urgency (PDF p.49-55 in this part; speech completed within this range). This condition depends on the preceding ones, so irreparable consequences cannot flow from rights that are not plausible; measures require “a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights claimed before the Court gives its final decision”, and under the Myanmar Order “concrete measures aimed specifically at recognizing and ensuring the right” of the group to exist would defeat urgency (PDF p.49-50). Such measures are detailed, with figures stated to be in the judges’ folder: a dozen bakeries re-opened with WFP assistance, with capacity to produce more than two million breads a day; food trucks averaging 70 a day before the war and 109 a day over the last two weeks; no restriction on water, two Israeli pipelines supplying Gaza, and an additional pipe from Egypt; four field hospitals, two floating hospitals and two more underway, medical teams, vaccinations with UNICEF, and evacuations through Rafah; fuel doubled from 8 December to 180,000 litres a day, the target requested by the UN, and cooking gas doubled since 21 December to an average of 90 tons per day; a joint operations room of Israel, Egypt, the United States and the UN; Kerem Shalom opened on 15 December to “improve and upgrade” delivery; air routes and a possible maritime corridor (PDF p.50-52). Hostilities are decreasing: the Defence Minister’s shift from the “intense maneuvering phase”, and the IDF spokesperson’s confirmation on 8 January 2024 that “The war shifted a stage”, with five brigades withdrawn (PDF p.53). Security Council resolution 2720 of 22 December 2023 is being implemented, a Senior Coordinator has begun work, and Israel co-ordinated a UN delegation into northern Gaza this week; Israel’s Co-Agents’ assurances that Israel remains bound by its international obligations may render measures unnecessary (PDF p.53-54). It is Israel and its citizens who would risk irreparable harm if the Request were granted (PDF p.54).
  • Christopher Staker, The Provisional Measures Requested by South Africa Are Unwarranted and Prejudicial (PDF p.55-71). For completeness Staker addresses each of the nine measures in turn, although the conditions are not met. The first and second would require immediate suspension of Israel’s military operations in Gaza: “This request is frankly astonishing”, made by a State not party to the conflict, requiring unilateral suspension by one party only, and the Ukraine v. Russian Federation measures were granted in a fundamentally different case, where Russia had claimed its operation was to prevent and punish genocide in Ukraine (PDF p.55-56). Israel does not rely on the Convention to justify its operations, so no plausible right of the Russia kind exists; Article 41 empowers only measures the circumstances require to preserve respective rights, and ensuring observance of the Convention does not require preventing the operation altogether; “at least some … acts” (Hassim) does not make “the military operations as such” genocidal, and the Court in Bosnia refused a cease-and-desist measure of this kind even where an ongoing genocide was said to be in progress (PDF p.56-57). Measures must balance both parties’ rights, must not cause irreparable prejudice to the respondent and must be proportionate — principles Staker grounds in Judges Abraham and Tomka, other Orders, ITLOS, PCA and ICSID practice, a 1923 Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and the Institute of International Law (PDF p.58-62). A World War II hypothetical follows: a neutral State’s suspension measure against the Allies would have required surrender to the Axis on a case that might later prove wholly unfounded; a measure likewise cannot require a State to refrain from a plausible right of self-defence (PDF p.62). Ten balancing factors are listed — Hamas’ terrorist designation, the continuing 7 October attack, internationally recognized self-defence, Israel’s IHL commitment and humanitarian steps, that measures would not bind Hamas, Hamas’ stated intention of further attacks, the threat, hostage rescue, and the space suspension would give Hamas — so the measures are a sword, not a temporary shield (PDF p.62-63). Third measure (prevent genocide): its wording reaches “the Palestinian people” generally, beyond this case’s subject-matter, and it would also bind South Africa, apparently to give South Africa a special mandate to act internationally on Palestinian issues, which provisional measures cannot confer (PDF p.64-65). Fourth measure (“desist” from Article II acts): no Bosnia or Myanmar counterpart, “desist” implies violations and seeks an implied merits ruling tarnishing Israel’s reputation, and on an intent-less reading every lawful killing, collateral casualty and even aid security checks under Security Council resolution 2720 would breach it (PDF p.65-66). Fifth measure (Article II(c) acts specified): not free-standing, again “desist”, and it seeks merits rulings that evacuation calls are “expulsion and forced displacement”, that the humanitarian situation and building damage in military operations are deliberately inflicted conditions of life — designed to ensure breach as soon as it is made (PDF p.66-67). Sixth measure: the “irregular armed units” wording is copied from Bosnia and Myanmar, where such units were expressly alleged, and its punishment obligation has no counterpart in those Orders and is not urgent (PDF p.67). Seventh measure: evidence preservation was granted only where destruction was specifically alleged, not on South Africa’s bare assertion, and would imply concealment; access for fact-finding missions is controlled by Egypt from the Egyptian side, Israel has no obligation to allow access from its territory, and Myanmar refused such a measure (PDF p.68-69). Eighth measure (reports): not routinely granted, granted only when specific action was indicated, and unjustified where Israeli material is publicly available (PDF p.69). Ninth measure (non-aggravation): not the norm, always applied equally to both parties where granted, declined in Myanmar, and unfair imposed on one party only while South Africa and Hamas remain free to aggravate and escalate (PDF p.70-71).
  • Gilad Noam, Co-Agent’s closing (PDF p.71-75). Noam, Deputy Attorney General for International Law, summarizes the five showings — no prima facie jurisdiction and no dispute (the Applicant “tried to mislead the Court into believing that one had existed”), no plausible rights, a war governed by IHL outside the Convention’s remit, no irreparable harm or urgency, and each measure unwarranted and prejudicial (PDF p.71). South Africa’s picture of Israel as a lawless State “beyond and above the law”, its society “singularly consumed with destroying an entire population”, is “patently false”: he attests first-hand that international-law advice to the Government has not changed since 7 October, through challenges including urban combat, Hamas’ military use of hospitals, civilians forced by Hamas to stay in the line of fire, aid stolen by Hamas, rockets and hostages — “When the cannons roar in Gaza, the law is not silent” (PDF p.71-72). Israel’s legal system is described from 1948: the Declaration of Independence’s reference to “the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”, the IDF’s military justice system founded mid-war, the Military Advocate General’s institutional independence and her staff’s role in training, plans, targeting and weaponry advice, civilian review under an independent Attorney General, open courts including the Supreme Court during the current conflict, and an independent IHL investigation mechanism already reviewing current incidents (PDF p.72-73). Harsh statements are attributed to the shock and pain since 7 October; the Attorney General has reaffirmed that statements calling for intentional harm to civilians contradict State policy and may amount to criminal offences including incitement, with several cases being examined (PDF p.73-74). Classifying this conflict as genocide would weaken the commitment to prevent genocide, turn the Convention into a weapon for terrorist groups, create tension with self-defence against enemies hiding behind civilians, signal that terrorist organizations can exploit the Court for protection, and leave Hamas holding 136 hostages while tens of thousands of displaced Israelis cannot return home (PDF p.74-75). Israel formally requests the Court “(1) Reject the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by South Africa; and (2) Remove the case from the General List” (PDF p.75).
  • The President’s closing (PDF p.75). The President thanks Noam, ending Israel’s single round of oral argument and the series of sittings; the Agents of both Parties are to remain at the Court’s disposal, the Court will render its Order as soon as possible and will advise the date of delivery in a public sitting. The Court rose at 1.10 p.m.

