Read Palestine

Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part IV (1984-1988)

Properties2
tags
aliasesThe Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part IV, Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem 1984-1988

37 min read

Summary

A United Nations study continuing Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part III (1978-1983) from 1984 to 1988: the endorsement in resolution 38/58 C of the call for an International Peace Conference on the Middle East; the study’s account of Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territory — human-rights violations, land acquisition and settlements, water control, labour exploitation and the economic value of the West Bank and Gaza markets for Israel; the year-by-year search for a peaceful solution from 1984 to 1987, in which conference support grew while Israel and the United States did not agree to participate; the First Intifada from December 1987 and its 1988 course, including the Secretary-General’s report of 21 January 1988 and resolutions 605, 607 and 608; and the diplomatic transformation of 1988 — the assassination of Khalil al-Wazir, Bassam Abu Sharif’s June statement, Jordan’s severance of its West Bank links on 31 July, the Palestinian National Council’s 15 November Algiers Declaration of Independence proclaiming the State of Palestine, Arafat’s Geneva address and 14 December news conference, resolutions 43/176 and 43/177, and the opening of the PLO-United States dialogue at Carthage on 16 December 1988 (Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part IV (1984-1988), lines 79-686).

What the file is

The web-page text of the fourth part of the United Nations study The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, covering 1984-1988, as published on the United Nations Question of Palestine site; the page version is dated 2019-01-03 in the copy’s dateline (line 75). The text copy is 980 lines as counted for verification (979 newline-terminated lines in the file as saved, line 980 being the final blank line) and about 26,566 words, of which lines 1-78 approx. and lines 932-979 are website navigation furniture. The body in full is an Introduction, four numbered sections (I. Thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly and the question of Palestine; II. Israeli policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory, with subsections A-E; III. Search for a peaceful solution of the question of Palestine, by year 1984-1987; IV. Intifadah, with subsections A and B, B having nine numbered parts), a Conclusion (section V), Notes 1-90, and a Table of Content at the end of the copy (lines 873-930). The only publication identifier in the copy is the mark “89-20684 1283-86e (E)” at line 871, after note 90. The study’s own publication date, place and document symbol are not otherwise stated in the copy; context the copy does not supply is held under Open questions.

Section by section

  • Introduction (lines 79-88): The International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29 August-7 September 1983, became a landmark focusing international attention on the Palestinian people’s struggle for its inalienable rights; its Geneva Declaration on Palestine laid down guidelines for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement through an international peace conference on the Middle East, and its Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights outlined obligations of Member States and the United Nations system and the role of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The years 1984-1988 were marked by continuous effort by all these forces to convene such a conference. The General Assembly, Security Council, Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, other United Nations organs and the International Committee of the Red Cross have been continuously seized of the ever-deteriorating situation in the territory occupied since 1967, the Committee calling in particular for Israeli application of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 (note 1/).

  • Section I (lines 89-106): Resolution 38/58 C of 13 December 1983 (note 2/) welcomed and endorsed the conference call with guidelines (a)-(f) quoted in full — Palestinian inalienable rights including return, self-determination and an independent State; PLO participation on an equal footing; an end to the occupation and Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem; opposition to settlements and other contrary policies; nullity of measures altering Jerusalem’s character and status, in particular the so-called “Basic Law”; and all States’ right to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, the sine qua non of which is attainment of the Palestinian people’s rights. The resolution invited all parties including the PLO, the United States and the Soviet Union to participate on an equal footing, called on the Security Council to facilitate organization, and requested the Secretary-General urgently to undertake preparatory measures and report early in 1984.

  • Section II.A. Violation of human rights in the occupied territory (lines 109-138): Over the five years the situation seriously deteriorated, in violation of international law instruments (note 3/). Israeli policy rested on the concept that territory occupied since 1967 should be considered part of the State of Israel — the so-called “homeland doctrine”, under which the occupied territory constitutes part of the “Jewish homeland”, ceasing to be “occupied territory”. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories’s successive reports record deportation, torture, mass arrests, house demolition, arbitrary beatings and killing, and humiliation, aggravated by armed settler violence. According to the West Bank Data Project, approximately 67,700 Jewish settlers lived in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in April 1987 (note 4/); Meron Benvenisti writes in its 1987 report (note 5/) that all settlers belong to the security forces and possess no less than 10,000 firearms, and that authorities are reluctant to prosecute vigilantes. The Special Committee’s 1988 report noted settler acts reaching “an unprecedented level” (note 6/) and a phase “characterized by a level of violence and repression never reached before in the course of the 21 years of occupation” (note 7/); the occupation itself constituted a violation of human rights, and Israel’s denial — that settlement and transfer did not constitute annexation — was a flagrant violation of its obligations as a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention (note 8/). Until a comprehensive settlement, the Committee recommended full Israeli application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, full co-operation with the ICRC, and Member State support for the ICRC and UNRWA (note 9/). The ICRC recorded continuing violations including curfews, movement restrictions, house destruction and walling-up, expulsions, land seizure as “State land”, and inciting collaboration (note 10/). A footnote to the heading states a further description is contained in chapter IV, section B.

