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The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel

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Summary

The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel’s 2006 collective vision document, produced over more than a year under the High Follow-Up Committee by a steering committee, seven research papers and four group meetings, defines the Palestinian Arabs in Israel as an indigenous national group and an integral part of the Palestinian People, diagnoses Israel as an ethnocratic state rather than a democracy, and demands a consensual democratic system — with acknowledgement of the Nakba, corrective justice, collective and individual equality, self-rule in education, culture and religion, and institutional self-organisation — across eight papers on the relation to the state, legal status, land and housing, economic development, social development, education, culture, and institutional and political work (The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, PDF p.3-40).

What the file is

The English translation (translator: Abed Al Rahman Kelani; editor: Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi) of the 2006 document, 40 PDF pages, printed pages numbered [3]-[40] after an unnumbered title and credits page. Steering Committee members as listed on PDF p.2: Shawki Khatib, Salman Natour, Aida Toma, Dr. Riad Eghbaria, Prof. Marwan Dwerie, Dr. Asaad Ghanem, Dr. Khaled abo Asbeh, Jaafar Farah, Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi. The text copy is clean except for PDF p.40, where the two-column Participants/Reviewers table is scrambled with stray glyphs interleaved; that table was read in the original PDF and reassembled in the reading notes in printed order. Name spellings vary inside the document (see Open questions).