Key passages

  • “Seared in our collective memory is the systematic murder of six million Jews as part of a pre-meditated and heinous programme for their total annihilation.” (Becker, PDF p.12)
  • “it is not offering the Court a lens, it is offering it a blindfold” (Becker, PDF p.20)
  • “Israel is fighting Hamas terrorists, not the civilian population.” (Netanyahu, as quoted by Becker, PDF p.21)
  • “Provisional measures are intended to constitute a shield and not a sword.” (Shaw, PDF p.29)
  • “The Prime Minister stated time and again … we must prevent a humanitarian disaster” (Prime Minister, Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, 29 October, as quoted by Shaw, PDF p.32)
  • “[a]ttacks will be solely directed towards military targets, while adhering to the principles of distinction, proportionality and the obligation taking precautions in attacks in order to reduce collateral damage” (IDF daily operational directive, as quoted by Shaw, PDF p.33)
  • “Israel has no intention of permanently occupying Gaza or displacing its civilian population.” (Netanyahu, 10 January, as quoted by Shaw, PDF p.34)
  • “In every single hospital that the IDF has searched in Gaza, it has found evidence of Hamas military use.” (Raguan, PDF p.43)
  • “a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights claimed before the Court gives its final decision” (the Court’s case law, as quoted by Sender, PDF p.50)
  • “The war shifted a stage” (IDF spokesperson, 8 January 2024, as quoted by Sender, PDF p.53)
  • “This request is frankly astonishing.” (Staker, on the first and second measures, PDF p.55)
  • “Provisional measures should be a temporary shield, to preserve claimed but as yet unproven rights pending a decision on the merits. Instead, they are being used here as a sword” (Staker, PDF p.63)
  • “there is no conceivable basis on which the first two provisional measures could be ordered” (Staker, PDF p.64)
  • “When the cannons roar in Gaza, the law is not silent.” (Noam, PDF p.72)
  • “We appeal to this Court not to be taken down that dangerous road.” (Noam, PDF p.75)