  • Section II.B. Acquisition of land and Israeli settlements (lines 139-150): Expropriation, new settlement construction and “thickening” continued unabated 1984-1988, by techniques including declaring land “closed” for military training, “State land”, expropriation for “public (Jewish) use” and “nature preserves” (note 11/). A 1988 United States Department of State report (note 12/) is quoted: approximately 2.5 per cent of the total area of the West Bank and East Jerusalem has been turned over to Israeli nationals, and Palestinians do not participate in the Higher Planning Council. According to WBDP, 11 settlements were populated in the West Bank over the period (note 13/); 6 were added in Gaza to the 12 existing, and one third of Gaza lands was declared “State land” or confiscated. Gaza’s density is given as approximately 3,754 people per square mile, 85 per cent urban (note 14/); Khan Yunis was virtually enveloped by a settlement cluster (note 15/). A plan to raise West Bank settlers to 40 per cent of the Arab population was revealed by a Prime Minister’s adviser on 3 December 1987 and confirmed on 5 December 1987 at Elon Moreh, stating the objective to raise the proportion of Jews to 40 to 60 per cent by the end of the century and preparations for a further million and a half settlers in the next 12 months (note 16/). Mattityahu Drobles’s plan to the year 2000, “Climb the mountain and open up the desert”, was introduced at the International Zionist Conference in Jerusalem in December 1987 (note 17/). Main post-1983 construction was in existing settlements; Deputy Defence Minister Michael Dekel announced study of converting all West Bank military camps into “civilian residential settlements” (note 18/). Minister Gad Ya’acobi said funds spent on settlement construction over 20 years amounted to $US 20 billion (statement published 27 January 1988, note 19/). Defence, transport, electricity and water systems were integrated into Israeli infrastructure.

  • Section II.C. Water resources (lines 151-168): Israeli water policies were implemented through customary, Ottoman, Mandate, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli and military legislation, with complete Israeli legislative, administrative and judicial authority since June 1967. In the early 1980s Palestinian per capita consumption was 35 cubic metres in towns and 15 m3 in villages, against settlement provisions set at 90 m3 per capita; projections for 1990 indicate 60 million m3 for some 30 Israeli agricultural settlements in the West Bank, only one third less than for 400 Palestinian villages (note 20/). Control is exercised by the Israeli Water Commission through Mekorot and Tahal. Israel’s State Comptroller report of June 1987 found dangerous overexploitation, exorbitant Palestinian bills against subsidized settler bills, a 1986 Mekorot land seizure and pipe-laying for a settlement, and a sewage pollution time-bomb (note 21/); WHO linked water and hygiene problems to infectious diseases (note 22/). 1986 estimates showed about a quarter of Israel’s annual water potential originated beyond the Green Line (some 475 million m3 of 1,900 million m3); WBDP’s 1986 report recorded integration of the West Bank system into the Israeli network (note 23/). In Gaza, settlers established 35 to 40 new wells in the mid-1980s while strict Palestinian quotas were enforced (note 24/). The Wall Street Journal of 22 January 1985 is quoted: West Bank Arabs have become net “importers” of water piped from Israel.

  • Section II.D. Exploitation of Palestinian labour resources (lines 169-188): Employment inside the territories steadily declined 1984-1988 while employment in Israel increased. WBDP’s 1987 report estimates for 1985: 30.7 per cent (51,300 workers) of the West Bank labour force and 46.1 per cent (43,400 workers) of Gaza’s were employed in Israel; Palestinian labour in Israeli construction rose from 62.3 per cent in 1985 to 65 per cent in 1986, and in agriculture from 29.5 per cent to over 30 per cent (note 25/). A footnote states less than half of Palestinians seeking employment in Israel in 1985 were legally registered. There was no equal pay for equal work; Benvenisti (note 26/) states legally employed Palestinians fare worse on premiums, pensions, sick leave and other rights, and that the 20 per cent wage deduction goes to the Treasury rather than the National Insurance Institute, in effect an “occupation tax”. Benvenisti further observes (note 27/) that many are forced to spend the night in Israel illegally in subhuman conditions, on low pay approximately half that of Israeli workers, searched, arrested or harassed on average twice a week. The 1988 United States report states approximately 100,000 Palestinian workers travel daily to Israel without equal treatment, and quotes their ineligibility for NII pensions, allowances and welfare programmes (note 28/); Labour Ministry inspectors acted against workers staying overnight without permission (note 29/).

  • Section II.E. Economic value of the West Bank and Gaza Strip markets for Israel (lines 189-200): A 1987 UNCTAD/ESCWA study (note 30/) gives three ways occupation influences the territories’ trade: the occupation’s own alteration of patterns, Israeli trade-policy measures, and trading procedures. Israel’s policy is that its exports flow freely into the territories while Palestinian exports to Israel are tightly controlled; an official affirmed Palestinian products “threaten Israeli firms with unfair competition” (note 31/). Lucrative crops were generally banned or limited, Gaza citrus exports to Western Europe remained forbidden, and a military order imposed complex labelling (note 31/ as printed, second use). The territories supplied around 3 per cent of Israeli non-military imports, while an average of 16 per cent of Israeli exports were destined for the territories, making the Palestinian market the second largest Israeli non-military export market after the United States, and, excluding diamonds to the United States, the largest single market since the mid-1970s (note 32/).

