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Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part II (1947-1977)

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aliasesThe Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part II, Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem 1947-1977

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Summary

A United Nations study continuing Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I) from Britain’s February 1947 referral of the Palestine question to the United Nations through 1977. It covers the 1947 Special Session and the creation of UNSCOP, UNSCOP’s majority Partition and minority federal plans, the Ad Hoc Committee, General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, the end of the Mandate and the establishment of Israel on 14 May 1948, the first Palestinian exodus, the Bernadotte mediation and assassination, the 1949 armistice agreements, resolution 194 (III), the Palestine Conciliation Commission and the Lausanne protocols, Israel’s admission to the United Nations on 11 May 1949 and its de facto absorption of the territory it occupied in 1948, the 1967 war and occupation of the whole of Palestine, Security Council resolutions 237 and 242 (1967) and the failed Jarring mission, and the transformation of the Palestine question at the United Nations from a “refugee problem” into recognition of the Palestinian people’s inalienable rights: the 1969-1974 General Assembly resolutions, the Rabat summit’s recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as sole legitimate representative, Yasir Arafat’s 13 November 1974 address, resolution 3236 (XXIX), PLO observer status, and the 1975 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and its 1976 recommendations. The study’s argument is that the case for recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs fared badly from the Special Session onward — UNSCOP’s charter contained no reference to terminating the Mandate or independence, and the Jewish European refugee issue was linked with Palestine (Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part II (1947-1977), lines 185-187) — and that the question remained, at the study’s end, a problem of self-determination the United Nations had created in part and had not resolved.

What the file is

  • The United Nations study Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part II (1947-1977) as reproduced on the United Nations Question of Palestine website, downloaded from the URL above (access basis: IGO, as supplied). The original delivered is the HTML page; the supplied text copy (about 34,079 words, as supplied) is a plain-text rendering of that page with no page markers, so locators are line numbers. The copy is 1,834 lines by the verification count (1,833 by wc -l).
  • The copy opens with United Nations website navigation furniture (lines 1-80 approx.), which is not study text. A date string attached to the title line reads “Part II (1947-1977)VS2019-01-03T12:30:23-05:00” (line 79, as printed). No author, publisher or publication date for the study itself is stated in the part read so far.
  • Structure: Introduction; I. United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Palestine; II. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine; III. The Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine; IV. The Partition of Palestine; V. The End of the Mandate and the Establishment of Israel; VI. Palestine and the United Nations (1948-1967); VII. Palestine and the United Nations (1967-1977); VIII. The United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; IX. The Status of the Palestinian Entity; Notes (notes 1/-117/, lines 1360-1597); Annexes I-VI (lines 1598-1794). The copy opens with United Nations website navigation furniture (lines 1-80 approx.) and closes with the same furniture (lines approx. 1795-1834), neither of which is study text.
  • The annexes reproduce three documents in full: resolution 194 (III) (annex III), Ambassador Jarring’s aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 (annex V), and the 1976 recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (annex VI). Annexes I, II and IV are maps — the Partition Plan 1947, the Armistice Lines of 1949, and Territories occupied by Israel, June 1967 — present in the copy only as captions with “(map)”; their map content is not in the text copy.
  • Text-quality notes for part 2 are held under Open questions: slips as printed include “in fa vour” in note 100/, “resolution 182;(S-2)” in annex III and “of 12;August;1949” in annex VI, each verified at the byte level in the text copy.
  • The study is a companion to Part I; the Introduction restates Part I’s account of Article 22, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate in compressed form.

Section by section

Introduction (lines 83-97 approx.)

  • Palestine was among the former Ottoman Arab territories made mandated territories after the First World War. Article 22 is quoted for the provisional recognition of independence of class “A” communities, subject to administrative assistance and advice by a Mandatory, with the wishes of the communities a principal consideration in selection of the Mandatory.
  • All class “A” Mandates except Palestine became fully independent. In Palestine the Mandate’s primary aim was instead implementation of the Balfour Declaration (1917) for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”, included in the Mandate allotted to Britain in 1922 without ascertaining the wishes of the Palestinian people as the Covenant required.
  • Jewish population rose from less than 10 per cent in 1917 to over 30 per cent in 1947; Palestinian demands for independence and resistance to immigration led to a rebellion in 1937 and continuing violence; Britain tried partition, provincial autonomy and a unified independent Palestine, abandoned each, and in 1947 turned the problem over to the United Nations.

I. United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Palestine (lines 99-187 approx.)

  • Britain, governing since 1917 and under Mandate from 1922, referred the question in February 1947 on the ground that its conflicting Mandate obligations were irreconcilable; Palestinian Arab opposition had defeated partition and Zionist opposition a unified independent Palestine on relinquishment. Alternatives examined: Security Council (veto), Trusteeship Council (a trusteeship agreement with Britain in the role it was shedding); the General Assembly was chosen. Britain requested a special session to appoint a special committee “to make recommendations … concerning the future government of Palestine” (line 113).
  • The first special session convened 28 April 1947 under Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria sought an added agenda item, “The termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence” (lines 119-121). The Lebanese delegate argued that refusing even to discuss independence prejudged it. Egypt would not press a vote, the Chairman ruled one mandatory, and the item was rejected in the General Committee and in plenary.
  • Representation: the Jewish Agency sought a hearing on the ground the Jewish case was unrepresented, Poland pressing the claim; the Secretary-General noted no precedent for hearing non-governmental organizations. The Assembly nevertheless directed the First Committee to accept the Jewish Agency’s request. The Palestinian Arab request was referred to the First Committee; the Palestine Arab delegation protested by telegram (letter dated 5 May) that its request, for Arabs who “constitute the great majority of the population of the country”, had been referred while the Jewish Agency, “which represents an alien and imposed minority”, was accepted directly, withdrew the request, and put on record that “the Arabs have never recognized and will never recognize the mandate over Palestine or any act or body deriving from it” (lines 141-145). The study comments that the Jewish Agency received international recognition similar to its League recognition while Palestinian Arabs were relegated to an inferior position. The First Committee’s resolution that granting a hearing to the Arab Higher Committee correctly interpreted the Assembly’s intentions settled the matter, and the Committee decided to appear.
  • The Special Committee debate: Argentina proposed 11 members including Security Council permanent members and an Arab State, with “the widest powers both to record facts and to make recommendations”; the United States proposed seven “neutral” States excluding permanent members and Arab States. A European delegate urged separating the Palestine question from the problem of homeless Jews in Europe; the Syrian delegate, after that delegation changed its position towards linkage, answered that there was no way to connect the two, that resettlement in a Non-Self-Governing Territory required its population’s consent, and that Palestine had taken enough refugees since 1920. The Jewish Agency representative insisted on linkage and on unlimited Jewish resettlement provided existing inhabitants were not displaced or worsened. The amended US draft was approved; the mission was stated broadly: “The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine” (lines 167-169). Soviet and Polish amendments requiring proposals on “the independent democratic State of Palestine” were defeated; the Soviet representative in plenary held out a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights as a first possibility and partition into two independent autonomous States only if coexistence proved impossible. Arab delegations protested that the reference to independence and to “the future government of Palestine” had been deleted. The study concludes the section: UNSCOP’s charter contained no reference to termination of the Mandate and independence, and the Jewish refugee issue had been indirectly linked.

II. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (lines 189-358 approx.)

  • UNSCOP elected Justice Emil Sandström of Sweden chairman, reached Palestine in mid-June 1947. The Arab League’s Secretary General indicated co-operation; the Arab Higher Committee resolved to abstain, cabling three reasons — refusal to insert termination of the Mandate and declaration of independence in the agenda and terms of reference, failure to detach Jewish world refugees from the Palestine problem, and insertion of world religious interests in place of the inhabitants’ interests — and holding Palestinian natural rights self-evident and not subject to investigation. Sandström appealed by radio and letter without effect.
  • Jewish organizations co-operated fully, submitting over a hundred documents against two brief Arab States papers; the Jewish Agency appointed two liaison officers; Zionist terrorist groups assured UNSCOP’s safety. David Ben-Gurion charged Britain with failing the Mandate: the Mandate “has not been implemented, its primary purpose has not been carried out”, and “The Mandatory in Palestine failed not because Jews and Arabs did not co-operate, but because the Mandatory refused to co-operate with the Mandate” (lines 207-211). On partition he said the Agency would “consider the question of a Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine, and that we are entitled to Palestine as a whole”, and if a favourable decision provoked violent Arab protest, “we will take care of ourselves”. Chaim Weizmann, in his personal capacity, accepted partition by a process of elimination as final and definite. Britain refuted the charges as “at least a gross self-deception”, restating that the national home could not have been established without British assistance, resources and lives.
  • The Palestinian Arab case was presented by the Arab League states in Lebanon (Transjordan in Amman) after the Arab Higher Committee again refused to appear: a Jewish State controlling unlimited immigration backed by foreign subsidies could reach 2, 3, 4 million and become “a bridgehead against the Arab world”; “The destiny of Palestine cannot be decided by outsiders”; Zionism had no rightful claim and had relied on a foreign power régime. Egypt voiced particular concern over Jewish colonies near its frontier as a step towards ambitions towards Sinai. Transjordan fully supported the Arab position.
  • A UNSCOP sub-committee visiting displaced persons camps in Germany and Austria reported refusal to repatriate from fear of anti-Semitism, an overwhelming majority unwilling to consider resettlement anywhere except Palestine, and a state of mind due to propaganda and self-persuasion, citing a poster “Palestine – a Jewish State for the Jewish people” and a design showing Palestine as a much larger area than its present limits. A member’s separate note recorded Mr. Sommerfelt of the International Refugee Organization’s Preparatory Commission admitting Jewish Agency propaganda in the camps, although those in them as a general rule would agree to go elsewhere if afforded opportunities.
  • UNSCOP’s report summarized the Jewish case (a Jewish State and unrestricted immigration interwoven; a State needed as refuge, immigrants needed to affect the Arab numerical preponderance; stress on a right to “return”) and the Arab case (immediate independent Palestine west of the Jordan as an Arab State; a “natural” right from uninterrupted possession; “acquired” rights from First World War pledges Britain was contractually obliged to uphold; the Mandate incorporating the Balfour Declaration held illegal and unrecognized).
  • UNSCOP could not agree. A majority of seven (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay) recommended partition into two politically separate independent States administering a unified economy, Jerusalem an international city. A minority of three (India, Iran, Yugoslavia) proposed a federated independent State with Jerusalem as capital. Australia supported neither. Unanimous only on terminating the Mandate at the earliest practicable date, granting independence at the earliest practicable date, UN responsibility during transition, and urgent international handling of the approximately 250,000 dispersed European Jews in assembly centres.
  • The majority justified partition on irreconcilable claims both possessing validity, “a clash of two intense nationalisms”, some 650,000 Jews and some 1,200,000 Arabs in Palestine, finality, and Jewish immigration as the central issue removable only by a Jewish State. The minority held that no Palestine solution can solve the Jewish problem in general, that Palestine is the common country of both peoples, that partition followed by artificial economic union was impracticable and could not provide two reasonably viable States, and that no claim to unlimited Jewish immigration could be entertained.
  • Events in Palestine: UNSCOP was petitioned over three Irgun death sentences, Menachem Begin having warned two kidnapped British sergeants would be killed in reprisal; it expressed concern at possible unfavourable repercussions and forwarded the families’ letter. After UNSCOP left, the three men were executed and the sergeants killed. UNSCOP decided against visiting the Cyprus internment camps. Members witnessed the Exodus 1947, with 4,500 illegal refugees, towed into Haifa; its report held enforcement of the 1939 White Paper, subject to 1,500 Jewish immigrants monthly permitted since December 1945, had created deep distrust, and that the struggle to admit further Jews measured the rift between the Jewish Agency and community and the Administration.
  • The report described a semi-military régime under defence emergency regulations; as of 12 July 1947, 820 persons held on security grounds, including 291 in Kenya, all Jews except four Arabs, plus 17,873 illegal immigrants detained. The Administration’s statement held that since the beginning of 1945 the Jews had implicitly claimed a right to use force, supported by an organized campaign of lawlessness, murder and sabotage, and that the Jewish community’s refusal to help suppress terrorism gave encouragement to the dissidents. On the national home, the report quoted the 1937 Royal Commission (“today it is a going concern”), gave Jewish population growth from 400,000 to some 625,000 in the decade and settlements from 203 with some 97,000 to more than 300 with some 140,000, described the Va’ad Leumi and the Jewish Agency’s some 20 departments, and called the Yishuv “a State within a State”.