Section by section

  • Introduction (PDF p.3-4), signed Shawqi Khateeb as Chairman of the High Follow up Committee and the National Committee: the process — invitation to Arab intellectuals, more than a year, four long meetings, research summaries discussed and ratified — and the aim, a clear self-definition covering political, cultural, economic, educational and social aspects and the relations with the rest of the Palestinians and with the State. The outcome is a property of the group, the High Follow-Up Committee and the National Committee; its purpose is to spark public discussion, and approval by all political streams on the Follow-Up Committee is not required. The group did not have the chance to discuss other major issues in detail.
  • View (PDF p.5-6): the self-definition and historical frame. “We are the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the indigenous peoples, the residents of the States of Israel, and an integral part of the Palestinian People and the Arab and Muslim and human Nation.” (PDF p.5). The 1948 war established Israel on 78% of historical Palestine; approximately 160,000 who remained became a forced citizen minority in their historic homeland, isolated from the rest of the Palestinian People and the Arab world, suffering structural discrimination, national oppression, military rule till 1966, land confiscation, unequal budgets, rights discrimination and threats of transfer, and killings at Kufr Qassem, on Land Day in 1976 and in the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 (PDF p.5). Defining Israel as a Jewish State excludes them; the document calls for a Consensual Democratic system guaranteeing individual and collective civil, historic and national rights, crystallisation of collective identity and a social and political agenda answering “who are we and what do we want for our society?” (PDF p.6), to be followed by a concrete action plan.
  • Work Process (PDF p.7-8), written by Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi as group moderator and program officer: steering committee meeting monthly since June 2005; four long weekend meetings in Jerusalem — September 2005 (visions and points of connection), December 2005 (strengths and weaknesses), April 2006 (seven researchers’ strategic plans on the eight subjects reviewed, approved, introduction written), June 2006 (final approval). Intended uses: conference book, think tank discussions, media campaigns in Arabic, Hebrew and international media, pressure on State ministries, implementation strategies.
  • The Palestinian Arabs in Israel and their relation to the State of Israel (PDF p.9-11), depending on research presented by Dr. Asaad Ghanem: Israel as outcome of a settlement process initiated by the Zionist–Jewish elite and realised by colonial countries promoting Jewish immigration, continuing internal colonial policies against its Palestinian Arab citizens; Judaization through expulsion in 1948, demolition of more than 530 Arab villages, massive land confiscation and more than 700 Jewish settlements (PDF p.9). “Israel can not be defined as a democratic State. It can be defined as an ethnocratic state such as Turkey, Srilanka, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia (and Canada forty years ago).” (PDF p.9). The five principles of an ethnocratic system and the five rules Israel implements to maintain it — severing identity relations and creating “Israeli Arabs”, preventing relations with Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and refugees, opposing independent organisation and non-parliamentary struggle, opposing a leadership vision that does not accept Jewish control, and forcing ethnic resource allocation (PDF p.9-10). The demand for institutional self-rule within a Consensual Democracy embodying two groups, and seven demands on the State (PDF p.10-11): acknowledge responsibility for the Nakba, rectify damage and consider compensation for damages derived from viewing its Palestinian citizens as enemies and not as citizens with a right to oppose the state and challenge its rules (PDF p.10); recognise Palestinian Arabs as an indigenous national group with directly chosen representatives, national institutions and an end to sect-dividing policies; acknowledge Israel as homeland for both Palestinians and Jews, with consensual democracy defined as an extended elite coalition, equal proportional representation, mutual veto and self administration of exclusive issues; acknowledge minority rights and international protection under international conventions; remove all ethnic superiority, adopt corrective justice, explore restoring confiscated land not for public use, and dedicate an equal part of resources; acknowledge Muslim self-rule over the Waqf and holy sites and end control of Islamic and Christian holy sites; acknowledge the right to continuity with the rest of the Palestinian people and the Arab and Islamic Nation.
  • The legal status of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel (PDF p.12-15), depending on research presented by Dr. Yousef Jabbarin: two founding facts — indigenous people of the country, and integral part of the Palestinian People — and two dimensions of dependency, official–legal (discriminatory core laws, “canonized discrimination”, citizenship classified into first, second and third) and economic-social (de facto poverty, unemployment, low study average), with the Supreme Court failing to protect Arab citizens except in very few rulings such as the Qa’dan family case, which carry no collective dimension (PDF p.12-14). Towards Group Transformational Equality: shared citizenship rights (anti-discrimination laws in all aspects, an independent commission for equality and human rights, international conventions as internal law) and collective–national rights in ten legal axes — official recognition as indigenous, complete collective equality, dual Arabic-Hebrew language system, effective representation with veto, self-rule in education, religion, culture and media with self-determination over collective life, equal distribution of budget, land and housing, collective representation, free relations with the Palestinian People and Arab Nation, rights on the Present Absentees and their return, the waqf, unrecognized Arab villages and land confiscation, and official acknowledgment of historical injustice and correction of its consequences (PDF p.14-15).