  • Section III, 1984 (lines 201-232): The Secretary-General’s report of 13 March 1984 pursuant to resolution 38/58 C (note 33/) followed consultations on 9 March and letters to 19 Governments (note 34/) and the PLO. The United States reiterated opposition: the only path lay in negotiations based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and a conference would hinder the process (note 35/). The USSR strongly supported collective efforts and a conference “which would open up a real path towards an all-embracing solution” (note 36/). Israel rejected the conference, which would serve “as a forum for the dissemination of anti-Israel propaganda” (note 37/). The PLO Observer, on Yasir Arafat’s instruction (note 38/), criticized the United States letter and recalled Arafat’s International Conference statement: the Fez Plan resolutions were a unique opportunity for minimum justice, and return, self-determination and national independence were the only basis for a just peace. Syria supported the conference and the Soviet proposals of 29 July 1984 (note 39/, used twice as printed). Jordan called the conference an idea worth pursuing, with terms of reference from international law and resolutions 242 and 338 (note 40/; the resolution is cited as “38/58;C” as printed). Lebanon was prepared to participate on stated concepts including the 1949 General Armistice Agreement (note 41/). Egypt reiterated support for Palestinian rights and called for consultations (note 42/). The Soviet proposals transmitted 31 July 1984 (document dated 29 July 1984, note 43/) proposed a conference on the basis of inadmissibility of capture of foreign lands, return of all territories occupied since 1967, dismantling of post-1967 settlements, a Palestinian independent State on the West Bank and Gaza lands freed from occupation, an end to the state of war, and international guarantees by the permanent members or the Security Council, with Soviet readiness to participate. In September 1984 the Secretary-General stated Israel and the United States were not prepared to participate. The Committee’s annual report (note 44/) regretted their negative attitude. The Secretary-General’s report of 26 October 1984 (note 45/) set the conditions for a comprehensive settlement — withdrawal, respect for sovereignty and the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, and a just settlement of the Palestinian problem including self-determination — with Jerusalem of primary importance, negotiation with all parties, major-Power support, and United Nations auspices. EEC, the Non-Aligned Movement and its Committee of Nine on Palestine, OAU, OIC and its Al-Quds Committee considered the question through 1984; the two committee footnotes give the Committee of Nine’s members and the Al-Quds Committee’s chairmanship by King Hassan II of Morocco.

  • Section III, 1985 (lines 233-291): The Security Council held 20 meetings; on 12-13 September 1985 a draft deploring repressive measures since 4 August 1985 was not adopted because of the United States’ negative vote. The Commission on Human Rights (forty-first session, 4 February-15 March 1985) adopted resolutions 1985/1 A — declaring Israel’s breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols war crimes and an affront to humanity, and requesting Chapter VII measures — and 1985/1 B on the Convention’s applicability to all territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem. The Bandung thirtieth-anniversary Declaration (24-25 April 1985), the EEC Ten’s Luxembourg Declaration (29 April 1985), the OAU Assembly at Addis Ababa (18-21 July 1985), the Arab Extraordinary Summit at Casablanca (7-9 August 1985) and the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers at Luanda (2-7 September 1985) all supported the Palestinian people under the PLO and the conference. The Committee’s 1985 report (note 46/) urged concerted action; the Special Committee’s annual report (note 47/) is quoted that the settlers constituted the real authority in the country and the civilian population remained without any protection whatsoever. The Secretary-General’s report of 22 October 1985 (note 48/) underlined the Security Council’s major responsibility. Israel persisted in confiscation, settlements and Judaization; in August 1985 the 1945 emergency regulations were reinstated, providing deportation, administrative detention for renewable six-month periods and newspaper closures, reported as the corner-stone of a new repressive policy (note 49/, first use). Resolution 40/96 D reaffirmed the conference call and called on Israel and the United States to reconsider.