III. The Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine (lines 360-548 approx.)

  • The second General Assembly session constituted itself as an Ad Hoc Committee. The majority plan as quoted provided: after a two-year transition from 1 September 1947, an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem; independence after a constitution, a UN declaration with guarantees, and a treaty creating the Economic Union of Palestine; citizenship of the State of residence on independence; an economic union treaty binding without ratification. Settled-population figures: Jewish State 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs and others (905,000), plus about 90,000 Arab Bedouins; Arab State 10,000 Jews and 725,000 Arabs and others (735,000); Jerusalem 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs and others (205,000). Jerusalem under an International Trusteeship System with the UN as Administering Authority.
  • The minority federal plan as quoted provided: an independent federal State after a transition not exceeding three years, comprising an Arab State and a Jewish State; a constituent assembly to formulate the constitution; a single Palestinian nationality; Jerusalem as capital with two municipalities, one including the Arab sections including the part within the walls, the other the predominantly Jewish areas; Jewish immigration for three years into the Jewish State only, capped by its absorptive capacity with due regard to the existing population and its natural increase, appraised by a commission of three Arab, three Jewish and three UN-designated representatives.
  • Reactions: the Arab League Political Committee would strongly resist partition; the Arab Higher Committee condemned it as “An excess of injustice to Palestine” and “a flagrant violation of the natural rights of the Arabs in their own country” (lines 421-423); the Zionist Organization approved partition while objecting to the territory allotted and termed the minority proposals “unacceptable”. Britain said it was ready to give effect to any plan agreed by Arabs and Jews, would not implement one not acceptable to both, and would soon withdraw. The Arab Higher Committee argued the UN’s raison d’être was to assist self-defence against Zionist aggression, that the Arab struggle had nothing in common with anti-Semitism, and that once Palestine was entitled to independence the UN was not legally competent to impose its constitutional organization. The Jewish Agency held the unanimous recommendation that no Palestine solution could solve the Jewish problem in general “unintelligible”, the Jewish problem being homelessness soluble only by reconstituting the national home, and the minority plan an Arab State with two Jewish enclaves freezing Jews as a permanent minority without control of immigration or fiscal policy.
  • General debate: Britain (a Jewish community of over 600,000 built up, Arab population doubled, no responsibility for enforcement in any case); the United States (support for unanimous principles and the majority plan, administration still the Mandatory’s responsibility); the USSR (self-determination of Jews and Arabs, the sufferings of the Jewish people against the Hitlerites); Weizmann (the Mandate envisaged a territory eight times larger, Jews had not come to become citizens of an Arab State, only partition remained); a Palestinian exposition (population 93 per cent Arab and 7 per cent Jewish at the end of the First World War, raised to 33 per cent Jewish; unwillingness of a minority to remain a minority no reason to convert majority into minority; Dr. Magnes’s 28 September 1947 New York times [as printed] letter warning partition secured through terror would be followed by attempts to secure the rest of the country the same way).
  • A Syrian proposal for a jurists’ sub-committee on the Assembly’s competence, with possible reference to the International Court of Justice, was discouraged by the Chairman. Sub-Committee 1 (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, USSR, United States, Hungary, Venezuela) amended the majority plan at Britain’s insistence: Britain to withdraw by 1 August 1948, governing until then without responsibility for implementation and with full discretion over co-operation; a two-month transition under a five-member UN Commission responsible to the Security Council; independence on 1 October 1948; Jaffa to be an Arab enclave linked to the Arab State.
  • The Negev: a proposal to divide the southern Negev was opposed by Zionist leaders anxious for the whole Negev and access to the Gulf of Akaba. Weizmann’s quoted account has him telling President Truman in Washington in the second week of November that Akaba is “the gate to the Indian Ocean”, that Egypt could close Suez and Iraq the Persian Gulf route, and Truman promising to communicate at once with the American delegation at Lake Success.
  • Sub-Committee 2 (Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen) reported for a unified Palestine that under Chapter XII neither the General Assembly nor any other UN organ is competent to entertain, recommend or enforce any solution for a mandated territory other than recognition of independence, that partition involves alienation of territory and destruction of the integrity of the State of Palestine, and that the UN cannot deprive the majority of its territory for the exclusive use of a minority. Its three resolutions (questioning the Assembly’s power to partition; international co-operation on the Jewish refugee problem; an independent unified Palestine) were all rejected, the second’s recommendation being included in the Committee’s report to the Assembly.
  • Sub-Committee 1’s amended partition report was approved on 25 November 1947 by 25 votes to 13 with 17 abstentions (footnote lists: in favour 25, against 13, abstaining 17, absent Paraguay and Philippines), no two-thirds majority being required in committee.

IV. The Partition of Palestine (lines 550-690 approx.)

  • In plenary a two-thirds majority was essential. The Rapporteur reported the informal conciliation group had produced no results. Britain repeated that it “cannot allow its troops and administration to be used in order to enforce decisions which are not accepted by both parties in Palestine” (lines 572-574) and that their departure would leave a gap.
  • Supporters quoted: Poland (both peoples want national States; a single State unattainable at present; no other way out); Brazil (partition presented as a fait accompli created by the Balfour promise, the Mandate and a permanently established homeland presenting characteristics of a State); the United States (a genuinely United Nations plan; no plan acceptable to both has ever been or will ever be presented; a solution “cannot be done without the use of the knife”); the USSR (all alternatives including a single Arab-Jewish State found unworkable; Jews and Arabs unable to live together, so two States the only workable solution).
  • Opponents quoted: the Philippines (rights conferred by mandatory power do not vitiate the primordial right of a people to determine its political future and preserve its territorial integrity; the issue primarily moral); Lebanon (pressure and manoeuvres in the last 36 hours, tackling delegations “in hotel rooms, in bed, in corridors and ante-rooms, to threaten them with economic sanctions or to bribe them with promises”); Colombia (25 to 13 with 17 abstentions is really a minority proposal; but for joint US and USSR backing it would never have reached the Assembly; postponement suggested); Pakistan (the Assembly deciding without self-determination or consent of the governed; Palestine cut into three parts of a Jewish State and three of an Arab State plus the Jaffa enclave and Jerusalem an international city, its “bleeding body upon a cross forever”; a vote for partition bars all peaceful solution).
  • Eleven delegations had declared support, thirteen had spoken against; France was non-committal; Britain, China and Ethiopia intended to abstain. After last-minute efforts to adjourn or refer the question to the International Court of Justice, the vote on 29 November 1947 was 33 in favour, 13 against, 10 abstentions (full lists at lines 643-651). Arab States and others declared they would not consider themselves bound by a recommendation contrary to the Charter; a quoted statement (note 63/) called it a fateful decision, said the proposal “totally lacks legal validity”, and expressed sympathy for representatives compelled under heavy pressure to change sides.
  • Provisions of resolution 181 (II): a recommendation to the United Kingdom as Mandatory and to all Members of “the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union”, the Security Council requested to undertake necessary measures for implementation. Britain to withdraw by 1 August 1948, making an area including a seaport available to the Jewish State by 1 February 1948 for “substantial immigration”; the UN to take over administration progressively through a Commission from November 1947, handing power to the two States not later than 1 October 1948; economic union. Eight parts: three to the Jewish State, three to the Arab State, Jaffa an Arab enclave, and Jerusalem a corpus separatum under a special international régime administered by the Trusteeship Council for an initial 10 years, then re-examination and a referendum of residents on possible modification. Holy Places safeguards quoted. The patchwork’s rationale was to encompass the maximum Jews and minimum (about 10,000) in the Arab State, yet the Jewish State would contain 497,000 Palestinian Arabs (including 90,000 Bedouin) against 498,000 Jews. Minority safeguards quoted at length — conscience and worship, no discrimination, equal protection, family law and endowments, minority education in its own language, community schools, and no expropriation except for public purposes with full compensation fixed by the Supreme Court paid before dispossession — were to be fundamental laws in each State’s declaration to the UN, prevailing over any conflicting law, regulation or official action.