  • Land, Planning, and Housing Policy (PDF p.16-18), depending on research presented by Dr. Thabet Abu Rass: land as core of the Palestinian–Zionist conflict; Zionist use of “holy land”, “land of Israel” and “a land without a people for a people without land” (PDF p.16); Land Day 1976 as turning point in a Jewish non-democratic planning system. Figures as printed: around 1.15 million Arabs, about 18% of the population, to double in 2020; per-person geographic space shrinking from 650 to 375 square meters; Palestinian Arabs possessing less than 3.5 of State land with 1.5 of it outside their local authorities’ jurisdiction (no percent sign printed, PDF p.16); Israel possessing more than 93% of the land as “state land”, land not for sale but for mortgage for 49 years (PDF p.16-17). Six components of Israeli land policy and five recommendations: distributional justice laws and cancellation of confiscation laws; recognising historic oppression and adopting “Israeli land” instead of “Jewish territory” or “State land” (PDF p.17); removing the Jewish Agency and Jewish National Fund and other non-Israeli participation from land institutions and giving genuine Arab representation; expanding Arab jurisdiction boundaries over public land; new structural planning based on consensual democracy and distributional justice settling the internally displaced, the Waqf, the Arabs of the Negev and Arab participation in public property. Full equality on land requires Israel to become a real democratic state; short-term political/legal struggle and longer-term public activism and international advocacy are both prescribed (PDF p.18).
  • Economic strategy (PDF p.19-21), depending on research presented by Professor ‘Aziz Haidar: low educational/professional level and workforce participation, distorted market participation, low quality of life against rising consumption, dependency on State politics and national insurance. No ethnic “Enclave” economy is possible (PDF p.19); developing large economic interests intersecting with Jewish society is an important factor in affecting the policy exercised against the Arabs, especially as the economic chances provided by the Israeli market for the Jewish majority are much more than those provided for the Arab minority (PDF p.20); and the situation in international relations is not different from that within the state, so the group that merges in that process as a strong working force attains economic successes and raises its political and social status (PDF p.20). The best choice is two-fold development — merging in the Israeli work market as an equal right, and internal momentum relatively free from dependency. Five higher objectives (a society able to deal with major economic operations; ending dependency, especially allowances decreasing since 2001; decreasing the deprived population; limiting unemployment and part-time work against market change and foreign workers; social security and belonging), and mechanisms: a special association for economic development created by the High Follow up Committee, a research center, infrastructure and education as the two important issues, guidance and rehabilitation centers, a study and fund to increase women’s workforce participation, and a committee to secure Arab workers’ rights, especially female workers’ (PDF p.20-21).
  • Strategy for social development (PDF p.22-26), depending on research presented by Professor ‘Aziz Haidar: social structures of family, clan and caste — clan fallen apart as economic/social unit, nuclear family now most important, clan maintained in local elections; patriarchy dominant even with two educated parents, women’s inferiority structural, control through customs, honor, shame, violence and barring recourse to authorities, with an active State role (PDF p.22-23). Institutions weak: 1980s-early 1990s administrative development limited and reversed, corruption expanded, parties banned social/cultural discussion, focused on the Palestinian Cause and the State, and no political party had included a female parliament member — “Even the first female representation in the Israeli parliament was through the Zionist parties.” (PDF p.23). Absence of institutions preventing social diseases and of local mediation/arbitration committees; educated academics reproducing the distorted structure. Seven goals, including upgrading women’s status through equating them with men, treating social diseases and nurturing collective identity (PDF p.24); nine considerations, including that family/clan bigotry needs education not institutional reform and that Israeli authorities are interested in deepening gaps (PDF p.24-25); twelve mechanisms — neighbourhood committees, social solidarity and crisis institutions, volunteering, mediation institutions covering domestic and school violence, values and generational education, special units for women and pressure for proportional representation, social research and a fund, a supervision institution against nepotism, and periodic local editions as a podium for criticism (PDF p.25-26).