  • Section III, 1986 (lines 292-332): The conference idea gained almost universal recognition. The Security Council considered the profanation of Haram al-Sharif; on 30 January 1986 a draft deploring “the provocative acts by Israelis, including members of the Knesset, which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem” was not adopted because of the United States’ negative vote. The Commission on Human Rights (forty-second session) adopted 1986/1 A — occupation itself a fundamental violation, and condemnation of the “homeland doctrine” and of the Jerusalem annexation decision as null and void — and 1986/1 B on the Convention’s applicability, ill-treatment and torture, and ICRC co-operation. The Al-Quds Committee (Marrakesh, 21-22 January 1986), the OIC Foreign Ministers (New York, 2 October 1986), the Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Mexico City, 7-12 April 1986), the OAU Council of Ministers (Addis Ababa, 21-26 July 1986) and the Non-Aligned eighth Summit (Harare, 1-6 September 1986) supported the conference, the Non-Aligned Declaration calling for a Security Council preparatory committee. The Secretary-General’s report of 14 March 1986 (note 50/) stated the obstacles still exist. The Committee’s 1986 report (note 49/, second use as printed) recorded continued occupation, repression and settlement expansion. The Special Committee’s 1986 report (note 51/) recorded the revived “iron-fist” policy, arrests, administrative detention and resumed expulsions, and concluded in paragraph 90 that Israeli policy continues to be based on the principle that the territories occupied in 1967 constitute part of the State of Israel, at the source of annexation and settlements in flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Secretary-General’s report of 29 October 1986 (note 52/) emphasized the absence of an accepted negotiating process and the disagreement over Palestinian representation. Resolution 41/43 D reaffirmed the conference call, called for a preparatory committee within the Security Council framework, and requested a report not later than 15 May 1987.

  • Section III, 1987 (lines 333-374): Anniversaries marked the year — the Balfour Declaration (seventieth), partition resolution 181 (II) (fortieth), the 1967 war (twentieth) and the Sabra and Shatila massacre of 17 and 18 September 1982 as printed (fifth). The Palestine National Council’s eighteenth session (Algiers, 20-26 April 1987) endorsed the conference and the preparatory committee. The Secretary-General’s report under resolution 41/43 D (note 54/), from consultations with Council members and Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the PLO, stated in paragraph 3 that no Council member opposed in principle an international conference, though wide differences existed on its form; sufficient agreement did not exist to convene it. The Warsaw Treaty’s Political Consultative Committee (Berlin, 28-29 May 1987) supported a conference and a preparatory committee (note 55/). The Secretary-General’s report of 13 November 1987 (note 56/) called the differences “differences about the procedural aspects of a conference” and stated in paragraph 33: “The major obstacle at present, however, is one of a different kind, namely, the inability of the Government of Israel as a whole to agree on the principle of an international conference under United Nations auspices.” The Special Committee’s 1987 report (note 57/) concluded the annexation policy and cycle of tension and repression had led to an explosive situation; the quotation as printed opens with an ellipsis and has no closing quotation mark in its paragraph. The Committee’s 1987 report (note 58/), the Arab Summit at Amman (8-11 November 1987) and the forty-second General Assembly session supported the conference; resolution 42/66 D stressed “the urgent need for additional concrete and constructive efforts by all Governments in order to convene the Conference without further delay”. The Fifth Islamic Summit (Kuwait, 26-29 January 1987), the EEC Twelve’s Brussels Declaration of 23 February 1987 (note 53/), the Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1987/2 A and “1987/2;B” (as printed), the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers at Reykjavik (25-26 March 1987) and the Non-Aligned Committee of Nine at Harare (14-15 April 1987) are also recorded in this year’s account, in the order the study presents them before the PNC passage.

  • Section IV.A. Beginning of the intifadah (lines 375-394): Between September and December 1987 incidents reflected growing unrest — violent demonstrations (printed “demons- trations”), clashes, shootings, petrol bombs and grenades, and strikes. In early December the massive uprising (intifadah) erupted in the Gaza Strip and spread. On 8 December four Palestinians died and nine were injured after an IDF truck struck their vans at an army road block in Gaza; Palestinians believed the deaths were deliberately caused, protests followed, and Israeli forces used live ammunition. The uprising flared in the West Bank and Jerusalem, met with live ammunition, indiscriminate beatings and other repression. The Security Council was convened on 11 December at Democratic Yemen’s request (note 59/) and held nine meetings in December (2770th, 2772-2777th and 2780-2781st). Resolution 605 (1987), adopted 22 December 1987 by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention (United States) (note 60/), “strongly deplored the policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and in particular the opening of fire by the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians”, reaffirmed the 1949 Geneva Convention’s applicability, and requested a Secretary-General report. Despite appeals under article 49, Israel obtained a court decision to deport nine Palestinians. Resolution 607 (1988) was adopted unanimously on 5 January, and resolution 608 (1988) on 14 January 1988 by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention, appealing “to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and to ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported”.