V. The End of the Mandate and the Establishment of Israel (lines 692-835 approx.)

  • Violence increased; the Arab Higher Committee called a general strike; Jewish paramilitary forces operated more freely as British withdrawal began, with sabotage, attacks on installations and capture of British arms. Britain announced termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948. The Security Council took no effective decision; a March 1948 US draft failed and the Council only called for an end to violence; resolution 181 (II) never reached the Sixth Committee for examination of its legal effects; the UN Commission on Palestine could not move to Jerusalem; the intended militia became impracticable; casualties in the first three months after partition’s approval were 869 dead and 1,909 injured.
  • Zionist policies of territorial expansion: the study states that from Zionist leaders’ writings Zionist policy was to occupy, during withdrawal, as much territory as possible, including the “West Bank”, beyond the partition boundaries. Plan “D” (Dalet), prepared by Haganah High Command in March 1948 replacing Plans “A”, “B” and “C”, is quoted from an Israeli official: its mission was “To gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders, and those of the blocs of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against a regular or pararegular enemy operating from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish State” (lines 716-718). Begin’s Irgun objectives of January 1948 were Jerusalem, Jaffa, the Lydda-Ramleh plain and the Triangle (the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarim area); only Jaffa was executed in full. Ben-Gurion is quoted that New Jerusalem was occupied and guerrillas expelled from Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias and Safad while the Mandatory was still present, and that the goal was reached on 14 May 1948 “in a State made larger and Jewish by the Haganah”.
  • The first Palestinian exodus: Palestinians allege a deliberate policy of displacement to make room for immigrants, quoting Herzl (“We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country”) and a transfer passage (“there is no room for both peoples together in this country”; “to transfer all of them; not one village, not one tribe, should be left”), and Weizmann’s 1939 account of Churchill agreeing to a State of three or four million Jews. Deir Yassin, April 1948: a former Israeli military governor of Jerusalem is quoted calling the combined Etzel and Stern Gang attack deliberate, unprovoked and an act of terrorism against a quiet village, with 254 persons reported by the Arab Higher Committee as killed. Begin is quoted in denial of the charges as enemy propaganda that in result helped: “Not what happened in Deir Yassin, but what was invented about Deir Yassin, helped to carve the way to our decisive victories on the battlefield”. The study holds that whatever the versions, the psychological effect was mass exodus. Yigal Allon’s quoted account describes whispering rumours through Jewish mukhtars that Galilee reinforcements would burn the Huleh villages, producing flight that “numbered myriads” and areas that “were cleaned”. Refugees were estimated at 726,000 by the end of 1949, half the indigenous population; a UN report quoted against the charge that Arab leaders incited flight states “almost the whole of the Arab population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation” and that the exodus resulted from panic created by fighting, rumours of real or alleged terrorism, or expulsion, most refugees coming from territory allotted to the Jewish State.
  • The end of the Mandate and the birth of Israel: a US trusteeship proposal and a truce move were opposed by Zionist leaders; Weizmann’s quoted account describes the US Security Council announcement of reversed policy (suspension of partition, truce, trusteeship from 15 May), the failure of trusteeship and of a temporary truce formula, and his view that retreat would be fatal and the only chance was to create facts. Israel declared independence on 14 May 1948; the High Commissioner’s departure the next day signalled the Mandate’s end. The Declaration is quoted: the 1897 Zionist Congress, recognition in the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 and the Mandate, the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe, and the 29 November 1947 resolution, whose recognition “is irrevocable”, the right being “the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State”. Ben-Gurion is quoted that the part of Palestine where the Haganah could operate was “almost clear of Arabs” on the day of destiny; the major part of Jerusalem meant to be internationalized had also been occupied.
  • Arab intervention: the Arab League cable to the Secretary-General declared the right to set up a government in Palestine pertains to its inhabitants under self-determination; peace and order were upset and, in consequence of Jewish aggression, over a quarter of a million Arabs had been compelled to leave their homes; the Mandate’s end left Palestine without administrative authority; disturbances threatened the Arab States themselves; the Arab Governments were compelled to intervene solely to restore peace and law and order and fill the vacuum, Palestine’s independence and sovereignty having become established in fact, its lawful inhabitants alone entitled to set up an administration. In the copy the place of item (d) in this quotation is taken by a line consisting only of an ellipsis. The fighting became the first Middle East War; Israeli forces, drawing on the Jewish Brigade, Haganah, Palmach and Irgun and well equipped, proved decisively superior; within weeks Israel occupied most of Palestine except the West Bank, held by Jordan’s Arab Legion, and the Gaza Strip, held by Egypt — virtually the entire territory claimed at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as the “Jewish national home”.

VI. Palestine and the United Nations (1948-1967) (lines 837-947 approx.)

  • The UN bore responsibility for commitments to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people not assured under the Mandate and now constrained by partition. The Security Council ordered a cease-fire on 29 May 1948, by which time Israel had consolidated occupation beyond its allotted territory.

  • Count Bernadotte, appointed Mediator on the day the Mandate ended to supervise the cease-fire and “promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine”, effected a temporary truce and proposed a “Union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish” with territorial adjustment, return of all refugees and some limitations on Jewish immigration; both sides rejected it, Israel particularly objecting on immigration. A second, indefinite truce was ordered on 15 July. Bernadotte’s report found Arab leaders fundamental on the refugee problem and the Jewish attitude stiffened between the truces, demands more ambitious, confidence grown from military efforts, less reliance on the UN. Arab States refused an Israeli offer of direct negotiations. Bernadotte’s new plan, premised on acceptance of Israel’s existence, joined Transjordan with most of the Arab State’s allotted territory, included the Negev in the Arab State, gave Galilee to Israel, and placed Jerusalem under UN administration; the Arab States (except Jordan) and Israel rejected it. Bernadotte was assassinated by, in the Israeli official view, the Stern Gang. The UN report on the assassination recorded a press campaign the Provisional Government had done little to hinder, the Stern threat “the task of the moment is to oust Bernadotte … Blessed be the hand that does it” given no particular significance, the Foreign Minister’s explanation that the Stern Group existed only as a political organization, the killers wearing Israeli army uniforms, and that “the Provisional Government of Israel must assume the full responsibility … for these assassinations …”. The Security Council requested an Israeli investigation report; none was received.