Evidence the work relies on

  • As presented by the speakers in part 1, in order: the Court’s orders in Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium); survivor testimony, forensic evidence and footage of 7 October 2023, and press reports on individual attacks (LBC, CNN, CBS, Times of Israel), all in or cited to the Volume submitted to the Court (tabs 6A-17); the Hamas Covenant of 18 August 1988 and MEMRI renderings of Hamas leaders’ statements, including Ghazi Hamad’s LBC TV interview of 24 October 2023; DIRCO’s statement of 7 October 2023; Chatham House Principles on self-defence (Vaughan Lowe, October 2005); the European Commission President’s speech of 19 October 2023; Schabas, Genocide: The Crime of Crimes; the Court’s judgments and orders in The Gambia v. Myanmar, Marshall Islands, South West Africa, Georgia v. Russian Federation, Bosnia v. Serbia, Ukraine v. Russian Federation, Iran v. United States, Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, Pulp Mills, Belgium v. Senegal, Equatorial Guinea v. France, Ukraine v. Russian Federation (ICSFT/CERD), Jadhav, Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, Canada and Netherlands v. Syria, Belgium v. Senegal (provisional measures), Passage through the Great Belt, Interhandel and Aegean Sea; Netanyahu’s statements on X (10 January 2024) and of 28 October and 23 November 2023, and statements of the Defence Minister and the President collated in Volume tab 2; internal cabinet decisions in tab 1A and IDF directives in tab 1B; the Notes Verbales and messages of 21 December 2023 to 10 January 2024 in tab 14; slides of Hamas military use of houses, schools, UN facilities and hospitals and of tunnels; United States and other intelligence on the Al Ahli Hospital blast (tab 13); COGAT and judges’ folder data on trucks, water, fuel, cooking gas and bakeries (tabs 4A-4C, 5, 5B); Security Council resolution 2720; and statements on the phase transition in tabs 16-A to 16-C. In part 2, Staker’s measures argument relies on the Court’s Orders and separate and dissenting opinions in Ukraine v. Russian Federation, Bosnia v. Yugoslavia, Pulp Mills (Judge Abraham), the ICSFT/CERD Ukraine v. Russian Federation case (Judge Tomka), LaGrand, Iran v. United States, Lockerbie, Timor-Leste v. Australia, Costa Rica/Nicaragua, Equatorial Guinea v. France, The Gambia v. Myanmar, the CERD Armenia/Azerbaijan orders, Canada and Netherlands v. Syria, Guyana v. Venezuela, Avena, Paraguay v. United States and Georgia v. Russian Federation; on ITLOS, PCA (Enrica Lexie) and ICSID provisional-measures practice; on the Belgian-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s Cie d’Électricité de Sofia et de Bulgarie (1923) and the Institute of International Law’s 2017 Hyderabad Final Resolution on Provisional Measures; on UNCITRAL instruments; on Security Council resolution 2720’s tenth preambular paragraph; and on South Africa’s Application para. 144(3)-(9) and para. 119. Noam’s closing relies on Volume tab 9 (the conflict’s operational and legal challenges) and tab 16D (the Attorney General’s public statement on statements calling for intentional harm to civilians).

Analysis

This is a court record, not an argument by its publisher: the speeches are Israel’s advocacy at the provisional-measures stage, and every factual figure and quotation in the record is Israel’s presentation of its sources, footnoted to the Volume, the judges’ folder, press, official statements or intelligence it cites. The speeches answer South Africa’s 11 January argument in a parallel sequence — the Convention’s purpose and the 7 October context, no dispute and intent as a prima facie element, plausible rights of both parties, the facts on the ground including Hamas’ embedding and Israel’s mitigation and aid efforts, urgency, a measure-by-measure objection that each of the nine measures is unwarranted, prejudicial or an implied merits ruling, and a closing institutional defence of Israel’s legal system — holding conflicting accounts side by side with South Africa’s presentation in Verbatim record CR 2024/1 — Public sitting of 11 January 2024, oral argument of South Africa (South Africa v. Israel), without reconciliation. South Africa’s account is not in this record except as quoted and answered by Israel’s speakers.