  • Section IV.B. 1988: The year of the uprising — Secretary-General’s report of 21 January 1988 (lines 395-466): In response to UN Security Council Resolution 605, the Secretary-General dispatched Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, who met Israeli officials and about 200 Palestinian men and women. Part I of the report records Palestinian complaints: rejection of the occupation, security-force practices, contempt and humiliation, routine violence in detention, administrative detention, and interrogation to extract confessions using techniques such as hooding; also lack of political outlets, land-taking for settlements and deportation. Part II considers protection. Paragraph 20 is quoted: such measures can only be palliatives and cannot cure the continuing occupation; the only certain way is negotiation of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement. Paragraph 26 is quoted in full on the Fourth Geneva Convention: even though Israel does not accept its de jure applicability, “the opinio juris of the world community is that it must be applied”. Paragraph 27 recommends a solemn appeal to High Contracting Parties under article 1 to persuade Israel to change its position. Paragraph 28 defines four forms of protection: physical, legal, “general assistance”, and “protection by publicity”. Paragraph 53 restates a settlement based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) taking fully into account legitimate Palestinian rights including self-determination, negotiated at an international conference. The report notes “squalid living conditions in many of the camps, especially in the Gaza Strip”, asks the UNRWA Commissioner-General for camp-infrastructure proposals and the UNDP Administrator to study economic revival, and concludes in paragraph 60 that an urgent international effort led by the Security Council is required. Preceding communications include the OIC communiqué (note 62/) on Israeli troops entering Masjid al-Aqsa during Friday prayers on 15 January 1988, the Committee Chairman’s letter of 20 January 1988 (note 63/) on collective punishment and food supply to refugee camps, and E. A. Shevardnadze’s message (note 64/) proposing Security Council consultations at Foreign Minister level. The Council discussed the report at five meetings (27-28 January and 1 February 1988; 2785-2787th and 2789-2790th); thirty-two delegations addressed the issue. A six-delegation non-aligned draft (note 65/) calling for de jure acceptance of the Convention, an end to violations, ICRC and UNRWA facilitation, continued monitoring and a comprehensive settlement was not adopted on 1 February 1988 owing to a permanent member’s negative vote; the other 14 members voted in favour.

  • Section IV.B continued — Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territory (lines 467-490): The intifadah continued with qualitative changes; Israeli authorities persisted in the “iron-fist” policy. Tear gas in high concentrations caused numerous deaths and miscarriages and deaths among children; beatings, settler attacks, curfews, collective punishment, house demolition, detentions and deportations became standard. At the time of writing over 450 Palestinians were reported killed, over 20,000 wounded or injured and 51 deported; over 2,000 were at various times under administrative detention for three to six months (note 66/), and up to 12,000 were held at certain periods; the footnotes state sources differ on exact casualty and detainee numbers. The United States Department of State 1988 report found violations including deportations, prisoner transfers and punitive house demolitions; the IDF response “led to a substantial increase in human rights violations”, soldiers “frequently used gunfire in situations that did not present mortal danger to troops, causing many avoidable deaths and injuries”, and five unarmed detainees died in 1988 in questionable circumstances or were clearly killed; severe abuse was reported at Dahiriya (note 67/). On 19 January 1988 Defence Minister Itzhak Rabin (spelling as printed) stated Israel’s first priority [was] “force, might, beatings” (note 68/). The State Department report (note 69/) records widespread club beatings in late January and February 1988. The Attorney-General of Israel criticized this policy and declared it illegal.

  • Section IV.B.2 continued — Israeli policies (lines 491-496): Palestinian children were treated as adults in security offences, according to the State Department report; Israel resorted to a media and information blackout, the report (note 70/) stating “to halt the uprising, the Israeli authorities imposed increasing restraints on freedom of expression and press in 1988, citing security reasons”; administrative detention and prolonged curfews causing severe hardship are also recorded.

  • Section IV.B.3. Action taken by the Commission on Human Rights (lines 495-505): At its forty-fourth session (1 February-11 March 1988) the Commission adopted resolution 1988/1 A, condemning physical violence including breaking bones and causing miscarriages, killing, wounding, arresting, torturing and kidnapping of children, rejecting the Jerusalem annexation decision and requesting Chapter VII measures; resolution 1988/1 B, urging Israel to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention; and resolution 1988/3, “Situation in occupied Palestine”, reaffirming support for the conference under resolution 38/58 C. The year’s actions by EEC, the League of Arab States, OIC, OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Nordic States, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Gulf Co-operation Council, the Caribbean Community and ASEAN are listed.

  • Section IV.B.4. United States action on the PLO representation at the United Nations (lines 507-520): The Foreign Relations Authorization Act legislation affecting the PLO Permanent Observer Mission in New York; the Assembly’s reaffirmation of the Headquarters Agreement and of the section 21 dispute procedure; the International Court of Justice’s unanimous advisory opinion of 26 April 1988 that the United States “is under an obligation, in accordance with section 21 of that Agreement, to enter into arbitration”; resolution 42/232 of 13 May 1988 endorsing the opinion; the Secretary-General’s report of 13 September 1988 (note 71/) enclosing the 29 June 1988 District Court judgement dismissing the lawsuit to close the Mission under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987; and the United States decision of 29 August 1988 not to appeal, welcomed by the Secretary-General’s spokesman (note 72/).

  • Section IV.B.5. Developments in the Middle East relative to the question of Palestine (lines 521-540): The assassination by a commando force on 16 April 1988 of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), for which a Tunisian investigation ascertained Israel’s direct responsibility, and UN Security Council Resolution 611 of 25 April 1988 (14-0-1); Bassam Abu Sharif’s June 1988 statement accepting resolutions 242 and 338 within a rights framework, proposing international guardianship, guarantees and a plebiscite (note 73/); King Hussein of Jordan’s 31 July 1988 address severing Jordan’s legal and administrative links with the West Bank, quoted at length (note 74/), the dissolution of the lower house, and the PLO’s welcome; and Arafat’s 28 August Geneva meeting with the Secretary-General and 13 September Strasbourg address (note 75/) setting out two conference bases and a democratic, multi-party Palestinian State.