  • Armistice agreements and resolution 194 (III): Acting Mediator Dr. Ralphe Bunche (spelling as printed) arranged armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, signed February-July 1949. The agreements called armistice “an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine”, recognized “the principle that no military or political advantage should be gained”, and, being dictated exclusively by military considerations, did not prejudice ultimate political positions; the study states they gave Israel no legal right to territories occupied in 1948 beyond the partition lines. Israel’s membership application of 29 November 1948 failed on 17 December 1948, 5 in favour, 1 against, 5 abstentions, after criticism for non-compliance with UN resolutions.

  • Resolution 194 (III), based on Bernadotte’s recommendations, established a Conciliation Commission headquartered at Jerusalem, called for demilitarization of Jerusalem and Commission proposals for a permanent international régime, and provided that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date”, with compensation for those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property. The study states its importance derives principally from establishing the right of peaceful return, reiterated annually by the General Assembly up to the present time.

  • The Conciliation Commission (France, Turkey, United States; established January 1949) arranged the Lausanne conference in April 1949 in separate talks. Arab States urged the refugee question first; Israel insisted on linkage to a territorial settlement; on 12 May 1949 two protocols agreed to use the partition boundaries as a “basis for discussions with the Commission”. The Commission’s report, quoted at length, records that it had not succeeded in achieving Israel’s acceptance of the repatriation principle; Israel proposed Mandate frontiers with Egypt, Lebanon and Transjordan and the military line for the central area, declared no ambitions for that area and left its disposition to the Arab side, and treated Jerusalem as separate; the Arab delegations proposed immediate return of refugees from certain areas including the “West Bank”, held Israel’s frontier proposal a flagrant violation of the 12 May Protocol as annexation rather than adjustment, and Israel replied it could not accept the 1947 proportionate distribution as a criterion. A study footnote records the Commission’s later Paris conference of 1951 and its reduction to routine functions (lists of refugee properties, owners, blocked bank accounts). The study comments Israel now envisaged a Palestinian Arab State limited to the territories occupied by Egypt and Jordan, unacceptable then to Palestinian Arabs and Arab States. The section also records that Israel moved its capital from Tel Aviv to western Jerusalem in 1950, in defiance, in the study’s words, of UN resolutions.

  • Israel joins the United Nations: Israel was admitted on 11 May 1949, one day before the Lausanne protocols were signed; its representative declared it would observe the Charter and implement resolutions. The study states Israel was the only State to have achieved statehood and received territory also through an act of the United Nations. The admission resolution’s preamble is quoted from “Having received the report of the Security Council on the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations” through “Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel before the ad hoc Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions” (lines 905-917); the quotation continues in part 2.

  • The admission resolution quotation is completed (note 87/): the Assembly, acting under Article 4 of the Charter and rule 125, decides Israel is a peace-loving State able and willing to carry out the Charter obligations and decides to admit it. The study comments that the preamble’s references to resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III) carried implications of Israeli acknowledgement of the continuing existence of a Palestinian Arab entity, but that entity had not come into existence: the territory it was allotted that Israel occupied in 1948 was absorbed de facto by extension of Israeli law, under the “Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance” of 22 September 1948, quoted in full (note 88/), with retroactive effect from 15 May 1948. On 24 April 1950 the West Bank was brought formally under Jordanian control, the Jordanian legislation quoted in part (note 89/) reaffirming intent to preserve the full Arab rights in Palestine without prejudicing the final settlement.

  • The Palestine issue widened into a broader Arab-Israel conflict. The 1956 Suez war was one outcome, though not directly involving Palestine. The June 1967 war brought Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem and territories beyond — far more than the area claimed by the World Zionist Organization in 1919, except the East Bank (map at annex IV). The great majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were made refugees, many for the second time; those who stayed formed a new category, a people under foreign military occupation, distinct from Palestinians within Israel’s pre-1967 borders, who were entitled to Israeli citizenship. Figures given (notes 90/, 91/): of about 2.7 million persons of Palestinian origin in June 1967, about 1.7 [million] lived in Israel or the occupied territories (about 1 million in the West Bank, 400,000 in Gaza, 300,000 in the areas controlled by Israel); almost half a million fled in 1967, leaving about 900,000 in the newly occupied areas, 1.2 million in total under Israeli control; 1,500,000 were refugees in exile.

