Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement

Summary

The General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949, transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Acting Mediator’s cablegram of 23 February 1949 as corrected in Security Council document S/1264/Corr.1 of 11 March 1949: responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, it establishes a general armistice between the two Parties’ land, sea and air forces, affirms that no military or political advantage was gained under the truce and that its provisions are dictated exclusively by military considerations and prejudice no rights, claims or positions in the ultimate peaceful settlement, withdraws the Egyptian forces in the Al Faluja area beyond the Egypt-Palestine frontier under United Nations supervision, delineates an Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza-Rafah area which is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, limits the western front to defensive forces only, demilitarizes El Auja and vicinity, provides for the exchange of all prisoners of war within twenty-one days under United Nations supervision, and creates a seven-member Mixed Armistice Commission, chaired by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and headquartered at El Auja, to supervise execution; the Agreement is not subject to ratification, comes into force immediately on signing, supersedes the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agreement of 24 January 1949, and remains in force until a peaceful settlement is achieved (Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, PDF p.1-9).

What the file is

Security Council document S/1264/Corr.1, 11 March 1949, original English: a corrigendum to the Acting Mediator’s cablegram dated 23 February 1949 transmitting the Agreement’s text. 9 PDF pages, about 3,572 words in the text copy. The Agreement’s twelve articles and signature block are complete in the file; Annex I (Plan of Withdrawal), Annex II (definition of the western and eastern fronts) and Annex III (definition of the defensive forces), all referred to in the articles, are not reproduced in this file. The text copy’s OCR is very heavily garbled throughout, including place names, map references and the Egyptian signatories’ printed names; the section account below paraphrases rather than quotes except where the original was checked, and records garbled readings as uncertain in the reading notes and under Open questions.