  • Section IV.B.6. Special session of the General Assembly (lines 541-558): The Secretary-General’s report of 30 September 1988 (note 76/) found all Security Council members believed a conference desirable, with differences on its nature, powers, basis and participants; collective punishment intensified. Resolution 43/21, adopted 3 November 1988 (footnote vote 130-2-16), condemned the measures against the uprising and called on High Contracting Parties to ensure Israel’s respect for the Fourth Geneva Convention; the Secretary-General’s first report under it, 21 November 1988 (note 77/), held protection measures would not resolve the underlying problem. The Committee’s 1988 report (note 78/) is quoted on “the increasing resort by Israel to armed force and other draconian measures in an effort to suppress the popular uprising”.

  • Section IV.B.7. Nineteenth session of the Palestine National Council and its decisions (lines 559-610): The nineteenth extraordinary session at Algiers, 12-15 November 1988, dedicated to Abu Jihad, adopted the Political Communiqué — points (a)-(g) quoted in full (note 79/): a conference on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338 guaranteeing self-determination first, Israeli withdrawal including from Arab Jerusalem, cancellation of annexation measures and removal of settlements, temporary United Nations supervision, a refugee solution under United Nations resolutions, freedom of worship, and Security Council security arrangements including for the Palestinian State — and the Declaration of Independence, which held resolution 181 (II) “nevertheless continues to attach conditions to international legitimacy that guarantee the Palestinian Arab people the right to sovereignty and national independence” (note 80/) and declared (note 81/): “The Palestine National Council hereby declares, in the name of God and on behalf of the Palestinian Arab people, the establishment of the State of Palestine in the land of Palestine with its capital at Jerusalem.” The Declaration’s characteristics (note 82/) and a decision to set up a provisional government are recorded; the Secretary-General’s 28 November report (note 83/) held the session had generated new momentum; within a month almost 80 States had recognized the State (note 84/).

  • Section IV.B.8. Forty-third session of the General Assembly at Geneva (lines 611-658): The United States refused Arafat a visa on security grounds; the United Nations Legal Counsel concluded (note 85/) the host country “was and is under an obligation to grant the visa request”; resolution 43/49 (154-2-1) moved consideration of item 37 to Geneva, 13-15 December, where 96 delegations, including 31 Foreign Ministers, spoke. Arafat’s 13 December address and his three-point peace initiative are quoted in full (note 86/) — a preparatory committee, temporary United Nations supervision with international forces, and a comprehensive settlement including the State of Palestine and Israel on the basis of 242 and 338 — as is his 14 December news-conference renunciation (note 87/): “we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism”. Resolution 43/176 (138-2-2) called for the conference and spelled out five principles; resolution 43/177 (104-2-36) acknowledged the proclamation and decided the designation “Palestine” should replace “Palestine Liberation Organization” in the United Nations system from 15 December 1988. The United States explained its negative votes (note 88/) while welcoming the PLO’s steps and its new dialogue, without recognition of a Palestinian State.

  • Section IV.B.9. Opening of PLO-United States dialogue (lines 659-672): President Ronald Reagan’s statement of 14 December 1988 is quoted (note 89/): “The Palestine Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and renounced terrorism. These have long been our conditions for a substantive dialogue. They have been met.” The first meeting took place on 16 December at Carthage, the PLO delegation headed by Yasser Abed Rabbo and the United States by Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau (footnote).

  • Section V. Conclusion (lines 673-686): Assistance by relief organizations and 19 listed United Nations system organizations (note 90/) aimed at restructuring the productive base; by end-1988 Israel found itself increasingly isolated; the study states the United Nations “succeeded in working out a balanced, even-handed approach” (as printed, “as is recognized by the overwhelming plurality of its Member States”) and that a United Nations conference forum appears most appropriate for the multilateral conflict involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the PLO and Syria; since February 1989 emphasis continued, but a just, comprehensive and lasting solution has yet to be achieved.

  • Notes (lines 687-871): Notes 1-90 in full, giving the study’s apparatus — Treaty Series, resolution compilations, the instruments list (note 3/), Benvenisti/WBDP reports, Special Committee and Secretary-General reports with document symbols, State Department Country Reports for 1988, UNCTAD/ESCWA, letters and press sources for each body passage, the Algiers documents through Jordan’s letter of 18 November 1988 (notes 79-82/), and the assistance organizations list (note 90/) — followed by the publication mark “89-20684 1283-86e (E)” (line 871).

  • Table of Content (lines 873-930): The contents as transmitted at the end of the copy, listing the Introduction, sections I-V, section IV.B’s nine numbered parts and Notes; lines 932-979 are website furniture.

Key passages

  • ”… all settlers belong to the security forces, being an integral part of the Israeli army (Territorial Defense Units)” (Benvenisti, WBDP 1987 report, as quoted, lines 119-121 approx.).