VII. Palestine and the United Nations (1967-1977) (lines 948-1183 approx.)

  • The question was still treated principally as a “refugee problem”, with little attention to Palestinian Arab identity; an uneasy peace since 1956 had been kept with UNEF’s help, and after 1967 by UNTSO. Security Council resolution 237 (1967), passed unanimously immediately after the June 1967 cease-fire, is quoted: Israel is called upon to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations took place and to facilitate the return of those who fled, and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are to be scrupulously respected. Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, “a basic instrument in all subsequent discussions”, is quoted: inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war; withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict [as printed]; termination of belligerency and acknowledgement of every State’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; a just settlement of the refugee problem; demilitarized zones. The study comments that 242 did not explicitly mention Palestine — its only cognizance of the underlying issue was “the refugee problem” — and that by calling for withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders it implicitly endorsed Israel’s jurisdiction over territory occupied in 1948 beyond the partition lines. Syria and Iraq rejected it; Egypt and Jordan demanded withdrawal from all 1967 territories as a pre-condition; Israel refused, insisting on direct negotiations and a comprehensive peace treaty.
  • The Jarring Mission: Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, appointed under resolution 242, worked from 1967 to 1970 without success. His identical aide-mémoire of 1971 (annex V) proposed simultaneous reciprocal commitments: Israeli withdrawal from occupied Egyptian territory to the former Egypt-mandated Palestine border, and an Egyptian commitment to a peace treaty on explicit understandings. Egypt agreed conditionally; Israel replied it would withdraw only to secure recognized and agreed boundaries and would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. The mission was suspended in 1972.
  • The PLO, formed in 1964, adopted a new Covenant in 1968 committing all Palestinians to continue the fight; the Covenant termed Israel an illegal State, leading to Israel’s refusal to deal with the PLO. Resolution 194 (III) has been reasserted virtually every year since 1948, with Israel consistently refusing compliance except in an overall settlement; reference to Palestinian national rights appeared in the UN only after over two decades. In 1969 the General Assembly formally recognized the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people (quoted, note 92/), citing collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of homes and deportation. In 1970 it recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination and declared full respect for their inalienable rights “an indispensable element” of a just and lasting peace (note 93/); similar resolutions followed in 1971 and 1972. A 1973 resolution on Africa, implicitly applicable to the Middle East, reaffirmed the legitimacy of struggle “by all available means, including armed struggle” (note 94/, with the study’s footnote giving the votes and delegations’ reservations).
  • After the October 1973 war, the October 1974 Rabat Conference of Arab Heads of State endorsed Palestinian self-determination and a homeland and recognized the PLO as the legitimate (in the quoted resolution’s words, “sole legitimate”) representative of the Palestinian people; Jordan’s acceptance was particularly significant. In September 1974 “The question of Palestine” returned to the Assembly’s agenda as a separate item, for the first time since 1952; in October 1974 the PLO was invited to participate in plenary deliberations by 105 votes to 4 (20 abstentions) (note 95/). Resolution 3236 (XXIX) followed a month later, passed by 87 votes to 8 with 37 abstentions and quoted in full (note 96/): it reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including self-determination without external interference and national independence and sovereignty, reaffirms the inalienable right of return and calls for it, and recognizes the Palestinian people as a principal party. Observer status was conferred simultaneously (note 97/). Yasser Arafat addressed the Assembly on 13 November 1974; the long excerpts quoted (note 98/) include “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.” The Israeli representative’s reply is quoted at length (note 99/): the PLO is “the umbrella organization of the Arab murder squads”, a creation of the Arab Governments in Cairo in 1964, “not representative of the Palestinian community”, whose Covenant is quoted against it.
  • Human rights: in August 1967 the Assembly endorsed resolution 237 (note 100/); in 1968 it established the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (note 101/), which Israel has refused entry. The 1977 Assembly resolution, quoted (note 102/), condemns ten listed Israeli policies and practices, from annexation and settlements to torture of detainees and pillaging of archaeological property. The Commission on Human Rights’ 1977 resolution is excerpted (note 103/): Israel’s grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention are “considered as war crimes and an affront to humanity”, all measures changing the territories’ status are null and void, and States are called on not to recognize any changes. The study closes the section: the decade saw a fundamental transformation, from a refugee problem to recognition of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people to return and to national self-determination.

VIII. The United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (lines 1184-1301 approx.)

  • In 1975 the Assembly requested the Security Council to act to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their rights and called for PLO participation on an equal footing in all Middle East negotiations under UN auspices, including the Geneva Peace Conference (note 104/). By resolution 3376 (XXX) (quoted in part, note 105/) it established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People: 20 original members are listed (Afghanistan to Yugoslavia), with Guyana, Mali and Nigeria joining in 1976 (the study’s footnote); observers included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania and Syria, and the PLO, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Ambassador Médoune Fall of Senegal was first Chairman. The mandate: recommendations for a programme of implementation of the rights to self-determination without external interference, national independence and sovereignty, and return.
  • The Committee’s first report (1976, note 106/, text at annex VI) recommended a two-phase right of return — phase one, the 1967 displaced, by immediate implementation of resolution 237 (1967) unrelated to any other conditions; phase two, those displaced between 1948 and 1967, with UN arrangements with the States directly involved and the PLO as interim representative of the Palestinian entity, and just and equitable compensation for those not choosing to return — and, for self-determination, evacuation of the territories occupied by force as a “conditio sine qua non”, a Security Council timetable for complete withdrawal from the areas occupied in 1967, possible temporary peace-keeping forces, a halt to new settlements and withdrawal from post-1967 settlements, scrupulous observance of the Geneva Convention, UN takeover of the evacuated territories and their handover to the PLO, and further arrangements once the independent Palestinian entity was established. (The body excerpt omits paragraph (f), UN assistance with Gaza-West Bank communications, which the annex text gives.)
  • Chairman Fall’s 1976 presentation to the Assembly is quoted (note 107/): “Never in the history of nations have the actions of an international organization had such a decisive effect on the destiny of a people than those of the United Nations on that of the Palestinian people”; the Committee’s mandate was “neither to resolve the question of the Middle East nor to reaffirm the rights of Israel, but to define ways and means to ensure recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people”. In the Security Council he stated (note 108/) that the UN “must bear a great part of the responsibility for the tragedy which the Arab people of Palestine are now experiencing” and quoted Mendes-France: “When a people wishes to free itself of an occupier although the occupier may be militarily more powerful, it will always be successful.” A draft Council resolution affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including return and national independence and sovereignty (note 109/), received 10 votes in favour, 1 against (United States) and 4 abstentions (listed in the study’s footnote) and failed due to the veto (note 110/). In October 1977 the Chairman told the Council its task was “righting the basic imbalance which has always characterized the various United Nations approaches to the Palestine question” (note 111/) and that “Israel’s right to exist is no longer challenged by anyone” (note 112/); the Council adjourned without taking any action.

IX. The Status of the Palestinian Entity (lines 1302-1359 approx.)

  • The study recapitulates its whole argument. In 1917 a Palestinian entity existed with two major attributes of a nation, a people rooted for centuries in a defined territory; the League provisionally recognized such communities’ existence as independent nations; the Mandate should have guided the transition to independence but also required securing a Jewish national home, and the indigenous people were not consulted. Implementation transformed demography and land ownership: Jews about 9 per cent of the population in 1917 and about 32 per cent in 1947; Jewish-owned land 2.5 per cent of the total land area in 1917 and 6.2 per cent in 1947. Partition awarded 56 per cent of the territory to 32 per cent of the population. In 1948 Israel expanded to 77 per cent of Palestine and occupied the larger part of Jerusalem; Jordan and Egypt held the rest of the Arab State’s allotted territory, which never came into being; the refugees numbered 726,000 by the end of 1949. In 1967 Israel occupied the remaining territory, including the rest of Jerusalem, made the Israeli capital; a second exodus was estimated at half a million. By 1970, of an estimated Palestinian population of 3 million, 1.6 million were in exile, 1 million in the territories occupied in 1967 and 400,000 within Israel’s pre-1967 borders. Israel has refused the annually repeated call to permit return and pay compensation, and has failed to comply with resolution 242’s withdrawal call except in a comprehensive settlement.
  • Statements evidencing recognition by the great majority of Member States: the Non-Aligned Conference at Colombo, August 1976 (note 113/), calling the Palestine question “the root cause of the conflict in the region”; the Organization of African Unity at Libreville, July 1977 (note 114/), requiring total Israeli withdrawal and recognition of the Palestinian people’s national rights; the European Economic Community spokesman, September 1977 (note 115/), basing a solution on resolutions 242 and 338 and four principles, including that a solution is possible only if the Palestinian people’s legitimate right to effective expression of its national identity is translated into fact, with a homeland; and the United States-Soviet joint communiqué of 1 October 1977 (no footnote marker in the copy), listing withdrawal, “the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”, and termination of the state of war among the key issues. The Secretary-General’s 1976 report noted the Council discussions “had emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem” (note 116/), and his August 1976 report stated (note 117/): “I would like to underline once again the fundamental importance of tackling the Palestinian question as an essential element in resolving the Middle East dispute”.