  • Educational vision and strategic planning of the Arab educational system (PDF p.27-29), depending on research presented by Dr. Khaled Abu Asbah: a political problem (discrimination) and an ideological problem (no approval over content and values for national/civil identity), and nine qualitative problems — theoretical memorising pedagogy, graduates entering services not production, poor achievements against Jewish schools at all levels, deprivation of pre-school education, absence of an Arab university and developed faculties, lack of investment, spoken/classical Arabic duality, and no new curriculum relevant to society and cultural identity (PDF p.27-28). The plan rests on the right to self-administration and self-determination of education policy as an indigenous people, and on the objectives drafted by the Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education after the fourth Arab education conference in 1994 (PDF p.28). Legal, educational-public and practical tracks, including a detailed study on building an Arab university and a high educational council; seven required steps including ending political assignments in local authority education departments, discussing national private schools, a committee for Arabic as mother tongue, an educational leadership school and a research center within the High Follow-Up Committee (PDF p.29).
  • The Palestinian Arab culture in Israel (PDF p.30-34), depending on research presented by Salman Natour: culture as continuation of pre-Nakba Palestinian culture centred on Lebanon and Egypt, print houses in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem, and rural religious culture; the Nakba expelled most intellects, demolished city institutions and undermined metropolitan life, and the State exercised a policy of national “nothingness” through non-recognition and imposed curricula (PDF p.30). Post-Nakba streams: national (communist party) and authoritarian (Histadrut and governmental apparatuses); Al-Itihad republished in 1948, Al-Jadeed in 1951, Histadrut clubs, Al-Yawm until 1967 then al-anba’ until it “was shot down in 1979” (PDF p.30-31, as printed). Five stages: 1948-1956 founding against the Culture of Nothingness; 1956-1967 national stream and resistance literature; 1967-1976 reconnection and restored identity of Haifa, Acre, Jaffa and Nazareth; 1976-1991 cultural renaissance, Land Day, PLO cultural institutions in Beirut from 1982 and the 1987 Intifada; 1991-2000 setback from the Gulf War through Oslo to the second Intifada (PDF p.31-32). “Historic Palestine” as the common unifying component and source of literary language (PDF p.32); failed intellectual-emotional transfer through a “loyalty to the state” identity; compulsory double cultural relevance — “we have become part of the culture of the other /the opposite.” (PDF p.32); ambiguous continuity with the Arab mother culture, from the “smaller self” to the “larger self” (PDF p.33); the relation with the Israeli other as a relation with the State, which treats them as religions/sects not a national minority; and the unposed question of the West and globalization. Proposal: an independent high board / Follow-up Committee of Palestinian culture beneath but not subject to the High Follow-up Committee, a general survey and subcommittees, and a first Palestinian cultural conference on identity, the relation with the Israeli Jew, and local culture within the global (PDF p.34).
  • The Institutional and Political Public Work (PDF p.35-39), depending on research presented by Mr. Ja’far Farah: national institutions as implementing bases for a society excluded from State institutions, especially after Oslo. Figures as printed: Arab institutions form 5% of NGOs registered in Israel, their average budget does not exceed 2% against budgets for active societies, and such societies receive 1.5% of the budget allocated for governmental societies; they are excluded from major global Jewish institutions’ support and face difficulty obtaining Arab world aid, and they work without coordination or clear strategy (PDF p.35). Nine proposed objectives, from obtaining individual/collective rights and deepening national identity and democratic civil values — including the status of Arab woman, children and social classes — to peace-process strategies, women’s social programs, international relations including International Jewish organizations, cooperation with Jewish organizations, and continuity with the Palestinian people and Arab world (PDF p.36). Principles: decisions on empowering the High Follow-Up Committee against parties, local initiatives and the private sector; organising relations between national institutions and completing the Committee’s new constitution; a coordinating framework between political factions; a national development plan based on a serious field survey; support for the discriminated private sector and for independent initiatives (PDF p.36-38). Institutions required: a political leadership framework, a local and factional leadership framework including representatives from mixed Arab-Jewish cities, a Local Authorities Framework for regional programs, and organisations to be developed — a national elected representative board, executive apparatuses for the National Committee, and nine sub-committees (educational/human resources; economic/agricultural; health/welfare; religious/inter-faith; international/regional; women’s status; Negev and unrecognized villages; land planning; media), with an executive professional body for planning and funding (PDF p.38-39).
  • Participants / Reviewers of Work Papers (PDF p.40): 38 participants and 6 reviewers listed with institutions, read in the original and recorded in full in the reading notes; participants include representatives of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Haifa University, Bier Shiva University (as printed), Adalah, Mossawa, Sikkuy/Sikuy, Mada, Madar and the local authorities.