  • “The most effective way, pending a political settlement, of ensuring the safety and protection of the civilian population of the occupied territories would thus be for Israel to apply in full the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention” (Secretary-General’s report, paragraph 27, as quoted, lines 425-427 approx.).

  • “The major obstacle at present, however, is one of a different kind, namely, the inability of the Government of Israel as a whole to agree on the principle of an international conference under United Nations auspices” (Secretary-General’s report, paragraph 33, as quoted, lines 351-353 approx.).

  • “The Palestine National Council hereby declares, in the name of God and on behalf of the Palestinian Arab people, the establishment of the State of Palestine in the land of Palestine with its capital at Jerusalem” (Declaration of Independence, as quoted, line 591).

  • “The Palestine Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and renounced terrorism” (President Reagan’s statement of 14 December 1988, as quoted, lines 663-665 approx.).

Evidence the work relies on

  • United Nations resolutions and drafts as the study presents them: General Assembly resolutions 38/58 C, 40/96 D, 41/43 D and 42/66 D; Security Council resolutions 605, 607 and 608, and the vetoed drafts of September 1985, 30 January 1986 and 1 February 1988; Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1985/1 A and B, 1986/1 A and B, and 1987/2 A and B.

  • Reports the study quotes or summarizes: the Special Committee’s successive reports including its 1986, 1987 and 1988 reports; the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People’s 1985, 1986 and 1987 reports; the Secretary-General’s reports of 13 March 1984, 26 October 1984, 22 October 1985, 14 March 1986, 29 October 1986, under resolution 41/43 D, 13 November 1987 and 21 January 1988; Israel’s State Comptroller report of June 1987; and the United States Department of State reports of 1988.

  • The West Bank Data Base Project reports cited through Benvenisti (1986 and 1987 reports), the 1987 UNCTAD/ESCWA study, WHO findings as reported, and The Wall Street Journal of 22 January 1985.

  • The declarations and proposals the study presents: the Soviet proposals of 29 July 1984, the Fez Summit resolutions as invoked by Arafat, and the 1985-1987 declarations of the EEC, OAU, OIC and Al-Quds Committee, Non-Aligned Movement, Arab Summits, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Warsaw Treaty States and Scandinavian Foreign Ministers.

  • For 1988, the documents the study presents in full or at length: Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1988/1 A and B and 1988/3; the ICJ advisory opinion of 26 April 1988 and the 29 June 1988 District Court judgement as enclosed in the Secretary-General’s report; Security Council resolution 611; King Hussein’s 31 July 1988 address (note 74/, FBIS); the PNC Political Communiqué points (a)-(g) and Declaration of Independence (notes 79-82/, through Jordan’s letter of 18 November 1988, A/43/827-S/20278); Arafat’s Geneva initiative and news-conference statement (notes 86-87/); resolutions 43/21, 43/49, 43/176 and 43/177 with their votes; and President Reagan’s 14 December 1988 statement (note 89/, Department of State Bulletin, February 1989).

Analysis

The study is a United Nations institutional account written from within the majority position it documents, as in Part III: its Introduction frames the 1983 Geneva documents as the groundwork, section II assembles committee, project and government reports as evidence of deterioration under occupation, section III accumulates conference endorsements year by year against the recorded refusals of Israel and the United States, and section IV presents the intifadah as the outcome the Special Committee’s 1987 report anticipated in its warning of an explosive situation. Its method in the part read is documentary accumulation: long quotations from WBDP/Benvenisti, the Special Committee and the Secretary-General’s January 1988 report carry the factual weight. Israel’s stated positions are given where the study reports them (rejection of the conference as propaganda; the water-control claim; Jerusalem and settlement objectives in officials’ statements) but on the intifadah measures it presents Defence Minister Rabin’s 19 January 1988 statement that Israel’s first priority was “force, might, beatings” and the Attorney-General’s criticism declaring that beating policy illegal, and gives no Israeli justification for the measures beyond these. Figures are carried from the bodies quoted without independent checking inside the study, and the casualty and detainee footnotes themselves state that sources differ.

The study’s second half reverses the first half’s deadlock narrative without resolving it: the intifadah, Jordan’s disengagement and the PNC’s Algiers decisions are presented as producing movement — recognition of the State by almost 80 States, the Geneva session, and a United States dialogue that President Reagan, in his quoted statement of 14 December 1988, called a serious evolution of Palestinian thinking toward realistic and pragmatic positions — while its Conclusion still holds that no just, comprehensive and lasting solution has been achieved and rests the way forward on the same conference the 1984-1987 chapters showed blocked. Its 1988 quotations carry the same documentary method: the Communiqué and Declaration are reproduced from the Jordanian letter’s annexes, Arafat’s initiative from the General Assembly record, and his renunciation from The Washington Post (notes 86-87/), so the study’s account of the turning point is a record of texts it reproduces, not an independent negotiation history.