Notes (lines 1360-1597)

  • Notes 1/-117/, each a citation. The apparatus runs from the Official Records of the First Special Session (notes 1/-17/) and the UNSCOP report A/364 (18/-38/) through the Ad Hoc Committee and plenary records (41/-64/), the Security Council record (65/), the books quoted in section V — Lorch, Begin, Ben-Gurion, Herzl, Weizmann, Weitz and Allon as cited in Hirst, Joseph, Moore (66/-80/) — the Mediator’s report A/648 and the assassination report S/1018 (81/-84/), Badi’s Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel for the 1948 Ordinance (88/), the New York Times of 25 April 1950 for the Jordanian legislation (89/), and Janet Abu-Lughod’s demographic chapter for the 1967 population figures (90/, 91/). Notes 92/-117/ identify the resolutions behind sections VII-IX, most with their votes: among them 2535 B (XXIV) (47-22-47), 2672 C (XXV) (47-22-50), 3070 (XXVIII) (97-5-28), 3210, 3236 and 3237 (XXIX) (95-17-19), 2252 (ES-V) (116-0-2), 2443 (XXIII) (60-22-30), the four human-rights resolutions collected in note 102/, Commission on Human Rights resolution 1 (XXXIII) with the Commission’s 1977 membership listed (103/), 3375 and 3376 (XXX) (104/, 105/), the Committee’s first report A/31/35 (106/), and the Colombo, Libreville and EEC statements (113/-115/). No note is supplied for the 1 October 1977 United States-Soviet joint communiqué.

Annexes (lines 1598-1794 approx.)

  • Annex I, the Partition Plan 1947, annex II, the Armistice Lines of 1949, and annex IV, Territories occupied by Israel, June 1967, are maps, present only as captions. Annex III reproduces resolution 194 (III) in full: the Conciliation Commission’s establishment and functions, protection of and free access to the Holy Places including Nazareth, the Jerusalem area (bounded by Abu Dis, Bethlehem, Ein Karim with Motsa, and Shu’fat) under effective UN control with demilitarization and a permanent international régime, freest possible access to Jerusalem, and para. 11’s return and compensation provisions. Annex V reproduces Jarring’s aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 in full, including the five undertakings requested of the United Arab Republic (termination of belligerency; acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence; the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; prevention of belligerent acts from its territory; non-interference). Annex VI reproduces the Committee’s recommendations in full: basic considerations (Palestine at the heart of the Middle East problem; PLO participation indispensable; inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force), the two-phase right of return (with ICRC and/or UNRWA assistance in phase one, added to the body excerpt), and section III on self-determination, which fixes the withdrawal timetable’s completion “no later than 1 June 1977”, adds paragraph (f) (UN assistance, if necessary, in establishing communications between Gaza and the West Bank) and paragraph (h) (UN economic and technical assistance for consolidation of the Palestinian entity), neither quoted in the body excerpt.

Key passages

  • “The case for the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs had fared badly in the special session. UNSCOP’s charter contained no reference to the termination of the Mandate and independence for Palestine. The issue of Jewish European refugees had been linked with Palestine.” (lines 185-187)
  • “The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine” (lines 167-169)
  • “An excess of injustice to Palestine … a flagrant violation of the natural rights of the Arabs in their own country … an echo of the influence of zionism …” (Arab Higher Committee on the partition plan, lines 421-423, “zionism” as printed)
  • “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date” (resolution 194 (III) as quoted, lines 889-891)
  • “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.” (Yasser Arafat to the General Assembly, 13 November 1974, line 1114)
  • “1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) The right to self-determination without external interference; (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty” (resolution 3236 (XXIX) as quoted, lines 1078-1082 approx.)
  • “Never in the history of nations have the actions of an international organization had such a decisive effect on the destiny of a people than those of the United Nations on that of the Palestinian people” (Ambassador Médoune Fall presenting the Committee’s recommendations, 1976, line 1254)
  • “The evacuation of the territories occupied by force and in violation of the principles of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations is a conditio sine qua non for the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine” (the Committee’s recommendations as quoted, line 1236; the annex VI text, line 1764, is in the same terms)

Evidence the work relies on

  • United Nations records of the 1947 special session, the First Committee and the General Assembly, quoted extensively with footnote markers 1/-17/ in section I, including the Lebanese and Syrian delegates, the Secretary-General, the Jewish Agency representative, the Soviet representative and the Palestine Arab delegation’s telegram of protest.
  • The UNSCOP report and proceedings, quoted for the Jewish and Arab cases, the displaced persons camps sub-committee report, the majority and minority justifications, the Exodus 1947 incident, the security situation and the development of the national home (notes 18/-36/).
  • Records of the Ad Hoc Committee and its two Sub-Committees and of the General Assembly plenary debate on partition, including statements by Britain, the United States, the USSR, Poland, Brazil, the Philippines, Lebanon, Colombia and Pakistan, and Weizmann’s account of his November 1947 meeting with President Truman (notes 37/-63/).
  • The text and provisions of resolution 181 (II) as summarized and quoted in section IV, with its population figures.
  • Writings of Zionist leaders quoted as evidence of policy in section V: an Israeli official on Plan Dalet, Begin on Irgun objectives and on Deir Yassin, Ben-Gurion on the Haganah’s operations, Herzl, Weizmann and Yigal Allon (notes 66/-79/).
  • The Arab League cable to the Secretary-General of May 1948, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Bernadotte’s report, the UN report on Bernadotte’s assassination, the 1949 armistice agreements as characterized, resolution 194 (III), and the Conciliation Commission’s report on the Lausanne talks (notes 80/-86/).
  • Resolution 273 (III) itself (note 87/); Badi’s Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel for the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance (88/); the New York Times of 25 April 1950 for the Jordanian legislation on the West Bank (89/); Janet Abu-Lughod’s “The Demographic Transformation of Palestine” (1971) for the June 1967 and post-war Palestinian population figures (90/, 91/).
  • The texts of Security Council resolutions 237 and 242 (1967) as quoted, Jarring’s 1971 aide-mémoire (annex V), and the General Assembly resolutions of 1969-1977 identified in notes 92/-105/ with their votes, including Arafat’s address (A/PV.2282, note 98/) and the Israeli reply (A/PV.2283, note 99/), the Special Committee resolutions in note 102/ and the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1 (XXXIII) (103/).
  • The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People’s first report, A/31/35 (note 106/), Chairman Fall’s statements to the Assembly and the Security Council (107/, 108/, 111/, 112/), the vetoed 1976 draft resolution S/12119 (109/, 110/), and the 1976-1977 statements of the Non-Aligned Conference, the OAU, the EEC spokesman and the Secretary-General (113/-117/).