Key passages

Evidence the work relies on

  • The document’s own collective process, as it presents it: research summaries and seven researchers’ strategic plans (Ghanem on the relation to the State, Jabbarin on legal status, Abu Rass on land/planning/housing, Haidar on economic strategy and on social development, Abu Asbah on education, Nattour on culture, Farah on institutional/political work), reviewed by academics and experts, discussed and ratified by the group over four meetings (PDF p.3, p.7-8, and the footnote at the head of each paper).
  • Official and public social-economic data on living standards, invoked without a cited table for the de facto inequality claim (PDF p.13).
  • The Supreme Court record as the document presents it, with the Qa’dan family case as its named favourable example (PDF p.13).
  • Its own population and land figures, given without a named source in the text: 160,000 remainers in 1948 and 78% of historical Palestine (PDF p.5); more than 530 demolished villages and more than 700 Jewish settlements (PDF p.9); 1.15 million Arabs, 18% of the population, 650 to 375 square meters per person, less than 3.5 of State land, more than 93% state land and 49-year mortgage (PDF p.16-17); and the 5%, 2% and 1.5% institutional budget figures (PDF p.35).

Analysis

The document is a programmatic collective vision, not a research study: its method is deliberation — commissioned papers by named researchers, group discussion and ratification — and its evidence is mostly asserted within that process rather than documented with citations, so its figures stand as the group’s claims. Its perspective is that of the organised Palestinian leadership inside Israel speaking in the first person plural: indigenous, national and citizen claims are held together, and every sector paper (legal, land, economic, social, educational, cultural, institutional) is made to follow from the opening diagnosis of ethnocracy and the consensual-democracy remedy. Its limits are stated in its own introduction: other major issues were not discussed in detail, and unanimity among the political streams was not required or claimed; the implementation stages it announces (conference book, action plan) are presented as intentions, not results.

Shawqi Khateeb, Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi, As’ad Ghanem, Yousef Jabbarin, Thabet Abu Rass, ‘Aziz Haidar, Khaled Abu Asbah, Salman Natour, Ja’far Farah, National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, High Follow-Up Committee, Vision Documents, Haifa Declaration, Democratic Constitution, Adalah, Mossawa, Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund, Histadrut, Land Day, Nakba, Present Absentees, Unrecognized villages

Consensual Democracy, Consociationalism, Ethnocracy, Group Transformational Equality, Culture of Nothingness, Judaization, Indigeneity, Binationalism

How it relates to other sources

Open questions

  • Name spellings vary inside the document and are recorded as printed: Shawki Khatib (PDF p.2) against Shawqi Khateeb (PDF p.3-4, p.40); Salman Natour (PDF p.2) against Salman Nattour (PDF p.30 footnote); Dr. Khaled abo Asbeh (PDF p.2) against Dr. Khaled Abu Asbah (PDF p.27 footnote) and Dr. Khaled Abu Asabeh (PDF p.40); Dr. Yousef T. Jabbarin (PDF p.12 footnote) against Dr. Yousef Jabareen (PDF p.40); Asaad Ghanem (PDF p.2, p.9 footnote) against Dr. Asa’ad Ghanem (PDF p.40); Thabet Abu Rass (PDF p.16 footnote) against Dr. Thabet Abu Ras (PDF p.40); Marwan Dwerie (PDF p.2) against Prof Marwan Deerawi (PDF p.40) and Professor Marwan Dwereh (PDF p.40, reviewers); Michael Karyeeni (PDF p.40, participants) against Michael Karyanni (PDF p.40, reviewers); Sikkuy (PDF p.2 context, Mossawa section) — the participants list prints both Sikkuy Institute (Ali Haidar) and Sikuy Institute (Ayman Odeh). No spelling is normalised on this page.
  • Land figures on PDF p.16 print no percent sign: “less than 3.5 of the size of the State land and 1.5 of it is out of their local authorities` jurisdiction boundaries” — both the text copy and the original PDF read this way, so what unit the 3.5 and 1.5 carry is not stated in the file.
  • PDF p.13 prints “the principle of quality is valid” where the argument concerns equality; recorded as printed, not corrected.
  • Slips as printed, each verified once in the text copy: “Srilanka” (PDF p.9), “appose” for oppose (PDF p.10), “looses” (PDF p.22), “parities” for parties (PDF p.23), “intuitional” (PDF p.24), “compilations” (PDF p.25), “decree the suffering” (PDF p.26), “stags” for stages and “Plaestinian” (PDF p.31), “shot down” for the closing of al-anba’ (PDF p.31), “forth meeting” (PDF p.8), and “Bier Shiva University” in the participants table (PDF p.40).
  • The culture paper’s chronology on PDF p.30-31 prints Al-Itihad as “published again, in 1948” after the Nakba passage and Al-Jadeed as published in 1951, and spells the newspaper both Al-Itihad and Al-Ithad in one paragraph; both spellings and dates stand as printed.
  • The document states the Arab population “will double in the year 2020” from around 1.15 million (PDF p.16) without giving the base year or source of the projection in the text.
  • Whether the announced second stage — general conference, conference book and concrete action plan (PDF p.6, p.8) — was completed is not stated in the file.

Coverage

read in full, PDF p.1-40 of 40

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