People, organizations, places and events

Yasir Arafat, Meron Benvenisti, Marrack Goulding, Yitzhak Rabin, Khalil al-Wazir, Bassam Abu Sharif, King Hussein of Jordan, Ronald Reagan, Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestinian National Council, State of Palestine, Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, West Bank Data Project, UNRWA, International Court of Justice, First Intifada, International Conference on the Question of Palestine, UN Security Council Resolution 605, UN Security Council Resolution 611

Concepts

Right of Return, Self-determination, Fourth Geneva Convention

How it relates to other sources

  • It continues Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part III (1978-1983) from the 1983 International Conference and resolution 38/58 C, whose guidelines Part III reproduced in its annex material, and records that call’s fate in 1984-1987: quasi-unanimous endorsement, repeated preparatory-committee proposals, and continued non-participation by Israel and the United States.

  • Its intifadah account — eruption after the 8 December 1987 road-block deaths, resolutions 605, 607 and 608, the Goulding mission and the January 1988 report, and over 450 killed at the time of writing — is held on the First Intifada page beside the differing tolls and accounts in Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, Perceptions of Palestine and other sources, not merged with them.

  • Its Rabin statement of 19 January 1988, printed as “force, might, beatings” and attributed to “Itzhak Rabin”, is held beside Makdisi’s differently worded version of the same statement on the Yitzhak Rabin and First Intifada pages.

  • Its 1988 sequence — Abu Sharif’s June statement, Jordan’s 31 July disengagement, the November Algiers proclamation and Arafat’s December Geneva statements opening the United States dialogue — is held beside Christison’s account of the same sequence, in which Shultz required the exact United States formula in the dictated order before the dialogue opened, on the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat and Ronald Reagan pages.

  • Its Declaration of Independence account, resting on resolution 181 (II) as continuing to guarantee sovereignty, is held beside the study’s own Part II treatment of resolution 181 and the State of Palestine page.

Open questions

  • Note markers 31/, 39/ and 49/ are each used twice in the body (31/ for both the “threaten Israeli firms” statement and the labelling order; 39/ for both Syria’s support statement and its support for the Soviet proposals; 49/ for both the 1945 emergency regulations and the Committee’s 1986 report). The Notes give a single entry for each: note 31/ is The Jerusalem Post, 6 May 1986; note 39/ is Syria’s letter of 20 August 1984 (A/39/416-S/16708), p. 2; note 49/ is the General Assembly Official Records, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/41/35), which corresponds in subject to the second use of 49/ only. No separate entry for the first use of 49/ appears in the Notes as transmitted.
  • The Special Committee’s 1987 conclusion quotation (lines 361-363 approx.) opens with an ellipsis and has no closing quotation mark in its paragraph as transmitted, byte-checked in the text copy; it is recorded as printed.
  • Spelling and wording slips in the copy, each as printed and byte-verified: “38/58;C” for resolution 38/58 C in the Jordan passage, “1987/2;B” for resolution 1987/2 B, “demons- trations” hyphenated across a line break in section IV.A, the Headquarters Agreement footnote’s “Agreement between the United States and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations” (line 513, first party as printed), note 24’s “vol. VII” for Sara Roy’s Journal of Palestine Studies article against “vol. XVII” for the same article in note 14, note 75’s “FBIS-NEW-88-179” against note 74’s “FBIS-NES-88-147”, and note 78’s lower-case “Forty-third session” against capitalized “Session” in notes 44, 46, 49 and 58. Whether each slip is in the study as printed or arose in the web copy cannot be settled from the text copy alone.
  • Note 43/ cites the Soviet transmittal letter as dated 30 July 1984, while the body dates the transmitted proposals document 29 July 1984 and the transmittal itself 31 July 1984; all three dates are recorded as printed in their places.
  • Note 71/ cites the Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country (A/42/915/Add.5), while the body passage it marks describes the Secretary-General’s report of 13 September 1988 pursuant to resolution 42/232; the citation is recorded as printed in each place.
  • In section III the year’s accounts are not strictly chronological within 1987: the EEC, Commission on Human Rights, Scandinavian and Non-Aligned Committee passages (February-April 1987) appear after the November 1987 Secretary-General and Arab Summit passages in the reading order as transmitted, following the PNC passage; they are recorded in the study’s order.
  • The study’s sentence introducing Arafat’s Geneva initiative (lines 631-632 approx.) reads as printed: “Mr. Arafat, in his capacity as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, that at the time carried out the functions of the provisional government of the State of Palestine, presented to the General Assembly the following Palestinian peace initiative” — the clause structure is recorded as transmitted.
  • The Table of Content at the end of the copy lists section II subsections A-D and passes directly to section III; subsection II.E (Economic value of the West Bank and Gaza Strip markets for Israel, lines 189-200) is not listed separately in the contents as transmitted.
  • The study’s own original publication date, place and document symbol are not stated in the copy beyond the publication mark “89-20684 1283-86e (E)” (line 871); the web page version is dated 2019-01-03.

Coverage

lines 1-980 of 980, read in full in parts 1-2 of 2

Graph View

Backlinks