Analysis

  • The study is a United Nations institutional history written from the Organization’s own records: its evidence is overwhelmingly the Official Records, resolutions and reports it quotes, supplemented in section V by the writings of Zionist leaders (Herzl, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, Begin, Allon, Weitz) quoted as evidence of policy, and in the later sections by Janet Abu-Lughod’s demography. It states its conclusions in its own voice at the end of each stage — the Palestinian case “had fared badly” in 1947; resolution 242 implicitly endorsed Israel’s 1948 acquisitions; the 1967-1977 decade transformed a refugee problem into recognized national rights — and section IX recapitulates the whole period as a single argument about a provisionally recognized nation denied the independence the Covenant promised it.
  • Its perspective is that of the later United Nations majority it documents: Israeli actions are characterized directly (annexation, absorption “de facto”, refusal of compliance), while the Palestinian claim is stated as the study’s own finding (“a people rooted for centuries in a defined territory”). The Israeli case in the later sections is present mainly in the quoted Israeli reply to Arafat and in Israel’s stated negotiating positions; no Israeli or outside critique of the study’s account is reproduced.
  • Its limits, on its own showing: the maps its argument cites (annexes I, II, IV) are not readable in this copy; several long quotations are excerpted with ellipses (the Commission on Human Rights resolution’s paragraphs 4, 5 and 7, and the Committee recommendations’ paragraph (f), are supplied only by the annex or not at all); one statement it quotes, the 1 October 1977 United States-Soviet communiqué, carries no note; and the study gives no publication date, so its “present time” references can be dated only from its latest cited material (December 1977 in note 102/).

People, organizations, places and events

UNSCOP, Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, Arab Higher Committee, Jewish Agency, Arab League, David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann, Menachem Begin, Yigal Allon, Harry Truman, Folke Bernadotte, Ralph Bunche, Palestine Conciliation Commission, United Nations Commission on Palestine, Haganah, Irgun, Stern Group, Deir Yassin, Dalet Plan, Exodus 1947, Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949, UN General Assembly Resolution 181, UN General Assembly Resolution 194, UN General Assembly Resolution 273, Jaffa, Gaza, West Bank, Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, Gunnar Jarring, Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Médoune Fall, UN Security Council Resolution 237, UN Security Council Resolution 242, UN General Assembly Resolution 3236

Concepts

Partition, Corpus separatum, Right of Return, Self-determination, Transfer, Jewish National Home

How it relates to other sources

Open questions

  • Footnote markers 33/ and 35/ are each used twice in this part (33/ for both the Irgun death-sentence resolution and the decision against visiting Cyprus; 35/ for both the Exodus 1947 passage and the Administration’s security statement). Whether this duplication is in the study as printed or arose in the web copy cannot be settled from the text copy alone.

  • In the Arab League cable quoted in section V, the place of item (d) is taken in the copy by a line consisting only of an ellipsis, so what item (d) stated is not in this copy.

  • The study gives Jewish population figures that differ by context without reconciling them: some 650,000 in the UNSCOP majority justification, some 625,000 in the report on the national home’s development, and over 600,000 in Britain’s Ad Hoc Committee statement; and Palestinian Arab figures of some 1,200,000 (majority justification) against the partition tables’ settled totals plus Bedouins. The figures are recorded as given, with their locators.

  • The UNSCOP majority table gives the Jewish State’s Arabs and others as 407,000 settled, while section IV gives 497,000 Palestinian Arabs in the Jewish State including 90,000 Bedouin against 498,000 Jews; the two are arithmetically consistent (407,000 + 90,000 = 497,000, computed) but the study does not state the connection.

  • The Israeli representative’s declarations on implementation of resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III), taken note of in the admission resolution preamble quoted at lines 913-917, are not reproduced in this part; the ingested resolution 273 text likewise incorporates them only by reference (see UN General Assembly Resolution 273).

  • No publication date for the study itself is stated in the part read; the web page version is dated 2019-01-03. Section VI speaks of resolution 194’s return provision as reiterated annually “up to the present time”, without dating that present.

  • The Notes give only one entry each for markers 33/ and 35/ (UNSCOP report, vol. I p. 6 and p. 28 respectively), although each marker is used twice in the body text; the Notes do not show which of the two uses each entry belongs to.

  • Note 100/ gives the vote on resolution 2252 (ES-V) as “116 in fa vour” (as printed, verified at the byte level in the text copy); whether the space is in the study as printed or arose in the web copy cannot be settled from the text copy alone. The same applies to “resolution 182;(S-2)” in annex III para. 2(a) and “of 12;August;1949” in annex VI recommendation (d), both as printed with semicolons and byte-verified.

  • The 1 October 1977 United States-Soviet joint communiqué quoted in section IX carries no footnote marker, and no note between 115/ and 116/ supplies its source.

  • The Committee recommendations as excerpted in section VIII omit paragraph (f) of the self-determination recommendations and phase one’s paragraph (ii); both are present in the annex VI text. The annex’s right-of-return section carries no roman numeral in the copy, where the body and the annex’s own sequence (I, then III) imply it is section II.

  • The Commission on Human Rights resolution of 1977 is excerpted with ellipses in place of its paragraphs 4, 5 and 7, which are therefore not in this copy.

  • Section IX’s population account is internally consistent but uses different bases from section VI’s ending: about 2.7 million Palestinians in June 1967 (notes 90/, 91/, sourced to Abu-Lughod), against an estimated 3 million by 1970, of whom 1.6 million in exile, 1 million in the 1967 territories and 400,000 within Israel’s pre-1967 borders (these three sum to the stated 3 million, computed). Section VI’s June 1967 figure is printed “about 1.7 lived in Israel or the occupied territories”, with the word “million” not repeated in the copy.

  • Section IX gives the Jewish share of Palestine’s population as about 9 per cent in 1917 and about 32 per cent in 1947, and Jewish-owned land as 2.5 per cent in 1917 and 6.2 per cent in 1947; Part I and the Introduction give related but differently rounded figures (less than 10 per cent in 1917, over 30 per cent in 1947). The figures are recorded as given in each place.

Coverage

lines 1-1834 of 1834, read in full in parts 1-2 of 2

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