Section by section

• Covering cablegram and preamble (PDF p.1). The Acting Mediator informs the President of the Security Council that an armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel has been signed that morning, 24 February, at Rhodes. The Parties, responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 calling on them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter and to facilitate the transition from truce to permanent peace, to negotiate an armistice, and having decided to negotiate under United Nations chairmanship on implementation of the resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948, agree through representatives empowered by their Governments.
• Article I (PDF p.1-2). Principles fully observed during the Armistice: the Security Council’s injunction against resort to military force in settlement of the Palestine question to be scrupulously respected; no aggressive action by either Party’s land, sea or air forces to be undertaken, planned or threatened against the people or armed forces of the other, “planned” having no bearing on normal staff planning; each Party’s right to security and freedom from fear of attack fully respected; the armistice accepted as an indispensable step toward liquidation of armed conflict and restoration of peace in Palestine.
• Article II (PDF p.2). A general armistice between the two Parties’ armed forces — land, sea and air — is established. No element of either Party’s military or para-military forces, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the other’s forces or against civilians in territory under the other’s control, advance beyond or pass over the Armistice Demarcation Line for any purpose except as provided in Article III, elsewhere violate the international frontier, or enter the other’s air space or the waters within three miles of the other’s coastline.
• Article III (PDF p.2). The Egyptian Military Forces in the Al Faluja area shall be withdrawn beyond the Egypt-Palestine frontier, beginning on the day after that which follows signing, at 0500 hours GMT, under United Nations supervision and in accordance with the Plan of Withdrawal in Annex I (not reproduced in this file).
• Article IV (PDF p.2-3). No military or political advantage should be gained under the truce; the Armistice’s purposes would not be served by restoring previously held positions, changing positions now held except as specifically provided, or advancing beyond positions held at signing. Non-military rights, claims or interests may be asserted by either Party and are, by mutual agreement, excluded from the Armistice negotiations for later settlement at the Parties’ discretion; the Agreement does not establish, recognise, strengthen, weaken or nullify any territorial, custodial or other rights, claims or interests asserted by either Party in Palestine, whether deriving from Security Council resolutions including that of 4 November 1948 and the 13 November 1948 implementation Memorandum, or any other source. Its provisions are dictated exclusively by military considerations and valid only for the period of the Armistice.
• Article V (PDF p.3). The Article VI line is designated the Armistice Demarcation Line, delineated in pursuance of the 4 and 16 November 1948 resolutions. It is not a political or territorial boundary and is without prejudice to either Party’s rights, claims and positions on the ultimate settlement; its basic purpose is to delineate the line beyond which the Parties’ armed forces shall not move except as provided in Article III; and the armed forces’ rules prohibiting civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between them remain in effect as applied to this Line.
• Article VI (PDF p.4). In the Gaza-Rafah area the Line runs as delineated in the 13 November 1948 Memorandum: from the coast at the mouth of Wadi Ghazza east through Deir Suneid and across the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway to a point 3 kilometres east of the Highway, then south parallel to the Highway to the Egyptian frontier (place-name readings in the text copy are partly garbled; see reading notes). Egyptian forces within the line shall not advance beyond their present positions, including Beit Hanun and its surrounding area, from which Israeli forces are to withdraw north of the Line, and other positions to be evacuated as paragraph 3 provides: five named Israeli outposts, each limited to platoon strength, may be maintained, with map references given; the Cemetery outpost is to be evacuated the day after signing’s following day, Hill 79 within four weeks, and two new outposts may then be established at the points stated. In the Beersheba-Hebron area the Agreement applies to both Parties’ forces where Egyptian forces hold positions, except that demarcation and reciprocal withdrawal and reduction arrangements there await an armistice agreement covering the other forces in that area, or sooner at the Parties’ will.
• Article VII (PDF p.4-5). Because a third party’s forces are proximate in certain sectors, the reciprocal reduction and withdrawal provisions apply only to the western front and not to the eastern front, pending an armistice with that third party; the fronts are as defined by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in Annex II (not reproduced). On the western front, Egyptian defensive forces only may be maintained in the area under Egyptian control, all other Egyptian forces withdrawing to points no further east than El Arish-Abu Ageila; Israeli defensive forces only, based on the settlements, may be maintained in the area under Israeli control, all other Israeli forces withdrawing north of the 13 November 1948 Memorandum’s paragraph 2-A line; the defensive forces are as defined in Annex III (not reproduced).
• Article VIII (PDF p.5-6). El Auja and vicinity, as bounded in paragraph 2 by frontier points five kilometres northwest and southeast of stated intersections, with intermediate points and map references (partly garbled in the text copy), shall be demilitarized and both Parties’ armed forces totally excluded; the Mixed Armistice Commission’s Chairman and United Nations Observers are responsible for full implementation. On the Egyptian side facing El Auja, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueiglia (spellings as printed, reading uncertain); the Taba-Qouseima-El Auja road shall not be employed by any military forces for the purpose of entering Palestine; and any movement of armed forces into the defined area, or failure to respect any provision of the Article, when confirmed by United Nations representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of the Agreement.
• Article IX (PDF p.6). All prisoners of war belonging to the other Party’s regular or irregular armed forces shall be exchanged under United Nations supervision and control, beginning within ten days after signing and completed not later than twenty-one days following, under a plan the Commission Chairman shall formulate on signing in consultation with the Parties’ military authorities. Prisoners under pending penal prosecution or sentenced for crime or other offence are included. Personal effects are to be returned to the prisoner, or, if he has escaped or died, to his Party. Unregulated matters follow the principles of the International Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929. The Commission is responsible for locating missing persons, military or civilian, in each Party’s controlled areas to facilitate their expeditious exchange, with each Party’s full co-operation.
• Article X (PDF p.6-8). Execution is supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission of seven members, three delegated by each Party, chaired by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or his designated senior officer from its Observer personnel after consultation with both Parties, headquartered at El Auja and first convened by the Chief of Staff within one week of signing. Decisions are by unanimity where possible, otherwise majority of members present and voting; on questions of principle appeal lies to a Special Committee (the Chief of Staff and one member each of the Egyptian and Israeli Rhodes delegations or another senior officer) whose decisions are final, and a Commission decision becomes final if no appeal is filed within one week. The Commission makes its own procedure (quorum a majority), may employ Observers from the Parties’ military organisations or United Nations personnel, receives claims and complaints through its Chairman for equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement, its interpretation of a provision prevails subject to appeal, it may recommend modifications, it reports to both Parties with copies to the Secretary-General, its members and Observers have the freedom of movement and access it determines necessary (with only United Nations Observers employed where a decision is by majority vote), and its expenses other than United Nations Observers’ are shared equally.
• Article XI (PDF p.8). No provision shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.
• Article XII and signatures (PDF p.8-9). The Agreement is not subject to ratification and comes into force immediately on signing; concluded in pursuance of the 16 November 1948 resolution, it remains in force until a peaceful settlement is achieved, except that the Parties may by mutual consent revise or suspend any provision other than Articles I and II at any time, and after one year either Party may call on the Secretary-General to convoke a conference to review, revise or suspend any provision other than Articles I and II, participation being obligatory; if that conference fails to agree, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council. It supersedes the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agreement of 24 January 1949. It is signed in quintuplicate: one copy to each Party, two to the Secretary-General for the Security Council and the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one to the Acting Mediator. Done at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on 24 February 1949, in the presence of the Acting Mediator and the United Nations Chief of Staff. The Israeli signatories as printed are Dr. Walter Eytan, Col. Yigael Yadin and Elias Sasson; the Egyptian signatories’ printed names are partly garbled in the text copy (see Open questions).