People, organizations, places and events

Gilad Noam, Tal Becker, Malcolm Shaw, Galit Raguan, Omri Sender, Christopher Staker, Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Gallant, Isaac Herzog, Vusimuzi Madonsela, International Court of Justice, South Africa, Israel, Gaza, South Africa v. Israel (Genocide Convention), Genocide Convention, Hamas, COGAT, Israel Defense Forces

Concepts

Genocide, Genocidal intent, Provisional measures

How it relates to other sources

  • This record is Israel’s single round of oral argument answering the argument recorded in Verbatim record CR 2024/1 — Public sitting of 11 January 2024, oral argument of South Africa (South Africa v. Israel): the same nine measures, Article II acts and officials’ statements are treated from the opposing side, with the figures South Africa gave for casualties (“over 23,000”) described by Becker and Raguan as unverified statistics provided by Hamas (Verbatim record CR 2024/2 — Public sitting of 12 January 2024, oral argument of Israel (South Africa v. Israel), PDF p.19, p.41-42).
  • The dispute question is directly contested between the two records: Dugard in CR 2024/1 traces a dispute crystallizing through public statements, a démarche, an ICC referral and the 21 December 2023 Note Verbale, while Shaw in this record presents the same Notes Verbales exchange as an Israeli offer of a meeting on 26-27 December 2023 that South Africa did not take up before filing on 29 December 2023 (PDF p.26-28). Both accounts are recorded with attribution and are not reconciled.
  • Netanyahu’s Amalek statement is quoted in part by Ngcukaitobi in CR 2024/1 as evidence of genocidal intent and quoted more fully by Shaw in this record, with the statement’s stated objectives and its “most moral army” passage, as showing the opposite (PDF p.34-35).
  • Staker’s measure-by-measure argument answers Lowe’s presentation of the nine measures in CR 2024/1 on the opposing terms: where Lowe argued the measures preserve plausible rights at a low threshold, Staker argues Article 41 requires balancing both parties’ rights and proportionality, and that the first two measures reverse the Court’s refusal of a cease-and-desist measure in Bosnia (PDF p.57, p.62-63).
  • Sender’s food-truck figures — 70 a day before the war and 109 a day over the last two weeks, for trucks specifically carrying food (PDF p.51) — are the figures COGAT’s page records from a later source for January 2024, presented there against UNRWA counts; the two presentations are not reconciled here.

Open questions

  • Ghazi Hamad’s repeated-attack words are quoted by Becker as “On October 7, October 10, October 1,000,0000 — everything we do is justified.” (PDF p.16), with “1,000,0000” as printed (byte-verified in the text copy). Recorded as printed and not corrected.

  • Shaw’s footnote 41 begins “41Obligations concerning Negotiations” without a space after the footnote number (PDF p.25, byte-verified in the text copy), while the parallel footnote 37 gives the same case title with normal spacing. Recorded as printed.

  • Shaw cites Dugard’s jurisdiction speech in two forms in the same speech: “CR 2024/1” at footnotes 43-44 (PDF p.26) and “CR 2024/01” at footnotes 47-48 (PDF p.26). Both forms are recorded as printed.

  • Becker states the hostage and casualty figures for 7 October 2023 as some 1,200 killed, more than 5,500 maimed and some 240 abducted (PDF p.14), and in his conclusion gives “the 136 hostages Hamas still holds” (PDF p.22); South Africa’s record gives its own figures for Gaza, not for 7 October, so no cross-check within the two records resolves the difference between abduction and still-held numbers, which are different measures as presented. Recorded as presented, not reconciled.

  • Staker’s speech prints “damage to buildings in miliary operations” (PDF p.67), with “miliary” as printed (byte-verified in the text copy), where the surrounding argument is about military operations. Recorded as printed and not corrected.

Coverage

PDF p.1-75 of 75, read in full in 2 parts (part 1: PDF p.1-55; part 2: PDF p.56-75).

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