Key passages

• “The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be” construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question (Article V, paragraph 2, PDF p.3; the full sentence was checked against the original, and the text copy garbles its continuation, which is not quoted here).
• “No provision of this Agreement shall” in any way prejudice the rights, claims or positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question (Article XI, PDF p.8; the full sentence was checked against the original, and the text copy garbles its continuation, which is not quoted here).
• The establishment of an armistice is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine (Article I, paragraph 4, PDF p.1-2, paraphrased; the text copy garbles this passage and it is not quoted here).

Evidence the work relies on

• The Agreement is a negotiated instrument, not an argued report; it gives no evidence section. Its stated authorities and incorporated documents are: the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948; Article 40 of the Charter (preamble); the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on implementation of the 4 November 1948 resolution (Articles IV, VI and VII, including the Gaza-Rafah line and the paragraph 2-A withdrawal line); Annex I, Annex II and Annex III (referred to, not reproduced in this file); the International Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929 (Article IX); and the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agreement of 24 January 1949, which it supersedes (Article XII).

Analysis

The Agreement’s method is military separation without political settlement, and it says so three times in its own terms: Article IV confines its provisions to military considerations valid only for the Armistice period and excludes non-military rights and claims for later settlement; Article V denies the Demarcation Line any character as a political or territorial boundary; Article XI repeats the non-prejudice rule for the ultimate peaceful settlement as a whole. Its machinery is correspondingly supervisory rather than adjudicative of title: a Mixed Armistice Commission with a United Nations chairman, observers, a complaints procedure and a final-appeal Special Committee, plus two physical devices — the Gaza-Rafah line with its platoon-strength outposts and evacuation timetable, and the totally demilitarized El Auja area whose violation is defined in advance as flagrant. Its temporal design is open-ended: immediate force without ratification, continuance until a peaceful settlement, a one-year unilateral right to force a review conference for all but the core Articles I and II, and Security Council recourse thereafter. What the file does not contain limits what can be taken from it: the three annexes defining withdrawal, fronts and defensive-force levels, and any map, are absent, so the Agreement’s most operational definitions are present only by reference.

People, organizations, places and events

Walter Eytan, Yigael Yadin, UN Security Council, Palestine Conciliation Commission, Gaza, City of Jerusalem

Concepts

Green Line — the 1949 Rhodes armistice lines are the lines later sources in the wiki call the Green Line (see UN General Assembly Resolution 181); this Agreement itself calls its line the Armistice Demarcation Line and denies it the character of a political or territorial boundary (Article V, PDF p.3).

How it relates to other sources

• This file is the first of the 1949 Rhodes armistices as a primary text in the wiki. Nakba and Survival’s account of the Jordan armistice of 3 April 1949, recorded on Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement (Rhodes, 1949), is the companion instrument for a different front; this Agreement expressly defers the Beersheba-Hebron demarcation and the eastern front until an armistice covering the third party’s forces is concluded (Articles VI.4 and VII.1), which is the textual setting for that later agreement.
• Palestinian Right of Return: Sacred, Legal, and Possible glosses Resolution 194’s “earliest practicable date” as the cessation of hostilities, February 1949 (Armistice with Egypt) to July 1949 (with Syria), as recorded on UN General Assembly Resolution 194; this Agreement, signed 24 February 1949, is the February 1949 instrument that gloss cites, and its own text contains no provision on refugees or return — its Article IV excludes non-military rights and claims from the Armistice negotiations for later settlement.
• Its transmission copies link it to the other instruments in this batch: two of its quintuplicate copies go to the Secretary-General for the Security Council and for the Palestine Conciliation Commission created by Resolution 194 (III): Palestine — Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator, and its negotiations under United Nations chairmanship were conducted by the Acting Mediator who succeeded the Mediator thanked in that resolution.

Open questions

• Annexes I, II and III are referred to (Articles III, VII) but not reproduced in this file; their contents — the Plan of Withdrawal, the western and eastern front definitions, and the defensive-force definitions — cannot be stated from this file.
• Several place names and map references in Articles VI and VIII, the sub-paragraph lettering of the 13 November 1948 Memorandum reference in Article VI.1, and the Egyptian signatories’ printed names are garbled in the text copy’s OCR and were not resolved against a legible original in this ingest; they are recorded in the reading notes as printed, reading uncertain. The Israeli signatories’ names and the Agreement’s operative wording checked at Articles V and XI are legible.
• The Agreement identifies the third party in Article VII only as a third party not covered by the Agreement whose forces are proximate in certain sectors; it does not name that party in the text as transmitted here.

Coverage

PDF p.1-9 of 9, read in full